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
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THE
SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY

OR
PROLEGOMENA TO SCIENCE

BY
FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD ABBOT, PH.D.

Knowing is the measure of the man. By how
much we know, so much we are.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON.

The man who knows not that he knows not aught—
He is a fool ; no light shall ever reach him.
Who knows he knows not and would fain be taught—
He is but simple ; take thou him and teach him.
But whoso, knowing, knows not that he knows—
He is asleep ; go thou to him and wake him.
The truly wise both knows and knows he knows—
Cleave thou to him and never more forsake him.

Arabian Proverb.

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THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER XII

THE SYLLOGISTIC MUST

§ 149. THE philosophy of pure experience, as represented by its greatest expositor, David Hume, ingenuously confesses its inability to think the I as person or to form a clear concept of personal identity. The philosophy of pure reason or pure thought, as represented by its greatest expositors, Aristotle, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, has proved its inability to think the I as person, because it surrenders the individual difference in general and the personal difference in particular as unknowable, confounds the specimen with the species, and degrades the personal I to the impersonal It. With Aristotle himself, the Aristotelian Paradox culminates in the imperishable but impersonal *voûs*, — with Kant, in the unknown x , a merely logical subject which may or may not be substance, — with Fichte, in a mere self-returning activity, a self-determining but in itself unconscious subject-object, of which personal self-consciousness or self-conscious individuality appears as a non-essential and fleeting accident, — with Hegel, in a self-determining notion of the notion, in which the I and the We are absolutely indistinguishable and both vanish as a mere “relation” (*Verhältniss*) of two contradictory terms. Hume gives us perceptions without perception, units without their necessary universal, and illustrates the Irrational Antithesis of I and Not-We in its Empiricist Form; Kant, Fichte, and Hegel give us pure self-consciousness without empirical conscious states, the universal without its necessary units, and illustrate the Irrational Antithesis of I and

Not-We in its Rationalist Form. (§ 71.) Hume represents the Antisthenian half, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel the Platonic half, of the Aristotelian Paradox (§ 79), around which philosophy helplessly revolved until the rise of Darwinism in natural science. In this complete failure of empiricism and rationalism to think the I except as the It, and in their consequent failure to effect a rational transition from the I to the We, the philosophy which recognizes the necessary identity in difference of experience and reason must not decline this supreme task of all philosophy: namely, the task of thinking the I as person in accordance with the law of unit-universals.

§ 150. Evolution is but one aspect or factor in the life-process of the universe, the absolute unit-universal in Space and Time. The other factor is involution. Nothing can evolve which does not live; nothing can live which does not evolve; evolution and life are so far equivalent terms. This truth is now too generally understood to require elaboration, much less defence, in this place. The world as a whole is no longer conceived as a mere mechanism, but as an organism, that is, a machine which lives and evolves. Spencerism, with its vain attempt to conceive and formulate universal evolution in purely mechanical terms, and therefore to ignore the immanent, universal, and necessary teleology on which all evolution itself depends, is already out of date at the beginning of the twentieth century. (§§ 178-183.)

Evolution itself, however, must be contemplated under two aspects, as the progress to actual consequences (history), and as the regress to necessary conditions (philosophy). Being in Space and Time moves everlastingly out of the past into the future through the present. From the standpoint of the present, a Delos-isle of Time between two pseudo-infinitudes which in truth are but the one infinite of Eternity, Thought may move in two directions, forward into the eternal differentiation of consequences as the Many, backward into the eternal integration of conditions

as the One. In Being, the One and the Many are distinguishable, but not separable; eternal evolution of the Many in the One, eternal involution of the One in the Many, — that is the entire self-perpetuating double-process of the universe, so far as known, of which the current evolutionism recognizes only the half. But in Thought two lines are possible. From some point of Time, arbitrarily chosen in the past, the line of evolution may be followed down *empirically* from some proximate origin as the One (the homogeneous) to the present stage of development as the Many (the heterogeneous): this is the progress to actual consequences, as in astronomy, geology, biology, psychology, so far as these are historical. Or, from the present point of Time, the line of involution may be followed back *rationally* from the existing stage of development to the necessary ultimate origin, the absolute unity of the universe as the Absolute I; this is the regress to necessary conditions, as in the scientific philosophy which grounds epistemology on ontology. (Chapters XV and XVI.) Is such a regress made possible, nay, necessitated, by the foregoing reformation of the Aristotelian Paradox as the law of unit-universals? That is the question we are now to answer.

§ 151. The method of the rational regress to conditions is determined necessarily by the Apriori of Being as the principle of individuation. (§ 99.) That is, every specimen, as a unit-universal, originates, inheres, and is differentiated, in a higher unit-universal as its own species; every species similarly originates, inheres, and is differentiated, in its own genus; and so on to the *summum genus*. If this is a law of scientific logic (for instance, *omne vivum ex vivo*), it is only because the Apriori of Thought is itself absolutely determined by the Apriori of Being; the necessities of logic are conditions of existence, and the only scientific classification is that which results from real genesis. The principle of the regress to conditions is that the specimen is conditioned by its species, the thing by its

kind, the individual by its universal, as its *condicio sine qua non*. That is, the species evolves the specimen and the specimen involves the species; the genus evolves the species and the species involves the genus; the progress to consequences in Being is the course of evolution through involution, and the regress to conditions in Thought, following this same course in the reverse order, is the course of involution through evolution. The regress itself is discovery, in that which has been evolved, of what was involved in that very evolution. For involution and evolution are in themselves only two coefficients or co-factors in one and the same life-process, complementary and essential to each other, neither possible without the other; but, while evolution gives the *actual fact* presented to observation, involution gives the *necessary reason* presented to reflection. Hence the evolutionary progress to consequences is learned empirically in history, while the involutionary regress to conditions must be learned rationally in philosophy. The sole known method of Being is this one double-method of involution in evolution and evolution in involution; the sole scientific method of Thought as Philosophy, that is, as rational regress to necessary conditions or principles, is the double-method of explaining evolution by involution and involution by evolution. In other words, because the Apriori of Thought is determined by the Apriori of Being, and because the method of Thought and the method of Being are thus essentially one, Thought (1) as History, and (2) as Philosophy, is the Knowledge of Being, τὸ ὅντως ὄν; and the unit of knowledge, the particular cognition as such, is the percept-concept, the syllogism.

§ 152. Every valid syllogism, which is the characteristic act of all *reason in experience*, expresses at once the progress to consequences in the *fact* and the regress to conditions in the *reason*: it is the identity in difference of the reason and the fact. The major premise posits the condition or reason as a universal rule; and this is an act of rational conception. The minor premise posits the con-

ditioned as a particular case of that rule; and this is an act of empirical perception. The conclusion posits the *unconditioned dependence* of the conditioned on the condition, the *necessary inherence* of the unit of the minor in the universal of the major, as an absolute necessity involved in their coëxistence; the major + the minor = the conclusion, as inevitably as $3 + 5 = 8$, which means *is and must be equal*. The whole syllogism, isolating it from all others as prosyllogisms and assuming the truth of the premises, is this one act of equation, this one judgment combining within itself the three elements of the conditioned (minor term), the mediating or conditioned condition (middle term), and the unconditioned condition (major term); it is this one act of equating the reciprocal relationship of the three terms, as implicit in the premises, with itself, as explicit in the conclusion; it is the absolutely necessary equation of essential self-identity of the two members; and it is an act of cognition as such — the molecule of cognition, as it were, in which the necessary relations of the atoms as parts are the molecular constitution of the whole. Every judgment is an implicit syllogism, and every syllogism is (as above) an equation or explicit judgment; both depend on the actual or assumed existence of the three terms, major, minor, and middle, whose interrelation under that assumption, however, is unconditionally determined by the Apriori of Being, the unconditioned conditions of existence, the law of unit-universals.

In this *must* of the conclusion, in this unconditioned necessity that, if both the premises *are* valid, the conclusion *must be* valid (and this *must* is always there, expressed and felt in the *therefore*) lies the essence of reason as distinguished from experience, and therefore the essence of the syllogism as its constitutive act. Experience, or the perception of units (things of some kind), is the learning of what *is*: reason, or the conception of universals (kinds of things), is the learning of what *must be*; knowledge, or the identity in difference of experience and reason, unites

the two elements under the relation of *conditioned and condition* ; and their union in the percept-concept of the unit-universal is the only actual or possible cognition of an actual or possible object (*something*, as thing in its kind, or kind in its things, or kind as thing in a higher kind). It follows, therefore, that every actual or possible cognition has of necessity the latent or patent form of the syllogism as a unit-universal, which is determined to be the necessary form of knowledge because it is the necessary form of existence ; the necessity is epistemological simply and solely because it is ontological. Consequently, the absolute *must* which conjoins the two premises, as "antecedent," to the conclusion, as "consequent," is not at bottom a necessity of Thought, but a necessity of Being, conditioning both Thought and Being alike as the absolute *prius* of their only actual or possible form : namely, the form of the unit-universal. In other words, the syllogistic *must* is the complex of those necessary organic relations, or "bonds," so to speak, by which the premises and conclusion, as atoms, are united and relationally constituted as a molecule, the three judgments as one syllogism or unit of cognition. As Sir William Hamilton has well expressed it : —

"In regard to the act of Reasoning, nothing can be more erroneous than the ordinary distinction of this process, as the operation of a faculty different in kind from those of Judgment and Conception. Conception, Judgment, and Reasoning are in reality only various applications of the same simple faculty, that of Comparison or Judgment. I have endeavored to show that concepts are merely the results, rendered permanent by language, of a previous process of comparison ; that judgment is nothing but comparison, or the results of comparison, in its immediate or simpler form ; and, finally, that reasoning is nothing but comparison in its mediate or more complex application. It is, therefore, altogether erroneous to maintain, as is commonly done, that a reasoning or syllogism is a mere decompound whole, made up of judgments, as a judgment is a compound whole, made up of concepts. This is a mere mechanical mode of cleaving the mental phaenomena into parts, and holds the same relation to a genuine

analysis of mind which the act of the butcher does to that of the anatomist. It is true, indeed, that a syllogism can be separated into three parts or propositions, and that these propositions have a certain meaning, when considered apart and out of relation to each other. But, when thus considered, they lose the whole significance which they had when united in a reasoning; for their whole significance consisted in their reciprocal relation, — in the light which they mutually reflected on each other. We can certainly hew down an animal body into parts, and consider its members apart; but these, though not absolutely void of all meaning, when viewed singly and out of relation to their whole, have lost the principal and peculiar significance which they possessed as the coefficients of a one organic and indivisible whole. It is the same with a syllogism. The parts which in their organic union possessed life and importance, when separated from each other remain only enunciations of vague generalities or of futile identities. Though, when expressed in language, it be necessary to analyze a reasoning into parts and to state these parts one after another, it is not to be supposed that in thought one notion, one proposition, is known before or after another; for in consciousness the three notions and their reciprocal relations constitute only one identical and simultaneous cognition.”¹

§ 153. Now the peculiar problem of the syllogism is the problem of the *must* which is its essence or soul. What is this necessity in thought? Is it ultimate, or is it grounded in a deeper necessity of being? In other words, is the Apriori of Thought derived from the Apriori of Being?

Pure Empiricism denies any knowable necessity whatever, and resolves its appearance in thought into mere custom, mere association of ideas, as a *fact without a reason*. Pure Rationalism denies any knowable necessity beyond thought as such, and resolves its appearance in thought into the result of a certain actual constitution of the reasoning faculty, as an ultimate fact; that is, this merely actual constitution of pure reason, by which the necessity or apodeicticity of a given judgment or a “pure *a priori* concept” is

¹ Lectures on Logic, 1860, p. 194.

supposed to be explained, offers us, again, a *fact without a reason*.

But scientific philosophy finds knowable necessity in the syllogism *per se*, and traces it back through a series of necessary prosyllogisms as the regress to conditions or grounds, until it arrives at the unconditioned, immanent alike in every single syllogism and in the nexus of prosyllogisms, as already involved and given in each link and in the chain of links. This immanent and unconditioned necessity is the Apriori of Being, the law of unit-universals, and constitutes the *immanent reason of reason itself*, the absolute ground of the possibility of intelligence as such in the reasoning process; for the ontological relation of condition and conditioned, as itself the absolutely unconditioned, is a fact of being on which the very existence of reason as a process of thinking unconditionally depends. Reason does not make this relation, and cannot unmake it; on the contrary, reason presupposes and depends on it. The Knowing I does not and cannot establish this relation, for it is only in accordance with this very relation that the Knowing I can be itself established as that which perceives, thinks, reasons, knows — it is only in accordance with the Apriori of Being that *reason itself* can be.

Thus scientific philosophy, as epistemology grounded in ontology, arrives, not at a fact without a reason, but at a *fact which is itself a reason*: namely, at the Being of Reason itself — at the Absolute Unit-Universal as the Absolute I — at the identity in difference of reason and experience in every actual or possible *cognition* as essentially a *syllogism*. For reason gives the condition in the major premise, experience gives the conditioned in the minor premise, and, these once given, knowledge gives the necessary or absolutely unconditioned conclusion: that is, every valid syllogism is an existent cognition as a given fact in consciousness, and its own content as *unconditioned dependence of the conditioned on its condition* is at once a *fact of existence* and the ultimate, absolute, unconditioned *reason of that fact*. This

constitution of the syllogism, as a knowledge of being which is itself being, is what it is simply because it cannot be otherwise; and its existence as the absolutely unconditioned form of every actual cognition is itself the existence of human knowledge.

§ 154. Empiricism, as we have said, denies any knowable necessity whatever in human knowledge. Hume has been already quoted above (§ 54) as holding that "the understanding never observes any real connection among objects," and that "even the union of cause and effect, when closely examined, resolves itself into a customary association of ideas." It is strangely obtuse in so acute a thinker not to perceive that the "customary association of ideas" itself presupposes unity, universality, and persistent identity in that which associates the ideas and acquires a permanent custom of associating them. This is a necessary condition immanent in the very act of "association" as such, beyond which mere act, however, Hume does not look at all, and into which he does not look deeply enough to see what it does and must contain. "Association" can unite separate states solely through unity in that which associates; "custom," as a habit of associating, is a repetition of acts which must be referred to one and the same agent; and the "understanding," if it is to be more than an intuitive but unretentive and non-associative mirror, does and must "observe" this unconditioned dependence of the conditioned on the condition as a "real connection among objects," in order to render comprehensible even the "association of ideas."

In the final edition of his "First Principles," in the "Postscript to Part I" (dated March, 1899), Mr. Herbert Spencer holds that "knowledge involves the three elements, *Relation, Difference, Likeness*," and that "unconditioned existence, of which no one of these can be affirmed without contradiction, consequently does not present a subject-matter for knowledge." That is, we cannot know the existence of anything unconditioned. Yet, in this very

postscript, Spencer himself refers to a previous section which says: "Before it can constitute a piece of knowledge or even become an idea, a mental state must be known not only as separate in kind or quality from certain foregoing states to which it is known as related by succession, but it must also be known as of the same kind or quality with certain other foregoing states." That is, we cannot know even the existence of a "piece of knowledge," an "idea," or a "mental state," unless we know the existence of its unconditioned similarity to foregoing states. In short, combining these positions, we *cannot*, and yet we *do and must*, know the existence of this similarity as *unconditioned*.

Similar contradictions lie in every other denial of the possibility of knowing the existence of the unconditioned or absolute element in human knowledge. For this very denial of possibility is in itself an affirmation of unconditioned necessity. That is, if S *cannot* be R, it *must* be Not-R. Impossibility and necessity are the only two forms of the unconditioned as such; if we know either in any case whatever, we "know the existence of the unconditioned." In these self-contradictions of Hume and Spencer, which can be matched in every empiricist writer, empiricism refutes and annihilates itself as rational thinking.

§ 155. Rationalism, in its turn, denies any knowable necessity beyond the actual constitution of the reasoning faculty, as in itself the ultimate and absolute ground of all necessity we can know. According to its way of thinking, the relation of condition and conditioned is itself merely a thought-relation, determined solely by the nature of the human intelligence as such; it is a purely subjective form, imposed on the otherwise formless but equally subjective matter of experience by a cognitive faculty whose existence is an absolutely inexplicable fact; it is the essential relation which determines the reasoning process, but has no origin extraneous to the spontaneity of the reasoning

faculty itself. In other words, there is an *Apriori* of Thought, which consists in forms that are the *necessary conditions of experience*, but there is no *Apriori* of Being as *necessary conditions of reason*: things in themselves are unknowable, and can have therefore, no knowable conditions. In other words still, the only necessity which is knowable by man is always subjective and never objective, — always grounded in the merely actual constitution of the subject as its ultimate origin, never grounded in a necessary constitution of the object *per se* as co-determinant factor in all cognition of the object by the subject. Consequently, while rationalism posits in reason alone all the necessary conditions of thought as cognition or experience (*Apriori* of Thought), it posits in reason itself merely an actual constitution, and denies that any explanation of this actual constitution can be discovered in any necessary conditions of its existence (*Apriori* of Being). It thus conceives human reason as a complete organism in itself, absolutely cut off from all being but its own, touching nowhere an existence which does not depend upon itself, and finding knowable independent existence beyond itself neither as units (things in themselves) nor as universals (conditions of existence in general); it absorbs into this exclusive subjectivity all things as mere phaenomena, and all conditions of things, even Space and Time themselves, as mere forms of these phaenomena. It follows, of course, that consistent rationalism is absolute subjectivism, and that consistent subjectivism is absolute solipsism; but this consequence must not delay us here.

With great clearness and precision, Kant has expressed this principle of the exclusive subjectivity of all knowable necessity as follows:—

“In our reason, considered subjectively as a human faculty of knowledge, there lie ground-rules and maxims of its employment which have altogether the aspect of objective principles. Hence it happens that the subjective necessity of a certain combination of our concepts in the service of the understanding is taken for an

objective necessity of the determination of things in themselves. This is an *illusion*, but it cannot be avoided.”¹

“Pure reason is a sphere so isolated, so thoroughly interrelated in itself, that we cannot touch one part without involving all the rest, and cannot effect anything without having determined beforehand for each part its position and its influence on the others. For, since there is nothing outside of this sphere which can correct our judgment within it, the validity and use of every part depends on the relation in which it stands to the others in reason itself; and, as in the structure of an organized body, the function of each organ can be deduced only from the complete concept of the whole. It may be said of a universal critique of reason, therefore, that it is never trustworthy unless it is wholly completed, even to the least elements of pure reason; and that we must determine and make out either *everything* or *nothing* in the sphere of this faculty. . . . [Synthesis was the original method of exposition] in order that the science might exhibit all its articulations in their natural

¹ Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 246. This passage seems, but only seems, to be contradicted in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Werke, V. 12, where Kant says: “Subjective Nothwendigkeit, d. i. Gewohnheit, statt der objectiven, die nur in Urtheilen *a priori* stattfindet, unterschieden, heisst der Vernunft das Vermögen absprechen, über den Gegenstand zu urtheilen, d. i. ihm und was ihm zukomme, zu erkennen,” u. s. w. For by “objective necessity,” in the passage translated in the text, Kant means a necessity inherent in “things in themselves,” of which he denies all knowledge; whereas, in this passage, he means by the same phrase a necessity inherent in “judgments *a priori*” respecting the “object of experience” (*Gegenstand* = *Erscheinung*), not the “thing in itself.” Of course, all “judgments” must inhere in the *subject*, not in the *object* as thing-in-itself; hence their necessity must be *subjective*, and not *objective*, and both passages referred to perfectly agree in doctrine. This confusion in terms is inimical to the interests of clear thinking, however, and is greatly to be regretted. In my own usage, “object” always means the “thing in itself,” determined by the Apriori of Being to be in itself a unit-universal, and determinant of the percept-concept as the necessary identity in difference of *Anscharung* and *Begriff*, and therefore as an implicit syllogism (§ 157). Hence, as will appear below, I regard the syllogism, even when it exists only in an individual consciousness as an “object” of that consciousness, as none the less a “thing in itself,” because the *necessity* of its conclusion results from its own constitution as determined by the Apriori of Being behind the Apriori of Thought.

connection, as the organization of an entire special faculty of knowledge.”¹

§ 156. It thus appears that empiricism is the philosophy of *simple actuality*, the quality of that which is, yet may be otherwise; that rationalism is the philosophy of *subjective necessity*, the quality of that which is and cannot be thought otherwise; and that critical realism is the philosophy of *objective necessity*, the quality of that which is and cannot be otherwise. It is evident, however, that objective necessity includes subjective necessity, since “to be” conditions and includes “to be thought,” which is only a particular mode of being, not exclusive of other possible modes; that is, the Apriori of Being includes the Apriori of Thought as the greater includes the less. For instance, Space must be, whether it can or can not be thought; its being thought is the condition of its being asserted, but neither its being thought nor its being asserted is the condition of its being, which has no condition at all; on the contrary, its being is the absolute condition of its being thought or being asserted. Hence Space is the unconditioned condition of extendedness or extension, since whatever is extended must have room (Space) to be extended in.² Conditions of being, therefore, cannot be resolved into nor explained by conditions of thought: these must be explained by those. The relations of condition, conditioned, and unconditioned are involved of necessity in all thought, because they are involved of necessity in whatever can be thought about; and this objective necessity, now everywhere recognized by modern science as the “conditions of existence,” is in itself identical with the simple *Possibility of Being*, without which there could be no possibility of thinking as a mode of being, and behind which no thought can go without a self-contradiction.

¹ Prolegomena, u. s. w., Vorrede, Werke, IV. 11.

² North American Review, July, 1864, article on “The Philosophy of Space and Time.”

§ 157. Now these primordial and constitutive relations of Being — condition, conditioned, and unconditioned, which cannot be conceptually united except as *unconditioned condition of the conditioned*, and which in this union, therefore, must constitute the goal of all philosophic inquiry into Being — are the essential relations or ground-form of Thought as a mode of Being, that is, as an act of the I. The rationalists are not wrong in seizing self-activity or self-determination as the essence of the Thinking I, nor are they wrong in seizing the syllogism as its essential act; their cardinal error lies in *not* seizing the Apriori of Being, the law of unit-universals or principle of individuation (every “thing” is an existent unit-universal of generic, specific, and reific essence, and cannot be otherwise), as the unconditioned condition of the syllogism itself, because it is the unconditioned condition of the particular unit-universal of which any given syllogism is the percept-concept. In all its self-activity, the Thinking I must be, in order to think, and must, therefore, be substance; it must act or think, in order to be, and must, therefore, be energy; its substance is its energy, and its form is thinking energy or the syllogism itself, which, if valid, is Knowledge of Being, but which, if invalid, is Error or Ignorance of Being. That is, the Thinking I is the Knowing I, when it thinks in accordance with the Apriori of Being; for the syllogism (expressed or implied) is the only possible form of real cognitions *in concreto*.

If, for instance, I say, “That tree is an oak,” my judgment, which seems to be grounded on nothing but apperception, is in truth a condensed syllogism, “All trees with certain marks are oaks; that tree has those marks; therefore, it is an oak,” — a syllogism in which perception as experience gives a unit in the minor, conception as reason gives its universal in the major, and knowledge of the object, as a unit-universal, follows in the conclusion, as a percept-concept of that unit-universal. Every answer to the questions, “What is that? And why?” similarly

throws itself, when analyzed, into the syllogistic form. In other words, to think is to syllogize, and to know is to syllogize in accordance with the Apriori of Being. It follows that, inasmuch as Kant's "pure knowledge *a priori*" is knowledge which is pure from all experience, and inasmuch as experience has been shown to be a necessary factor of the syllogism as the necessary form of all knowledge, there is and can be no such thing as "pure knowledge *a priori*."¹ For it would be total suppression of the minor premise in every syllogism.

§ 158. It was said in § 153 that the problem of the syllogism is the problem of the *must*; and it now is evident that the *must* is at bottom ontological — epistemological only because it is ontological. Given a conditioning universal as a kind, and given, also, a conditioned unit as a thing of that kind, that unit *must inhere* in that universal; it cannot *be* otherwise, and for that reason alone cannot without error *be thought* otherwise. This unconditional objective necessity *in rerum natura* that whatever exists must exist in and of the kind it belongs to, and cannot exist in and of a kind it does not belong to, is the ontological ground of the law of contradiction as a law of logic. Self-contradiction in Being is impossible, and for that reason is impossible in Thought, except as Error. Whatever is, *is as it is, and*

¹ "Was Schlimmeres könnte aber diesen Bemühungen wohl nicht begegnen, als wenn Jemand die unerwartete Entdeckung machte, dass es überall gar kein Erkenntniss *a priori* gebe, noch geben könne. Allein es hat hiemit keine Noth. Es wäre eben so viel, als ob Jemand durch Vernunft beweisen wollte, dass es keine Vernunft gebe. Denn wir sagen nur, dass wir etwas durch Vernunft erkennen, wenn wir uns bewusst sind, dass wir es auch hätten wissen können, wenn es uns auch nicht so in der Erfahrung vorgekommen wäre; mithin ist Vernunfterkennntniss und Erkenntniss *a priori* einerlei." (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Werke, V. 12.) To affirm that there is *no reason separated from experience* is not to affirm that there is *no reason*. That *separation* is the fatal mistake, not of Kant alone, but of the whole school of the *Begriffsphilosophie*. To suppress experience in the syllogism is to suppress the minor altogether, and that is to suppress the syllogism as such. To separate reason and experience is to deny both.

cannot be as it is not; that is the bottom reason why it *cannot be known as it is not* — that is, cannot be without error referred to any kind it does not belong to. If S is R, it cannot be Not-R, too; it may cease to be R and become Not-R, but it cannot be and not-be R at once. Thus the law of contradiction in logic is conditioned by the law of unit-universals as *unconditioned objective necessity* — a necessity of Being in the existence of the unit-universal as the necessary form of any possible object of knowledge, and a necessity both of Being and of Thought in the existence of the percept-concept, the syllogism itself, as a unit-universal which is the ultimate molecule of knowledge as such. In this correspondence or agreement of the forms (immanent relational constitutions) of the object of knowledge and the syllogism, the thing in itself and the thought of it, as both unit-universals (*ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἰσότης ἐνότης*), lies the reality of the cognition, that is, its *truth*. And thus the Apriori of Being, the Apriori of Thought, and the Apriori of Knowledge, as shown in Chapter VIII, are all three united in the Law of Unit-Universals: which, it may now be added, having the Apriori of Being for its major premise, the Apriori of Thought for its minor premise, and the Apriori of Knowledge for its conclusion, now appears as the aboriginal and eternal Syllogism of Being, the identity in difference of Being and Thought as Subject-Object, the Self-Knowledge of the Absolute I.

§ 159. In this *must*, then, contained in the “therefore” which declares the unconditionally necessary equation of the two premises as the twofold “antecedent” with the conclusion as the single “consequent,” lies the soul of the syllogism, its energy as affirmation or judgment, its essence as the characteristic act of reason. With the penetration of a genius never surpassed, Kant identified this “act of synthesis” with “the understanding” itself; although he considered it as only an “act of spontaneity,” traced it back no farther than to the actual constitution of the understanding itself, and failed to see that the “synthetical unity

of the manifold in intuition" cannot be thought except in the form of the syllogism, more or less disguised in countless ways outwardly, but always essentially the same. The synthetic act of reason in the syllogism is certainly spontaneous, as every act must be, in the sense that the act may or may not be performed; but, if performed, its form is determined by the nature of that with which it deals, as the course of a river is determined by the nature of the country through which it flows, and the spontaneity of reason or the synthetic understanding in no way creates the absolute *must* of the syllogism, the unchangeable form and intrinsic self-relatedness of the understood. In other words, necessary relations, which are what they are simply because they cannot be otherwise, and which, therefore, constitute an absolutely unconditioned element in all intellection, enter into every syllogism, not ultimately because the subject cannot think otherwise, but ultimately because the object cannot be otherwise, and because the subject cannot think the object as it is, or *know it*, without thinking its own subjective necessities as at bottom objective necessities, too.

The entire aim of Kant's famous deduction of the categories, however, is to explain away all objective necessities in the thing-in-itself as merely subjective necessities in the thinking subject—to disprove the objectivity of relations in Being by proving the exclusive subjectivity of relations in Thought. The method of procedure, in a nutshell, is (1) to conceive the object in general, not as the objectively determined *Ding an sich*, but as the merely subjectively determined *Erscheinung* or *Gegenstand der Erfahrung*; and (2) to conceive all relation as such, not as the immanent relational constitution of the object in itself, but merely as the relating activity of the subject—that and nothing more.

This is in truth the complete disappearance of the object of cognition, as distinct or distinguishable in the last analysis from the individual subject; but the two misconceptions

just stated are the sum and substance of Kant's so-called "theory of knowledge" — which would be better described as his theory of our necessary *ignorance* of things as they are in themselves. But, waiving this consequence, the ground of Kant's position is the assumption that *relation as such* is nothing whatever but the *subject's act of combination*. Sensuous intuition, mere sensitiveness to impressions which in some inexplicable way come from without the subject, gives the Many, the manifold content of our representations; and the form of sensuous intuition (Space and Time), which exists *a priori* in our representative faculty as the condition of our sensibility itself, is nothing but the mode in which the subject is affected. But it is the spontaneous act of combination which alone gives the One in this Many, the unity in this manifold content of intuition; and this act of combination, which cannot be given by sensuous intuition as such, and cannot even be contained in the *a priori* form of it, can proceed only from a faculty which is itself active, not passive or receptive like the representative faculty. As distinguished, then, from the merely passive sensibility and its *a priori* forms of Space and Time, the actively combining faculty must be the understanding. Consequently, all combination (*Verbindung, conjunctio, synthesis*), that is, all *relating* or *relationing*, must be in all cases a mere act of the understanding, determined by nothing beyond itself, and therefore purely spontaneous. "We cannot represent anything to ourselves as combined in the object [that is, as related or interrelated within it] without having ourselves combined it previously. Of all representations, combination is the only one which cannot be given through objects, but must be performed by the subject itself, because it is an act of its self-activity." Combination, then, is the spontaneous act by which the understanding relates, and thereby unifies, the manifold content of a phaenomenal object. It originates, in so doing, the category of unity of a pure concept *a priori*; but this unifying act of combination presupposes a higher unity

still, not the unity of the manifold in the phaenomenon, but the unity of the combining faculty of that which unifies. This higher unity is that of the subject itself, the originally synthetical unity of apperception, without which there could be no combination as a spontaneous act of the understanding, and no combination of its combinations in a single consciousness.¹ This is the entire content of the famous chapter on the "deduction of the categories," put into a nutshell as the principle of the *exclusive subjectivity of relations* — that is, the principle of the Apriori of Thought as the ultimate and exclusive source of all knowable necessity or universality in whatever is known. (See § 172.)

§ 160. Here, in the most unequivocal manner, is taught the principle of the exclusively subjective origin of all relations as such; for positive and negative combination includes both conjunction and disjunction, both synthesis and analysis, with all that these imply. All combination, then, all relating or relationing, is reduced to the *mere energizing of the understanding*, as the active faculty in all cognition; and the form of its activity, the combining judgment, is a *fact without assignable reason*. All known things are the product of "sensibility," and all known combinations or relations of things are the product of "understanding," as the receptive and active faculties of the subject: in Kant's own words, "the understanding does not derive its *a priori* laws from Nature, but prescribes them to it."² In other words, Nature as we know it is nothing whatever but the work of the human mind. This is the necessary and logical outcome of the principle of the exclusive subjectivity of relations, the denial of their independent objectivity, the reduction of all *relation in the object* to the mere combining or *relating activity of the subject*. It is the simple, merely actual nature of the understanding to combine, to predicate, to judge; but *why* it combines or predicates or judges as it does, and not otherwise, *why* it runs

¹ Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 114.

² Prolegomena, u. s. w., Werke, IV. 68.

all the fluid matter of experience in the form-giving mould of its own *a priori* categories, *why* these categories are at all necessary in themselves, — these are questions unanswered and unanswerable by the Kantian theory of knowledge. For, as we have seen in § 155, Kant denies explicitly that subjective necessities in *knowing* are determined ultimately by objective necessities in *being*; he fails to see that what is necessarily combined or related in the object must be so, and not otherwise, combined or related by the subject in its thought of the object, or else its thought of the object will be, not knowledge, but ignorance. For objective relations are the absolute condition of the possibility of knowledge; all combinations by the understanding must be governed by prior combinations in the object, or else the understanding forfeits its own being and vanishes in misunderstanding.

§ 161. The bearing of these considerations on our present subject, the syllogistic *must*, lies in the fact that Kant's theory of the exclusive subjectivity of relations, as acts of combination by the understanding which are purely spontaneous, that is, wholly independent of and uninfluenced by any possible but unknown combinations in the object *per se*, converts that *must* into a "spontaneous act" of unexplained assertion, and evacuates the syllogism itself of all logical necessity. Let us examine an instance: —

- (1) All stars shine by their own light.

Procyon is a star.

Therefore, Procyon shines by its own light.

- (2) All stars shine by their own light.

Procyon is a star.

Therefore, Procyon does not shine by its own light.

Here we have two final judgments, "Procyon shines by its own light" and "Procyon does not shine by its own light," which, considered merely as isolated judgments uncombined with other judgments, are equally possible in themselves. Why is not one as valid as the other? Why

may I not make the affirmation or the negation with equal ease? There is nothing in either judgment, as a mere single judgment, to prevent the understanding from combining its subject and its predicate just as the understanding itself arbitrarily elects; irrespective of other judgments, there is manifestly no necessity which requires the understanding to combine that subject and that predicate either with or without the "not," and its act of combination, therefore, is indeed so far "spontaneous," or undetermined by anything beyond itself.

But the case is totally changed as soon as we consider the two judgments not as isolated, but as conclusions from premises in a syllogism. The first immediately becomes a necessary inference, the second an impossible inference. The understanding's act of combination is no longer "spontaneous," in the sense of being undetermined by anything beyond itself; on the contrary, it is now determined by the premises, that is, by the inherent necessity of other judgments *per se*, which necessitates the understanding in this case to combine the subject and predicate of the conclusion affirmatively, not negatively. The nature of the syllogism *per se* is as absolute as that of the triangle, and depends no more than the latter on any imagined spontaneity of the understanding. It is impossible for the understanding to think the triangle at all except in accordance with the immanent laws of the triangle, or to infer at all except in accordance with the equally immanent laws of the syllogism. We may or may not conceive or construct a plane triangle; but we can neither construct it nor conceive it except under the conditions that, if constructed or conceived at all, the greatest side shall stand opposite to the greatest angle, and the sum of the three angles shall equal two right angles, and not more than one of the three shall be as large as ninety degrees. Omnipotence itself could not construct, omniscience itself could not conceive, a plane triangle, except under these conditions, the unconditioned necessity of which is a

part of the Apriori of Being; no power, no will, no spontaneity of the understanding, nothing whatever could in the least degree modify the conditions named, which simply cannot be otherwise. The same is true of the syllogism. I may not infer at all, or I may draw false inferences, which are no inferences; I cannot infer except in accordance with the nature of the syllogism, which is determined by the Apriori of Thought, which is itself determined by the Apriori of Being. Because the law of unit-universals is the condition of whatever exists, it is the condition of all knowledge of whatever exists; and for this reason the form of all knowledge is the syllogism, the enthymeme, or the percept-concept in general.

§ 162. Now these forms of the triangle and the syllogism, once put forth by one understanding and brought within the scope of another understanding as actual products, cease to be purely subjective, and become as undeniably objective *per se* as a house or a mountain. A communicated syllogism is a known *Ding an sich*. The two syllogisms presented above, which, while I am writing, stand as my own individual thinking only, cease to be my thinking altogether when thought by the reader. To me, the conclusion of the first syllogism is a necessary inference, and that of the second an impossible inference; whatever spontaneity I may attribute to my own understanding, I *must* combine that subject and that predicate in the first way, and I *cannot* combine them in the second way. Moreover, I believe that you, the reader, are equally necessitated to draw the same inference. If so, what is the ground of this identical necessity in two independent minds? If two, twenty, a million minds cannot but infer as I do from those particular premises, is it not evident that they are all constrained so to think by the determinative nature of this syllogism in itself, as an object *per se* of independent intelligences, an object which determines the combining faculties of various cognizing minds to combine that subject and that predicate, not according to any supposed spontaneity

in themselves, but according to immanent and absolutely fixed relations in the object itself?

Even Kant could not otherwise account for the necessary agreements of independent minds. In a remarkable passage which unconsciously surrenders his own dogma of the unknowableness of the *Ding an sich*, he says:—

“When we find reason to hold a judgment as necessarily and universally valid (in which case it never rests on perception, but on the pure concept of the understanding under which the perception is subsumed), we must hold it as also objective. That is, we must hold that it expresses, not merely a reference of perception to a subject, but a constitution of the object [*Gegenstand*—which is here treated as a *Ding an sich*]. For there would be no reason why other people’s judgments must of necessity agree with mine, if there were no unity of the object to which they all refer, with which they must all agree and therefore must all coincide one with another.”¹

Yet, after thus attributing to the object *per se* a determinative influence on the judgments of different individual subjects, so irresistible as to explain by the immanent relations of that object *per se* the necessary coincidence of all those judgments respecting it, and after thus claiming a knowledge of its inner “constitution” (*Beschaffenheit*), Kant goes on in the very next sentence to repeat the dogma he has just unwittingly discredited: namely, that “we do not know the object in itself (*das Object an sich*).” This is trying to have one’s cake and eat it, too. If I retain those two syllogisms, one with a necessary and the other with an impossible inference, strictly within the sphere of my own consciousness, I may perhaps succeed in convincing myself that the necessity of my combining judgment lies solely in the subjective “act of sponta-

¹ Prolegomena, u. s. w., Werke, IV. 47. The same idea is expressed in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Werke. V. 12, 13: “Ich erwähne hier nicht einmal,” u. s. w. But it is distinctly denied in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 117: “Verbindung aber liegt nicht in den Gegenständen,” u. s. w.

neity" of my own understanding. But, if I communicate them to others, that explanation breaks down. For I find that all other minds judge precisely as I do; that, if all the necessity in the syllogism communicated is derived from my particular understanding *a priori*, nothing but this necessity of my particular understanding can possibly be found there by others; that any necessary agreement of all other minds with mine must be explained either (1) as the effect of my mind necessitating all other minds to agree with *me*, or (2) as the effect of an absolute relation in the syllogism itself, independent of me and necessitating all minds to agree with *it*. For I cannot arrive at any necessity immanent in all mind as mind, that is, at any *Bewusstsein überhaupt* or "universal consciousness," until I arrive there by the path of the *I in the We in the Absolute I*—until I find the unit-mind explained by the universal mind, and this I cannot do until I effect a rational transition from the *I* to the *We*, which, as we have seen, is not to be found in Kant, in Fichte, in Hegel.

Kant, therefore, explains his "subjective necessity" in the syllogism, not as a necessity *in it*, as a part of the conditions of existence or the *Apriori* of Being, but only as a necessity in *him*, resting at last on an "act of spontaneity" of an individual subject. So, at least, he leaves the case logically. His *Bewusstsein überhaupt* is only his own individual consciousness writ large, and he deceives himself in imagining that any "pure concepts *a priori*" of his particular understanding must needs be absolute categories for any other understanding, unless he can prove that absolute categories *for all understandings* are determined to be such by a known immanent constitution in the object *per se*, the *Ding an sich*. But this is precisely what he most persistently denies. He unconsciously evacuates the syllogism of its intrinsic *must*, therefore, just because he cannot see that this *must* is at bottom an "objective necessity," a condition of existence: namely, *necessary total inherence of the unit in the universal, and necessary partial*

inherence of the universal in the unit. In other words, he leaves the syllogism itself a mere arbitrary assertion, a mere “act of spontaneity” without a reason — an act ungrounded in the necessary nature of Thought, because he fails to ground the necessary nature of Thought in the necessary nature of Being.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SYLLOGISM IN GENERAL: NINE CANONS OF SYLLOGISTIC

§ 163. It is now time to enter into a more searching examination of the nature of the syllogism itself, and to inquire how any judgment whatever can be at once *synthetic* and *necessary*. This latter question was the original problem which confronted Kant, and he thought he had solved it by explaining all synthetic judgments as merely of *a priori* origin—that is, as due merely to an *a priori* constitution of reason, antecedent to all experience, and to the *a priori* combinations of this pure reason as “acts of spontaneity.” But this notion of “spontaneity” is fatal to his explanation. As the conclusion of our given syllogism, the synthetic judgment that “Procyon shines by its own light” is necessary; but mere “spontaneity,” whether in the sensibility *a posteriori* or in the understanding *a priori*, can never explain necessity—not even the “subjective necessity” which Kant intends. The real question is: why *must* the understanding combine that subject and that predicate affirmatively, and why *cannot* it combine them negatively? To say that it *does* combine them so “*a priori*,” or independently of all experience, would not say in the least that it *must* combine them so; while to say that it combines them so “spontaneously” would say that it combines them so without any assignable necessity anywhere. In either case, the synthetic judgment is not shown to be necessary at all, much less explained as such, and the original problem is evaded. To ground “subjective necessity” on mere “acts of spontaneity,” even if not an absolute contradiction (for spontaneity, it might be

claimed, is itself disguised and unexplained necessity), is at least a curious instance of stopping short of an explanation.

But the problem itself cannot thus be abandoned. Any particular syllogism may be properly enough referred to an "act of spontaneity," so far as the understanding either may or may not frame it. But, if the understanding does frame it, it *must* be framed in accordance with the immanent and necessary laws of the syllogism *per se*, over and above any possible freedom of "spontaneity" in the understanding itself; otherwise, it is not a hit, but a miss, — not a syllogism at all, but a fallacy. In other words, the syllogism, like the triangle, has an absolutely limited relational constitution as a *Ding an sich*, an unconditionally necessary frame of its own, which determines every combining act of the understanding, however spontaneous it may appear or pretend to be; and this "subjective necessity" of the syllogism, as a mode of thinking, must rest, Kant to the contrary notwithstanding, on an "objective necessity" in the syllogism itself, as an object of thought, that is, on the conditions of its existence as a syllogism and not a fallacy, on the Apriori of Being as the law of unit-universals.

§ 164. These ontologically *a priori* conditions of existence determine the truth of the syllogism as a piece of knowledge, and the untruth of the fallacy as a piece of ignorance; and exact compliance with them in all its operations or thought-combinations is the condition of the understanding itself as the knowledge-faculty, Kant's "faculty of cognitions." They in no degree limit or interfere with the understanding's legitimate freedom or spontaneity; on the contrary, they are the very ground of possibility of the understanding itself, which, if the immanent laws or relations of the syllogism were not unconditionally fixed, would have no fixed form of activity, instrument of action, or field of exercise. Relations in the object which were determined solely by the understanding's "acts of spontaneity," as Kant holds they all are, would give nothing to know

except these acts themselves ; which acts of "combination," moreover, being "spontaneous" or destitute of assignable grounds of reasons, would be non-rational or purely empirical, — destitute, that is, even of "subjective necessity" in "pure reason" itself. In this manner, by this principle of the exclusive subjectivity of relations, Kant annihilates all principles of rational necessity, all possibility of reason itself as the source of synthetic judgments which are really necessary and universal, and gives a firm foothold in his system to the alogism of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann — none to the panlogism of Hegel. It is the objectivity of relations, as this is grounded in the law of unit-universals, and both illustrated and demonstrated by the absolutely necessary nature of the syllogism *per se*, which alone throws light on the nature of Being as itself essential Reason — as in itself, not alogistic, nor purely panlogistic, but necessarily, universally, and eternally syllogistic. For the objective ground of subjective necessity in the syllogism, as the norm of all human knowing, is the objective necessity of the unit-universal itself, as the norm of all possible being. That is, the eternal self-ordering of Energy in Space and Time according to absolute objective relations of genus, species, and specimen, which are what they are because they cannot be otherwise, and because no possible universe could be other than the One in the Many and the Many in the One, is itself the Syllogism of Being. (§ 158.)

Absolute objective relations of genus, species, and specimen, then, determine the constitution of every subjective syllogism, thought or communicated, as a known thing in itself ; not at all because the understanding has so related or "combined" it *a priori* by "acts of spontaneity," but because the conditions of its possibility are fixed immutably by the law of unit-universals or Apriori of Being, — that is, because the conditions of human knowledge are identical with the conditions of existence itself. "Subjective necessity" must be itself explained ; but it cannot be explained by Kant's "spontaneity" — it can be explained only by

“objective necessity,” which is as far as explanation can go. Let us, then, study the syllogism further.

§ 165. Every valid syllogism may be considered in the quantity of intension or in the quantity of extension. Viewed in the quantity of intension or comprehension, our given syllogism —

All stars shine by their own light;
Procyon is a star;
Therefore, Procyon shines by its own light—

means that Procyon contains all the common specific attributes of stars, that all stars contain the common generic attribute of self-luminosity, and that Procyon, therefore, must contain this generic and specific attribute. Viewed in the quantity of extension, the syllogism means that Procyon is contained as a specimen in all stars as a species, that all stars as a species are contained in self-luminous bodies as a genus, and that Procyon, therefore, must be contained in the genus of self-luminous bodies. In either case, we have the same three elements, genus, species, specimen; and the whole rational, logical, or subjective necessity of the inference, the *must* of the syllogism as a whole, depends on the ontological or objective necessity of those relations among genus, species, and specimen which cannot but be what they are, and which, therefore, necessitate the inference itself, irrespective of any supposed “spontaneity” in the understanding or its “combinations.” That is, if the understanding should combine the major, middle, and minor terms in a syllogism contrary to the objective relations of whole and part which exist among genus, species, and specimen in nature, the syllogism would be distorted into a fallacy, and the understanding would extinguish itself as sheer misunderstanding. For those objective relations of genus, species, and specimen which constitute the law of unit-universals are conditions of existence of the syllogism itself, and knowledge

consists in conforming the subjective relations of thought to those objective and immutable relations of being.

In the quantity of extension, the major term of the syllogism is the genus, as containing most units, and the minor term is the specimen or a class of specimens, as containing fewest units. In the quantity of intension, the major term is the specimen, as containing most attributes, and the minor term is the genus, as containing fewest attributes. But the middle term in both quantities is the species, mediating between the genus and the specimen or specimens, and linking the three elements in thought as they are necessarily linked in existence. The intensive syllogism is founded upon the necessary constitution of the *specimen*, as comprising generic essence, specific essence, and reific essence in indissoluble unity—the immanent relational constitution of the “something,” the “object in general,” the “thing in itself,” the unit-universal. (§ 98.) The extensive syllogism is founded upon the necessary constitution of the *genus*, as comprising all its whole species, and that of the *species*, as comprising all its whole specimens. In other words, the validity of the syllogism as a *cognition*, whether considered intensively or extensively, depends unconditionally upon the law of unit-universals as the Apriori of Being. (§ 99.)

§ 166. The three terms of the syllogism can be combined in three, and only three, pairs. Inclusion of the species in the genus gives the major premise, which is the assumption of one rational concept under another; inclusion of the specimen or class of specimens in the species gives the minor premise, which is the subsumption of an experiential percept under the smaller rational concept; and inclusion of the specimen or class of specimens in the genus gives the conclusion, which is the subsumption of the experiential percept under the larger rational concept. Here we have, apparently, merely three acts of inclusion, three “acts of spontaneity” by the understanding, three judgments of precisely similar nature; yet there is a profound difference between the last and the first two.

In any isolated syllogism, the premises are non-necessary judgments, mere judgments of actuality which may even be mistakes, and which, considered logically, stand only as assumption and subsumption in an argument; yet, if the subjective relations of genus, species, and specimen, as determined in the two premises taken together, accord with the objective relations of genus, species, and specimen, as determined by the Apriori of Being, the conclusion drawn from those premises is an absolutely necessary judgment. The necessity of the inference, as inference merely, has nothing to do with the truth of the premises as statements of fact, and nothing to do with the "spontaneity" of the understanding in "combining" them; the understanding may or may not "combine" them, but it cannot combine them as the conclusion of a syllogism except in accordance with the objective laws of the syllogism *per se*, as determined by the conditions of its existence in the law of unit-universals. For instance:—

All books are birds;
The Parthenon is a book;
Therefore, the Parthenon is a bird.

These absurd premises are simple assertory judgments; yet the conclusion, being the only possible inference from those premises as assumed, is an apodeictic or necessary conclusion. That is, *if* all books are birds, and *if* the Parthenon is a book,—if books are a species of the genus bird, and if the Parthenon is a specimen of that species,—it follows of necessity that the Parthenon cannot but be a bird. How happens it that the combination of two merely assertory judgments, when related as sumption and subsumption, can yield an apodeictic judgment? Major + minor = conclusion: how can the second member of an equation contain more than the first member? Neither premise contains necessity, yet the conclusion contains it. Manifestly, the necessity of the conclusion is derived, not from either premise alone, nor even from the mere sum of

the two premises uncombined, but solely from their objective interrelation or natural "combination" — that is, not from any "spontaneity" in the subject, but from the intrinsic character of their *objective relations as "objective necessity."* The above syllogism is merely one case, all the more easily perceptible and intelligible because destitute of material truth, of the law which determines *a priori* the universal and necessary reciprocal relations of genus, species, and specimen, that is, the conditions of their co-existence as wholes and parts; and this *a priori* necessity of their objective interrelation as the ground of their possibility is itself the Apriori of Being. Genus, species, and specimen cannot exist at all as logical wholes and parts, unless they are as absolutely interrelated as the angles and sides of a triangle; and all syllogisms whatever are merely cases of this unconditional interrelation of genus, species, and specimen as logical wholes and parts. The apodeicticity of the syllogism, its absolute *must*, has nothing to do with the "spontaneity" of the understanding; for the constitution of the syllogism *per se* is a necessary cosmic law as the form of all actual or possible reasoning. If the understanding fails to conform its operations to that cosmic *must*, it becomes mere misunderstanding, mere mindlessness, and swamps the syllogism in the fallacy. The Apriori of Thought can never explain this syllogistic *must*, this derivation of an apodeictic conclusion from merely assertory premises, except as the Apriori of Thought is itself explained by the Apriori of Being, the laws of which are the deep and ill-discerned, yet none the less absolute, determinant condition of all reasoning whatever.

§ 167. The "objective necessity" which Kant pronounced an "illusion which cannot be avoided" (§ 155) proves, therefore, to be no illusion at all. So far from this, it is the only possible explanation of an indubitable logical fact: namely, that the premises of an isolated syllogism are never anything in themselves but merely assertory

judgments, while yet their combination in the conclusion is an apodeictic or unconditionally necessary judgment. This supreme characteristic of the syllogism, of which Kant takes no notice, and of which his "spontaneity" of the understanding is certainly no explanation (necessity out of spontaneity is *ex pumice aqua*), can be explained solely by the fact that, while the premises singly are mere assertions, they already contain the whole rational necessity of the conclusion in their own organic combination, connection, or interrelation in the syllogism *per se*. That is, the "objective necessity" of the correlational *nexus* of the two assertory judgments as premises = the "subjective necessity" of the apodeictic judgment as conclusion. Nothing but this equation of involved objective necessity in the premises and evolved subjective necessity in the conclusion constitutes the necessary truth that *sumption + subsumption = conclusion* — that is, the truth and apodeicticity of the syllogism itself.

§ 168. The peculiar nature of the syllogism as itself an absolutely fixed form and "object of knowledge," with a necessary constitution of its own which is dependent on nothing but the Apriori of Being, will be made clearer by a conspectus of its most important characteristics, which may be called the Nine Canons of Syllogistic.

CANON 1. In the syllogism as a constitutive act of the logical understanding, the major and middle terms are concepts, the work of reason; the minor term is a percept, the work of experience; and the conclusion, subsuming the percept under the major concept in a single indivisible judgment, is a percept-concept—a particular cognition grounded on identity in difference of experience and reason as the essential elements of all human knowledge.

CANON 2. The major term denotes the concept of a genus; the middle term denotes the concept of a species of that genus; and the minor term denotes the percept of a specimen or specimens of that species. The copula must be "is" or "is not," and always denotes inherence, signify-

ing "contains" or "is contained in." Every syllogism may be read both ways, as intensive or extensive; but, if read intensively, the major term becomes the percept, as containing the most attributes, and the minor term the genus, as containing the fewest.

CANON 3. The major premise subsumes the species under the genus; the minor premise subsumes the specimen or specimens under the species; and the conclusion subsumes the minor premise under the major premise in a single judgment, that is, subsumes the specimen or specimens through the species under the genus.

CANON 4. The logical "antecedent" consists of the two premises taken together — two merely assertory judgments which are linked, welded, or mediated by the identity or self-equality of their common middle term. The logical "consequent" is the conclusion alone — a single apodeictic judgment whose apodeicticity or "subjective necessity" is derived from the intrinsic inevitableness or "objective necessity" of that mediation through self-equality of the middle term, as unconditioned condition of the possibility of a syllogism. That is, there can be no syllogism without self-mediation — no logical "consequent" without self-mediation in the logical "antecedent." The self-mediation itself consists in an objective subordination of the specimen or specimens under the species, and of the species under the genus; and the necessity of it in the syllogism is the necessity of that subordination in Being, if there is to be a syllogism in Thought at all. Failure of that objectively necessary self-mediation, as in case of "undistributed middle," is failure of the sequence, and destruction of the syllogism's "subjective necessity" as apodeicticity or demonstrative force.

CANON 5. The logical necessity of self-mediation as the principle of demonstration in Thought, that is, the logical necessity of the syllogism as the mode and form of all proof, is conditioned by and depends upon the ontological necessity of universal self-mediation in Being: that is,

objective self-mediation by the species between the genus and specimen, through necessary inherence of every specimen in its species and of every species in its genus (§ 127). This necessary inherence is necessary origination of every unit in its own universal. If such inherence is not universally and unconditionally necessary, the syllogism, which presupposes it, ceases altogether to be a proof; but, if it is, the syllogism as a proof is ultimately grounded in the law of unit-universals as the *Apriori of Being*. The necessity of inherence cannot be derived from "the understanding as a faculty of spontaneity,"¹ because real spontaneity contradicts all necessity, whether objective or subjective, and because no "faculty of spontaneity" will account for a single necessary judgment. The principle of necessary inherence is itself the principle of all inference and all proof. It does not depend upon reasoning, but all reasoning absolutely depends upon it. It is the *condicio sine qua non* of the syllogism itself, for the relations of major, middle, and minor terms in particular are nothing but relations of genus, species, and specimen in general. Inference is simply a connecting or relating comprehension of necessary

¹ "Dieses ist der *logische* Unterschied zwischen Verstand und Sinnlichkeit, nach welchen diese nichts, als Anschauungen, jener hingegen nichts, als Begriffe liefert. Beide Grundvermögen lassen sich freilich auch noch von einer andern Seite betrachten und auf eine andere Art definiren; nämlich, die Sinnlichkeit als ein Vermögen der *Receptivität*, der Verstand als ein Vermögen der *Spontaneität*. Allein diese Erklärungsart ist nicht logisch, sondern *metaphysisch*." (Kant, Logik, Werke, VIII. 36.) If the spontaneous operations of the understanding are governed only by its own spontaneous action, determined by no assignable necessity, it is impossible to explain the difference between the valid syllogism and the fallacy. One is as valid as the other, if they are equally products of mere spontaneity. The power to enact is the power to repeal, and the understanding cannot bind itself to infer with even "subjective necessity," unless there is a higher "objective necessity" which it can neither enact nor repeal. Hence the "pure concepts *a priori*" cannot be absolute categories in experience, if their source is mere "spontaneity." Only that which cannot be otherwise (*Apriori of Being*) will explain that which cannot be thought otherwise (*Apriori of Thought*.)

inferences as objective relations. The syllogism proves because Being syllogizes.

CANON 6. The Syllogism of Being is the *real* identity in difference of genus, species, and specimen, as the unit-universal in general — the One in the Many and the Many in the One, the Absolute Unit-Universal, the Universe, the necessary constitution of the Absolute I as identity in difference of Knower and Known. It is the Unconditioned Form of Existence.

CANON 7. The Syllogism of Thought is the *ideal* identity in difference of genus, species, and specimen, as the percept-concept of the unit-universal in general and in particular, the necessary constitution of every particular cognition. It is the Conditioned Form of Knowledge of Existence.

CANON 8. The formal truth of the syllogism is equality of the consequent with the antecedent in part, that is, in respect to inherence or self-mediation as form alone. In every isolated syllogism, the two premises which constitute the antecedent are always two interdependent assumptions, a self-mediated pair of hypotheses, which must be "granted" before the conclusion is "proved."¹ If their self-mediation is determined by the self-mediation of Being in accordance with the principle of inherence, — that is, if the minor term inheres in the middle and the middle in the major, — then the consequent, inferring explicitly through the middle that the minor inheres in the major, is precisely equal to the antecedent as implicitly self-mediated; the inherence which is implicit in the antecedent simply becomes explicit in the consequent. Thus the syllogism, instead of being a mere "begging of the question," is that march of thought by which the implicit is converted into the explicit; and its formal truth is simply exact equality of the self-mediation of the conse-

¹ "Logic is only concerned with the formal truth, the technical validity, of its syllogisms, and anything beyond the legitimacy of the consequence it draws from certain hypothetical antecedents it does not profess to vindicate." (Sir W. Hamilton, *Lectures on Logic*, 322.)

quent, *as evolved*, with the self-mediation of the antecedent, *as already involved*. In other words, logical sequence, as “subjective necessity,” is Thought becoming aware of the universal self-equality of the involved with the evolved in all evolution of Being, the eternal identity of Being with itself, as “objective necessity.” Whenever this equality obtains in a syllogism, the syllogism itself, irrespective of the material significance of its three judgments, is formally true, — that is, is valid as the *empty form of every particular cognition*.

CANON 9. The material truth of the syllogism is equality of the consequent with the antecedent as wholes, that is, not only with respect to inherence or self-mediation as form alone, but also with respect to material or substantial significance.

The material truth of the minor term as a percept, that is, the agreement of the percept with the object perceived, can never be proved by reasoning; but by continued observation and experiment, by comparison of repeated observations, by use of instruments which augment the observing powers, by co-operation of many observers, and so forth, the percept may be purified, deepened, enlarged, corrected, verified, yet never brought to absolute adequacy with an inexhaustible object. The material truth of the middle and major terms as concepts, likewise, so far as concepts are founded in percepts, is subject to the same experiential limitation; but, so far as they are abstractions from percepts, that is, so far as they are conceptual comprehensions of specific and generic essence, their material truth is determinable by reason.

The minor premise, therefore, remains always the subsumption of a percept under a concept; it brings of necessity an empirical yet essential element into every possible syllogism, and renders chimerical that dream of separating reason and experience which is the inveterate illusion of the *Begriffsphilosophie*; ¹ and its material truth must be

¹ “. . . an dessen Statt ich es lediglich mit der Vernunft selbst und ihrem reinen Denken zu thun habe, nach deren ausführlicher Kenntniss

determined by experience. The major premise, however, remains always the subsumption of one concept under another concept; and its material truth as a valid universal principle must be determined by reason. This rational validification of the major premise happens with perfect cogency only when the principle itself stands as the conclusion of a prosyllogism in the regress to conditions; that is, when it can be traced back through a series or chain of prosyllogisms to a larger principle which is conditioned by nothing but the Apriori of Being itself. Such a series of prosyllogisms, including and completing the given syllogism, constitutes the *grounded and filled form of a particular cognition*.

§ 169. Thus it is only as the syllogism, only as the experientially filled and rationally grounded form of the percept-concept, only as that immanent relational constitution of every actual or possible cognition which, as itself an object of knowledge, is determined, not by the Apriori of Thought as Kant's mere "spontaneity of the understanding," but by the Apriori of Being as absolute condition of the understanding itself, that knowledge can be said to have real existence. The individual subject may be as completely unconscious of the epistemological laws it obeys

ich nicht weit um mich suchen darf, weil ich sie in mir selbst antreffe und wovon mir auch schon die gemeine Logik ein Beispiel gibt, dass sich alle ihre einfachen Handlungen völlig und systematisch aufzählen lassen; nur dass hier die Frage aufgeworfen wird, wie viel ich mit derselben, wenn mir aller Stoff und Beistand der Erfahrung genommen wird, etwa auszurichten hoffen dürfe." (Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Vorrede zur ersten Ausgabe, Werke, III. 8.) The conception of logic as a purely formal or exclusively rational science disappears, of course, just as soon as it is perceived that experience enters of necessity into the syllogism together with the minor premise, not to mention the experience which lurks in the background of every concept, however abstract. The empirical-rational constitution of the syllogism itself, determined as such by the Apriori of Being because it "cannot be otherwise," puts an end to the "hope" of accomplishing *anything* without the "material and assistance of experience"—an end, therefore, to the dream of "pure *a priori* knowledge."

in all its knowing, as the bee is unconscious of the geometrical laws it obeys in all its honeycomb-building; but the laws are there, and they must be obeyed. Knowledge consists in conscious subsumption of the singular and the particular under the universal — in conscious solution, as it were, of the empirical in the rational, and precipitation of their crystalline union in the form of the percept-concept or syllogism, no matter how disguised the crystals may be by their own conglomerations, transformations, or recombinations in the metamorphic bedrock of human knowledge. Or — changing the comparison — the doctrine of syllogistic which results from the law of unit-universals as the Syllogism of Being, namely, that the Syllogism of Thought is the typical form of every actual or possible cognition through the necessary identity in difference of experience and reason in the Syllogism of Knowledge, becomes the cell-theory of all living intelligence, (1) as the organized world-knowledge of the Human We, and (2) as the organized self-knowledge of the Absolute I.

§ 170. But we must push further our inquiry whether the logical necessity of the syllogism, in which consists all the finality or conclusiveness of demonstration itself, is at bottom a merely rational necessity (Apriori of Thought) or an absolute necessity (Apriori of Being) — whether apodeicticity itself lies in a proximate “it cannot *be thought* otherwise” or in an ultimate “it cannot *be* otherwise.” The decision must lie in the essential relations of thought and existence.

To exist is to be something; for the only possible alternatives are to be something or to be nothing, and to be nothing is not to exist. But to be something is to be a thing of some kind; for to be a thing of no kind is to be no kind of thing, that is, to be nothing, which is, again, not to exist. It follows that thing and kind reciprocally condition each other, and are inseparably related in existence. There can be no *separation* of thing and kind, or of individuality and universality, but the *distinction* between them

is involved in the very nature and possibility of existence as a world of things, a universe of units, identity in difference of the Many and the One.

Now this necessity is unconditional, absolute, ontological as well as logical. It lies in the very nature of existence as such, and can be in no way deduced or derived from the nature of thought as thought. Existence is the absolute *prius* of thought, not the reverse: both the subject and the object of thought *must exist*, or else thought is impossible. If thought itself exists, it can exist only as subject to and conditioned by this absolute ontological necessity. Thought as existent can exist only under the unconditional condition of all existence: to wit, that it shall be a something, a thing of some kind, *a thinking* of the *thinking-kind*, an individualized thought (*Begriff*) in thought as a universal (*begreifen*). For, if thought is not *a thinking* it is *no thinking*, and does not exist as thinking or thought at all; it cannot exist as mere abstract or formless Being (*Sein*), but only as concrete or formed Existence (*Dasein*) in a determinate thing of a determinate kind (*Etwas* determined as this particular and no other *Begriff*). More specifically, the constitutive existential determinations or objective relations of genus, species, and specimen, which inhere in the form of immanent relational constitution of every possible sense-object, inhere no less in the form or immanent relational constitution of every possible thought-object, the *Begriff des Begriffes* or *νόσις νοήσεως* itself not excepted. For these relations are the aboriginal groundform, the possibility itself, of Existence as a universe of Existents, identity in difference of the One and the Many. They are the condition of all thoughts of all beings because they are the condition of all beings themselves; they are the Apriori of Being itself, and for that reason the Apriori of Thought and the Apriori of Knowledge, too. They are not the causes of any existence, neither are they the limits of any knowledge; they are simply the absolute condition of all existence and all knowledge, without which neither could

be — that absolute form of both without which nothing could either be or be thought. In other words, the unit-universal, as identity in difference of generic *plus* specific *plus* reific essence, as only one specimen of only one species of only one genus, is the most general formula of the thing in itself, as the only possible object of knowledge; and the law of unit-universals formulates that “objective necessity” which to Kant was only an “illusion,” yet without which the “subjective necessity” of his “pure judgments *a priori*” ceases to be necessity altogether, and becomes the merely actual and empirical working of an “organization” of “pure reason” which he does not pretend to account for, but assumes to exist as a mere matter of fact, inexplicable by us.

§ 171. This point is of paramount importance to philosophy. Are the necessities of thought, above all the apodeicticity or logical necessity of the syllogism, without any deeper root than a certain *actual constitution* of “pure reason,” for which no reason can be rendered? Or are all necessities of thought ultimately determined by deeper necessities of being, and is the *actual* constitution of reason itself at bottom *necessary* — in other words, what it *is* because it *cannot be otherwise*? According to Kant, the human intellect cannot penetrate deeper than to mere “subjective necessity,” and is powerless to reach an objective or absolute necessity in the nature of “things in themselves,” — a notion which he pronounces to be an “unavoidable illusion.” (See above, § 155, and *note*.) But, according to what has been here argued, the law of unit-universals is of subjective necessity in Thought *because* it is of absolute necessity in the Being which determines and conditions all Thought. The arguments already adduced appear to be conclusive, and to need no further enforcement; but these additional considerations are entitled to no small weight.

§ 172. Kant teaches (1) that necessity and universality are the essential characteristics and indispensable criteria of synthetic judgments *a priori*; (2) that all judgments

a priori are derived from pure reason alone; and (3) that pure reason itself, as pure "spontaneity of knowledge,"¹ is derived from nothing, but founds a science of itself as the "organization of an entire special faculty of knowledge."² Thus both the essential constitution and the whole operation of pure reason stand in the Kantian system as a mere matter of fact, the ultimate fact which explains all other facts, but is itself unrationalized, unexplained, underrived, unrelated even to a knowable I; and its "subjective necessity," the only necessity that is real and not an "illusion," springs solely out of its own "spontaneity." What is the logical implication of these positions? Certain very important consequences, as follows:—

I. That Kant's "subjective necessity" loses itself in mere actuality. For, if the human understanding is nothing but the "spontaneity of knowledge," and if spontaneity is nothing but non-necessity, and if no stream can ever rise higher than its source, the "subjective necessity" which flows merely from spontaneity can never rise above the level of the non-necessary, the merely actual.

In truth, Kant's critical idealism or rationalistic subjectivism shows in this consequence its vulnerable Achilles-heel. It would explain the "necessity and universality" of "synthetic judgments *a priori*" by that of pure reason itself, as their exclusive source; but pure reason turns out to be pure "spontaneity"—not necessity at all, but non-necessity. Surely, there can be no necessity in any

¹ "Wollen wir die *Receptivität* unseres Gemüths, Vorstellungen zu empfangen, so fern es auf irgend eine Weise afficirt wird, *Sinnlichkeit* nennen, so ist dagegen das Vermögen, Vorstellungen selbst hervorzu-bringen, oder die *Spontaneität* des Erkenntnisses, der *Verstand*." (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Einleitung, Werke, III. 82: cf. 114, 115.)

² "Hier ist nun ein solcher Plan, nach vollendetem Werke, der nunmehr nach analytischer Methode angelegt sein darf, da das Werk selbst durchaus nach synthetischer Lehrart abgefasst sein musste, damit die Wissenschaft alle ihre Articulationen, als den Gliederbau eines ganzen besonderen Erkenntnisssvermögens, in seiner natürlichen Verbindung vor Augen stelle." (Prolegomena, u. s. w., Vorrede, Werke, IV. 11.)

judgment whatever which proceeds exclusively from non-necessity in the judging subject; a judgment is necessary only when it cannot be otherwise, and, if it cannot be otherwise, the subject is necessitated to make either that judgment or none. But this is necessity, not spontaneity, in the judging subject itself. What determines it? *The nature of the object judged.* There is no other possible determinant of a particular necessary judgment, whether analytic or synthetic; its necessity must be immanent in itself. Knowledge is judging an object as it is, ignorance is not judging it as it is, error is judging it as it is not, and that, too, absolutely irrespective of any spontaneity in the judging subject, which must be limited to the option of judging or not judging. According to Kant himself, the "faculty of judgment" is identical with the "faculty of thought."¹ Now there is unquestionably a real spontaneity of thought, because thought, when it considers an object, may be either knowledge or error; and, further, it may or may not consider it. But there is no such thing as a "spontaneity of knowledge," since, in order to be knowledge, thought *must* judge the object as it is. Yet a real "spontaneity of knowledge," as the real existence of pure reason or the understanding, is the fundamental assumption of the Kantian subjectivism, which makes knowledge itself depend wholly on the subject and not at all on the object, inasmuch as it makes the subject "spontaneously" create the object as concept, and with it all knowledge of it. In this way we can easily comprehend how Kant came to conceive the understanding as a real "spontaneity of knowledge," although we cannot easily comprehend how so keen a mind came to suppose that "spontaneity" generates "subjective necessity," that being clearly impossible. But he found necessity among his twelve categories or pure concepts *a priori*, and he found the understanding, whence he derived them, to be nothing but a "spontaneity of

¹ "... Vermögen zu urtheilen, welches eben so viel ist, als das Vermögen zu denken." (Werke, III. 101.)

knowledge;" hence he had no option but to derive necessity from spontaneity. In this, the rationalistic subjectivism of Kant blindly imitated the empiricistic subjectivism of Hume: if the former found necessity in the spontaneity of pure reason, the latter found it in the spontaneity of pure experience.¹ They agreed in finding no necessity save in the subject. "Necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in objects," said Hume. "The subjective necessity of a certain combination of our concepts in the service of the understanding is taken for an objective necessity of the determination of things in themselves. This is an *illusion*, but it cannot be avoided," said Kant. Both agreed in denying objective necessity, in affirming subjective necessity, and in deriving subjective necessity from mere spontaneity. But out of mere spontaneity, or non-necessity, no necessity of any kind can proceed in fact or be derived in thought. It is subjective necessity ungrounded in objective

¹ "The idea of necessity arises from some impression. There is no impression conveyed by our senses which can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, be derived from some internal impression, or impression of reflection. There is no internal impression which has any relation to the present business but that propensity which custom produces to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant. This, therefore, is the essence of necessity. Upon the whole, necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, considered as a quality in bodies. Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects, and from effects to causes, according to their experienced union. Thus, as the necessity which makes two times two equal four, or three angles of a triangle equal to two right ones, lies only in the act of the understanding by which we consider and compare these ideas [*i. e.* in the understanding as the spontaneity of knowledge, governed by experience or custom *a posteriori*]; in like manner, the necessity of power which unites causes and effects lies in the determination of the mind to pass from the one to the other. The efficacy or energy of causes is neither placed in the causes themselves, nor in the Deity, nor in the concurrence of these two principles, but belongs entirely to the soul, which considers the union of two or more objects in all past instances. It is here that the real power of causes is placed, along with their connection and necessity." (Hume, *Philosophical Works*, I. 212, 213, ed. 1854.)

necessity which is the "illusion;" but this "illusion" can be "avoided" by reasoning rightly.

II. *That, if there is any real necessity at all in human knowledge, whether in mathematics or ethics, in logic or physics or metaphysics, it must rest at bottom upon absolute or objective necessity in the nature of things, as its absolute condition.* For it is only as modes of existence that knowledge and thought exist, and, consequently, whatever thought contains, being contains. If the converse is also true, that whatever being contains, thought contains, it can be true only on the condition that thought and being are identical in difference as the Absolute I. Even the "conditions of existence" are themselves modes of existence; whence it follows that Being includes its own Apriori,—that the Apriori of Being is immanent in Being itself, as its absolute necessity to be, and its absolute impossibility not to be. It is this absolute and immanent objective necessity in existence which is the ground and explanation, the only possible *why*, of subjective necessity in knowledge; it is the ultimate fact of facts, because it is a fact which is not "spontaneity," but a fact which cannot be otherwise.

When Kant sought to establish the condition of individual human consciousness in the "subjective necessity" of a universal human consciousness, it was a great stride forward in philosophy. If he had followed it up by establishing the condition of this "subjective necessity," not in his illusory "spontaneity of knowledge," but in the real "objective necessity" which alone can explain it and which he mistook for the "illusion," he would have escaped the intellectual futilities of rationalistic subjectivism and succeeded in planting philosophy upon the rational objectivism of science. For, despite all the vagaries of subjectivism and idealism and phaenomenism in certain half-philosophized scientific men, science itself in all ages has remained true to the spirit and principle of Greek realism, and refused to surrender the strictly scientific ideal of Aristotle, *ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὄν ᾧ ὄν καὶ τὰ τοῦτω ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὐτό.*

III. *That the permanent interests of philosophy demand imperatively a better epistemology than the Kantian theory of knowledge.* For this "theory of knowledge," reducing our sensibility or "receptivity" to experience of unknowable objects and our understanding or "spontaneity" to generation of pure *a priori* forms of this experience out of an unknowable subject, reduces our "knowledge" itself to the mere relation of an unknowable subject to unknowable objects: that is, to a merely *formal relation of the unformed to the unformed*. But it thereby reduces itself to a theory, not of knowledge at all, but of necessary and universal ignorance. It becomes an abstract and empty formalism, with neither rational subject nor empirical object which can be known — some positive or real knowledge of both being the logical condition of knowledge even of their merely formal relations.

Nevertheless, it endeavors, through a highly complicated mechanism of *a priori* forms of sensibility and *a priori* categories of the understanding and *a priori* regulative ideas of the reason, to explain how the I, as an "unknown *x*," absolutely generates out of the understanding, as pure "spontaneity of knowledge," the vast network of RELATIONS which science observes, studies, and investigates as the given system of Nature. Thus its germinal, organic, and constitutive principle is that of the exclusive SUBJECTIVITY OF RELATIONS, as opposed to the scientific principle of the OBJECTIVITY OF RELATIONS. It is this principle of the exclusive subjectivity of relations which logically determines the conception of the understanding itself as a pure "spontaneity of knowledge:" this is, as a universal combining or relating self-activity, by whose spontaneous act alone (*Actus der Spontaneität, Synthesis a priori*) every particular combination or relation (*Verbindung, conjunctio, synthesis*) absolutely originates.¹ From this "act of spon-

¹ " . . . ein Actus der Spontaneität der Vorstellungskraft . . . eine Verstandeshandlung, die wir mit der allgemeinen Benennung *Synthesis* belegen werden, um dadurch zugleich bemerklich zu machen, dass wir uns nichts

taneity" or "synthesis *a priori*," every "synthetic judgment *a priori*" derives its exclusively "subjective necessity," and becomes thereby universally valid in the sensuous experience of which it is the intellectual form. In this manner Kant solves the fundamental problem of his entire *Erkenntnisstheorie*: namely, how to explain the necessity and universality of "synthetic judgments *a priori*." This solution of the problem, of course, is no solution to any one who puts the unanswerable question: how can necessity, in any synthetic judgment whatever, emanate from pure spontaneity, pure non-necessity, in the synthetizing understanding? But the doctrine itself is clear; all combinations, that is, all relations, are "pure syntheses *a priori*," and exist in thought only as the spontaneous or non-necessary work of thought; no relations whatever exist in being; the understanding determines all things, but is itself determined by nothing. This, in its rationalistic form, is the doctrine of the exclusive subjectivity of relations; that is, derivation of them from the subject alone, acting through the understanding as the pure "spontaneity of knowledge." It follows apodeictically, however, that no synthetic judgment can be, in the last analysis, any more necessary than that non-necessary act of the understanding which is itself the synthesis, — that, since all "synthesis *a priori*" is non-necessary, no "synthetic judgment *a priori*" can be neces-

als im Objecte verbunden vorstellen können, ohne es vorher selbst verbunden zu haben, und unter allen Vorstellungen die *Verbindung* die einzige ist, die nicht durch Objecte gegeben, sondern nur vom Subjecte selbst verrichtet werden kann, weil sie ein Actus seiner Selbstthätigkeit ist." (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 114, 115.) — ". . . die veränderte Methode der Denkungsart . . . dass wir nämlich von den Dingen nur das *a priori* erkennen, was wir selbst in sie legen." (*Ibid.* III. 19.) — ". . . die Principien der Synthesis *a priori*, als worum es uns nur zu thun ist." (*Ibid.* III. 49.) — "Erscheinungen sind nur Vorstellungen von Dingen, die nach dem, was sie an sich sein mögen, unerkannt da sind. Als bloße Vorstellungen aber stehen sie unter gar keinem Gesetze der Verknüpfung, als demjenigen, welches das verknüpfende Vermögen vorschreibt." (*Ibid.* III. 134.)

sary. In other words, when Kant tries to prove that "synthetic judgments *a priori*" are necessary, because all "synthesis *a priori*" is spontaneous or non-necessary, he unwittingly rests his proof on the proposition that necessity = non-necessity. This surprising but undeniable self-contradiction is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the genetic principle of the whole *Erkenntnisstheorie*. Is it not self-evident that philosophy needs a better epistemology?

§ 173. But there can be no epistemology better than the subjectivistic theory of knowledge (which, strange to say, either as rationalism or as empiricism, has dominated the philosophic world for more than a century and seems to dominate it still), unless we go to the bottom and once for all renounce the cramping subjectivistic principle itself — namely, the principle of the subjectivity of relations. Hume was no less an adherent to this principle than Kant, who indeed confessed that he had been awakened by Hume from his "dogmatic slumber," but might better have confessed that he had been put by Hume into a subjectivistic, hypnotic trance. Be this as it may, Hume no less than Kant denied all knowledge of connection, combination, or relation in or between things in themselves.¹ Both equally

¹ "There is no object which implies the existence of any other, if we consider these objects in themselves and never look beyond the ideas which we form of them." (Hume, *Philosophical Works*, I. 116.) — "Objects have no discoverable connection together; nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another." (*Ibid.* I. 137.) — "Now nothing is more evident than that the human mind cannot form such an idea of two objects as to conceive any connection between them." (*Ibid.* I. 208.) — "The very nature and essence of relation is to connect our ideas with each other, and upon appearance of one to facilitate the transition to its correlative." (*Ibid.* I. 256.) — "When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connection in our thought, and gave rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence; a conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient evidence." (*Ibid.* IV. 86.)

Hume, in turn, seems to have derived the inspiration of his own sub-

affirmed "subjective necessity," the one as empirical "custom" or "association of ideas," and the other as rational "synthesis *a priori*" or "spontaneity of knowledge," and they equally interpreted it as the subjectivity of all relations; and they both equally rejected "objective necessity," as the objectivity of any relations. These two principles of (1) *subjective necessity alone*, and (2) *objective necessity and subjective necessity together*, or *absolute necessity*, lie at the foundation of the irrepressible conflict between the subjectivism of unmodernized philosophy and the objectivism of modern science: a conflict which has as many forms as Proteus, but under all is itself one and the same.

These two principles are alike productive of consequences.

jectivism from Locke: "General and universal belong not to the real existence of things, but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas. Words are general, as has been said, when used for signs of general ideas, and so are applicable indifferently to many particular things; and ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things; but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence, even those words and ideas which in their signification are general. When, therefore, we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding of signifying or representing many particulars; for the signification they have is nothing but a relation that by the mind of man is added to them." (Essay of Human Understanding, Bk. III. Ch. III. § 11.)—"What are the essences of those species set out and marked by names, but those abstract ideas in the mind which are, as it were, the bonds between particular things that exist, and the names they are to be ranked under? And when general names have any connexion with particular beings, these abstract ideas are the medium that unites them; so that the essences of species, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are nor can be anything but those precise abstract ideas we have in our minds." (*Ibid.* Bk. III. Ch. III. § 13.)

It would be useless to multiply illustrations of the doctrine of the exclusive subjectivity of relations, as held in modern philosophy. It was a legacy from mediæval nominalism and conceptualism, of which Kant was the scientific formulator. But it will be unable to compete with the doctrine of the objectivity of relations, as the influence of Darwinism makes itself felt more and more in undermining the Aristotelian Paradox.

Precisely as subjectivism determines the conception of the understanding to be pure "spontaneity," either of reason or of experience, because no other conception of it could account for the subjective origin of all relations in the "spontaneity of knowledge;" precisely so does objectivism determine the conception of the understanding to be primarily *perceptivity*, because no other conception of it could account for the objective origin of all ultimate relations of thought itself in the *necessary perceptibility of all relations as such*, whether in thought or in being. It ought to be considered axiomatic that *no relation can be understood if it cannot be perceived*, — that the *perceiving* of it is itself the *understanding* of it. Yet non-perception of this self-evident truth is the very source of subjectivism itself, the ground of its inability to perceive the logical and epistemological condition of the "subjective necessity" which it *affirms* in the "objective necessity" which it *denies*. Witness Kant's strenuous and repeated denials of the possibility of a perceptive or intuitive understanding in man, while yet he admits its possibility in general; for, although it seems absurd to hold that a man can understand relations without perceiving them, the admission of a perceptive understanding in man would have destroyed the whole fabric of the *Kritikismus* as rationalistic subjectivism.¹ Yet the essential

¹ "Der Verstand vermag nichts anzuschauen und die Sinne nichts zu denken." (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 82.) — "Nun ist alle uns mögliche Anschauung sinnlich." (*Ibid.* III. 124.) — "... sinnliche Anschauung, die einzige, die wir haben ..." (*Ibid.* III. 214, note.) — "Verstehen wir aber darunter [unter Noumenon] ein *Object* einer *nichtsinnlichen Anschauung*, so nehmen wir eine besondere Anschauungsart an, nämlich die intellectuelle, die aber nicht die unsrige ist, von welcher wir auch die Möglichkeit nicht einsehen können, und das wäre das Noumenon in *positiver* Bedeutung." (*Ibid.* III. 219.) — "Da nun eine solche, nämlich die intellectuelle Anschauung, schlechterdings ausser unserem Erkenntnisvermögen liegt," u. s. w. (*Ibid.* III. 220.) — "Alle unsere Anschauung geschieht aber nur mittelst der Sinne; der Verstand schaut nichts an, sondern reflectirt nur." (Prolegomena, u. s. w., Werke, IV. 37.) — "Die Summe hievon ist diese: die Sache der Sinne ist, anzuschauen; die des Verstandes, zu denken." (*Ibid.* IV. 53.) — "... indem unser Ver-

function of the understanding must be to understand; and what is that, except (1) to perceive real particular relations,

stand kein Vermögen der Anschauung, sondern blos der Verknüpfung gegebener Anschauungen in einer Erfahrung ist . . ." (*Ibid.* IV. 65.) — "Man kann von der Sinnlichkeit doch nicht behaupten, dass sie die einzige mögliche Art der Anschauung sei." (Werke, III. 221.) Contrast these dogmatic and rather nervous denials by Kant of a perceptive understanding in man which may yet exist in higher intelligences, with Locke's earlier and unwarped recognition of perception as the very essence of all knowledge: "Knowledge, then, seems to me to be nothing but the *perception* of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this *perception* is, there is knowledge; and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge. . . . There could be no room for any positive knowledge at all, if we could not *perceive any relation* between our ideas, and find out the agreement or disagreement they have one with another, in several ways the mind takes of comparing them. . . . Sometimes the mind *perceives* the agreement or disagreement of two ideas *immediately* by themselves, without the intervention of any other; and this I think we may call intuitive knowledge. . . . Certainty depends so wholly on this *intuition*, that, in the next degree of knowledge which I call demonstrative, this intuition is necessary in all the *connexions of the intermediate* ideas, without which we cannot attain knowledge and certainty." (Essay of Human Understanding, Bk. IV. Ch. I. §§ 2, 5: Ch. II. § 1. Italics ours.) It matters not at all whether the *objects related* be held to be "things in themselves," "objects of experience," "phaenomena alone," "ideas," or "states of consciousness:" knowledge itself, as Locke saw, consists first of all in *perceiving those relations*, and the *perceiving* of them is the *understanding* of them. The fundamental error of Kant is his notion of the understanding as "spontaneity of knowledge" or "*synthesis a priori*," instead of the *intellectual perception of relations as such*, as an inseparable element of every actual cognition or percept-concept. In what way the perceptive understanding perceives relations is a separate problem of scientific psychology, physiological or other; but no possible psychology can wipe out the fact of which all psychology is the study — the fact that the understanding understands, that is, perceives and conceives the relations of things, be these things what they may, sensations or motions or states of consciousness or what not. For all things of all possible kinds are determined *per se* as genera, species, and specimens, by the Apriori of Being; and scientific study of them presupposes a scientific epistemology which is grounded in the recognition of the Objectivity of Relations as the Law of Unit-Universals, and must dominate all scientific investigations whatsoever.

(2) to conceive them or unite them in universal percept-concepts, and (3) to use these intelligently, that is, understandingly; as ends and means in the conduct of life? ¹

Subjectivism, then, is the principle of "subjective necessity" in the subject alone, whence results the principle that, as *spontaneity* (pure synthesis *a priori* or else mere custom), the understanding necessarily creates out of itself the whole world of the understood (subjectivity of relations, Nature as "phaenomena alone"); ² while objectivism is the principle of "objective necessity" as the ground of all "subjective necessity," whence results the principle that all necessities of the understanding, as *perceptivity*, are determined by the necessities of the understood (objectivity of relations, Nature as the noumenal Unit-Universal of existence). And the ground of decision between subjectivism in philosophy (critical idealism) and objectivism in science (critical realism) is the fact that all creation of something out of nothing, including subjectivistic creation of the understood out of a spontaneous and confessedly empty understanding, is not only an impossibility in itself, but also a logical, ontological, and epistemological misunderstanding even of "subjective necessity."

§ 174. These indispensable preliminaries being disposed of, we now return to examination of the syllogism. Our former example will serve as well as another:—

ANTECEDENT.

CONSEQUENT.

All stars are self-luminous bodies;	}	<i>therefore</i> Procyon is a self-luminous body.
Procyon is a star;		

¹ For a fuller statement of the threefold function of the understanding as perceptive or analytical, conceptive or synthetical, and creative or teleological, I may be permitted here to refer to Scientific Theism (Boston, 1885), pp. 134-147. Wherever that statement varies from the present work, as it does in a few minor points, it should be regarded as corrected by the latter.

² "Der Verstand schöpft seine Gesetze (*a priori*) nicht aus der Natur, sondern schreibt sie dieser vor." (Prolegomena, u. s. w., Werke, IV. 68.)

In the major premise, the objective relation of one universal to another, of "all stars" as a *species* to "self-luminous bodies" as its *genus*, is given or presented to the understanding of the reader as that which is to be perceived or understood. This relation of species to genus is a cosmical organic relation, a "condition of existence" of the universe as an organism.¹ Similarly, in the minor premise, the objective relation of one particular individual to its kind, of "Procyon" as a *specimen* to "all stars" as its *species* (for "a star" = one star in all stars), is given or presented to the reader; and this organic relation is another "condition of existence" of the universe as it is in itself. For, without these objective organic relations of genus, species, and specimen, no organized or organic universe could possibly exist; and, if they could not be perceived or understood, the syllogism itself could not possibly exist. There should be here no doubt or misunderstanding of this all-important point, no confounding or perversion of the relation of the conditioning and the conditioned.

¹ "The broad general hypothesis that all the bodies of the universe are, so to speak, of a single species — that nebulae (including comets), stars of all types, and planets, are but varying stages in the life history of a single race or type of cosmic organisms — is accepted by the dominant thought of our time as having the highest warrant of scientific probability. . . . In this extended view, nebulae and luminous stars are but the infantile and adolescent stages of the life history of the cosmic individual; the dark star, its adult stage or time of true virility. Or we may think of the shrunk dark star as the germ-cell, the pollen-grain, of the cosmic organism. Reduced in size, as becomes a germ-cell, to a mere fraction of the nebular body from which it sprang, it yet retains within its seemingly non-vital body all the potentialities of the original organism, and requires only to blend [through collision] with a fellow-cell to bring a new generation into being. Thus may the cosmic race, whose aggregate census makes up the stellar universe, be perpetuated — individual solar systems, such as ours, being born and growing old and dying to live again in their descendants, while the universe as a whole maintains its unified integrity throughout all these internal mutations — passing on, it may be, by infinitesimal stages, to a culmination hopelessly beyond human comprehension." (Henry Smith Williams, *The Story of Nineteenth Century Science* 1901, pp. 84-87.)

The organic constitution of the universe as it is in itself, with its immanent objective relations of genus, species, and specimen, is the absolute condition of the possibility of the syllogism; the constitution of the syllogism as such is determined by that of the objective universe, not *vice versa*. The *a priori* law of the syllogism is that of genus, species, and specimen; and it is derived from no "synthesis *a priori*" in the "understanding" as "spontaneity of knowledge," but solely from the Apriori of Being, as that absolute necessity which determines the understanding to be first of all perceptivity, and the syllogism or percept-concept to be the sole form of its knowledge *in concreto*. If any athletic Kantian aspires to defend Kant's splendidly audacious thesis that "the understanding does not derive its *a priori* laws from Nature, but dictates them to her," the scientific objectivist stands ready to strike his flag and surrender at discretion, provided his valiant but perhaps indiscreet opponent can succeed in "spontaneously" constructing a valid syllogism on any other principle than that of genus, species, and specimen, derived as the Apriori of Being from Nature alone. This principle does not in the least depend upon the understanding. Quite the reverse; for it determines the understanding. Nothing but absolute or natural necessity determines the nature of the understanding itself to be primarily perceptive of genus, species, and specimen, and that of the syllogism to be the necessary form of all reasoning in dependence upon their necessary relations.¹

¹ "To conclude: this whole mystery of genera and species, which make such a noise in the schools and are with justice so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract ideas, more or less comprehensive, with names annexed to them." (Locke, *Essay of Human Understanding*, Bk. III. Ch. III. § 9.) This dictum, though still echoed virtually in many quarters to-day, is amusingly pre-Darwinian. If genera and species are "nothing else but abstract ideas," and not most significant facts of Nature, what becomes of the great historical battle over the "origin of species"? What of modern biology? What of the whole philosophy of evolution? But the most amusing aspect of the case is the fact

The two premises, therefore, are expressions or enunciations, in terms of Thought, of objective organic relations in Being, which determine objectively *a priori*, that is, by objective necessity, the essential form of every judgment as subject and predicate, and of every syllogism as antecedent and consequent. The species can exist only in its genus, and the specimen can exist only in its species: these are universal and necessary conditions of existence which "cannot be otherwise," and which therefore determine *a priori* the essential constitution of every possible judgment and every possible syllogism as existent forms of knowledge. But, besides these two expressed relations in the premises,

that the process of forming "abstract ideas," as told by Locke himself, involves "genera and species," not as abstractions, but as realities. He says, in the same chapter: "Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one; each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort. . . . And thus they [children] come to have a general name and a general idea; wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all." What, then, is this "way of abstraction"? Peter and James, Mary and Jane, it appears, possess each numerous characteristics — a real genus; of these characteristics, some are "peculiar to each" — a real species; and others are "common to all" — another real species. The "way of abstraction," therefore, whatever is understood by "ideas," presupposes (1) a real genus of characteristics, (2) a real species of those "peculiar to each," and (3) another real species of those "common to all;" and the "abstract idea" itself is formed by dividing the genus, including all of one species, and excluding all of the other species. What stronger proof could be desired than that which Locke himself supplies of the fact that, instead of disproving the reality of "genera and species," the process of abstraction would be itself impossible without them? The same fact is patent in every other process, physical and psychical alike. Genus, species, and specimen, with their immanent real relations, must remain the absolute condition *a priori* of every process, whether in Being or in Thought; and every attempt to disprove this truth is necessarily a bald begging of the question, since all reasoning whatsoever presupposes it.

there is another relation not expressed, equally necessary, but only implied. This unexpressed but implied relation is that of the specimen to its genus — the relation necessarily contained and involved in the co-existence of the two premises as one antecedent, and equally necessary *per se* whether that co-existence is perceived or not. It *cannot but be* that, if the species is in the genus, and if the specimen is in the species, the specimen is in the genus, too. This necessity is all one necessity; it is unconditional, objective, absolute; it is the ground and form of the reasoning process as such, determines the syllogism, and constitutes its apodeicticity, because it determines the reciprocal relation of all thoughts no less than the reciprocal relation of all beings.

Now the antecedent expresses this one objective necessity in part, and in part leaves it unexpressed; it expresses the relation of species and genus in the major, and the relation of specimen and species in the minor, but it does not express the relation of specimen and genus at all. Yet this last relation is already contained and exists objectively in the objective co-existence of the three terms, genus, species, and specimen; for where the terms are, there is every possible relation of the terms, whether expressed, or unexpressed, perceived or unperceived. Consequently, in the antecedent, the inherence of the specimen in the genus ("Procyon is a self-luminous body") is already an objective necessity, but only as unexpressed, latent, implied, involved. In the consequent or conclusion, however, the previously involved objective necessity becomes expressed as an evolved subjective necessity, too; and in this union of objective necessity with subjective necessity, as absolute necessity, lies the apodeicticity of the syllogism as a proved or completed real cognition. For thus the Syllogism of Being reproduces itself in the Syllogism of Thought as the Syllogism of Knowledge.

§ 175. In every valid syllogism, therefore, — that is, in every Syllogism of Knowledge, — there is exhibited in con-

sciousness the identity in difference of objective necessity and subjective necessity as absolute necessity: the Apriori of Being and the Apriori of Thought unite in the Apriori of Knowledge, and the syllogism in its entirety is the form of their actual union. But the syllogism is neither a dead form nor an unconscious mechanism; on the contrary, it is the formed act of the Knowing I, the definite product of a process which is identity in difference of experience and reason in a living intelligence as I in the We. The antecedent and the consequent of a syllogism are not simultaneous. As the names indicate, the antecedent precedes and the consequent follows; the syllogism is a march of thought, a movement of mind from the involved objective necessity to the evolved subjective necessity; this movement, this process, is conscious formation of a conception of the identity in difference of the involved and the evolved; and the law of the process is self-mediation grounded on the necessary inherence of every individual, of whatever order, in its own universal, — that is, grounded on the law of unit-universals, the widest generalization of which human intelligence is capable. The conceptive or discursive understanding infers inherence of the specimen in the genus from the two inferences of species in genus and of specimen in species, because species, as the middle or mediating term, must be always identical with itself; and this self-mediation, which lies in the very nature of inference because inference itself is mediation through this identity, is the active movement of mind as such from the involved to the evolved. That is, the existent but as yet unperceived objective necessity, involved in the premises, comes into clear consciousness as the existent and perceived subjective necessity which is evolved in the conclusion; both are at bottom one and the same absolute necessity of Being. The convincingness of the syllogism is the conscious development of this perception from nascency to clearness in the discursive or syllogizing understanding, as it moves from the antecedent to the consequent, from the involved to the evolved. It is

perfectly true that the conclusion contains nothing which is not involved in the premises, but, so far from being a "begging of the question," this is the very essence of all proof. For proof never originates anything new; it only creates a certitude out of the uncertain — makes a judgment subjectively necessary as the "conclusion" which before was subjectively doubtful as the "problem;" and this it does by developing an evolved or felt necessity in the conclusion out of the involved or unfelt necessity in the premises. An understanding which was indeed "spontaneous" could prove nothing, because it could not generate in the subject even a "subjective necessity" which it did not itself contain. Kant's "subjective necessity" could not possibly emanate in any manner from a real "spontaneity." It can emanate solely from an understanding which (1) perceives or intuites the particular objective relation of a single species to its own single genus, and the particular objective relation of a single specimen, or a single class of specimens, to that single species; (2) conceives or infers the necessary relation which is already involved objectively in the objective co-existence of those two particular relations through the objective identity of the mediating term; and (3) syllogizes, or creates a single syllogism in a single percept-concept of three unit-universals, namely, a genus, a species, and a specimen or class of specimens, by developing the involved objective necessity of this self-mediation into the evolved subjective necessity of the syllogism itself as a whole, organic, particular cognition. This is the scientific analysis of the syllogistic process as proof, demonstration, or apodeictic certitude (*ἀπόδειξις*), because it rests upon absolute necessity as the Apriori of Being — upon the law of genus, species, and specimen, as the absolute *a priori* condition of the possibility of the reasoning process itself as an actual syllogism.

CHAPTER XIV

THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING

§ 176. REASON, therefore, or the syllogizing understanding, is not at all the "spontaneity of knowledge," but acquisition of knowledge in accordance with law. It is orderly movement of mind from the involved necessities of Being to the evolved necessities of Thought, and the law of this orderly movement, as discovery of truth or learning-process, is the scientific method of observation (perception), hypothesis (conception as rational imagination), and verification (subjection of rational imagination to the test of renewed perception). This orderly movement from the involved to the evolved is the necessary method of Thought because it is the necessary method of Being: it is the way of the mind simply and solely because it is the way of the world. There is and can be no subjective or rational necessity in the syllogism, the existing norm of all knowing, which is not grounded in objective or absolute necessity in the unit-universal, the norm of all existing. The absolute relations of genus, species, and specimen cannot be deduced from any concept whatsoever, *a priori* or *a posteriori*, because they are the antecedent conditions of all intuitions, all concepts, all judgments, all syllogisms, all exercise of the sensibility and the understanding and the reason, — of the reasoning process, — of the mind *per se*, whether finite or infinite, — of consciousness as such; for the forms of consciousness, be they what they may, are determined *a priori* by these very relations, and can exist under no other condition. The syllogism formulates but does not originate them. Here we abut on absolute necessity, on that which "cannot be otherwise,"

on the Objectivity of Relations, on the Apriori of Being. Thought itself, though sublimated to Hegel's *Begriff des Begriffs* or *absolute Wissen*, depends on these supporting relations of thing and kind, unit and universal, or genus, species, and specimen, just as absolutely as the flight of birds depends on a supporting atmosphere. And the ground of the absolute necessity of these supporting relations, whatever it may be, or whether it may be at all, can never be explained; for all explanation presupposes both them and it.

§ 177. In the very constitution of the syllogism, therefore, as the norm of all thought that knows, we behold that necessary movement of mind from the involved to the evolved which is the essence of the knowing process. The antecedent involves the consequent, the consequent evolves the antecedent; the entire syllogism, as percept subsumed under concept in the percept-concept of the unit-universal, exhibits the genesis of knowledge as such. In truth, the syllogism is itself knowledge in the making, the one and only way of the mind as the Knowing I. As we have already said, it is the way of the mind simply and solely because it is the way of the world; and the reason is that the world itself is at bottom mind — not, as critical idealism would have it, the human mind dictating its *a priori* laws to a merely phaenomenal Nature, but, as critical realism has it, the Absolute I syllogizing eternally in noumenal Nature as identity in difference of Existence, Thought, and Knowledge, yet in absolute conformity with that Apriori of Being which is the necessity of its own existence as identity in difference of the Energy and the Reason of the Universe, identity in difference of the causal series and the rational series in that “course of Nature” which is the autobiography of the Absolute I itself.

§ 178. Nothing, then, could be more unphilosophical than the mechanical evolutionism of the Spencerian school, unless it be the inconsequent subjectivism of the idealistic school — the only consequent subjectivism being solipsism.

Herbert Spencer (whom no one should mention except *honoris causa*, in view of his splendid devotion for more than half a century to the advancement of truth as he understood it) labors to conceive evolution without involution. So far as the method of thought alone is concerned, he comprehends both factors in the syllogism of knowledge, and well states the case:—

“The consciousness of logical necessity is the consciousness that a certain conclusion is implicitly contained [*i. e.* involved] in certain premises explicitly stated. If, contrasting a young child and an adult, we see that this consciousness of logical necessity, absent from the one, is present in the other, we are taught that there is a *growing up* to the recognition of certain necessary truths, merely by the unfolding of the inherited intellectual forms and faculties.”¹

That is true vision. But, so far as the method of being is concerned, he altogether loses this insight into evolution and involution as complementary factors of one indivisible world-process. Here the civil engineer or the pure physicist, not the philosopher, defines his fundamental conceptions of both terms:—

“Evolution under its most general aspect is the integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; while Dissolution is the absorption of motion and concomitant disintegration of matter. The last of these titles answers its purpose tolerably well, but the first is open to grave objections. Evolution has other meanings, some of which are incongruous with, and even some directly opposed to, the meaning here given to it. The evolution of a gas is literally an absorption of motion and disintegration of matter, which is exactly the reverse of that which we here call Evolution. As ordinarily understood, to evolve is to unfold, to open and expand, to throw out; whereas, as understood here, the process of evolving, though it implies increase of a concrete aggregate, and in so far an expansion of it, implies that its component matter has passed from a more diffused to a more concentrated state — has contracted. The antithetical word Involution would

¹ First Principles, 6th ed., p. 155.

more truly express the nature of the change; and would, indeed, describe better those secondary characters of it which we shall have to deal with presently. We are obliged, however, notwithstanding the liabilities to confusion resulting from these unlike and even contradictory meanings, to use Evolution [rather than Involution] as antithetical to Dissolution. The word is now so widely recognized as signifying, not, indeed, the general process above described, but sundry of its most conspicuous varieties, and certain of its secondary but most remarkable accompaniments, that we cannot now substitute another word. While, then, we shall by Dissolution everywhere mean the process tacitly implied by its ordinary meaning — the absorption of motion and disintegration of matter — we shall everywhere mean by Evolution the process which is always an integration of matter and dissipation of motion, but which, as we shall now see, is in most cases much more than this.”¹

In no other passage in “First Principles” is the word “Involution” so much as mentioned; and it is mentioned here solely as a possible but undesirable equivalent, alternative, or “substitute,” for the word “Evolution” in antithesis to “Dissolution.” So trivial a fact is significant merely as showing how destitute of philosophical insight is Spencer’s notion of evolution itself.² No man has done

¹ First Principles, p. 261. The “much more than this” proves to contain no new concepts but those of homogeneity and heterogeneity, with reference to the redistribution both of matter and of motion.

² The only passage in all his works, we believe, in which Huxley mentions the word Involution, is this sentence in his Collected Essays, Vol. I. p. 94: — “The phaenomenal world, so far as it is material, expresses the evolution and involution of energy, its passage from the kinetic to the potential condition and back again.” This is the syllogism of energy, recognized below in § 179, 9; but it does not add to the mechanical concept of evolution. Huxley remains as blind as Spencer to all involution of reason in energy as teleological end; his conception of evolution remains as exclusively mechanical as that of Spencer. Haeckel expresses the common principle of all the advocates of mechanical evolutionism better than any other of them in this luminous statement of it: — “The great abstract law of mechanical causality, of which our cosmological law — the law of substance — is but another and a concrete expression, now rules the entire universe, as it does the mind of man; it is the steady, immovable pole-

more than he during the last four decades to give currency to the word, and no man has done so much as he to belittle its meaning. For he derives his notion of it from the mechanism alone, and not from the organism, the only possible source of an adequate notion of it.

§ 179. Let us look at the law of the organism in a concrete case of its operation.

1. Acorn evolves oak, then oak evolves acorn; again, acorn evolves oak, and oak evolves acorn; and so on. This is the visible or evolutionary side of the organic process.

2. But, at the same time, acorn involves oak, that is, holds within itself the inherited oak-idea as the condition and origin of the new oak-form,—also, oak involves acorn, that is, holds the inherited acorn-idea as the condition and origin of the new acorn-form; again, acorn involves oak, and oak involves acorn; and so on. This is the invisible or involutinal side of the organic process.

3. Thus it is the essential nature of the organic process, considered both evolutionally and involutinally, to revert to its own initial stage and renew itself in a connected series of similar generations. This rhythmical succession of generations involves in itself one continuous and universal life of the species, as itself a higher organism of organisms. In each generation the oak-species alternately contracts into its acorns and expands into its oaks, yet with minute changes under modification by the environment which in time may amount to a gradual change or

star, whose clear light falls on our path through the dark labyrinth of the countless separate phenomena." (The Riddle of the Universe, translated by McCabe, 1901, p. 366.) Under this conception, however, the "course of Nature" is *evolution of nothing*—not rational and purposive formation, but senseless, purposeless, irrational transformation—in Spencer's own phrase, "different aspects of one transformation, determined by an ultimate necessity." (First Principles, p. 505.) If he had entitled his philosophy, not that of "Evolution," but that of "Purposeless Transformation," how much popularity would it have got? One need not be a Diogenes to see that mankind is fooled by words.

evolution of species itself, already involved in the evolving genus and the evolving world. This alternate contraction and expansion constitute, as it were, the regular beat, the systole and diastole, of a single heart. The contraction is involution, and the expansion is evolution; each conditions the other; it requires both to constitute the self-perpetuating organic process, and what happens in the species happens equally, on a smaller scale, in the specimen. The life of the oak in the genesis of its own organs is the life of the oak-species on a smaller scale, and no less is it, on the grandest scale, the indwelling and inworking life of the world, as the identity in difference of the Many and the One.

4. This conception of life is the exact reverse of Spencer's as the passively mechanical "continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations;" for it conceives life as the actively organic adjustment of external relations to internal relations. Instead of being in the last analysis a merely mechanical result of "incident forces," life is the victorious subjugation of "incident forces" by immanent forces, as is proved by the constant absorption, assimilation, and incorporation of *food*, with selective excretion of whatever successfully resists this digestion. Instead of being a merely mechanical product of the "environment," life dominates the environment, and harnesses it to its own chariot; it originates from itself alone (*omne vivum ex vivo*), reproduces itself alone, and exhibits itself from first to last as mastery of the mechanism by the organism. What constitutes the organism, as distinguished from the mere mechanism (the mere mechanism can only be manufactured from without, but the finite organism is itself a mechanism which, seizing its own material from without, makes and works itself from within), is above all else the immanent inherited and constructive idea of the species, Claude Bernard's *l'idée créatrice*; which, so long as the specimen lives, dominates the environment, yokes to its own ends all "incident forces," shows itself visibly as a

new unit of the universal life at work in the involution of form as idea and evolution of form as fact, and ceases to work only when the specimen dies. For the cessation of this organic and organic process in the specimen is its death or dissolution.

5. Involution of form as plan or idea and evolution of form as fact: that is the double life-process itself. Slowly evolving the oak, the acorn evolves trunk, roots, boughs, twigs, leaves, new acorns, as an actual constitution of constituent natural organs; slowly involving in each new acorn the specific plan of this constitution as the bequeathed idea of the species, the oak involves it as an inherited law of future development, proposed or purposed in advance of the fact. This inherited organic idea which dominates the young specimen, and which, if the specimen lives, dominates its environment, too, is all in all, because it gives definite and unchanging direction to all the specimen's inherited energy; it is the predetermined goal and the determinant of that goal, — the bequeathed, inherited, and involved idea of a future fact which is the cause of the development of the present fact into that future fact, and so a final cause, — the end or aim of the life-process, — the *propositum*, the result proposed or posited in advance, the purpose of it as a process. This involution of idea in all evolution of form, which is the very essence of the organic process as life, is that immanent and universal teleology of Nature which only blindness can deny. For, of course, in all growth of the oak from the acorn and the acorn from the oak, the idea *in* the oak is not an idea *of* the oak; the seat of the idea as consciousness is the self-involving and self-evolving universe itself, the identity in difference of World-Energy and World-Reason as the Absolute I. This inherent, omnipresent, and ineradicable purposiveness of the organic constitution as such is that teleology of Nature which, because it is a fact of obvious experience, admits of no rational denial. But, deny it who may, the organic process is everywhere and always both a mechanical and a

teleological one, and its two inseparable factors are involution and evolution — involution as the inflow of the idea into the form, and evolution as the outflow of the form from the idea. Thus all life is movement from the involved to the evolved in form, and movement of the involved into the evolved in idea; and the living being is this living identity in difference of idea and form in fact.

6. The involutinal side of the organic process, therefore, is its invisible teleological side; while the evolutionary side of it is its visible mechanical side. The necessary identity in difference of involution and evolution in the organic process, outside of which neither element alone is in the least intelligible, is the necessary identity in difference of the mechanical and the teleological — the impossibility, therefore, of separating them or conceiving either without the other, the impossibility of conceiving evolution without involution or the mechanical without the teleological. The thing cannot be done, and the attempt to do it simply defeats itself by a manifest misconception of the mechanism; for the mechanism just as much involves teleology as the organism involves causation. What sort of a concept of the empirical machine is it which leaves out the purpose of the machine as a whole, or the purpose of its parts in their reciprocal relations? Can it be anything better than an unreal abstraction? Yet, if the real machine of experience cannot be itself explained without teleology, how can it explain a "world-machine" in which all teleology is denied? These questions answer themselves. Hence the mechanical theory of evolution, which aspires to explain Nature without teleology as a mere machine, necessarily begins by misunderstanding the machine as mechanical only, and ends by misunderstanding Nature even in its strictly mechanical aspect. It is a blind leader of the blind. Nothing but the organism can explain a world which evolves.

7. The organic process, then, as the life-process, that is, as the perpetual involution of idea and perpetual evo-

lution of form, is itself the cosmical process, the "Course of Nature." Either this is true, or there is no cosmical process at all, no cosmical procession of existence from form to form in accordance with any genetic or intelligible law, no orderly evolution of energy as form and orderly involution of reason as idea in a formed cosmos. Nothing can be said to "proceed" at all, in the sense of moving by rational law or intelligible rule, except as *genesis*, that is, *formation through ideation* — purposive formation, not purposeless transformation. The exact opposite of orderly process is formless and aimless motion — disorderly motion which has no form for aim; while all orderly process, that is, motion which has form for aim, is essentially organic, both mechanical and teleological at once, — mechanical as cause and effect, teleological as end and means, and organic as identity in difference of the mechanical and the teleological, or evolution and involution, in every organism as such, and therefore in the world-organism as a whole. This is the only thinkable cosmical process; for the only alternative is an absolutely irrational time-series, an unintelligible succession of events as empty of evolution as of involution, because having no more rational or genetic connection than the mechanically related but teleologically unrelated succession of figures in the kaleidoscope (as a machine, even the kaleidoscope contains a teleological element, but not in the immediate relation of figure to figure). The "Course of Nature," on the contrary, is a self-sustained rational and genetic movement from the involved to the evolved, from the idea to the form, from the universe as invisible but abiding unity to the universe as visible but vanishing multiplicity; and the rationality of it lies in the eternal genesis of form out of form (the specimen as fact out of other specimens as facts) through the eternal mediation of idea (the specific form as purpose) — a genetical syllogistic process which is mechanical so far as it contains causality and teleological so far as it contains finality, and which is organic because it contains both laws at once in

working harmony. The abiding unity of the universe is the eternity of this cosmical process as life-process: the universe is alive. This is the Syllogism of Being, in which the antecedent, as involved cosmical idea, or Spirit, is eternally equal to the consequent, as evolved cosmical form, or Nature. That is, the organic life of the cosmos as a whole, differenced as infinite from all the finite organisms within it because, unlike these, it is self-originated and self-sustained, self-perpetuating and self-sufficing, is the eternal self-equation of activity in the transient and repose in the permanent — of mechanical energy and teleological reason — of evolution and involution, in the infinite personality as Eternal Subject-Object or Absolute I.

8. For, in the last analysis, the organic or life-process of the world, the cosmical process itself, is the personal or ethical process, of which aetiology or mechanics is the outermost, biology or organics the inner, and teleology or ethics the innermost principle: causality, finality, and ethicality are all one in personality, and this one is the identity in difference of Nature and Spirit as God. Cause and effect, end and means, actual and ideal, — these are the three ultimate principles of all real being as known, whatever more may lie hidden in the unknown; and the rash objection that these principles are inconsistent, and must needs clash in operation on a cosmical scale, is at once silenced by the obvious fact that they exist simultaneously and operate without clashing in the actual constitution and operation of every human being. If they can thus co-work in harmony in man, it would be frivolous to argue that they cannot co-work in harmony in the cosmos as a whole. Cause is universally involved in effect, end in means, ideal in actual — effect is evolved out of cause, end out of means, actual out of ideal: the cosmos is not a dead static fact, but perpetual movement from the involved to the evolved, and this movement in its unity and universality is identity in difference of cause, end, and ideal, or energy, purpose, and reason — the Syllogism of Being —

the rational self-activity of that infinite All-Person in whom the mechanical process, as evolution of the actual out of the ideal, and the ethical process, as involution of the ideal into the actual, are one and the same as Life, and in whom all evolved finite persons live and move and have their being. Nothing less than this can be the content of a "philosophy of evolution" which is to be conceptually adequate to all the known facts it would explain, as cognition of the identity in difference of Nature and Spirit in God.

9. In fine, so conceived, the total world-process presents itself, not to blind human faith, but to seeing human intelligence, as possessing inherently a threefold aspect: mechanical or kinetic, teleological or vital, and ethical or spiritual. In the mechanical aspect, the universal or cosmical energy particularizes itself in the single cause or group of causes as the involved antecedent, and remains equal to itself in the single fact, effect, or event, as the evolved consequent (syllogism of energy as potential and kinetic). In the teleological aspect, the universal or cosmical purpose particularizes itself in the single preconceived end as the involved antecedent, and remains equal to itself in the means or in the realized end as the evolved consequent (syllogism of reason as idea and form). In the ethical aspect, the universal or cosmical ideal particularizes itself in the single ideal aim as the involved antecedent, and remains equal to itself in the deed or act as the evolved consequent (syllogism of conduct as ideal and real). But these three aspects are all one in the Syllogism of Being, conditioned and determined as the necessary syllogistic form of existence by the law of unit-universals or the *Apriori* of Being—that ultimate and absolute necessity which, being the condition of all explanation through reason, is not to be itself explained by reason.

These, then, are the essential elements of the concept of the cosmos as Reality:—

(1) One sole substance as Energy.

(2) One sole essence as Reason.

(3) One sole constitution as identity in difference of substance and essence, or Energy and Reason, in the cosmos as All-Person or Absolute I (§ 185).

(4) One sole process as the identity in difference of involution and evolution: involution of essence in substance as ideal form, or end intended, and evolution of essence in substance as real form, or end achieved.

(5) One sole law of the process as the Syllogism of Being: eternal self-mediating procession of the involved antecedent idea into the evolved consequent form.

(6) One sole aim of the process as the Good of the Universe: eternal involution of the changeless ideal as absolute virtue and absolute beatitude, and eternal evolution of the changing actual as finite virtue and finite beatitude — eternal pursuit of the ideal.

(7) One sole ground of the process as the Love of the Universe: eternal identity in difference of Being with Itself as the One and the Many — eternal self-devotion of the One to the Many as the Life of God in Infinite Love.

One thing more by way of application. When a human life is lived consciously and voluntarily in accordance with Nature (*secundum Naturam*), that is, when it freely subsumes itself under the strictly natural law of spiritual movement from the involved ideal of Good to the evolved actual of Character, the cosmical-ethical process in Man and the cosmical-ethical process in Nature are so far one and the same in essence, differing only in scale as a unit in its universal.¹ This is identity in difference of the finite life of Man and the infinite life of God — which is Religion.

§ 180. Comparing this ethical theory of evolution through involution with Spencer's mechanical theory of

¹ This is a sufficient answer to the Romanes lecture of the noble but confused Huxley, setting up a factitious antagonism between the ethical process in Man and the cosmical process in Nature. Such antagonism is consistent with the mechanical theory of evolution, but not with facts.

evolution without involution, we find the latter's essential elements determined in the following passages:—

“We come down, then, finally to Force, as the ultimate of ultimates. Though Space, Time, Matter, and Motion, are apparently all necessary data of intelligence, yet a psychological analysis (here indicated only in rude outline) shows us that these are either built up of, or abstracted from, experiences of force. Matter and Motion as we know them are concretes built up from the *contents* of various mental relations; while Space and Time are abstracts of the *forms* of these various relations. Deeper down than these, however, are the primordial experiences of Force. . . . Force, as we know it, can be regarded only as a conditioned effect of the Unconditioned Cause—as the relative reality indicating to us an Absolute Reality by which it is immediately produced.”¹

“A finished conception of Evolution thus includes the redistribution of the retained motion, as well as that of the component matter. . . . The formula finally stands thus:—Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from a relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.”²

“In other words, the phaenomena of Evolution have to be deduced from the Persistence of Force. As before said—‘to this an ultimate analysis brings us down, and on this a rational synthesis must build up.’ This, being the ultimate truth which transcends experience by underlying it, furnishes a common basis on which the widest generalizations stand; and hence these widest generalizations are to be unified by referring them to this common basis.”³

“From this conception of Evolution and Dissolution as together making up the entire process through which all things pass, and from this conception of Evolution as divided into simple and compound, we went on to consider the law of Evolution as exhibited among all orders of existences in general and detail. . . . Further,

¹ First Principles, pp. 151, 152.

² *Ibid.* pp. 366, 367. In obedience to the “Note” on the latter page, the word “relatively” is inserted above in its proper place.

³ *Ibid.* p. 369.

it was pointed out that in all evolutions, inorganic, organic, and super-organic, this change in the arrangement of Matter is accompanied by a parallel change in the arrangement of contained Motion. . . . While we think of Evolution as divided into astro-nomic, geologic, biologic, psychologic, sociologic, etc., it may seem to some extent a coincidence that the same law of metamorphosis holds throughout all its divisions. But when we recognize these divisions as mere conventional groupings, made to facilitate the arrangement and acquisition of knowledge — when we remember that the different existences with which they severally deal are component parts of one Cosmos — we see at once that there are not several kinds of Evolution having certain traits in common, but one Evolution going on everywhere after the same manner. . . . It must be remembered that, while the connection between the phaenomenal order and the ontological order is forever inscrutable, so is the connection between the conditioned forms of being and the unconditioned form of being forever inscrutable. The interpretation of all phaenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, is nothing more than the reduction of our complex symbols of thought to the simplest symbols ; and, when the equation has been brought to its lowest terms, the symbols remain symbols still. . . . Though the relation of subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of Spirit and Matter, the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the Unknown Reality which underlies both.”¹

§ 181. These citations sufficiently indicate Spencer’s conception of Evolution as the universal or cosmical process. It is essentially and solely mechanical. It completely suppresses both the teleological and the ethical elements of the cosmical process, because it completely neglects and leaves out Involution, the necessary correlative and complement of Evolution. We will tersely restate his essential positions in our own words, and criticise them as tersely as may be.

1. Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force, are the only elements of reality, so far as man relatively knows it. But Space, Time, Matter, and Motion are mere derivatives

¹ First Principles, pp. 499-510.

of Force, which is the sole ultimate relative reality. Force itself, however, is a mere derivative of the Unconditioned Cause or Absolute Reality.

The Unconditioned Cause, we infer, is meant to be in itself something other than Force. But what can this other be? To call it cause is to call it that which produces its effect, and Spencer himself says that Force is a "conditioned effect," a "relative reality" which is "immediately produced" by the Unconditioned Cause as "an Absolute Reality." He thus forgets the sagacious warning of Hume: "I begin with observing that the terms of *efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connection, and productive quality*, are all nearly synonymous; and therefore it is an absurdity to employ any of them in defining the rest."¹ When he attributes immediate productivity to his Unconditioned Cause, he identifies the latter with the Force which he ostensibly distinguishes and derives from it. The "productive quality" of Cause is one with the "productive quality" of Force, and Spencer thus locates his ultimate "Absolute Reality" in nothing but Force itself. Since, therefore, he carefully excludes all teleological and ethical elements from Evolution as such, he reduces the whole reality of the evolutionary process to nothing but Mechanical Force, and erases all his intended distinction between this and the Unconditioned Cause. When he thus refers all reality, whether "relative" or "absolute," to pure Mechanical Force as its ultimate origin, and characterizes this pure Mechanical Force as the "ultimate of

¹ Treatise of Human Nature, Philosophical Works, I. 201. It should be observed that "necessity" does not belong in the above list, unless limited as "physical necessity." For the necessity which makes the greatest side and the greatest angle opposite in the triangle involves nothing that can be resisted, nothing of agency, power, force, etc. That which, in Kant's phrase, simply "cannot be otherwise" involves nothing but the conditions of existence or *Apriori* of Being; and this is not causation as energy or force. So "connection" belongs in the list only as limited to "causal connection"—which Hume, however, would not admit.

ultimates," — when he sums up all in the declaration that "it is alike our highest wisdom and our highest duty to regard that through which all things exist as The Unknowable,"¹ — he virtually confesses that Mechanical Force itself is unknowable *per se*, takes refuge in blind "feeling" or "*indefinite* consciousness of it" as "the Absolute,"² concedes unconsciously that evolution without involution, as we have shown, is itself unintelligible, and reduces the Synthetic Philosophy to an island of Mechanism in an ocean of Mysticism.³

2. The definitive "formula" in which Spencer embodies his "finished conception of Evolution" omits all Involution — includes only the mechanical, and omits the teleological and the ethical which are inseparable from the mechanical in the cosmical process. He includes only (1) Matter, (2) Motion, (3) Processes of integration and dissipation in Matter and Motion, and (4) States of homogeneity and heterogeneity in Matter and Motion.

Such a "finished conception of Evolution" as his "formula" defines, however, omits not only the involution of idea, but also the evolution of form. It explains neither the genesis nor the form of anything whatever. Yet the whole meaning of evolution is concentrated in the Becoming of Existence — that is, in the gradual genesis of its particular specific forms, as opposed to their sudden creation without genesis. Its capital questions are — What evolves? From what does it evolve? Into what does it evolve? The one answer is — Particular specific form evolves from its own specific form as idea into its own specific form as fact. Correctly understood, this answer covers machine, organism, and person, whether as finite or as infinite. Question and answer alike depend on the genesis of form as the essence of all evolution. Yet Spencer's formula has nothing to say either of form

¹ First Principles, p. 97.

² *Ibid.* pp. 75, 109.

³ *Ibid.* p. 96.

or of its genesis. His half-conception of evolution is fatal misconception of it.

Even his maimed and fragmentary abstraction, however, although omitting the most essential elements of what it purports to define, contains nevertheless a presupposition which, if he had understood its importance, would have shown him that his "finished conception of Evolution," so far from being "finished," was scarcely begun. For "homogeneity" and "heterogeneity" self-evidently presuppose the whole law of unit-universals. Homogeneity is nothing but likeness among things of the same kind, and heterogeneity nothing but unlikeness among things of different kinds. They presuppose, therefore, knowable objective relations of things and kinds, all the necessary relations of genus, species, and specimen, the whole law of unit-universals, — in a word, the Syllogism of Being, with its immanent necessity of *involution and evolution as one inseparable process*. Strike out either necessary element of this necessary process, and there remains neither homogeneity nor heterogeneity — neither integration nor dissipation — neither Matter nor Motion — neither "finished conception" nor defining "formula" of Evolution, even as Spencer vainly tries to conceive it. For the Involution he leaves out lurks unsuspected in the very Evolution he retains: the inseparability of the factors he tries to separate is the self-destruction of the "finished conception" he tries to construct out of one factor alone.

3. All the phaenomena of Evolution must be deduced from the Persistence of Force.

But there are and can be no phaenomena at all without homogeneity and heterogeneity among the elements of the phaenomena — without likeness and unlikeness of things and kinds — without necessary and knowable objective relations of genus, species, and specimen — without the Syllogism of Being — without identity in difference of involution and evolution, as one inseparable process. Consequently, there are and can be no phaenomena of

evolution which are not at the same time phaenomena of involution—that is, phaenomena of the one inseparable process. But these, the only real phaenomena because they are also noumena *per se*, cannot be deduced at all from the persistence of mere Force or Energy alone, that is, Cause and Effect as mere Mechanical Force: they can be deduced (so far as they are deducible) solely from the persistence of the cosmical process as at once mechanical, teleological, and ethical, that is, from the identity in difference of Energy and Reason in the cosmos itself as Absolute I.

4. The one Evolution going on everywhere, the entire process through which all things pass, is Mechanical Evolution and Mechanical Dissolution, deducible exclusively from pure Mechanical Force.

But such evolution as this, evolution without involution, goes on nowhere; and the “finished conception” of it is an impossible pseudo-concept, proved to be such by Spencer’s unconscious presupposition, as proved above, of the very involution which he aims to exclude, when he defines mechanical evolution in terms of homogeneity and heterogeneity.

5. The connection between the phaenomenal order and the ontological order is inscrutable, as is also that between the conditioned forms and the unconditioned form of Being.

In other words, things in themselves are unknowable: human knowledge is nothing but unverifiable and groundless human supposition. It is unnecessary to examine Spencer’s very crude form of subjectivism, after what has gone before in criticism of profounder forms of it.

6. The interpretation of all phaenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, is merely reduction of complex concepts to simple concepts; but all concepts, including those of Matter and Spirit, are mere symbols or signs of a Reality which remains Unknown.

The attempt to interpret all phaenomena in mechanical terms is the attempt to exclude all but mechanical concepts

from human knowledge—in other words, to think the world as machine, and nothing but machine. Such an attempt is logically congruous with the ancient dualism which Spencer especially abjures—the theory of an external Artificer making the world as a mechanical product, and operating it from without after the analogy of all artificial machines. But it is not logically congruous with monism in any form. A world which makes and works itself, without any external Artificer, can be a machine solely in the sense of the organism, the natural machine which makes and works itself from within, that is, the machine which is not artificially constructed but naturally evolves. The mere machine manifests only the law of cause and effect in the motion of its parts and its own motion as a whole. But the organism, the natural machine, manifests in its motions both the law of cause and effect and the law of end and means at one and the same time. It manifests in actual working harmony the identity in difference of the teleological and the mechanical, of causality and finality, of involution and evolution; and only from the organism, not from the mere machine, can be derived the true theory of evolution, as applied to a world which is not made from without, but makes itself from within. It is amazing that Herbert Spencer should not understand the necessity of this. The philosophy of evolution must be monism, not dualism; and the philosophy of monistic evolution must be derived from the law of the organism, not that of the mere machine. Yet Spencer defeats the essential aim of such a philosophy by his self-contradictory attempt to interpret all phaenomena in mechanical terms. Only purely mechanical phaenomena can be so interpreted; all others remain overlooked and uninterpreted.

If Spencer's Unconditioned Cause, or the Absolute, resolves itself into pure Mechanical Force, as we have seen it does, and this into an Unknown Reality, all the "relative reality" with which so-called human knowledge deals

becomes a merely euphemistic synonym for *unreality*. The distinction between "relative reality" (phaenomena) and "absolute reality" (noumena), just like that between the "relatively true, the true *for us*," and the "absolutely true, the true *in itself*," must rank no higher than a controversial shift, an adroit sleight-of-hand, a political compromise, a device by which a bewildered philosophy which is afraid of logic seeks to escape from decision between the only logical alternatives: namely, the true and the untrue, the real and the unreal. From pure Mechanical Force as an Unknown Reality, no real knowledge can be derived. Pure Mechanical Force, divorced from all teleology and all ethics, and reduced to a law of mere Mechanical Motion of Matter without assignable purpose, idea, or ideal, becomes an absolute *surd*; and all the knowledge of "phaenomena alone" which is derivable from it becomes knowledge which is not knowledge, but illusion, — knowledge which is as unreal as the "relative reality," and so, in a very literal sense, *ab-surd*.¹ At bottom, the question is one of the reality or unreality of knowledge, of knowable truth itself; and it is no cause for surprise that the philosophy of mechanical evolution, driven to pure mechanical force without teleology or ethical aim as the ultimate principle of all explanation of the cosmos, should name itself Agnosticism — the philosophy, not of Science, but of Necessary Nescience.

§ 182. The word Agnosticism, originally adopted by Huxley as the name of the obfuscation which he had avowedly derived from Mansel, Hamilton, and their teacher Kant, and virtually sanctioned by Spencer, not only in deriving his own obfuscation from the same authorities in "First Principles," but also in declaring that "our own and all other existence is a mystery absolutely

"When Phaenomenalism loses its head, and, becoming blatant, steps forward as a theory of first principles, then it is really not respectable. The best that can be said of its pretensions is that they are ridiculous." (F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 1893, p. 120.)

beyond our comprehension,"¹ has acquired two distinct meanings in current use, one loose and popular, the other strict and philosophical. The former might be formulated as, "I don't know anything about God, Freedom, or Immortality;" the other as, "I know phaenomena, but I can't know and you can't know anything about noumena." Many of the noblest and bravest men of our time are Agnostics in the former sense, and simply reflect a confusion of thought quite intelligible in the present confused state of philosophy and of the popular teachings founded on it. The other formula expresses a definite and dogmatic epistemological doctrine, the absolute unknowableness of noumena or things as they are in themselves, which received its scientific form from Kant, so far as that can be called scientific which abolishes science as science of the real and reduces all knowledge to illusion agreed on. For, if things as they are cannot be known, much less can things as they are not; and the agreement to accept knowledge of phaenomena, or things as they are not in themselves, as a substitute for the knowledge of noumena, or things as they are in themselves, can be dignified with no other or higher name than illusion agreed on. The intellectual self-sophistication of such an agreement to accept falsehood for truth amounts to a moral degradation of philosophy in its present state, and more or less justifies the widespread contempt for it as "mischievous metaphysics." Philosophy can recover its legitimate influence by nothing short of stern and virile loyalty to logic — by ceasing to pretend that knowledge of phaenomena alone, or things as they are not in themselves, is "science," or that a "relative truth for us" which is confessedly not "absolute truth in itself" can be anything else than *absolute falsehood for us*. It is this not logical and not valiant and not sincere pretence which is the vice of philosophical agnosticism, and which is not in the least expunged or atoned for

¹ First Principles, p. 96.

by the splendid personal virtues, and shining achievements in the particular sciences, of the great men who, unable to detect its sophistries, have made agnosticism fashionable in our day. The chief evil of agnosticism, apart from the intrinsic falsity and deceptiveness of its epistemological dogma, lies in the fact that it paralyzes human reason by driving it to despair, stops investigation in the highest themes by making it seem futile, and quenches the love of truth by making truth itself seem a riddle without an answer—in other words, demoralizes the human intellect itself. It is no accident that the rise and spread of agnosticism, as a popular belief among the reading classes, has been followed at the opening of the twentieth century by a world-wide recrudescence of barbarism, militarism, and commercialism, a world-wide decay of the democratic ideal, a world-wide revival of that imperialist spirit of conquest and greed and contempt for human rights which was supposed to be passing away forever. What else could be expected when the majority of thinking men, misled by false lights, have learned to look on the world as nothing but a machine—to see in it nothing but “an infinite and eternal Energy from which all things proceed,” that is, nothing but Mechanical Force—to discern in Nature no moral law at all, and to discern in Man no moral law that has a deeper root in his own nature than habit, custom, statutes, social conventions, business policy, self-interest in citizens and in nations alike? No stream rises higher than its source, and no man’s life rises higher than his idea of the universe and his own place in it, save by that “divine inconsistency” for which he can never rationally account, and which in fact is the unacknowledged but overpowering influence of a universe vaster and truer than his idea of it. This influence of a universe truer than his idea of it makes Herbert Spencer’s life, which has been devoted to a very noble ideal, not to be at all “interpreted in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force,” immeasurably more instructive than his system. Nevertheless, before

leaving the latter, it is necessary to note the utmost height to which he has carried his idea of the universe itself. This high-water mark of his philosophy is shown, we think, in a well-known passage:—

§ 183. “This, which to most will seem an essentially irreligious position, is an essentially religious one—nay, is *the* religious one, to which, as already shown, all others are but approximations. In the estimate it implies of the Ultimate Cause, it does not fall short of the alternative position, but exceeds it. Those who espouse this alternative position assume that the choice is between personality and something lower than personality; whereas the choice is rather between personality and something that may be higher. Is it not possible that there is a mode of being as much transcending Intelligence and Will as these transcend mechanical motion? Doubtless we are totally unable to imagine any such higher mode of being. But this is not a reason for questioning its existence; it is rather the reverse. Have we not seen how utterly unable our minds are to form even an approach to a conception of that which underlies all phaenomena? Is it not proved that we fail because of the incompetency of the Conditioned to grasp the Unconditioned? Does it not follow that the Ultimate Cause can not in any respect be conceived because it is in every respect greater than can be conceived? And may we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the ground that such attributes, derived as they must be from our own natures, are not elevations, but degradations? Indeed, it seems strange that men should suppose the highest worship to lie in assimilating the object of their worship to themselves. Not in asserting a transcendent difference, but in asserting a certain likeness, consists the element of their creed which they think essential. . . . To think of the Creative Power as in all respects anthropomorphous is now considered impious by men who yet hold themselves bound to think of the Creative Power as in some respects anthropomorphous, and who do not see that the one proceeding is but an evanescent form of the other. . . . After it has been shown why, by the very constitution of our minds, we are debarred from thinking of the Absolute, it is still asserted that we ought to think of the Absolute thus and thus. In all ways we find thrust on us the truth that we are not permitted to know, nay, are not even permitted to conceive, that Reality which is behind the

veil of Appearance; and yet it is said to be our duty to believe (and in so far to conceive) that this Reality exists in a certain defined manner. Shall we call this reverence? or shall we call it the reverse? Volumes might be written upon the impiety of the pious."¹

In this passage Spencer shows an evident desire to set before mankind a formless form as a possible object of rational worship. We say intentionally, *a formless form*: if that is a contradiction, it is Spencer's own.

On the one hand, this object is absolutely inconceivable because it is too great to be conceived in any respect; there can be absolutely no conception of it, not even an approach to a conception of it. That is to say in effect that, since all form, being a congeries of relations, is for that reason essentially and necessarily conceivable, the only possible object of rational worship must be in itself relationless or absolute.² It must be devoid of all relations, external or internal; it must possess no attributes, since all attributes involve relations; it must be the Absolute itself as *Absolute Formlessness*.

On the other hand, this object of rational worship must be conceived, that is, relationally formed in thought, as having at least nine attributes. It must be conceived, according to this very passage itself:—

1. As *Unconditioned*: related to the conditioned as its negation and condition.

2. As *Noumenal*: related to phaenomena as "underlying" them, or as "that Reality which is behind the veil of Appearance."

3. As *Causal*: related to phaenomena as its own effects.

¹ First Principles, pp. 92-94. Compare with the closing part of the above: "It is alike our highest wisdom and our *highest duty* to regard that through which all things exist as the Unknowable" (p. 97 — italics ours).

² "It is impossible to put the Absolute in the same category with anything relative, so long as the Absolute is defined as that of which no necessary relation can be predicated." (*Ibid.* pp. 67, 68.)

4. As *Ultimate*: related to proximate causes as their opposite.

5. As *Transcendent*: related to the immanent in general as its opposite, and here to "Intelligence and Will" in particular, as that which stands below it and in which it is not immanent.

6. As *Different*: related to what is like as the unlike, and here to human nature as that to which it is unlike.

7. As *Great*: related to possible objects of conception as having in itself a magnitude which renders it "too great to be conceived."

8. As *Inconceivable*: related to man's conceiving power as beyond its possible field of exercise.

9. As *Impersonal*: related to the personal, not as that which is below it, but as that which is above it. That is *Impersonality transcends Personality*.

It is evident, therefore, that the Absolute must be *in itself* unconditioned, noumenal, causal, ultimate, transcendent, different, great, inconceivable, impersonal. This complexus of strictly conceptual and conceivable relations constitutes, if not a coherent conception, at least "an approach to a conception." It certainly is Spencer's own conception of the inconceivable, and, however ineffectively, conceives the Absolute as "the unconditioned form of being" which underlies "the conditioned forms of being:" in other words, as *Absolute Form*.

Consequently, in accordance with his combined teachings on the subject, the only possible object of rational worship, as we have just said, must be the Absolute as *Formless Form*.

This result, meaningless because contradictory, would doubtless be explained by Spencer himself as merely illustrating his own thesis that we "are not even permitted to conceive that Reality which is behind the veil of Appearance." We admit this. But it would be a cogent reason for his repudiating the whole Part First of his own "First Principles," as a vain effort to conceive that "Reality," a

self-stultifying attempt to know "The Unknowable," and therefore a mischievous source of confusion in multitudinous minds of his own generation. Nevertheless, this Part First is the most important, because the most influential, portion of his whole Synthetic Philosophy, and demands further consideration on that account. Giving in advance the final outcome of his "finished conception of Evolution" as applied to religious ideas, and conceiving the Absolute Reality as, on the whole and in the last analysis, nothing but Impersonal Mechanical Force, it illustrates the logical impossibility of the effort to think the world as nothing but a machine — that is, the logical impossibility of thinking evolution without involution and the mechanism without the organism. So much as this, we believe, has been made plain enough in what has gone before. But, whether the Absolute Reality is Impersonal Mechanical Force or Absolute Person itself, is a question on which more must be said.

§ 184. "Is it not possible," Spencer asks, "that there is a mode of being as much transcending Intelligence and Will as these transcend mechanical motion? Doubtless we are totally unable to imagine any such higher mode of being. But this is not a reason for questioning its existence; it is rather the reverse." Most certainly so. Nothing could be more admirably spoken, and the manifest truth of the words has gone very far to persuade the unwary thinker of the truth of the utterly sophistical differences he draws from them.

Spencer infers that the mode of being which transcends intelligence and will must be itself devoid of intelligence and will; that to attribute these or any other human attributes to the Ultimate Cause must be, just because they are human, a degradation, and not an elevation; that it is wisdom to assert a "transcendent difference" between that Cause and all things human, but folly, irreverence, and impiety to assert between them any "likeness" in any degree; that to do the latter is to fall into bottomless gulfs

of "anthropomorphism;" that the choice lies, not between personality and subterpersonality, but between personality and superpersonality — in other words, that the superpersonal cannot be also personal, but must be absolutely impersonal. In all this, how much logical force and material truth can be found?

In the first place, intelligence and will, as Spencer himself admits, certainly transcend mechanical motion. But, as we know intelligence and will in our own experience, they transcend mechanical motion by including, not excluding it. Person includes, not excludes, the machine; the living man is a machine as well as a person, moves as a machine under all the laws of mechanical motion, and dies when his machinery ceases to work under those laws. Whether the person-machine or the mere machine, such as a steam-engine, transcends the other in dignity and intrinsic worth, need not be here debated; we will accept the common opinion as well grounded, namely, that intelligence transcends unintelligence, and that will, or conscious force directed to rational ends, transcends unconscious force — in a word, that the man transcends the machine. But, if so, the man transcends the machine by including, not excluding it; the personal machine transcends the impersonal machine, and not *vice versa*. That is, reversing Spencer's principle of estimation of worth, *personality transcends impersonality*. If the choice lies, as Spencer says it does, between personality and something higher, not something lower, then the higher must be, not impersonal, but *personal and something more*, unimagined though it be. In order to be higher than mere personality, then, the Ultimate Cause must be personal and something more; it must transcend personality by including, not excluding it; it must transcend intelligence and conscious will, not by dropping *down* to unintelligence and unconscious force, but by rising *up* to higher intelligence and vaster consciousness, perhaps to modes of spiritual existence as much above human personality as the human person is

above the mere machine. What more than person the Ultimate Cause may be we know not, for we cannot rise even in thought above ourselves; for us, at least, the dictum of Protagoras holds true — "Man is the measure of all things." But high, infinitely high if you will, as the Ultimate Cause must be above the human, it cannot transcend personality without including it and being personal, too. That is the law of Nature as we know it: the organism transcends the machine by including it; the person transcends the organism and the machine by including both; and the Ultimate Cause can transcend the person, the organism, and the machine solely by including all three. This law of ethical worth (for ethical it is and must be), namely, that the higher must include the lower, is our only possible criterion of transcendence; and the application of it here is the conclusion that, whatever more than personal the Ultimate Cause may be, it must be personal first of all, intelligent and not unintelligent, or, instead of being higher than personality, it is necessarily lower. If Spencer reasoned logically from facts as they are, he could reason in no other way. His Ultimate Cause, his apotheosis of blind, unconscious, unintelligent, impersonal, Mechanical Force, for all its absoluteness and infinitude, is as much below the "Apologia" of a Socrates as is the unconscious roaring of a furnace-blast; and his sophistical pretence that the Ultimate Cause is "elevated" rather than "degraded" in rational estimation by being characterized as *impersonal* can impose only upon the shallowest and least thoughtful of minds.

In the next place, the superficial considerations quoted above about "anthropomorphism" are such as to delight the "groundlings" in philosophy, but to "make the judicious grieve." They make Spencer himself illustrate his own statement in the fine opening sentence of *First Principles*: "We too often forget that not only is there a 'soul of goodness in things evil,' but very generally, also, a soul of truth in things erroneous." He certainly forgets

to apply this principle to anthropomorphism, which he takes to be error with no soul of truth. Yet, justly and rationally interpreted, the essential principle of anthropomorphism, however hidden by gross and uncomely superstitions, is a shining and much-needed truth: namely, that, in all that concerns moral dignity or ethical worth, *personality transcends impersonality*. This principle, if Spencer had only understood it, would have rescued him from falling a victim to indiscriminating anti-anthropomorphism in the apotheosis of Force, as the sole principle of his "finished conception of Evolution;" for it is this latter principle of mere mechanism that makes all the real degradation of anthropomorphism itself, when it substitutes Force for Good, Power for Love, in men's notions of the Divine. But the lurking truth in anthropomorphism, that personality transcends impersonality, lies at the very foundation of ethics; for ethical categories of "good" and "bad," and ethical obligation to realize the ideal of the "good" in all self-conscious acts, apply to persons and persons only. Spencer very clearly recognizes that real being without form is impossible, when he makes his ultimate contrast lie between its "conditioned forms" and its "unconditioned form;" if, then, among the forms we know as conditioned, the form of personality is the highest, to think of the unconditioned Ultimate Cause as personal is a higher conception, however "symbolical" it may be, than to think of it as impersonal. To put it plainly, the anthropomorphism which, however crude or raw its concept of the person may be, conceives the Ultimate Cause under the *highest form it knows*, that of personality, is a less degrading superstition than the anti-anthropomorphism which, violating the ethical scale of worth, conceives the Ultimate Cause under the *lowest form it knows*, that of impersonality. In the dry light of reason and logic, the mechanical theory of evolution without involution, referring all things at last to Impersonal Force, is more superstitious than the lowest fetich-worship which conceives its

fetich as, in whatever grotesque or incomprehensible or mysterious manner, Person. If that judgment is itself anthropomorphism, so be it: it is none the less sane and scientific philosophy, for it finds the essence of personality itself in the principle of ethicality.

Lastly, although the closing pages of Spencer's Part First on "The Unknowable" express much that is ethically very noble and does him the highest honor, he yet makes use earlier of a humorous satirical illustration which has had great popular influence, yet is a masterpiece of sophistry. It is this: "If for a moment we made the grotesque supposition that the tickings and other movements of a watch constituted a kind of consciousness, and that a watch possessed of such a consciousness insisted on regarding the watchmaker's actions as determined like its own by springs and escapements, we should simply complete a parallel of which religious teachers think much. And were we to suppose that a watch not only formulated the cause of its existence in these mechanical terms, but held that watches were bound out of reverence so to formulate this cause, and even vituperated, as atheistic watches, any that did not venture so to formulate it, we should merely illustrate the presumption of theologians by carrying their own argument a step further."¹

Soberly and not sophistically handled, what does this illustration really illustrate? The exact opposite of what Spencer very honestly but very curiously intends. In "formulating the cause of its existence in *mechanical terms*," and "holding that watches were bound out of reverence so to formulate them," such a watch would only do what Spencer himself does, and ought to be lauded by him as a faithful and intelligent disciple of his own philosophy of *mechanical evolution*. He satirizes himself alone.

This hypothetical watch endowed with consciousness becomes by the hypothesis itself a conscious machine, a

¹ First Principles, pp. 94, 95.

being which is consciousness and machine in one, and just so far a person. The watchmaker, likewise, is consciousness and machine in one, a person. When the supposed watch, therefore, forgetting the consciousness and remembering only the mechanism in itself, ignores the consciousness and recognizes only the "springs and escapements" or other mechanism in the watchmaker, as the cause of its own existence, the watch argues precisely as Spencer argues, makes the very same argument, and merits his applause rather than his satire; for both formulate the phaenomena in merely mechanical terms, both formulate the Cause of the phaenomena in merely mechanical terms, and both, suppressing consciousness, exalt mechanical force as all in all. But if, on the contrary, the watch as conscious machine, or person, should formulate the watchmaker, the cause of its own existence, as likewise conscious machine, or person, it would show itself a reprehensibly anthropomorphic watch, to be sure, but, *mirabile dictu*, would exactly hit the truth! For the true cause of the watch was indeed the personal watchmaker. The moral of Spencer's little apologue, quite contrary to his intention, would seem to be that anthropomorphism in its rudest form is a truer philosophy than his own incoherent compound of mechanism and mysticism.

"Theologians" may not be very wise (we fear they seldom are), but very few of them are such poor reasoners as Spencer here shows himself to be. The failure of the Synthetic Philosophy was foreordained in its "finished conception of Evolution" as evolution without involution—in its conception of the World as only Machine, Force without End or Aim.

§ 185. For the world is not a mere machine, involving nothing but the mechanical law of cause and effect in Motion; nor yet a mere organism, involving nothing but the mechanical law of cause and effect, and the organic law of end and means, combined in Life; but Person itself, involving both these laws and the ethical law of actual and

ideal in Conduct. All forms of being and all modes of action which are known by man, whether in common experience or science or philosophy, are easily resolvable into these ultimate elements, which meet in practical union and working harmony in the constitution of man as finite person; consequently, there can be no *a priori* reason why they should not meet in equal union and harmony in the constitution of the world as infinite All-Person. That this identity in difference of man and the world is essentially, in point of principle, no philosophical innovation, but a truth in some sort familiar to the ancients, is evident in the old crude doctrines of *homo mensura* and of macrocosm and microcosm. But its conclusive grounds are not fully brought to view except by the philosophy of the identity in difference of evolution and involution, as founded on the reformed epistemology which this philosophy necessitates and supplies through the reformation of the Aristotelian Paradox as the law of unit-universals, the *Apriori* of Being.

The Idea of the Universe which results from the philosophy of evolution without involution, as exemplified by Herbert Spencer and all other agnostics who philosophically comprehend their own principle of the "relativity of knowledge" as essentially the Kantian epistemology, is that of an "Ultimate Unknown Reality" as the "Unconditioned Cause," which manifests itself solely as the "persistence of Force" — mechanical, impersonal, alogical Force — an infinite and eternal but *Irrational Energy* from which all things proceed; for, if it were Rational Energy, it would be personal, which all agnosticism most strenuously denies. Realities, noumena, or things as they are in themselves, are unknowable; appearances, phaenomena, or things as they are not in themselves, are "relatively known" as a "relative reality." But knowledge of a "relative reality" which *ex hypothesi* is unreal, that is, knowledge of things which are not so, is nothing but ignorance, error, illusion agreed on. In other words,

agnosticism is the philosophy of intellectual self-despair, man's abdication of his own nature as "rational animal," in strictest truth the philosophy of Absolute Nescience: in Spencer's self-humiliating expression — "Our own and all other existence is a mystery absolutely beyond our comprehension."¹

The Idea of the Universe, on the contrary, which results from the philosophy of the identity in difference of evolution and involution in the Syllogisms of Being, Thought, and Knowledge, may be stated thus:—

Mechanical causality or the law of cause and effect in Nature, organic finality or the law of end and means in Life, and personal ethicality or the law of ideal and real in Spirit, — the three eternal and all-pervasive real principles by which the whole known world exists, — are at bottom one in the real principle of omnipresent *Reason-Energy, Self-Consciousness, or Absolute Personality*, and constitute the unity of the universe in the essential being and life of God, as at once Nature, Life, and Spirit, or infinite machine, infinite organism, and infinite person — the All as Absolute I, known by the finite I in its own self-knowledge as *I in the We in the Absolute I*.

So far as the truth of philosophies is to be estimated by the truth of their rational outcomes, the two philosophies of evolution, the one without and the other with involution, may be judged from comparison of these two Ideas of the Universe as a Unit. The one ends in Nescience, as experience without reason. The other ends in Science, as identity in difference of experience and reason in the Syllogism of Knowledge. And it is the latter, not the former, which is philosophy true to itself, the self-certitude of man as a reasonable being, a Knowing and Self-Knowing I.

¹ First Principles, p. 96.

CHAPTER XV

THE SYLLOGISM OF KNOWLEDGE

§ 186. COMPREHENSION of identity in difference—not separation in the distinguishable, but distinction in the inseparable—is the key to comprehension of the world. This has been hitherto assumed, and now it must be explained.

Organization is the type of identity in difference. In Being it is the organic constitution; in Thought it is the organic idea. The organic constitution is the idea as realized or evolved in Being; the organic idea is the constitution as idealized or involved in Thought; the organism, therefore, is the identity in difference of involution and evolution, idea and constitution, reason and energy, Thought and Being. As such, and only as such, can the organism appear, whether as Kant's "mere phaenomenon" or as Hegel's "phaenomenon in itself." But since, in order to appear, the phaenomenal organism must exist, and since, in order to exist, it must be the identity in difference of organic constitution and organic idea, it follows that the organism cannot be a phaenomenon without being a noumenon too. That is, it cannot be perceptible without being *ipso facto* intelligible,—perceptible as many related organs and intelligible as one self-related organism, and so an object of both experience and reason, that is, of knowledge. In other words, the organism cannot possibly be known at all except as the identity in difference of the One and the Many as organism and organs, a phaenomenon-noumenon, a "thing in itself" and "object of knowledge."

For instance, the finger is an organ of the hand, the hand an organ of the arm, the arm an organ of the body; the body is the living whole of all its own organs, from the constituent cell to the nervous system. If the finger is cut from the hand or the hand from the arm or the arm from the body, the organ is destroyed and the organism is mutilated; the destruction of all the organs is the destruction of the organism itself. It is Nature, not human reason, which constitutes the reality as *finger in hand in arm in body*—that is, all the parts in correlation and graduated reciprocal interdependence as one organism of many organs, identity in difference of the one and the many—many unit-universals in one larger unit-universal; for the possibility of human reason is itself conditioned on the prior reality of the human organism, and it is absurd to dream that the conditioned can “prescribe to Nature” its own conditions of being. If in my thought of the organism I undertake to separate the one and the many, I establish difference without identity, and thereby destroy; if I confound the two elements, I establish identity without difference, and again destroy; if I would understand, I must neither separate nor confound, but distinguish. This immanent relational constitution of the organism in itself as one in many and many in one, this necessary reciprocity between the organic whole and the organic parts, is in no sense the productive work of the human mind. It is neither my concept, nor yours, nor ours, but (since Kant himself confesses, in the Introduction to the Prolegomena, that human reason is itself an organism) it is the prior condition of you and me and all our concepts. It is absolute refutation of the theory of the exclusive subjectivity of relations, whether as “pure thought,” “pure reason,” “pure synthesis *a priori*,” or what not. It is that absolute necessity in objective relations which conditions and predetermines all necessity in subjective relations, and necessitates recognition of the Apriori of Being as the origin of the Apriori of Thought.

Man is organic, therefore, because the world is organic, not *vice versa*. Identity in difference of the One and the Many as the Absolute—not the Absolute One here and the Relative Many there, but the Absolute in the Relative and the Relative in the Absolute everywhere and always—is the essential and eternal *a priori* condition of the Absolute itself, the necessary constitution of the universe as the All-Organism; and organism in the highest form comprehensible by man as finite person (not necessarily the highest form in Being beyond the reach of his present comprehension) is the infinite All-Person—identity in difference of infinite reason and infinite energy as the Absolute I. The way of separation or abstraction as *reines Denken* is the *facilis descensus Averni* of philosophy. Whether it be abstraction of experience from reason as in Hume's aposteriorism, or of reason from experience as in Kant's apriorism, — abstraction of energy from reason as in Spencer's pandynamism, or of reason from energy as in Hegel's panlogism, — any attempted separation of the inseparable defeats itself, and renders every problem in philosophy insoluble. The only possible solution of philosophical problems is the way of identity in difference. For necessary total inherence of every unit in its own universal and necessary partial inherence of every universal in each of its own units,—that is, identity in difference of the unit and the universal, — constitute together the unconditioned condition of the reciprocal relations of genus, species, and specimen, whether in Being or in Thought; and, since these conditions and relations are what they are simply because they "cannot be otherwise," the law of unit-universals is the Apriori alike of Being, of Thought, and of Knowledge.

Turn in whatever direction we may, illustrations of identity in difference meet us on every hand. Every object of vision presents it as inseparable form and color; wherever the form is, there is the color, and wherever the color is, there is the form; extinction of one would be extinction of the other as a visual object. Every object of

touch presents it as inseparable form and resistance; and every object of hearing, as a sound, a word, a tune, presents it as inseparable pitch, intensity, and timbre. Identity in difference is less than absolute sameness; but it is more than indissoluble union, which may be mere external juxtaposition, while identity in difference is the absolute internal co-extension and interpenetration of essences as reciprocal conditions each of the other. When, for instance, Kant teaches that "intuitions without concepts are blind, and concepts without intuitions are empty," he seems to declare their interpenetration as matter and form, and doubtless means that; yet he really declares only their indissoluble union in "experience" alone, for he actually separates them as "pure concepts" and "pure intuitions" in "pure knowledge *a priori*." He derives intuitions from the sensibility alone and concepts from the understanding alone, two faculties which "have, perhaps, a common though unknown root," but which act in reciprocal independence of each other; their products, therefore, cannot be more closely united than the processes themselves, which are separated in all "pure knowledge *a priori*." But identity in difference of substance, as energy, and essence, as reason, in the constitution of the cosmos, as All-Person,—identity in difference of involution of essence in substance, as ideal form or reason, and evolution of essence in substance, as real form or fact, in the cosmical process as Syllogism of Being,—identity in difference of experience and reason in all process of human intelligence as Syllogism of Thought,—identity in difference of sensibility and understanding in the one knowing-faculty and the one knowing-process, or of perception and conception in the percept-concept of the unit-universal as real product of that process in the Syllogism of Knowledge,—such identity in difference as this is immeasurably more than mere juxtaposition, or even indissoluble union, for it is interpenetration so profound that suppression of one element is *eo ipso* absolute suppression of the other, too.

Comprehension of such identity in difference as this, not separation in the distinguishable, but distinction in the inseparable, is, we repeat, the key to comprehension of the world; for it is the key to the solution of the problem of Greek philosophy, nay, the problem of all philosophy, in the reconciliation of the One and the Many as at once infinite Machine, infinite Organism, and infinite Person, in the Absolute I. In the last analysis, all identity in difference is that of essence and substance. What are these?

§ 187. Descartes answered this question by affirming that substance is Independent Being—that which so exists as to need nothing else for its existence (*res quae ita existit ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum*). There are three substances: one absolutely independent substance which is infinite and uncreated but creative, perfect personal spirit as *causa sui*, that is, God; and two finite and created substances which are absolutely dependent on God, but relatively independent of each other, namely, body and soul. The nature or essence of independent substance is to be conceivable through itself alone, that is, through its own independent quality as two ultimate attributes, (1) of extension and (2) of thought. The nature or essence of the dependent substances is to be conceivable through others alone, that is, through their own dependent quality as modes, accidents, or particular forms of extension or of thought (*modi extensionis* or *modi cogitationis*), which have nothing in common; thinking substance and extended substance (*res cogitans* and *res extensa*) are both conceptually distinct and ontologically separable. This is the dualism of mind and matter, which, however, proves to be an awkward compromise between trinism and monism; for it gives a primary dualism of God and the World, and a secondary dualism in the World itself as Body and Soul. These two dualisms, as really a trinism if taken together, hopelessly confuse the relations of God, Body, and Soul, as soon became manifest in the universal occasionalism of Geulinx and the universal pre-established harmony of

Leibnitz. That is, Descartes separated God, as immaterial spirit, from the World, as mere material mechanism; between which two disparate substances the possibility of interaction was just as incomprehensible as between body and soul in the World itself. The primary dualism ought to exclude all Soul from the World; within an exclusively mechanical World, however, in which there can be no logical place for soul at all, he conceded the actual interaction of body and soul in human beings, as a fact not to be denied, but also not to be explained. The conception of substance which involved such perplexities as these evidently needed to be recast.

§ 188. Spinoza greatly modified the answer of Descartes. Substance remained Independent Being — that which exists in itself and is conceived through itself (*id quod in se est et per se concipitur*). But there were not with Spinoza, as with Descartes, three substances, God, body, and soul, but only one substance, God alone (*Deus sive substantia*). Descartes's two finite and dependent substances became Spinoza's two infinite and independent attributes of the one independent substance as extension and thought, each conceived without the other, each independent of the other, and each both distinct and separate from the other in its own kind; particular bodies and souls were no longer substances at all, but merely modes of these two attributes of the one substance. The whole problem of interaction between two disparate substances thus disappeared, of course, but at no small cost of philosophical comprehensiveness. For, while Descartes completely separated God as personal spirit from the world as mere machine, Spinoza overcame the separation and reunited the two by sacrificing the spirit to the machine. He discarded the spirituality and the personality altogether and virtually identified God with simple mechanical causation, operating with equal universality and rigor in the two spheres of extension and thought, and without the least tincture of teleology in either. This violated the essential difference of extension

and thought, which were thus merged in one class as *effects*. God became simply the identity in difference of *natura naturans*, as the one immanent and absolute Free Cause, and *natura naturata*, including both extension and thought as two parallel but independent Causal Series (*ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum*). In both, God was one and the same Free Necessity (*libera necessitas*), because all things in each series follow in pure logical sequence and absolute purposelessness from the inner mechanical necessity of the divine nature alone. In exact phrase, the one divine substance is Independent Being, and the one divine essence is Purposeless Power or Mechanical Force (*Dei potentia est ipsa ipsius essentia*).

No better formula could be devised for Evolution without Involution. Spinoza's *Causa Sui* is Spencer's Unconditioned Cause: Spinoza knows only *natura naturans* as Cause, and *natura naturata* as Effect — Spencer knows the Absolute only as the "Unconditioned Cause," and the Persistence of Force as "conditioned Effect." To both thinkers there is a reserved field for mysticism — to Spinoza, the innumerable "infinite attributes" other than "extension and thought," — to Spencer, the "indefinite consciousness of the Absolute" as the Impersonal Reality which is "higher than personality;" but, to both, this mystical field is the Unknowable, while the whole field of the Knowable is that of all-inclusive mechanism without teleology.

It may be imagined that Spinoza, at least, recognizes more than the purely mechanical, when he makes *thought* one of the two known attributes of the one infinite substance; and this supposed recognition of the hypermechanical has deceived many as to the strictly mechanical character of his system. For in this system the purely mechanical law of cause and effect is conceived to govern absolutely the Divine Thought, no less than the Divine Extension; whence it follows that thought itself ceases to be thought and becomes, at the very utmost, merely self-

conscious mechanism. But self-conscious mechanism is a self-contradiction, as evident as Spencer's confessedly "grotesque supposition" that "the tickings and other movements of a watch constituted a kind of consciousness." The reason is that the necessary condition of all real thought is free purpose, (1) the purpose to know from the desire to know (διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν), or (2) the purpose to know from the desire or need to act: thought without this free purposive self-activity, thought directed to no end and for no end, is itself impossible, because the possibility of thought is destroyed in destroying freedom as its condition.

Spinoza's recognition of thought, therefore, as an attribute of his one substance, is merely nominal (God he conceives to be devoid both of "will and understanding," as mere "modes of thought"); while his recognition of efficient causality (*Dei potentia*) as its sole essence (*ipsa ipsius essentia*) is real. Thus the attribute of extension necessarily swallows up the attribute of thought, extinguishes it, and reduces God in reality to the one essential and sole attribute of efficient without final causality. This is a one-sided Mechanical Monism, that is, a monism of mechanism without teleology, evolution without involution, efficient causal series without purposive rational series, identity in difference of substance as God and essence as Mechanical Force alone. Even this one-sided monism does not escape an internal dualism, since the two attributes, the nominal and the real, are conceived as not only distinguished but also separated in the one substance, incapable of affecting one the other. Such a distorted and imperfect monism of substance in ostensible but illusory dualism of essence fails to justify the common conception of Spinozism as a thoroughly monistic system. Pure monism, indeed, would be unphilosophic, since philosophy can think the One and the Many in organic harmony only as identity in difference of monism and pluralism. But in a higher sense this total organic constitution, too, must be thought as absolutely

one in the absolute unit-universal of Existence, the one and only universe of Real Being, the identity in difference of unity and universality in the Absolute I. Spinoza fails to conceive the self-supporting and all-comprehensive totality of a oneness which fulfils itself through its own internal self-correlation in an infinite manifoldness, just because he divides his one substance into two essences, that is, two essential attributes, which are supposed to have nothing in common, and which stand over against each other within the Divine nature itself in stark and unreconciled opposition. For his Extension is the Mere Machine, and his non-purposive or merely mechanical Thought is Thoughtlessness: Extension devours Thought. Substance and essence cannot be thus violently separated; they are identical in difference, distinguishable but indivisible; and the only monism of substance which can sustain itself is that which involves monism of essence — one eternal substance and one eternal essence in one eternal process. Only as Absolute I can this condition be fulfilled in Real Being, and Spinoza excluded the conception of the I from his conception of God by his exclusion of teleology, will, and understanding, thereby reducing his conception of the one substance to that of the mere machine.

§ 189. Leibnitz conceived substance neither under the form of Descartes's attempted dualism nor under that of Spinoza's attempted monism, but under the form of pluralism or monadology. Substance remained Independent Being, but only as Independent Active Being. Substance is not the all-producing unit-universal, but a mere infinite multitude of disconnected monads or units, each existing by acting independently of all the rest. "Whatever acts is a singular substance; whatever does not act does not exist; substance is a being capable of action." Substance, then, is independent individual being, and its essence is independent individual activity; and, except in their inexplicable likeness in substance and essence, no two monads are alike at all. More than this does not concern us here,

since the doctrine of monads bristles with difficulties, to consider which would take us too far afield. However, the common essence is further defined. The monad, as an independent unit of substance (there is no universal of substance other than the arithmetical sum of the units as an infinite multitude), is not a material, solid, inactive unit, an atom moved only from without, but an immaterial unit of self-active force (*vis activa*), moved only from within and incapable of influence by its fellows; it is incorporeal, indivisible, immortal, punctual or nonspatial, capable only of self-development from within, representative of the universe it mirrors by reproducing it internally, and so forth. Its substance is its being as uniqueness or absolute individuality, and its essence is its form as absolute self-activity; while yet, as dependent on God, it is also passive — a relation which, as in the case of Descartes, throws the whole doctrine into confusion again. For God is only the supreme monad, the *monas monadum*, between whom and the other monads there ought, by the theory, to be no interaction whatever. This is the internal contradiction of the monadology which seems least of all to admit of reconciliation, for it seems to negative the very essence of substance as independent self-activity of the individual monad. The conception of substance as a pluralism of monads appears thus to destroy itself: substance as independent individual being, and its essence as action which is at once dependent and independent, are certainly irreconcilable with each other.

§ 190. The dualism of Descartes, the monism of Spinoza, and the pluralism of Leibnitz were all held as ontological theories of things as they are in themselves. With all three, substance was Independent Being, τὸ ὄν ἡ ὄν. But Descartes's principle of individual self-certainty as the primal and fundamental fact of philosophy contained in itself the seeds of modern subjectivism in forms of exhaustless variety and of all degrees of inconsistency; for the only form of subjectivism which is logically consistent

with itself is pure solipsism, and this does not occur. Descartes, who thought he had avoided solipsism through the idea of God as innate in the Ego, merely gave a scientific formula to the spirit of subjectivism in his famous *cogito, ergo sum*; he thereby doubtless strengthened that spirit, but he did not originate it. Objectivism in science, as purely physical investigation of Nature, had maintained itself by the verifiable character of its results; but these results were too closely confined to physics to permit any larger generalization than the conclusion of Descartes himself as a physicist, not as a philosopher, that the world is a machine: a generalization which is an indubitable truth, yet which is turned into an untruth when it is made to mean that the world is *nothing but* a machine. For, instead of being a final result, an end of all investigation and all thinking, it is merely the definite first step or beginning of larger investigation and higher thought: the question remains, *what is a machine?* Put that question precisely and press thought to an answer — analyze the machine of experience, and discover that it is and can be nothing but an artificial, separable, and temporary organ of the organism — demand further to know how such a concept of human experience can be applied at all to the world as a whole, and discover the necessary identity in difference of the infinite machine and the infinite organism as one infinite universe — insist on knowing how the universe as an infinite organism could possibly be an infinite system of immanent ends and means without being at the same time an infinite person: press objectivism in science, we say, to these higher and necessary generalizations, and the spirit of subjectivism in philosophy would vanish like the fog before the coming day. (See Appendix, Fundamental Analyses.)

But the day had not come, and the fog of subjectivism spread everywhere, until Kant arrived at last to give to it, in his *Erkenntnisstheorie*, the formidable and gigantic shape of a Spectre of the Blocksberg. Intimidated by this phan-

tom, the type of speculative thought which sincerely believes itself to be "modern philosophy," but which in truth is waiting to be modernized by scientific objectivism, just as chemistry has been modernized by the atomic theory and biology by the derivation theory within the last half-century, has not even yet proved able to resist the phantom's paralyzing influence. For under the much-abused name of the "relativity of knowledge" it still upholds the Kantian *Erkenntnistheorie*, which we have shown above (§§ 172, 173) to rest ultimately on the proposition that necessity = non-necessity. Such a theory of knowledge, teaching the absolute subjectivity of all relations as such, and denying the objectivity of any relations in real existence because all relation as such is nothing but "synthesis *a priori*" by the Subject, reduces existence itself to a surd, and permits no higher concept of substance than that of Relative or Dependent Being: that is, Being which has no reality whatever except as the pure product, idea, or conceptual work of the human Subject, and which, therefore, absolutely depends on that Subject. When, in perfect good faith, Kant caricatured as "dogmatism" the claim to know substance as Independent Being, or things as they are in themselves (*Dinge an sich*), he forgot that he exposed himself thereby to the crushing but inevitable retort that the claim to know substance as Dependent Being, or things as they are not in themselves (*Gegenstände, nur Erscheinungen*), is on the very face of it self-convicted "humbug" as nescience. For who is so blind as not to see that pretended knowledge of "what is not so" is nothing but ignorance? So long as noumena remain, by Kant's own definition, things as they are in themselves, and phaenomena things as they are not in themselves, the pretence that *we know* "phaenomena alone" must remain, no matter how sincerely and innocently the pretence is made, what Sokrates satirically characterized as "the conceit of knowledge without the reality." If we cannot know substance as Independent Being, as Reality, we can at least reconcile

ourselves to necessary nescience with stoical fortitude; but it concerns the dignity of philosophy and the ethics of the intellect not to accept as "knowledge" at all that pseudo-science of substance as Dependent Being, or mere Relativity, which passes current now with so many as "modern philosophy." The very first step towards a truly modern philosophy must be the clear recognition, in no spirit of opposition, but in that of unflinching scientific accuracy, that phaenomenism in all its forms is essential agnoiology, and noumenism the only scientific epistemology.

§ 191. If the concept of substance as Independent Being, then, fails to sustain itself with Descartes as dualism, with Spinoza as monism, with Leibnitz as pluralism, — if the concept of substance as Dependent Being fails to sustain itself with the Kantian subjectivism as "phaenomena alone," mere appearances without intrinsic reality, — what conceivable form remains for it to take? Briefly, this: identity in difference of Independent Being and Dependent Being — not an abstract Absolute without a Relative ("out of relation," as it is put), nor yet an abstract Relative without an Absolute ("pure relativity"), but, on the contrary, concrete identity in difference of the Absolute, or Independent Being as One (which is the absolute monism), and the Relative, or Dependent Being as Many (which is the absolute pluralism), in the real form of the world as one infinite and eternal sole universe. More particularly: the real form of the world as the infinite One is by no means an abstract Eleatic unity or sterile simplicity, but rather an immanent relational constitution (the objectivity of relations being inseparable from the objectivity of things as their real terms) which is an infinite and eternal productivity of real forms as the finite Many, and which is both organic in itself and organific in these its concrete products. This immanent relational constitution of the universe, as one infinite real form in itself and infinitely many real forms in its immanent concrete products, is clearly and distinctly conceivable as identity in difference

of substance, essence, and process, in one knowable Reality, as follows:—

I. The substance of the world is one infinite and eternal Energy, or Action in Thought, as the mechanical side of the organic process, that is, as Evolution.


II. The essence of the world is one infinite and eternal Reason, or Thought in Action, as the teleological side of the organic process, that is, as Involution.

III. The process of the world is the identity in difference of Energy and Reason, Action in Thought and Thought in Action, or Evolution and Involution, as the one organic process of Life, the eternal Syllogism of Being.

IV. The Being or Reality of the world is the identity in difference of this substance, this essence, and this process, as One All-Person, the Absolute I. (§ 179, *ad finem*.)

V. Whatever may lie in the reality of the world as not yet known may add to, but not subtract from, the reality of what is known already. For, just so far as it goes, Knowledge is as real as Being, because it is Being itself as conscious Subject-Object.

The concept of substance as identity in difference of Independent Being and Dependent Being, therefore, is involved in that of the world as identity in difference of substance, essence, and process. This is Reality itself—Energy informed by Reason in the course of the actual universe. Human experience gives us knowledge of Dependent Being as the Many Units, and human reason gives us knowledge of Independent Being as the One Universal,—two distinguishable but inseparable elements of knowledge as science of the Unit-Universal of Real Existence. This conception of Reality may be simply set down in this little diagram of the “course of Nature” from the One to the Many:—



§ 192. Reason is here intended to connote all other essential elements of personality, of which it is the dominant principle; and process implies its own law, aim, and ground, as indicated in § 179. Reason means *to think*, and it can exist as ideality only in real ideation — that is, only as Thought in Action. Equally, Energy means *to act*, and it can exist as actuality only in real action — that is, only as Action in Thought. Separate and isolate Reason from Energy, as is done by rationalism, — or separate and isolate Energy from Reason, as is done by empiricism, — and both vanish from reality into mere abstraction. *It is only as identity in difference of Reason and Energy in Life that either element can be real.* That is why their separation yields only a concept of the Unreal I, while their identity in difference yields the only concept of the Real I, as explained in § 60 by Tables I and II; also, why both empiricism and rationalism reach only the Irrational Antithesis of I and Not-We, as explained in § 71 by Table III; also, why all systems of materialism, or Energy without Reason, and all systems of idealism, or Reason without Energy, are equally and absolutely failures — equally and absolutely incompetent to meet the just demands of science and scientific realism. Kant's "pure reason" and Hegel's "pure thought," that is, Reason or Thought pure from all experience or empirical elements, and therefore pure from all admixture of Energy as affecting the understanding through sensuous or intellective perception, ultimate in nothing but unreal abstractions from real knowledge; and the root of the failure lies in their subjectivist concepts of substance.

Kant fatally separated Reason, or essence, from Energy, or substance, by his fundamental doctrine of "synthesis *a priori*," or "spontaneity of knowledge" in the pure understanding, as the exclusively subjective origin of all relations as such. The consequence was that "things as they are in themselves," being divested of all originally immanent relations, became necessarily unintelligible as

substance without essence, and nothing was left to be known but "phaenomena alone," or things as they are not in themselves; that is, essence without substance, mere relations created by and inherent in the subject, abstractions, absolute unrealities, nothing but pure *entia rationis*.

Hegel fared no better, but just as fatally separated Reason from Energy, though he transformed Kant's "subjective idealism" into "absolute idealism." He says:

"According to the Kantian philosophy, the things of which we know are only phaenomena *for us*, and their *Ansich* [*i. e.* their immanent relational constitutions, the relational essence which makes the substance intelligible] remains for us an unattainable Beyond. The common-sense consciousness has justly taken umbrage at this subjective idealism, according to which that which forms the content of our consciousness is something that is *only ours*, something which is posited by *us*. In fact, the true relation is this: the things of which we immediately know are not only mere phaenomena *for us*, but also mere phaenomena *in themselves*, and the peculiar determination of finite things is to have the ground of their being, not in themselves, but in the Divine Idea. This conception of things, then, is to be designated in any case as idealism, yet, in distinction from that subjective idealism of the critical philosophy, as Absolute Idealism; which absolute idealism, although transcending the common realistic consciousness, is nevertheless so little to be considered as a peculiarity of philosophy that it rather forms the foundation of all religious consciousness, namely, in so far as this, too, considers the total content of all that exists, in general the actual world, as created and ruled by God."¹

¹ Encyklopädie, Werke, VI. 97, 98. Of course, "phaenomena in themselves" which have the "ground of their being in the Divine Idea," yet are also "phaenomena for us," can have no possible self-subsistence or independent being in themselves, but must exist only as effects wrought in the human subject by the Divine Subject. This conception of Hegel seems scarcely, if at all, distinguishable from that of Berkeley — objects whose only *esse* is *percipi*, to be explained only by the direct action of the Divine on human consciousness. From this point of view, the distinction between "objective idealism" in Hegel and "subjective idealism" in Kant or Berkeley wholly disappears. Kant himself opposed Berkeley and "subjective idealism," as "mystical and visionary," as mere "cobwebs of the brain." (Prolegomena, Werke, IV. 41, 42.)

This "objective" or "absolute idealism" is frequently considered as conceding the "real existence of a material world," even if not quite in the way that "common sense" wants it; and too many Hegelians, who would not accept this view if they discriminated the really significant statements of Hegel from the relatively insignificant ones, so take it. The most important of the significant statements are those which define or indicate Hegel's concept of substance, and are mainly these (the italics are everywhere his own): —

"The need of philosophy may be more precisely determined by the consideration that, since Spirit as emotive and intuitive has for its object the sensuous, — as imagination, images, — as will, aims, — and so forth, it thus, in the bare *opposition or distinction of these forms* of its existence and its objects, at the same time satisfies its own supreme subjectivity, Thought, and arrives at Thought as its object. In this way it comes to *itself* in the deepest sense of the word, for its principle, its unalloyed selfhood, is Thought."¹

"As for the *beginning* which philosophy has to make, it seems, even in its universality, to begin with a subjective presupposition, just like the other sciences: that is to say, just as they make Space, Number, etc., their particular object, so philosophy seems to be under the necessity of making Thought itself, as a given single fact, the particular object of Thought. But this is the free act of Thought, to put itself in the position where it exists for itself, and thereby *produces and gives to itself its own object*."²

"Thought, as it constitutes the substance of external things, is also the universal substance of the spiritual,"³

"In truth, however, as we have just seen, *Thought is that which determines itself to be Will (das sich selbst zum Willen Bestimmende)*, and the former remains the substance of the latter."⁴

¹ Encyklopädie, Werke, VI. 17.

² *Ibid.* VI. 25.

³ *Ibid.* VI. 46.

⁴ *Ibid.* VII. ii. 358. (Cf. VIII. 35: "Der Wille ist eine besondere Weise des Denkens.") Hegel here contradicts himself, for *self-determination* "to be will" presupposes the *will to determine*. Kuno Fischer very justly remarks: "In this transition from the theoretical to the practical

“Thought abides with itself, relates itself to itself, and has itself for object.”¹

“The Idea shows itself as the Thought which is absolutely identical with itself, and no less as the Activity [*i. e.* Will] which places itself over against itself in order to be for itself, and in this Other merely abides with itself.”²

“The objective meaning of the figures of the syllogism is in general *this*, that everything rational (*alles Vernünftige*) shows itself as a threefold syllogism, and indeed in such a manner that each of its members just as well assumes the position of an extreme as it does that of the mediating middle term. This is particularly the case with the three members of the philosophical science, that is, the Logical Idea, Nature, and Spirit. Here, in the first place, Nature is the middle or connecting member. Nature, this immediate totality, unfolds itself in the two extremes of the Logical Idea and Spirit. Spirit, however, is only Spirit while it is mediated by Nature. Then, in the second place, the Spirit which we know as the Individual and the Active is just as much the middle, and Nature and the Logical Idea are the extremes. It is Spirit which knows the Logical Idea in Nature, and spirit there lies a certain ambiguity. Is it the result of the whole previous development that the Intelligence knows itself as Will, or that it makes itself Will and becomes Will? If we look back to the beginning, we must answer this question affirmatively in its first alternative. . . . At the beginning of the development of the theoretical spirit, the Will appears as the moving principle — at the close, as the emergent result; there it is *primary*, here *secondary*. As to the relation between Will and Intellect, therefore, there exists just as unmistakable an agreement between Hegel and Schopenhauer there, as here the unmistakable opposition and conflict. Here, therefore, a contradiction makes itself observable which affects the Hegelian doctrine itself.” (*Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, VII. ii. 683.) Again: “The Hegelian psychology has proved that there is no Will without Thought, but also no Thought without Will, since the whole development of the theoretical Intelligence starts from intuition, which itself presupposes attention and the *act of the Will* necessary to it.” (*Ibid.* 692.) Then the Hegelian psychology itself disproves the Hegelian metaphysic which makes Thought the one sole substance. The identity in difference of Thought and Will can be only that of Reason and Energy as Person — Energy as substance and Reason as essence, which is our contention against Hegel.

¹ Encyklopädie, Werke, VI. 63.

² *Ibid.* VI. 26.

so elevates it to its essence. In the third place, the Logical Idea itself is just as much the middle; it is the absolute substance of Spirit as well as of Nature,—the Universal, the All-Pervading. These are the members of the absolute syllogism.”¹

“The definition of *the Absolute*, that it is *the Idea*, is itself absolute. All previous definitions return to this. . . . The Idea itself is not to be taken as an *Idea of Something* [*von irgend Etwas*], just as little as the Notion is to be taken as determined Notion. The Absolute is the One Idea, which, as *judging*, particularizes itself in the *system* of determined ideas, which, however, exist as determined ideas only to return to the One Idea, to its truth. It is first of all from this act of judgment that the Idea is the one universal substance, but its developed genuine reality is that it exists as *Subject*, and so as *Spirit*.”²

Briefly: Thought is the only Substance—that is, nothing exists but ideas, as fleeting forms in the eternal dialectic of self-contradiction and self-reconciliation as the One Idea. This is the fundamental and distinctive standpoint of Absolute Idealism.

§ 193. These few passages are enough to determine with great precision the fundamental position of Hegel as to the concept of substance, on which everything else in philosophy depends. What he found in previous modern

¹ Encyklopädie, Werke, VI. 353, 354. If any one should assert that Hegel's objective or absolute syllogism resembles or is identical with our Syllogism of Being, he would only convict himself of the grossest incapacity for fundamental distinctions. For Hegel recognizes no “substance” in Nature or in Spirit but the Logical Idea itself, nothing but Thought or Reason—*Reason without Energy*; while we consider Reason without Energy, just as much as Energy without Reason, to be absolute nothingness or non-existence. Hegel never blunders on this prime principle of *Thought the only Substance*—there is no place in his system for Energy, as an element just as substantial as Thought, Reason, Logical Idea. To confound this philosophy with Hegel's, or to imagine it derived from Hegel's, when its source has been simply the logical implications of the anti-Hegelian principle of the *objectivity of relations*,—and this has been done,—ought to be impossible for any critic who is both educated and honest. For Hegel himself, if he were alive, would be the first to disown it—with emphasis.

² *Ibid.* VI. 385, 386.

thinkers as materials from which to construct it, on the general basis of the Aristotelian Paradox (§§ 122-129), may be shortly summed up, taking account of great distinct standpoints alone, as follows:—

Spinoza represented the standpoint of ontological monism, the doctrine of the absolute reality as One Independent Being. The one sole substance was God, the Absolute Unit as the necessary juxtaposition or indissoluble union, not the identity in difference, of Extension and Thought — *real Extension* and nominal Thought as *real Thoughtlessness*; its essence was purposeless necessity, that is, purely mechanical force; and its process was the eternal concatenation of mechanical causes in a twofold chain, in the connected but alien attributes of Extension and Thought. This was the conception of the world as nothing but Energy in a machine, notwithstanding its apparent but deceptive recognition of Thought as a purposeless intellect — which is no intellect.

Leibnitz represented the standpoint of ontological pluralism, the doctrine of the absolute reality as Many Independent Beings. The innumerable substances were monads, unextended but thinking individuals, Absolute Units of Thought; their common essence was individual self-developing activity; and their common process was the mirroring or representation, with varying degrees of clearness and distinctness, of the universe of monads by each monad in isolated subjective thinking. This was the conception of the world as nothing but Thought in a multitude of ontologically independent centres or subjects — Thought as the Many.

Kant represented the standpoint of individual subjectivism or phaenomenism, the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge in each individual subject as the true reality of Subjective Dependent Being: a doctrine which is, in truth, the absorption and disappearance of individual subject and individual object in the relation of which they are the terms, and on which, as the sole true reality, they both

depend (Pure Formalism, Pure Relationism). The only real substance was this relativity of knowledge itself, as the formal relation of the unformed to the unformed, that is, of an unknown logical subject (the $I = x$) to an unknown real object (noumena = unknowable things as they are in themselves, phaenomena = knowable things as they are not in themselves: with either as real object, the "relativity of knowledge" = error or absolute ignorance). The essence of this substance was the exclusive subjectivity of relations. The process was "pure synthesis *a priori*," or free subjective creation of all relations by the individual understanding as "spontaneity of knowledge." This cannot be called a conception of the world at all, for it gives us a mere *je ne sais quoi*.

Out of these heterogeneous elements, Hegel, with marvellous ingenuity, wove the web of his absolute idealism.

From Spinoza he took the principle of the *absolute monism of substance*, but rejected the principle of mechanism. Handicapped by his own juxtaposition of Extension and Thought as incompatible attributes of the one substance, Spinoza had been logically compelled, in order to preserve the unity of process in both attributes, to drop Thought by construing it as a purposeless and mechanically moved intellect, devoid both of will and understanding; whereby his one substance, as compound of real Extension with real Thoughtlessness, could be moved only by mechanical causation as its one process. But Hegel took the other horn of the dilemma. Equally unable to reconcile Extension with Thought, he dropped the former entirely, expunged the whole mechanical process to universalize the logical, and kept *Thought alone as the one sole substance*, as declared so explicitly in the foregoing extracts — Thought purified from all Experience of Extension as Matter, Mechanism, or Mechanical Energy (*reines Denken*).

From Leibnitz Hegel took the principle of *free self-development as the absolute process in substance*, but rejected that of pluralism of substances, or Thought as the Many.

His monistic process is the Infinite Logic, Thought as the One, self-activity as free self-determination in the dialectical unfolding of the notion in the one eternal self-thinking (*Begriff des Begriffes, reine Idee*). His idea is not the "Idea of Something," but has its infinite Being as the One Absolute Idea of itself, in itself, and for itself.

From Kant Hegel took the principle of subjectivism, but freed it from the narrowness of Kant's individualistic standpoint by universalizing the individual subject as the knowable (not unknowable) Absolute Subject, and making this, as Absolute Spirit, the *absolute essence in substance*. He thus brought substance, essence, and process, the three great elements of Reality, into the unity of a true synthesis as identity in difference—one absolute substance as Thought, one absolute essence as Subject or Spirit, and one absolute process as self-development, free self-determination, or dialectical Self-Activity. So constituted as a pure Monism of Thought, it is not to be wondered at that Hegel's absolute idealism won and so long held an immense influence in the philosophical world; for no previous system ever exhibited on the whole so high or so superb a degree of self-harmony.

§ 194. Nevertheless, the imposing structure rests on a false foundation in its concept of substance, and this falsity has wrought the ruin of its influence by alienating the scientific mind. The real substance of the world, the one sole and universal substance, is not Thought, but Energy, without which Thought itself could not exist as Self-Activity. Hegel's admission of Self-Activity into his panlogism is his unwilling, if not unconscious, confession that his panlogism itself is fundamentally false—that Thought, after all, is not the one sole substance. Energy, on the contrary, is the substance, and Thought or Reason (in fuller truth, Personality) is the essence, of the real universe: abolition of either element would be the renascence of chaos. When, ignoring Energy altogether as mechanical causation because recognition of it would have

involved that empirical element from which all idealistic thought must be "pure," yet compelled to recognize it as spiritual self-activity because without this even idealistic thought itself could not think at all, Hegel put pure Thought in the position of the one sole substance, he not only fatally separated the real substance and the real essence of the world, but no less fatally confounded the real distinction between substance and essence as such by putting "form" in the place of "matter." In justice to him, however, it must be admitted that here he wavered just as his master Aristotle had wavered before him. Conceiving $\psi\lambda\eta$ as pure potentiality, that is, unreality now and reality by and by, Aristotle had conceived substance first as $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma + \psi\lambda\eta$, $\tau\acute{o} \sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$ or $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon \tau\iota$, and then as $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ alone, using the same name $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ for both conceptions. In taking "form" as itself the only real or non-potential "matter," essence as the only true substance, or Thought alone as the only true Being, Hegel might plead so far the authority of Aristotle's own wavering example.

Nevertheless, essence and substance are equally real and equally necessary, and philosophy ends in smoke when it confounds them. The distinction lies in the very heart of truth. The crude and blind representation of matter as *inaction*, dead atoms moving only as they are moved, has passed by. Matter is action in work; motion, rest, inertia itself, are only modes of action; nothing whatever is known of matter which is not *action* in molecular systems internally and externally *related*. The substance or matter of the world is nothing but Energy; its essence is Form; and, when form is understood as immanent relational constitution, the form or essence of the world is seen to be nothing but Thought, Reason, Subject-Object, Absolute I. Thought is not substance at all; in all the fulness of its significance, it is the essence of the world, origin and ultimatum of all forms in Person as the Form of Forms. The taking of Thought as the sole substance, instead of the taking of it as the essence of substance, was logically

the exclusion of Energy, not only as mechanical causation, but also as spiritual activity, from the system of absolute idealism; retention of it in the latter shape was wholly without logical warrant, and logically involved retention of all those empirical elements without which activity, whether mechanical or spiritual, is both inconceivable and impossible—a consequence which detroys the supposed purity of “pure thought.” The incurable fault of the Hegelian philosophy, therefore, incurable by all the devices and expedients of Neo-Hegelianism, is its own fundamental, genetic, and constitutive principle: namely, its panlogism, its own ideal as *reines Denken*, its one-sided exclusion of *Erfahrung*, its putting of Thought, which is the form or essence, into the false position of the matter or substance. This initial fault works itself out in the final result as the *impersonality* of Thought in the Subject, the Spirit, the Absolute Idea. For we saw in Chapter XI, (§§ 131, 143) how Hegel’s Pure I, in its supreme development as the Spirit, becomes the Pure It. This ultimate equation of the Spirit, or Pure I, with the It, or the Not-I, in consequence of which the Subject ceases to be the I at all and Thought becomes Unthought, is nothing but the legitimate, natural, and necessary consequence of the original endeavor to think Thought as the one sole substance, to abstract it from Energy, and to separate it thereby from all Experience of Energy, as *reines Denken*.

§ 195. The conception of substance as Energy is no invention of ours. Not to mention Leibnitz, Kant himself, and other philosophical pioneers in that direction, the growing and spreading spirit of scientific objectivism, which long since broke the influence of “absolute idealism” in the country that gave it birth, and which will ere long break its influence in the countries of its emigration, now sanctions that conception on physical grounds in strictly scientific circles. It is enough here to quote Professor Ostwald, who has prominently advocated it for many years:—

"It lies close at hand to see in Energy a real existence, not merely a mathematical abstraction. Four years ago I emphasized this thought on occasion of my inaugural address at Leipzig, without being conscious at the time that it had been previously expressed in the most unambiguous manner by J. R. Mayer, the discoverer of the energy-principle, in his first short memoir [1842], and that Tait, in the year 1885, had accented the same thought with reference to the equivalence and convertibility of forces. Meanwhile I was still so far entangled in the common ideas of the reality of Matter that the utmost I ventured to do was to assign to Energy an equal position by the side of Matter as 'substance.' My more searching investigations into the properties and nature of Energy, begun since then, have in the meantime led me farther. The more intimately acquainted I became with these properties, the clearer became the proof that Matter is nothing but a system of energies [*ein Komplex der Energiefaktoren*], which possess the property of being reciprocally proportional. In fact, the traditional fundamental properties of Matter show themselves as factors of Energy, or, if one prefers, its forms of expression. Thus mass is the capacity for kinetic energy, gravity the intensity of space-energy, impenetrability (that is, volume) the capacity for volume-energy, and so forth. In this manner, on keen inspection, Matter more and more vanishes behind Energy, and the latter irresistibly exchanges its former subordinate or at most co-ordinate position for the most absolute primacy."¹

¹ W. Ostwald, *Studien zur Energetik*, Zeitschrift für physikalische Chemie, IX. 566 : Leipzig, 1892. Even E. Haeckel shows a marked tendency to the same conception: "I postulate for ether a special structure which is not atomistic, like that of ponderable matter, and which may provisionally be called (without further determination) *etheric* or *dynamic* structure." (*Riddle of the Universe*, trans. McCabe, 1901, p. 227.) T. H. Huxley still more nearly approaches it: "Thus the most obvious attribute of the cosmos is its impermanence. It assumes the aspect not so much of a permanent entity as of a changeful process in which naught endures save the flow of energy and the rational order which pervades it." (*Evolution and Ethics*, 1899, p. 50.) If Huxley had only held fast to this position, and perceived that no "rational order" can possibly be non-ethical, he would never have written the Romanes lecture. But Professor C. S. Minot has put the dynamical theory of matter with admirable terseness and vigor in his President's Address before the American Association for the Advancement of Science, at Pittsburgh, June 28, 1902: "All our

§ 196. By strictly following its own lines of investigation, therefore, objectivism as physical science has thus already reached a higher and deeper philosophical truth than Hegel ever discerned in his "absolute idealism," which is nevertheless the finest product of "pure reason *a priori*" or "pure thought." According to modernized physics itself, as we see in Ostwald, Energy is "substance," and Matter is only a "system of energies." That is, if thought out logically and fully in accordance with the law of unit-universals, Energy is the Universal Substance, and Matter, whether as "atom" or "ion," or still smaller "corpuscle" or "electron" of electricity, or smallest "particle" of the luminiferous ether, is nothing but the Units of Energy. But no less true is it that Mind, also, is only a system of energies, another Unit of which Energy is still the Universal Substance. In other words, Energy is the one and only substance, of which Mind and Matter are the two real forms or essences. But these two forms, unlike Spinoza's two attributes, are neither alien nor apart. The unit of matter is a system of moving energies, of which the principle is mechanical causality or necessary unconscious motion; the unit of mind is a system of thinking energies, of which the principle is teleological self-activity or free conscious action; and the person is identity in difference of matter and mind, mechanical causality and teleological self-activity, necessary unconscious motion and free conscious action, organized as a living system of moving and thinking energies in which the machine, the organism, and the person all exist, act, interact, and co-act in complete working harmony. In

sensations are caused by force and by force only, so that the biologist can say that our senses bring no evidence of matter. The concept 'matter' is an irrational transfer of notions derived from the gross molar world of the senses to the molecular world. Faraday long ago pointed out that nothing was gained and much lost by the hypothesis of material atoms, and his position seems to me impregnable. It would be a great contribution to science to kill off the hypothesis of matter as distinct from force."

the finite, this working harmony is a fact of constant experience in every I as One of the We; and its proved actuality in the finite is assuredly no proof of its impossibility in the Infinite. If Energy is the absolute substance, and Thought as Personality is the absolute essence, then the identity in difference of substance and essence, Energy and Reason or Thought or Personality, is certainly, even from the standpoint of "speculative philosophy" itself, a higher "Idea" than that of *Thought the sole substance and Impersonality the sole essence*, as a "Subject" or "Spirit" which is no more than the barren *Verhältniss* of *Ich* to *Ich* in the formula $Ich = Ich$, a mere treaty of alliance as a "reconciling *Yes*" which is only the relation of two separate *Yeses* (§ 142).

So conceived, man is the identity in difference of matter and mind as finite person, and God is the identity in difference of Nature and Spirit as infinite All-Person. In such a conception, which is in perfect congruity with the scientific method and is fitly named scientific theism, there is no room for the old difficulty as to the possibility of interaction between matter and mind, or body and soul; both of these, as correlated systems of energies, are of one substance, not two substances, and interaction between correlated energies, instead of being inconceivable, is the known condition of the known existence of energy itself as action and reaction. This truth is involved in the equivalence and convertibility of natural forces. The inconceivable thing would be, not that matter and mind should act on each other, but rather that they should *not* both act and react on each other. If Energy is the sole substance, then, and if mind and matter are in us united but different forms of this one substance, as different but co-working systems of energies, the old difficulty vanishes. So, too, vanish the old difficulties as to the communication of motion between masses, and the communication of knowledge between minds; for these, too, are but cases of action and reaction in Energy as one and the same uni-

versal substance, and non-influence, not influence, would be the miracle. So, too, the old absurdity of considering mind as a mere inexplicable phaenomenon of matter (materialism), and the equal absurdity of considering matter as a mere inexplicable phaenomenon of mind (idealism), equally vanish; for nothing could be more absurd than to consider the essence of one form of substance to be a mere phaenomenon of the essence of another form of the same substance. One might as well consider land as a phaenomenon of water, Mont Blanc as a phaenomenon of the Bay of Biscay.

Lastly, the question of the permanence of personality, the question of the "future life," takes on a new aspect, and is totally transformed. So long as body and soul were considered to be two absolutely disparate and independent substances, the person, as actual but transient combination of the two, was an insoluble scientific mystery, and death, as separation of the two, left no rational ground for expectation of the permanence of personality; personal consciousness seemed absolutely conditioned on that irrational combination as person, and such an expectation found no warrant except in supernatural revelation. But, if body is a system of mechanical energies as one form of substance, if soul is a system of spiritual energies as another form of substance, and if person is the identity in difference of mechanical and spiritual energies as organic union of these two forms in a still higher form of one and the same substance, the question of the permanence of personality after death becomes a wholly new question: namely, is the finite person of sufficient intrinsic value or worth to warrant a rational expectation that the infinite All-Person, acting by the law of ethical personality as its own Divine nature, includes the permanence of finite personality in the warp and woof of the actual, as the slow working out of its own Divine ideal? In other words, is it reasonable to think that the person as free and self-conscious ethical being, as the I in the We, which is the actual outcome of

evolution and involution in an unvarying cosmical process lasting untold millions of years, was also *in so far* the involved end and aim of that process from the beginning? That the worth of the person as product justifies the cost of the process as the evil of suffering? That the infinite All-Person is able to *preserve* what it has certainly been able, at the cost of such patient and unflagging labor, to *produce*? That there need be no inherent impossibility of preserving it, as still the identity in difference of mechanical and spiritual energies in personal form, although to us now imperceptible, under conditions of existence beyond the scope of our very limited present perceptive powers? And that, in the absence of such impossibility, the ethical All-Person is ethically bound to preserve it? Such questions as these certainly suggest an affirmative rational answer. They are not unreasonable, at least, and open new fields of investigation in quite new directions. For they do not arise legitimately at all in physics, or chemistry, or anatomy, or physiology, or biology, or psychology, and, if raised illegitimately there, are rightly dismissed as irrelevant or even impertinent; they are ethical questions at bottom, concern only the intrinsic use and conduct and worth of personal life, and are raised legitimately in ethics alone, and in ethics alone will receive their final answer. It is enough here to point out this very important consequence of the principle of personality as above defined, in accordance with the concept of Energy as the sole substance, and to pass on to further consideration of this.

§ 197. Thanks to the heroes of science, Mohr and Mayer and Helmholtz, Faraday and Joule and Kelvin and Colding, and many others, the world has learned that all natural forces are one Force, all natural energies one Energy. But it has not yet fully learned, as Ostwald seems to have learned, that Energy is the sole Substance of the universe. Still less has it learned that matter and mind are but two kindred and inseparable modes or forms of this one substance, united in each of us as finite persons and in the

infinite All-Person, and that in this one essential constitution of personality, at once mechanical, organic, and spiritual, lies the profound identity in difference of the finite Human and the infinite Divine. But more still remains to be said about Energy as the sole substance.

I. Energy means *to energize, to do, to act*. It is the universal reality of Being in Existence, as the One in the Many. It maintains itself as Being solely as Acting. But to act is necessarily (1) to act on something, and (2) to be something in order to act on something; for to act on nothing would be not to act, and to be nothing would be equally not to act. In brief, *Being is Acting, and Acting is Being*. So far Leibnitz was right, and it was a great advance in thought. This is the aboriginal self-identity of Energy as Substance, its inner necessity as self-existence, its inner reciprocity as One and Many. But self-identity is *eo ipso* self-difference, likewise; two cannot be one unless they are also two. That is, the identity depends on the difference, and the difference depends on the identity; each conditions the other. If Being were non-active, or if Acting were non-existent, both would vanish: the self-identity of Energy as Substance is the necessary identity in difference of Being and Acting.

II. Substance as Energy, then, signifies—to Be by Acting and to Act by Being: Energy is the *Absolute One as Acting*. But the Absolute One can act only on itself and within itself; beyond it there is and can be nothing—it is the Absolute All; it must be the Absolute One as Acting on something which is both identical with itself and yet different from itself, and which is within itself; and this can only be the Many. In other words, Energy, as sole, universal, active substance of the world, can act on something, and itself exist as something, only by evolving the Many within itself as the One; it can be and act only as the universal which particularizes itself in its own units; it can be and act only as the infinite generic unit-universal of Energy which particularizes itself in

finite unit-universals of specific energies. That is, the Absolute Energy can exist only in a state of internal polarity or tension which, as endless change, motion and rest, alternation of kinetic and potential forms, or identity in difference of continuity and discontinuity, is mechanical evolution of the Many in the One throughout Space and Time. This is the necessary derivation of the atom from the universe, already foreshadowed in physics by the hypotheses of Prout and Lockyer, and it holds good universally as the law that every universal particularizes itself in its own units (*Ableitung des Besonderen aus dem Allgemeinen*).

III. In this mechanical evolution as the origination of the Many in the One, Energy is the doing of work, and work is the overcoming of resistance. But to resist is to act, and resistance is itself Energy; Energy can act only on Energy, and nothing but Energy can resist Energy; Energy can limit Energy, and nothing but Energy can limit Energy. This is the absolute quantitative equality of action and reaction, each of which is Energy alone. The necessary equality of action and reaction is merely the one comprehensive and unchangeable fact of Energy as the sole substance, maintaining its own Being as Action through its own eternal Tension, and thereby originating the Many, as an innumerable multitude of Units of Energy, out of itself as the One Universal of Energy. For Energy as Substance can itself exist only under the absolute condition of all existence, that it be the Absolute Unit-Universal of *Being as Acting* (Apriori of Being).

IV. But Energy as Substance could not exist without Reason, Thought, Personality, as its Essence. It is Reason as Essence which determines all finite relations or forms, because it is itself the infinite Form of Forms. It is Reason as Essence which, by determining all forms in Energy as Substance, determines the identity in difference of evolution and involution as Process, that is, determines all relations as objective or ontological in the Syllogism

of Being. And it is Reason as Essence which reappears in subjective consciousness as the Syllogism of Thought, and in universal science and philosophy as the Syllogism of Knowledge. Thus the Infinite Reason of the world, the all-formative Form of Forms, evolves all its own Units as finite relational forms in itself as the Universal, and exists only under the same absolute condition of all existence, that it be the Absolute Unit-Universal of *Being as Thinking* (Apriori of Being).

V. As identity in difference of substance, essence, and process, that is, of Energy and Reason in the Syllogism of Being, the universe ceases to be the "unknown and unknowable Reality" of one-sided empiricism and equally one-sided rationalism, and becomes the absolutely knowable and partially known Reality which the scientific method is unveiling. The rationality of the universe is luminous in its concrete Reality as Reason-Energy, but not out of it. Suppress the Energy-side of it, and it fades into Hegel's apotheosized "relation" as a treaty of peace between two warring I's which are nothing but two Its. Suppress the Reason-side of it, and it darkens into Spencer's Unknowable. Unite the two in their natural and necessary whole, and the Way of the World reveals itself as the Way of the Mind; for the method of Being and the method of Thought are one and the same in the syllogism, in which shines out the perfect oneness of *Being as Acting* and *Being as Thinking* in the *Absolute I*.

§ 198. It is no false metaphor or loose analogy, but literally exact science, to hold that the way of the world is the Syllogism of Being, and that the way of the mind is the Syllogisms of Thought and of Knowledge. Taking the world just as it is in itself and just as science proves it to be in itself, the cosmic process of evolution through involution is a progress to consequences which is absolutely syllogistic in its essential nature, and reveals itself as such in the endless succession of generations of organic forms as genera, species, and specimens. This is evident in the

phaenomena of life, less evident but no less certain in the so-called inorganic phaenomena of the world-machine; for all phaenomena are essentially those of genera, species, and specimens, that is, syllogistic. The syllogism proves, as we have already said, because Being syllogizes (§ 168, 5). In the life of the species as a series of generations, the species itself alternately contracts and expands — contracts into its fertilized germs and expands into its matured forms; the contraction is involution, the expansion evolution (§ 179, 3). This process is a rhythmical succession of living syllogisms, unfolding itself forever on the stage of the great theatre of Being, and intelligible by all who can catch the spirit of the play. This self-determining movement of Reason in Energy according to the law of unit-universals, which is itself determined by absolute objective necessity as the Apriori of Being, this living syllogism of the Course of Nature as perpetual creation of new out of old forms, may be expressed somewhat informally as follows: —

COSMIC PROCESS OF OBJECTIVE INFERENCE.

Every species is evolved from and inheres in its own genus.

This specimen-group, male and female, is evolved from and inheres in its own species.

Therefore, this specimen-group, continuing itself in its offspring, evolves new specimens as still evolved from and inherent in its own species and genus.

This is the Syllogism of Heredity, at once logical and dynamical in every new organism as such. It means that the species evolves the specimens as facts, and that the specimens involve the species as idea (*l'idée créatrice*). It means that evolution involves involution in the objectively real world as at once fact and idea, every new specimen being at once dynamical as caused effect and logical, teleological, rational, as fulfilled end. It applies obviously to all organic forms characterized by sex, and less obviously, but no less necessarily, to all sexless forms, since

every specimen, whether organic or so-called "inorganic," is derived from its own species alone. Everywhere and always, the Cosmic Reason involves the ideal form in the antecedent, and the Cosmic Energy evolves the real form in the consequent. It is no more fact than it is syllogistic logic, that the offspring of the stallion and the mare shall be always a colt, never a puppy or a pig. Birth consists in evolving the idea of the species, already involved in the fertilized germ, into a new specimen of that species in the real world: *Reason thinks it in the premises, Energy makes it in the conclusion.* And this essence of the cosmic process, conceived thus as the making, creation, or genesis of the new object in both mechanical and logical sequence from old objects, may be named, in strictest conformity with the principles of mechanical as well as of logical science, the OBJECTIVE INFERENCE; for it shows how the Many are both *inferred* and *made*, that is, evolved as objects, out of the absolute One.

In a recent scientific work there occur these candid words:—

"It has become more and more clear that the problem of the method of the evolution of species is not yet solved. . . . The fact that these two older theories [natural selection and the Lamarckian factors] leave many problems unsolved has become more appreciated, and to-day naturalists are actively searching for something to aid in the solution of the problems. We find it freely admitted that we need something more before we can feel that we understand even the fundamental aspects of the method of the origin of species, and we are beginning to find references to the 'unknown factor' in evolution. Of course, to some classes of thinkers, this 'unknown factor' will at once be said to be *design*, and the admission of biologists that they are not satisfied with the present explanation of evolution will be hailed as an argument for design. The naturalist will, of course, insist that the unknown factor will be found among natural forces. In all directions do we find this exploration continuing. . . . On all sides there is a feeling that we need something more than Darwin discovered. With the exception of a few extremists, no one appears thoroughly satis-

fied with our present information as to the methods of evolution or with the present known laws and forces regulating the origin of species. It is significant to find that it is among the younger men where this dissatisfaction is most expressed, and among them where we find the strongest conviction that something more remains to be discovered. Some of them believe this unknown factor or factors will soon be found. One of the foremost of young experimenters, however, says that it is not only unknown but unknowable."¹

This "young experimenter" is indubitably in the right, just so long as the mechanical evolutionism of Spencer, Haeckel, Huxley, and the rest, remains in the ascendant. So long as Nature is conceived as mechanism without teleology, that is, as Energy without Reason, the "unknown factor" will remain "unknowable," too. But, just as soon as men discover that the concept of the world as nothing but a machine bursts like a Prince Rupert's drop at the touch of the question, "What is a machine?" knowledge of the unknown factor becomes unavoidable; for analysis of the machine involves the organism, and analysis of the organism involves the person as identity in difference of Energy and Reason. The whole truth of the origin of the species, which is simply a specimen to its own genus as a species of species, is covered by the Syllogism of Heredity as the Cosmic Process, and the "unknown factor" is the Objective Inference. For this meets and satisfies all rational demands of both parties, as indicated by Professor Conn. On the one hand, it meets the demand of those who insist on "design," provided they will surrender the outgrown dualistic conception of the world as two substances divorced from each other as matter and mind, and accept the monistic conception of it as one essence, Reason, in one substance, Energy; which transforms external and miraculous "design" into the regular

¹ H. W. Conn, *The Method of Evolution, A Review of the Present Attitude of Science toward the Question of the Laws and Forces which have brought about the Origin of Species*, 1900 : pp. 280-282.

immanent and universal teleology of One Infinite Life, at once dynamical and purposive and regulated by its own exceptionless law as Eternal Reason or Syllogistic. On the other hand, it meets the demand of the "naturalists," those who insist that the "unknown factor" must be "found among natural forces;" for the Objective Inference is found there, and nowhere else, as simply the perpetual operation and inner meaning of Nature itself. It is the necessary derivation of every unit from its own universal, which is no more true of the human being or the animal or the plant than it is of the drop of water or the grain of sand, as the least reflection makes plain to a quick mind; for the drop of water, as aggregation of water-molecules, is derived from its own species, and so is the grain of sand as a mere particle of comminuted rock. The trouble with mechanical evolutionism has been that it has looked solely to external or "incident forces" to explain the origin of species, neglecting wholly the involucional side of the evolutionary process, and therefore missing the profound significance of heredity as the bequeathed and inherited *idea* of the species, involved in the germ and evolved in the adult. This neglect necessitates an "unknown factor," which must be likewise "unknowable" until the neglect itself ceases with the coming of a deeper insight. Expand the narrow notion of the world as mere machine into the all-comprehensive notion of the world as All-Person, and instantly the "unknown factor" becomes the Syllogism of Heredity as the perfectly intelligible Objective Inference.

§ 199. Viewed thus as the Syllogism of Heredity or Objective Inference, the cosmic process reveals itself as that unchangeable and eternal "course of Nature" which is at bottom the Course of Spirit, the identity in difference of dynamism and teleology, the self-activity of Being as both Doing and Thinking, the unresting Power of the Universe which acts only as it is guided to the eternal End of the Universe by the immanent Reason of the Universe, — in a word, identity in difference of Energy and Reason, Nature

and Spirit, in the Absolute I. From this it follows of necessity that in man, product and child of the Universe, the Syllogism of Being which eternally antedates him is the only possible source and norm of his new-born Syllogism of Thought, — that the Objective Inference of the World is the only possible law of the Subjective Inference in logic, science, philosophy, as the Syllogism of Human Knowledge. But this general deduction of epistemology from ontology must remain more or less vague and unconvincing until the Subjective Inference is compared directly with the Objective Inference, and thus the absolute oneness of their constitution and governing principle is made plain. Let us make the comparison.

Since everything exists as a specimen in itself (*τόδε τι*, *Ding an sich*), that is, as only one specimen in only one species in only one genus (Syllogism of Being), — and since to know it at all must be to know it syllogistically as it is in itself (Syllogism of Knowledge), — it follows that every possible syllogism of thought as knowledge, that is, every particular cognition or cognitive judgment, may be reduced to this universal form of all reasoning: —

KNOWING PROCESS OF SUBJECTIVE INFERENCE.

Every species is conceived as evolved from and inherent in its own genus.

This specimen or specimen-group is conceived as evolved from and inherent in its own species.

Therefore, this specimen or specimen-group, continuing itself in its consequences, is conceived as evolving new cognitions which are still evolved from and inherent in its own species and genus.

This is the Syllogism of Knowledge in its evolutionary form, that is, the Syllogism of Epistemological Heredity, as determined by the law of unit-universals and the principle of inherence, and not as misconceived by the Aristotelian Paradox and the principle of mere subsumption (§§ 124–127). Its most perfect form is the scientific method in general, as contrasted with the speculative or dialectical

method of Hegel (see Chapter XVII.). It is the necessary origin of every particular cognition because it is determined by the necessary origin of every particular existence, which continues itself in its continued effect on the perceptivity of the subject in continued observation. The law of unit-universals as genus, species, and specimen, or the Apriori of Being, is what absolutely determines the form of the syllogism itself and imparts to it all its apodeictic necessity; the untruth of that law, if it were demonstrable, would be the logical abolition of logic through destruction of the syllogism as its necessary form.

Now the general relations of the concepts of genus, species, and specimen, as involved in the premises of the Syllogism of Knowledge, are not determined there by the "spontaneous" understanding of the universalized human subject that thinks it, although Kant in that way subjectifies all relations in his cardinal doctrine of "*synthesis a priori*," on which he founds his whole *Erkenntnisstheorie*.

The universal conditions or forms of existence itself as genera, species, specimens, that is, as individual things in universal kinds, are what they are simply because they could not be otherwise: the one substance or Energy of the World can itself exist only as One in Many and Many in One, and that *means* individual things in universal kinds (§ 197). The whole structure of the syllogism presupposes these general relations. What the individual human subject contributes to the premises of the Syllogism of Knowledge is not the relations of genus, species, and specimen in general (since without these as absolute antecedent conditions the syllogistic form itself would be impossible), but only in each case the "this," by which these general relations are *perceived and predicated* in the premises as *particular judgments* by the *perceptive understanding*. That is, the inclusion of the concept of "this" particular species by the concept of "this" particular genus is simply perceived and predicated by the understanding in immediate experience or intuition of them as "this" and "this," and

so likewise the inclusion of the percept of "this" particular specimen or specimen-group in the concept of "this" particular species; for these inclusions are simply expressed or asserted, not proved or inferred, in the premises. But the inclusion of the percept of "this" particular specimen or specimen-group in the concept of "this" particular genus is not expressed or asserted at all in the premises, but only implied or involved (Apriori of Being); and judgment of this last inclusion is reached, not by the intuitive or perceptive, but by the *discursive or inferring understanding*.

Here we have quite another element, over and above the simple perceptions of the intuitive understanding: to wit, the making or drawing of the inference in the conclusion. If the simple perceiving is mainly (not wholly) receptivity, the inferring, the making or drawing of the inference, is not only activity, but self-activity; for the merely implied or involved relation will never express, assert, or evolve itself in the conclusion, but will remain merely implied or involved until the understanding actively draws the inference and asserts it in a judgment. In other words, the understanding is mainly receptive in the premises, as intellectually intuitive of the relations expressed, although active even here as predicating or judging; but it is wholly active in the conclusion, as intellectually developing, judging, and asserting a relation which is before only implied. The two judgments *beget* a third judgment. This is a true evolution, for in it the syllogism as a whole, that is, the Subjective Inference, evolves the ideal form involved in the premises into the real form of the conclusion as a new act, a new specimen, a new judgment; and it is wrought, not by the understanding as receptivity alone, but by the understanding as both receptivity and self-activity, too. But intellectual self-activity is just as much a real form of Energy as mechanical causality. In other words, the understanding manifests itself in the syllogism as both Reason and Energy — Reason as comprehending the premises, and Energy or Self-Activity as drawing the inference

and creating the conclusion as a new judgment, involved but not evolved in the premises alone. In this way mind proves itself to be as real as matter: matter is a system of mechanical energies, and mind is a system of spiritual energies, and one is just as active as the other. Moreover, the Subjective Inference obeys the same law of evolution which we saw at work in the Objective Inference; for it not only evolves an ideal form in the premises into a new real form in the conclusion, but it also does this in precisely the same way — *Reason thinks it in the premises, Energy makes it in the conclusion*. Thus the Objective Inference repeats and reproduces itself in the Subjective Inference, the Syllogism of Being in the Syllogism of Knowledge, the Cosmic Process in the Knowing Process; all these are one and the same continuous method so far as they all are identity in difference of evolution and involution, and manifest the identity in difference of Energy and Reason, Substance and Essence, not only in the Absolute I as the All-Person, but just as much in each of us as finite person, and for the same reason — *it cannot be otherwise*.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SYLLOGISM OF PHILOSOPHY

§ 200. THE significance of these results as principles is profound. *Reason thinks or involves the ideal form in the premises ; Energy makes or evolves the real form in the conclusion.* That is the law of evolution in the world of reality, as the Objective Inference or Syllogism of Being ; it is the law of evolution in the world of ideality, as the Subjective Inference or Syllogism of Knowledge. It involves the identity in difference of substance and essence, or Energy and Reason, (1) in the cosmic process or way of the world, and (2) in the knowing process or way of the mind. It is confirmation of the general deduction of epistemology from ontology by the proposed and now executed comparison of the Objective Inference and the Subjective Inference, which shows that these are absolutely one in their syllogistic constitution and in their governing principle : namely, that in both Reason involves the new specimen ideally in the antecedent and Energy evolves it really in the consequent. This is specific deduction of the Syllogism of Knowledge from the Syllogism of Being, which, until it is shown to be fallacious, justifies the acceptance of a theory of knowledge which is founded, not, like Kant's, on "*synthesis a priori*" and the exclusive subjectivity of relations in a merely phaenomenal world, but on the law of unit-universals and the objectivity of relations in a world which is both phaenomenal and noumenal.

§ 201. The new epistemology of objectivism can be fully understood only in direct comparison with the Kantian epistemology of subjectivism. The latter still remains the foundation of unmodernized "modern philosophy," and is

inconsiderately taken for granted by many masters of modern science who, like Huxley, stand bewildered by the plausibilities of Berkeley, Hume, and Kant. The clew of exit from this labyrinth of confusion is comprehension of the Aristotelian Paradox, the Law of Unit-Universals, and their mutual relation. We have now reached the point where a searching comparison of the two epistemologies may be most advantageously made.

§ 202. That the Aristotelian Paradox shaped and determined the entire Kantian epistemology is plain beyond the possibility of a reasonable doubt. It may be nowhere explicitly advanced in the form of a general theory of universals as such, independent of particular applications of it; yet that Kant, with one important modification, thought the relation of universal and individual substantially as Aristotle thought it, is a fact wrought into the very warp and woof of his system as a whole. This has been already made abundantly clear in sections 56-57, 60, 70-72, 96-97; but it may be made clearer still.

The core of Aristotelianism, as every student knows, is contained in the distinction of matter and form. It is no less the core of Kantianism, as Kant himself explicitly declares: "*Matter* and *Form* — these are two concepts which lie at the bottom of all other reflection, so profoundly and inseparably are they bound up with every use of the understanding. The first means the determinable in general, the second its determination — both in the transcendental understanding, since abstraction is made from every difference in that which is given, and from the mode in which it is determined."¹ Here, in the suppression of every individual difference and of every specific determination, in order to arrive at the concept of Matter as "the determinable in general," we see illustrated Kant's entire agreement with Aristotle in rejection of the individual difference as such, in order to arrive at the concept of the pure universal, τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν. The modification which Kant introduces is

¹ Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 228.

the change from Greek realism to German idealism or conceptualism; for, while Aristotle finds his Matter in the sphere of "Being as Being," that is, in objective existence as $\beta\lambda\eta$ in the $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\iota$, Kant finds it only in the sphere of Thought, that is, in subjective existence as (1) that which objectively corresponds to sensation, but remains unknown as the *Ding an sich*, and (2) sensation itself in the *Erscheinung*, in which, however, sensation is the still unknown matter and nothing is known but the form as pure concept *a priori*. Both Aristotle and Kant know nothing but $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ in the $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\iota$ as $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma + \beta\lambda\eta$.

In strict conformity with these "two concepts of Matter and Form," Kant gives us a practical illustration of his agreement with Aristotle in his doctrine of "consciousness in general." This he conceives by "abstracting from every difference in that which is given [in this case the empirical consciousness], and from the mode in which it is determined." That is, to think the purely universal or rational I, he drops everything that distinguishes the individual or empirical I from it, and also everything that distinguishes one empirical I from another. That is, My-Pure-Self is absolutely identical with Your-Pure-Self: *The-Pure-Self* contains neither *my* nor *your*, but only that which is indistinguishable and common alike to you and me. Here, then, unmistakably reappears Aristotle's eternal and impersonal $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, which neither Aristotle nor Kant can combine conceptually with the empirical person, as Zeller proved with regard to the former (§ 77); for the $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ contains no ground of individual difference and no ground of plurality whatever, but is indivisibly and unchangeably *one*. Yet, in order to know *you* and *me*, as (1) one in our common essence and (2) two in our individual differences, the individual differences must be just as knowable as the common essence. In other words, if you and I know ourselves as two, the Aristotelian Paradox, in Kant no less than in Aristotle himself, must give way to the Law of Unit-Universals.

§ 203. But let us now consider Kant's ground-plan as

outlined by himself in the form of his all-essential definitions. In the very first section of the Transcendental *Æsthetic*, he founds his primordial distinction of sensibility and understanding, and with it his whole philosophy, on the fundamental distinction of Form and Matter as just explained. He says:—

“Intuition takes place so far only as an object is given to us. This, however, is not possible, at least for us human beings, unless the object affects the mind in a definite manner. . . The effect of an object on the representative faculty, so far as we are affected by it, is called *sensation*. The intuition which relates to an object through sensation is called *empirical*. The unformed object of an empirical intuition is called *phaenomenon*. That in the phaenomenon which corresponds to the sensation I call its *Matter*; but that which causes that the manifold content of the phaenomenon can be disposed in definite relations I call the *Form* of the phaenomenon. That, however, in which sensations simply assume order and can be set in a definite form cannot be itself sensation. Consequently, while the Matter of all phaenomena is given to us solely *a posteriori*, their Form must lie ready for them as a whole in the mind *a priori*, and for this reason can be treated in separation from all sensation.”¹

In these fundamental definitions at the very outset of his great work, as all-determinative as those of Spinoza's *Ethica*, Kant determines its character beforehand by fundamental positions, as follows:—

I. Every cognition (*Erkenntniss*) must relate to its immediate object (*Gegenstand*) through intuition (*Anschauung*).

II. Intuition is possible to us so far only as the object is given to us *a posteriori*. This object is the “thing in itself,” the “non-sensuous cause of our representations,” the “transcendental object,”—not the “object of experience.”²

¹ Werke, III: 55, 56.

² Cf. Werke, III: 349. Hölder notes the general ambiguity of Kant's terminology: “Vor allem gilt dies vom Begriff des *Gegenstandes*. Die Gegenstände, welche mich afficiren und dadurch meine Empfindungen be-

III. The object is given to us so far only as it affects the subject definitely (*das Gemüth auf gewisse Weise afficire*) — that is, given to us only in its effect.

IV. This effect of the object on the subject (its *Wirkung auf die Vorstellungsfähigkeit*) is sensation (*Empfindung*).

V. The object itself, *after* it has thus determined the subject to sensation, but *before* the sensation and intuition are formed by the subject, is the Matter of the phaenomenon, expressly defined as the undetermined or unformed object of an empirical intuition (*der unbestimmte Gegenstand einer empirischen Anschauung*). The Matter of the phaenomenon (*die Materie der Erscheinung*) is, not the sensation, but that “in the phaenomenon” which corresponds to the sensation (*das, was der Empfindung correspondirt*); and this is the manifold content, not of the sensation, but of the phaenomenon itself (*das Mannigfaltige der Erscheinung*). This Matter of the phaenomenon, however, possesses no originally immanent Form of its own; the phaenomenon in itself is absolutely formless, an originally unformed or undetermined object of “blind” empirical intuition alone.¹ Thus the object as such, *after* it has affected the subject to sensation, but *before* it is formed by the subject in cognition, is necessarily unknowable, because it is *Matter without Form*. This result is in complete accordance with Aristotle,

wirken, sind wirkliche Dinge im gewöhnlichen Sinne (von Kant sonst ‘Dinge an sich’ genannt), es kommt ihnen reale, von meinen Vorstellungen unterschiedene, nicht erst durch meine Vorstellungsthätigkeit gesetzte Existenz zu; dagegen die Gegenstände, die mir gegeben sind (von Kant auch Objecte genannt, welcher Ausdruck allerdings vereinzelt auch von den Dingen an sich vorkommt), sind mit meinen *Anschauungen*, meinen anschaulichen Vorstellungen identisch.” (A. Hölder, Darstellung der Kantischen Erkenntnisstheorie, 1873, S. 7.) Kant distinctly declares, in the passage just referred to, that the “transcendental object” is “given,” not *in* experience, but “*before* all experience” (dass es vor aller Erfahrung an sich selbst gegeben sei); because, of course, the *condition as cause* is necessarily given in and with the *conditioned as effect*.

¹ “Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.” (Werke, III. 82.)

who taught that matter in itself is both formless and unknowable (εἶδος οὐκ ἔχει ἡ ὕλη — ἡ ὕλη ἀγνωστος καθ' αὐτήν).

VI. The phaenomenon or unformed object of empirical intuition, after it has determined the subject to sensation *a posteriori* (*Sinnlichkeit* = *Receptivität der Eindrücke*), and after the sensation and intuition thus determined in the subject (*Vorstellung als bloße Bestimmung des Gemüths*) have been elaborated or thought by the understanding *a priori* (*Verstand* = *Spontaneität der Begriffe*), becomes now the formed object of experience (*Gegenstand der Erfahrung*) or of sensuous cognition (*sinnliche Erkenntniss*). But in this process, be it noted, a new Matter has been illicitly substituted, and the object, therefore, is no longer the same object. The Matter of the *unformed object* was "that in the phaenomenon which corresponds to sensation," the "manifold content of the phaenomenon" as the determinant of sensation; but the Matter of the *formed object* is the sensation itself,¹ the manifold content of the sensibility as itself sole object of the understanding.² If this (evidently unconscious) substitution of one object for another object be allowed, it destroys the whole transcendental theory of knowledge, but it at least heals the violent separation of Matter and Form (χωρισμός) which was previously attempted in attributing the Matter to the object alone and the Form to the subject alone; the formed object is at least brought entirely within the subject, and becomes knowable because it is now *Form in Matter* as *Begriff in Anschauung*. This last result accords fully, although only with a subjective

¹ "Man kann die letztere [d. h. die Empfindung] die Materie der sinnlichen Erkenntniss nennen." (Werke, III. 81.)

² "Die Sinnlichkeit, dem Verstande untergelegt, als das Object, worauf dieser seine Function anwendet, ist der Quell realer Erkenntnisse. Eben dieselbe aber, so fern sie auf die Verstandeshandlung selbst einfließt und ihn zum Urtheilen bestimmt, ist der Grund des Irrthums." (Werke, III. 245, footnote.) By this canon, however, real error, as distinguished from merely logical error, is no longer possible. Sensation must exercise no influence on the cognition, which must be the exclusive work of the pure understanding; if this obeys its own laws, error is impossible.

interpretation, with Aristotle's doctrine that nothing is knowable except the form in the matter ($\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\ \epsilon\acute{\nu}\omicron\upsilon\upsilon$).

These fundamental positions may be concisely expressed in the following table: —

TABLE IV

Critical Idealism: Object of Knowledge.

I. PHAENOMENON AS MATTER WITHOUT FORM (*das Gegebene*):

Unformed and Unknown Object of Empirical Intuition.

- i. Its Matter = That in the Object which Corresponds to Sensation = Manifold Content of the *Object in Itself* (*Ding an sich*).
- ii. Its Form = 0.
- iii. Its Effect in the Subject = Sensation *a posteriori*.

II. PHAENOMENON AS FORM IN MATTER (*das Gedachte*):

Formed and Known Object of Experience.

- i. Its Matter = *Not* That in the Object which Corresponds to Sensation, *but* = Manifold Content of the *Sensation in Itself*.
- ii. Its Form = That in the Sensation which Orders its Content = Pure Forms of the Sensibility *plus* Pure Forms of the Understanding = pure $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ in the Sensation as $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma + \upsilon\lambda\eta$.
- iii. Its Effect in the Subject = Formed Empirical Intuition = Real Cognition.

III. SELF-REFUTATION OF CRITICAL IDEALISM.

These determinations work a total abolition of the *Real Object*. The illicit substitution of One Matter for Another Matter is the arbitrary creation of *Another Object*. But neither as *one matter without form* nor as *form in another matter* can the Real Object be known at all: the mere separation of its form and matter cannot create another matter. Hence Critical Idealism remains absolutely without a Real Object of Knowledge and is mere confusion of thought, so long as it hesitates to make both Sensation and Cognition equally "spontaneous" or equally *a priori* in one and the same individual subject (solipsism).

§ 204. "All phaenomena," says Kuno Fischer, the faithful and conscientious interpreter of Kant, "are, as is evident from the manner of their origination, nothing but *representations* in us, not contingent and voluntary, but necessary and universally valid, which are explained by the constitution and laws of our reason. This complete ideality of all phaenomena is the discovery and the theme of transcendental idealism, with the system of which the Kantian Criticism must stand or fall.

"There are two conceivable cases for metaphysic, that is, for our universal and necessary knowledge of things: either our knowledge is conformed to the objects, or these are conformed to that. In the first case, metaphysic is impossible;¹ therefore, all its previous undertakings have been in vain, for they rested on the assumption that our knowledge is conformed to the things. In the second case it is possible, but must be grounded anew. Now the objects cannot conform to our knowledge, unless they depend on the conditions and organization of our reason — unless, that is, their origin lies in the factors of reason, or, what means the same thing, unless they are *phaenomena* and *not things in themselves*. Consequently, the Critique of Reason is the doctrine of the origination of objects, or phaenomena, out of the material and formal conditions contained in our reason: this doctrine is called transcendental or critical idealism. 'The situation here,' says Kant, 'is just as it was with the first thought of Copernicus, who, when he could not get on with the explanation of the heavenly motions on the assumption that the whole starry host revolved about the beholder, tried whether he might not succeed better on the assumption that the beholder revolves and the stars remain at rest.'"²

¹ This is true, if "our universal and necessary knowledge of things" is, as Kant teaches, nothing but the subjective work or transcendental synthesis of the pure *a priori* consciousness-in-general. But it is not true, if this knowledge is simply knowledge of the *universal and necessary relations* objectively determined in things themselves by the aboriginal *conditions of existence*, or Apriori of Being (§§ 89–98). In the latter case, what is impossible is not metaphysic, as scientific philosophy of the real, but transcendental idealism, as unscientific philosophy of the merely ideal. The Kantian theory of knowledge rests on the assumption that relations (*Verknüpfung*, *Zusammenhang*, etc.) have no existence in the nature of things, independently of *our* existence and experience, but exist only as an absolute creation *ex nihilo* — that our *Vernunft* can evoke cosmos out of chaos by a simple *fiat lux*.

² Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, III. 568. Copernicus abandoned

§ 205. Kant's theory of the origination of the object of experience, then, is confessedly the kernel of the whole Critical Philosophy. It was an attempt to discover all the conditions of the object, all its *matter* as well as all its *form*, entirely within the constitution of the universal human mind. It was a large undertaking. Success in it demanded a remorseless adherence to logic for which even Kant lacked the nerve.

Manifestly, if the matter as well as the form of the object of experience is to be derived from the subject *a priori*, then not only the origin of concepts, but also the origin of sensations, must be discovered there. The origin of concepts is provided for in Kant's principle of synthesis *a priori*, that is, of the exclusively subjective origin of *relations*: quantity, quality, relation, and modality, with their subdivisions, constitute his table of the pure concepts *a priori*, and their absolute origin is the spontaneous activity (*Spontaneität der Begriffe*) or transcendental synthesis (*Verbindung*¹) of the pure understanding, independ-

the geocentric for the heliocentric position; Kant abandoned the objective for the subjective position, the heliocentric for the geocentric. Has it occurred to no one that Kant retreated from Copernicus to Ptolemy?

¹ "Unter allen Vorstellungen die *Verbindung* [*i. e.* relation] die einzige ist, die nicht durch Objecte gegeben, sondern nur vom Subjecte selbst verrichtet werden kann, weil sie ein Actus seiner Selbstthätigkeit ist." (Kr. d. r. V., Werke, III. 114, 115.) Windelband admirably states this principle of relation or synthesis: "In dieser Formulirung kam die Einsicht zur Geltung, welche Kant im Laufe seiner kritischen Entwicklung von dem Wesen der Vernunftthätigkeit gewonnen hatte: sie ist Synthesis, d. h. Vereinheitlichung einer Mannigfaltigkeit. Dieser Begriff der *Synthesis* ist etwas Neues, was die Kritik von der Inaugural-dissertation trennt: in ihm fand Kant das Gemeinsame zwischen den Formen der Sinnlichkeit und denjenigen des Verstandes, welche in der Darstellung von 1770 nach den Merkmalen der Receptivität und der Spontaneität sich gänzlich von einander sondern sollten. Es zeigte sich nun, dass die *Synthesis der theoretischen Vernunft* in drei Stufen sich vollzieht: die Verknüpfung der Empfindungen zu Anschauungen geschieht in den Formen von Raum und Zeit, die Verknüpfung der Anschauungen zur Erfahrung der natürlichen Wirklichkeit geschieht durch Verstandesbegriffe, die Verknüpfung der Erfahrungsurtheile zu metaphysischen Erkenntnissen ge-

ently of all experience. But the absolute or ultimate origin of sensations is left by Kant wholly unprovided for, except by a reference to causative yet unknowable things-in-themselves, of which nothing at all can be affirmed except that they are the limit of human knowledge (*Grenzbegriff*). Sensations, indeed, are possible only under the "*a priori* forms of sensibility," Space and Time; but Space and Time do not in the least explain their actual origin. Nothing short of a doctrine of the "spontaneity of sensations," parallel to his doctrine of the "spontaneity of concepts," would have enabled Kant to explain their actual origin by the spontaneous activity or transcendental productivity of the sensibility itself, and thereby to discover the *material* conditions of experience entirely within the constitution of the universal human mind. Instead of this indispensable parallel doctrine, Kant teaches that

schiebt durch allgemeine Principien, welche Kant Ideen nennt. Diese drei Stufen der Erkenntnissthätigkeit entwickeln sich also als verschiedene Formen der Synthesis, von denen jede höhere die niedere zu ihrem Inhalte hat." (W. Windelband, Geschichte der Philosophie, 1892; 423, 424). Hölder further explains Synthesis as the action of the schematizing imagination: "Doch sehen wir dieser Ableitung der Kategorien näher zu, so ist es ein weiterer, für uns neuer Begriff, welcher hier in die Mitte geschoben wird, der der *Einbildungskraft*. Sie erscheint als ein Bindeglied zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, von denen als einziges Erkenntnisvermögen wir bis jetzt gehört haben. Ihr Geschäft (Synthesis genannt) ist, das in Raum und Zeit gegebene Mannigfaltige zu verbinden. Ist das zu verbindende Mannigfaltige in der Erfahrung gegeben, so ist die Synthese empirisch; sie ist rein, wenn das Mannigfaltige *a priori* gegeben ist. . . . Erst wenn der Begriff der Einbildungskraft als beherrschender Mittelpunkt der Kantischen Erkenntnistheorie sich herausgestellt haben wird, wird auch die Apriorität von Raum und Zeit in ihrem wahren Lichte erscheinen. . . . Doch wie, wenn die Einbildungskraft nichts wäre als der unbewusst arbeitende Verstand? wenn der Verstand beim Beurtheilen der Anschauungswelt wie beim Denken der Kategorien nur das Wesen seiner eigenen unbewusst producirtten Gebilde sich zum Bewusstsein brächte? Dass diese Auffassung, wie sie schon bei § 10 sich aufdrängt, der ganzen Kantischen Erkenntnistheorie zu Grunde liegt, soll die weitere Entwicklung zu zeigen versuchen." (A. Hölder, Darstellung der Kantischen Erkenntnistheorie, 1873; 18-20.)

of the "receptivity of impressions" (*Receptivität der Eindrücke*). The result is complete logical dislocation of his theory and failure of his undertaking. If the "spontaneity of concepts" had been paralleled by the "spontaneity of sensations," as the logic of the undertaking required, the object of experience would have been wholly derived from the subject *a priori* — both the material and the formal conditions of experience would have been discovered entirely within the constitution of the universal human mind. But in what sense "universal"? Only in the sense of such universality as may obtain within a single individual consciousness. According to Kant, to one human subject no other human subject can possibly be more than an object of experience, a mere phaenomenon; and it would follow that I cannot know the existence or appearance of other I's except as absolute products of my own activity *a priori*, as mere "things in my dream." This is solipsism, the only logical outcome of the undertaking in question. The logic of all idealism, whether subjective, transcendental, or absolute, is the logic of solipsism, avoidable by inconsequence alone. Nothing short of an absolute spontaneity of the subject — spontaneity of sensations as well as spontaneity of concepts — could logically explain the object of experience "out of the *material and formal* conditions contained in our reason." Rigorously followed out, what is that but solipsism? For "*our* reason" is a mere act of "*my* reason," unless I advance from the synthetic to the generic unity of apperception. Yet Kant was no solipsist. He imagined he escaped that consequence because the universal "pure consciousness-in-general" was immanent, identical, and unchangeable in every individual "empirical consciousness," and, therefore, what was true of that must hold good in this. In other words, he built on the Aristotelian Paradox. But neither Kant nor Aristotle could explain how, since "perception" is not "knowledge," it can be *known* that there is *more than one* "empirical consciousness." By rejecting

"knowledge" of the individual difference, both lose all ground of plurality and individuation. The Kantian *Trennung* is as fatal as the Platonic χωρισμός, and the only logical escape from solipsism is the Generic Unity of Apperception (§ 63).

§ 206. Hitherto the new theory of knowledge has been presented piecemeal in unsystematized form, but now it is time to present it as a whole in the form of system, that is, in tabular conciseness, comprehensiveness, and unity. The general principle of these tables is that of the realism which has perpetuated itself in unbroken continuity through the ages as the realism of physical science; it took unscientific form in scholasticism, and now waits to assume scientific form in philosophy through rejection of the Kantian critical idealism and development of a scientific epistemology on the basis of a scientific ontology (§ 172, III). The principle of all realism was formulated by Aristotle, and the formula, if fully comprehended, cannot be bettered:

"There is a science which considers Being as Being [universally] and the units which belong to it in itself (ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τις ἥ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὄν ἢ ὄν καὶ τὰ τούτω ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὐτό)."

That is, the object of the "first philosophy" is Being as the Unit-Universal in itself. Modern critical realism must found itself on the necessary objectivity of relations as the Law of Unit-Universals, and the consequent identity in difference of experience and reason in all cognition; and the following tables are an endeavor to give scientific development and form to this law as the fundamental principle of the new epistemology.

TABLE V

Critical Realism: Object of Knowledge.**I. PHAENOMENON-NOUMENON AS UNIT-UNIVERSAL OF EXISTENCE.**

*Identity in Difference of Matter and Form as Energy and Relation.
Specimen in Itself as One System of inwardly and outwardly Related Energies.*

- i. Its Matter = Energy as a Unit of Substance.
- ii. Its Form = Relation as a Universal of Essence = Immanent Relational Constitution of Generic, Specific, and Reific Essence.
- iii. Its Effect on the Subject = Stimulus to Perception of the Unit and Conception of the Universal.

II. PHAENOMENON-NOUMENON AS UNIT-UNIVERSAL OF KNOWLEDGE.

*Identity in Difference of Matter and Form as Experience and Reason.
Percept-Concept of Specimen in Itself.*

- i. Its Matter = Experience as Perception of Specimen in Itself.
- ii. Its Form = Reason as Conception of Specimen in Itself.
- iii. Its Effect on the Subject = Knowledge of Specimen in Itself.

III. EVOLUTION OF REAL COGNITIONS.

Dynamical Correlation of Object and Subject as Specimens in Themselves.

Gradual Reproduction in Thought of a Phaenomenon-Noumenon of Existence as a Phaenomenon-Noumenon of Knowledge, through Perception of it and its single relations (attributes, qualities, properties, accidents, etc.) as Units, and Conception of them as Universals, in the Percept-Concept of the Unit-Universal or Object of Knowledge. (*Ἐν τοῦτοις ἡ ἰσότης ἐνότης*: Agreement of Percept-Concept with Object = Science as Truth.)

§ 207. Thoughtful comparison of Table V with Table IV will make clear the ground of failure in critical idealism as a theory of knowledge. Kuno Fischer, in a passage already quoted, says that "the Critique of Reason is the doctrine of

the origination of objects, or phaenomena, out of the material and formal conditions contained in our reason: this doctrine is called transcendental or critical idealism." But such origination is precisely what the doctrine fails to explain. It frustrates its own aim: (1) by illicitly separating matter and form, substance and essence, or energy and relation; and then (2) by illicitly substituting a new matter for the original matter, the sensation in itself for the thing in itself, the energy of the subject for the energy of the object. It consistently enough *subjectifies form* (that is, all relations as such) by deriving it exclusively from the energy of the subject as "self-activity" or "*synthesis a priori*." But it is incurably inconsistent, when it first *objectifies matter* by attributing the origin of each particular sensation, and therewith of each "real cognition," to the causal energy of an external "transcendental object" (*die nichtsinnliche Ursache dieser Vorstellungen*), and then *subjectifies matter* by substituting for this external real energy in the object an internal real energy in the subject as feeling or pure sensation (*Empfindung*). This substitution of one energy for another, this duplication of matter, throws the Kantian doctrine of origination into confusion. Energy in the object and energy in the subject are two units in one universal energy; and each, as matter, must have its own form. In one and the same unit of reality, according to Kant himself, matter and form are distinguishable, but not separable, as "the determinable in general" (*das Bestimmbare überhaupt*) and "its determination" (*dessen Bestimmung*). The attempt to separate them simply splits this unit into two other units, each of which, however, must have its own matter and form as before. This is what happens with Kant. He simply splits the "object" into "thing in itself," as external cause, and "sensation," as internal effect: to the latter, as a new matter, he of course assigns a new form, deriving it from *synthesis a priori*, while to the former, although he has made it equally a new matter and un-

consciously assigned it a new form (as will appear below), he denies all form, and for that reason conceives the fiction that the "thing in itself" is utterly unknowable. But this is total collapse of critical idealism, which thus fails to explain the "origination of objects, or phaenomena, out of the material and formal conditions contained in our reason" — that is, in the subject alone. For the offered explanation leaves the "thing in itself," as out of the subject, an indispensable material condition of the "phaenomenon," as wholly within the subject. Nothing short of the doctrine that sensation is derived from the sensitive individual subject *a priori*, independently of all "things in themselves," could have made critical idealism self-consistent, or enabled it to offer even a plausible solution of the problem tersely formulated by Kuno Fischer. No one of Kant's successors has ever supplied this defect, because no one of them has ever ventured to be a strict solipsist.

§ 208. The logical failure of critical idealism just noted has been more or less clearly seen from the beginning, but a deeper logical failure, so far as we know, has not yet been discerned. Contrary to his own definitions as *das Bestimmbare überhaupt* and *dessen Bestimmung*, Kant not only distinguishes but separates "matter," as solely *a posteriori*, from "form," as solely *a priori*; and his general result is that we know "phaenomena alone," because the "thing in itself," being matter without form, is *in itself* unknowable (ἡ ὕλη ἀγνωστος καθ' αὐτήν): that is, it is known to be unknowable — a contradiction *per se* involved of necessity in the separation. Of course, the separated form instantly acquires its new matter, as we saw in the previous section; Kant supplies it in "sensation." But the separated matter no less instantly acquires its new form, and it is curious that Kant should fail to see that he himself supplies this, too. By his own showing, his "thing in itself" is not, as he supposes, matter without form, but matter and form both. Conceding all his own determinations without exception and introducing no new ones whatever,

his "thing in itself" is self-evidently just as knowable as his "phaenomenon" — nay, much more so. His *Dinge an sich* are avowedly given in themselves, before all experience (*vor aller Erfahrung an sich selbst gegeben*), as a *species*, hence as a real universal; each *Ding an sich* is given as a specimen of this species, hence as a real unit; all are given as "things," real existences of one and the same real kind, hence possessed of a common specific essence as "thinghood;" each is given as numerically different from all the rest (τὸ ἀριθμῶν ἕν), hence possessed of a unique individual difference or reific essence as this particular thing and no other; each is given as an actual cause of sensation, hence possessed of causal energy as its real substance, and related specifically to its own individual effect and no other; lastly, all these determinations, combinations, and connections, that is, all these *relations*, are absolutely given in an immanent relational constitution of generic, specific, and reific essence in each and every *Ding an sich*, not in the least as derived from any "synthesis *a priori*" in the subject, but as inherent of necessity (Apriori of Being) in the nature of the object as a unit-universal of energy, — an undeniable *Ansich* which is independent of the subject and logically prior to all its sensuous experience and rational synthesis combined. Here were present all the elements of a complete and definite concept of the "thing in itself" — one of the highest generality, it is true, but that holds good of all great conceptual generalizations. What amazes is that Kant should not understand the actual outcome of his own work, and, instead of inferring from his own premises that the "thing in itself" is *knowable*, as identity in difference of matter and form, substance and essence, or energy and relation in the necessary constitution of the unit-universal of real existence (critical realism), should on the contrary infer that the "thing in itself" is *unknowable* (critical idealism). For he thereby destroyed every possible concept of the object of knowledge, since his "phaenomenon" can be only one of two alternatives: either "not the thing

as it is in itself," which is the object of ignorance (I do not know the thing as it is), or "the thing as it is not in itself," which is the object of error (I know the thing as it is not). He himself says of the "phaenomenon" that it "has no objective reality in itself, and exists only in being known" — which perfectly conforms to Berkeley's principle that the only *esse* of objects is *percipi*.¹ What amazes still more, however, is that this theory of the unknowableness of the "thing in itself," which offers nothing but the "phaenomenon" as *illusion agreed on*, either as an object of ignorance or an object of error, should have maintained itself so long as a "theory of knowledge." Surely, the interests of civilization call audibly for a scientific epistemology.

§ 209. Epistemology is obviously impossible, unless the object of knowledge is knowable: knowable as it is, not as it is not — knowable (more or less) as it is both in itself and out of itself, that is, in both its internal and external relations, without which there would be nothing to know. Only that which is intrinsically unrelated could be intrinsically unknowable, and that which is intrinsically unrelated could not exist at all in a universe which is both many and one; for co-existence and number are themselves relations of the many in the one. Whatever exists, therefore, must exist in relations, and be *ipso facto* knowable in itself through having a relational constitution. In other words, if the "thing in itself" could possibly be unknowable, it could not possibly exist; existence and knowableness are of necessity one and the same; the unknowable is simply the non-existent. Hence relations are real, if things are real; the reality of one is that of the other. This principle of the necessary Reality or Objectivity of Relations, without which no epistemology can have a knowable object

¹ ". . . sie an sich selbst keine objective Realität hat und nur im Erkenntnisse existirt . . ." (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1te Aufl., Werke, III. 579.) Similarly: "Erscheinungen können, als solche, nicht ausser uns stattfinden, sondern existiren nur in unserer Sinnlichkeit." (*Ibid.* III. 583.)

of knowledge, is the fundamental principle of critical realism: namely, that the only possible object of knowledge is the "thing in itself" — that is, identity in difference of energy and relation, relational constitution of generic, specific, and reific essence in the unit-universal of energy or substance. This necessary principle of the Objectivity of Relations, when developed, is the Law of Unit-Universals: that is, the law of genus, species, and specimen, as (1) immanent relational condition of existence itself, or the Apriori of Being; and for that reason (2) immanent relational condition of all possible percept-concepts of existence, or determination of the Apriori of Thought by the Apriori of Being. Still further developed, it is the Law of Syllogistic, which determines *a priori* (1) the origination of unit-universals of existence, real relational objects of knowledge, or "things in themselves," through the Objective Inference or Syllogism of Being; (2) the origination of individual percept-concepts of unit-universals of existence through the Subjective Inference or Syllogism of Knowledge; and (3) the origination of universally verified cognitions and particular sciences and world-science through the Scientific Method or Syllogism of Philosophy. Lastly, when brought to its fullest logical development, this fundamental principal of the Objectivity of Relations is the Scientific Theory of Reality, as the real, objective, or cosmical identity in difference of substance, essence, process, and law: that is, (1) necessary identity in difference of energy and relation in the universe as one in many; (2) necessary identity in difference of *self-particularization*, through energy, substance, or Will, and *self-universalization*, through relation, essence, or Reason, in the universe as many in one; and (3) necessary identity in difference of self-particularizing Will and self-universalizing Reason in the universe as infinite subject-object or Absolute I. Thus critical realism is the derivation of scientific epistemology from scientific ontology as its only possible ground. Existence determines knowledge in epistemology; knowledge

determines existence in ethics; and identity in difference of these two principles is the supreme principle of personal and social life as rational religion. These statements will all receive elucidation in Chapter XVIII.

§ 210. But a vital inquiry must precede. What is the ultimate origin of Relation as such? This question, than which none can go deeper or mean more, is the parting of the ways between critical idealism and critical realism. Let us first consider the answer of the former.

All the forms of synthesis *a priori* which Kant attributes to the transcendental subject, whether as the "synthesis of apprehension in intuition," the "synthesis of reproduction in imagination," or the "synthesis of recognition in concepts," are only steps in that subjective spontaneous origination of Relation as such by which the formless matter of sensation is "arranged" or brought into shape in the intelligible or internally related form of the phaenomenon, the object of knowledge in general. So little does he conceive the all-embracingness of relation that he makes it only one of the four great heads, "quantity, quality, relation, modality," under which he classifies all pure concepts *a priori*, not seeing that quantity, quality, and modality are merely varieties of relation. Partly in consequence of this inappreciation, he makes all relation the pure work of the human mind, and pure production of form through the mind's spontaneity the very possibility of knowledge itself.

"Only the *productive* synthesis of imagination can take place *a priori*, for the *reproductive* rests on conditions of experience. Therefore, the principle of the necessary unity of the pure productive synthesis of the imagination before apperception is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience."¹

In other words, the exclusively subjective origin of all relation as such is the necessary condition of the possibility of experience itself. All formative relations whatsoever originate spontaneously in the "pure productive synthesis

¹ Werke, III. 578.

of imagination," prior to that "synthetical unity of apperception" by which many imaginative syntheses are related and made one in a single consciousness as all *mine*. In the last analysis, this productive synthesis is itself the "spontaneity of knowledge," because it is the spontaneity or subjective origin of all relation as such out of the relating self-activity or pure creativity of the subject alone. By this doctrine the *Apriorismus* of critical idealism is concentrated or focussed in the principle of the exclusively subjective origin of all relation as such.

Thus all relation in the object is explained as the pure work of the subject. But relation in the subject itself, relation in the highly complex constitution of a *priori* faculties by which it works—how is that explained? Is that, too, the pure work of the subject? Does the subject absolutely create its own relational constitution? Does it determine itself to be itself before it is itself? This it must do, if relation as such has no other origin than the human subject. How does Kant answer these questions? He never answers them, because he never puts them. But, prior to all a *priori* relating self-activity of the subject, he unwittingly presupposes relation, as he must, in the subject itself, and thereby unwittingly presupposes the law of unit-universals, as that Apriori of Being which conditions all his own *Apriorismus* of Thought: the conditions of thought in the *thinking subject* must be determined a *priori* by the conditions of existence in the *existing subject*, or else thought itself is impossible. Hence every subject which exists and thinks must be itself a something, a thinking thing of a thinking kind, many in one and one in many as a real unit-universal. Not perceiving this Apriori of Being in general as logically and ontologically prior to his own "pure reason a *priori*," Kant yet postulates an ontological synthesis as the necessary condition of his own synthesizing transcendental subject:—

"The synthetical principle that every variant empirical consciousness must be combined in a single self-consciousness is

the absolutely first and synthetical ground-principle of all our thinking.”¹

Yet this ground-principle is no work of the subject at all. For solely *in a subject relationally constituted beforehand as a unit-universal of self-consciousness*, as Kant himself here confesses, can “*synthesis a priori*” itself appear as its relating or relationing function. Still more in detail, the relational constitution of reason itself, as the faculty of “*synthesis a priori*,” is explained to be essentially an organic constitution:—

“Pure Reason is a whole so isolated and everywhere so interrelated in itself that we cannot impinge upon one part of it without affecting all the rest, and we cannot do anything with it without having previously determined for each part its place and its influence on the other parts. For, there being nothing outside of it by which our judgment of it in itself could be regulated, the validity and use of every part depend on the relation in which it stands to the other parts in Reason itself. As in the structure of an organized body, the purpose of each member can be deduced solely from the complete concept of the whole.”²

Manifestly, the organic interrelatedness which thus avowedly conditions the very existence of reason itself as a judging energy or synthesizing faculty cannot be explained by “*synthesis a priori*” as a mere functioning or act of that faculty. Yet subjective “*synthesis a priori*” is the only explanation which critical idealism has to give of the

¹ “Der synthetische Satz, dass alles verschiedene empirische Bewusstsein in einem einigen Selbstbewusstsein verbunden sein müsse, ist der schlechthin erste und synthetische Grundsatz unseres Denkens überhaupt.” (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1te Auflage, Werke, III. 578, footnote.) So, in both editions: “Sie [d. i. die Kategorien] blos dazu dienen, durch Gründe einer *a priori* nothwendigen Einheit (wegen der nothwendigen Vereinigung alles Bewusstseins in einer ursprünglichen Apperception), Erscheinungen allgemeinen Regeln der Synthesis zu unterwerfen.” (*Ibid.* Werke, III. 146.) This relational “union,” prior to the “rules of synthesis,” must be ontological, yet *a priori*, too — the Apriori of Being.

² Prolegomena, Vorrede, Werke, IV. 11.

origin of relation as such. It presupposes relation in the subject itself, prior to all its synthesizing or relating in the phaenomenal object, and so begs the question of that origin. If, then, its substitution of the subjective energy of *Empfindung*, as material effect, for the objective energy of the *Ding an sich*, as material cause, and its invention thereby of a new and purely subjective "matter" in the subjective formation of the *Erscheinung*, as sole object of knowledge, were not alone more than enough to condemn the Kantian *Erkenntnisstheorie* as a scientific theory, surely this *petitio principii*, this naïve presupposition in the subject itself of that very *relation as such* which it seeks to account for in the object as solely the work of the subject's "synthesis *a priori*," would be itself enough to justify the demand for a genuinely scientific epistemology.

§ 211. What answer, then, does critical realism give to the question as to the origin of relation as such?

Kant's necessary assumption or presupposition of relation as such in the necessary constitution of the subject, as a unit-universal of synthesizing energies or self-activities, prior both logically and ontologically to all its actual syntheses of intuition, imagination, and conception in the production of the "phaenomenon," furnishes itself a clue to the labyrinth. For this presupposition, although not at all warranted by his own theory as the mere *Apriori* of Thought, is perfectly warranted by the law of unit-universals as the *Apriori* of Being. No subject is (logically) possible, as Kant himself teaches, except as a real (ontological) synthesis of empirical consciousnesses in a single rational self-consciousness — that is, as a *unit-universal*: this, he says, is the "ground-principle of all our thinking." Such a subject, however, is a unit-universal of real existence, and already possesses an ontologically relational constitution as one in many and many in one. Unaware, therefore, of the significance of his own procedure, Kant's presupposition is his unintended but virtual recognition of the *uni-*

versal ontological law of unit-universals, as logically and ontologically anterior to his supposed "ground-principle of all our thinking." In other words, by his own unconscious showing, the Apriori of Being necessarily conditions and determines his Apriori of Thought in all human knowledge. Critical realism is simply full and conscious recognition of this same law of unit-universals, as a necessity which is absolute and ultimate in both Being and Thought. It is a law which admits of no further explanation, because all explanation must take it for granted, even the syllogism being a mere case of application of it. It simply "cannot be otherwise" (*es nicht anders sein könne*), inasmuch as it conditions the possibility of a subject no less than that of an object, and determines the reality of each of the two as an actual identity in difference of energy and relation; which reality is the prior condition of knowledge itself, as the actual relation of subject and object in every actual cognition. Self-evidently, if knowledge itself is the relation of subject and object, knowledge depends on relation, not relation on knowledge, and the Objectivity of Relations, as conditioning *a priori* the Subjectivity of Relations, is the first principle of a scientific epistemology.

Critical realism, then, inquiring into the origin of relation as such, must first of all discriminate between those relations which inhere in the object known and those which arise in the subject as coming to know it. Since the human subject itself arises, it is manifest that the relations involved in its essential constitution, which Kant himself recognizes to be that of a unit-universal, are necessarily prior, no less logically than ontologically, to all those which arise through its own mere functioning, whether as "synthesis *a priori*" or synthesis *a posteriori*; and all such constitutional relations, conditioning as they do the possibility of its own functional syntheses, exist *a priori*, and become known in the subject itself solely *qua* object of its own cognition, not *qua* subject at all. These considerations, independently of all others, demonstrate the untenability of the

Kantian principle of the exclusively subjective origin of all relation as such. In other words, by the Apriori of Being, relation as such must exist in the object *per se*, the *Ding an sich*, the unit-universal, as the absolute condition of the possibility of knowledge: immanent relational constitution in the unit-universal as such is at once the condition of existence and of knowableness, (1) in the object as known, (2) in the subject as knowing, and (3) in the subject-object as knowing itself. Thus the absolute and unconditioned necessity of "that which cannot be otherwise" lies at the bottom of all existence and of all knowledge alike, and constitutes that Apriori of Being which determines the Apriori of Thought.

With reference to the question of origin, therefore, relations may be divided into two great classes as variable and invariable, necessary and contingent, *a priori* and *a posteriori*.

§ 212. I. ONTOLOGICAL RELATIONS.

i. Invariable, unconditioned, unoriginated: Apriori of Being in Space and Time: relational necessities as conditions of possibility in existence: real relations which "cannot be otherwise." *E. g.* every scalene triangle must have its greatest side opposite to its greatest angle; every case of cause and effect must be a transformation of energy; every species must be a unit to its own genus and a universal to its own specimens; every free action ought to be just. Such eternal relations have no origin whatever; they condition and determine the possibility of all origin itself. This is the element of absolute necessity and universality — the unoriginated major premise in the Syllogism of Being.

ii. Variable, conditioned, originated: Aposteriori of Being in Space and Time: related forms of actuality in existence: real relations which "may or may not be." *E. g.* the area of any particular triangle depends on the lengths of its

base and its half-altitude; the nature of any particular effect depends on that of its cause or causes; the nature of any particular specimen or thing depends on that of its species or kind. Such mutable relations, under the immutable conditions of the Apriori of Being, originate in evolution through involution, that is, the eternally one yet infinitely varying process of the World-Reason in the World-Energy, and emerge from potentiality into actuality in all origin as such. This is the element of relative contingency and particularity — the self-originated minor premise in the Syllogism of Being.

iii. These two relational elements of Being, its Apriori or absolute necessity and universality, and its Aposteriori or relative contingency and particularity, are the warp and woof of the world. Neither possesses the slightest reality or significance without the other, but both together constitute the *origin of origin itself*. All relating or relationing in the real cosmos is reasoning, the work of the One Reason-Energy which eternally syllogizes as generation of new forms out of old forms in the "course of nature," thinking them as premises and making them as conclusions. But all relationing, that is, all actual origination or production of relations, is free creative spontaneity under that absolute relational necessity which, itself unoriginated and unproduced, conditions *a priori* all possible origination, whether in Being or in Thought; that is, all Becoming is a rational process, an evolution through involution, a Syllogism of Being. In the infinite multiplicity of relations which "may or may not be," nothing short of the law of unit-universals, the Apriori of Being, the ultimate and absolute necessity which, as the ground of possibility of all form and all nature, determines the form and nature of the syllogism itself, can explain those ultimately syllogistic relations in Nature which "cannot be otherwise," and which for that very reason cannot be explained as the work of any "synthesis *a priori*" by the human or divine understanding. If some ontological or objective relations are

necessary *per se* and others contingent *per se*, the ground of this difference cannot lie in the subject at all, whether human or divine. Not even God could make a triangle with only two straight lines; yet no power or energy would prevent — *nothing* would prevent but that unoriginated objective necessity of constitutive relations, generic, specific, and reific, which we have called the Apriori of Being, and which is simply the condition of the exercise of any power or energy whatsoever. Hence it would be frivolous and childish to interpret this aboriginal necessity of the law of unit-universals as a limitation of “omnipotence;” nothing but power can limit power, and the Apriori of Being is simply the possibility of the exercise of power. But the exercise of all power must take the form of the Syllogism of Being, in which the product is at once the logical conclusion and the ontological result.

§ 213. II. EPISTEMOLOGICAL RELATIONS.

i. Invariable, conditioned, originated: determination of the Apriori of Knowledge by the Apriori of Being: relational necessities as conditions of possibility in human knowledge: cognitive relations which “cannot be otherwise.” *E. g.* knowledge must agree with reality; position (*setzen*) must agree with knowledge; inference must agree with position. Or, more specifically: the relational constitution of every real cognition, as a percept-concept or unit-universal of knowledge, must agree with that of the object, as a unit-universal of existence in whatever sphere of reality; the predicate of every judgment must agree with its posited subject; the conclusion of every syllogism must agree with its posited premises. These agreements are subjective relational conditions of all science: that is, all thought-syntheses by the subject must agree with real relations or prior syntheses in the object, or thought will be error (misconception, misjudgment, fallacy) and not

knowledge. Such necessary relations in knowledge originate in the law of unit-universals as the Apriori of Being, which determines the syllogistic form and nature of knowledge itself. In knowledge as such there is no freedom whatever — no “spontaneity” except as degrees of more or less in that self-active and self-directing intellection of objective relations which lies in observation, attention, reflection, and which thus constitutes the learning-process; for all human knowledge must be gradually acquired. This necessary use of the law of unit-universals in all learning is itself intelligence, the element of reason, the determination of all subjective necessity and universality by absolute objective necessity in the universe of Being, the self-regulation of our human reason-energy according to the universal law of the World-Reason in the World-Energy. Thus the Apriori of Being reappears as the major premise in the Syllogism of Knowledge.

ii. Variable, conditioned, originated: determination of the Aposteriori of Knowledge by the Aposteriori of Being: determination of the associations of ideas by the associations of realities: reciprocally but shiftingly related forms of actuality in human knowledge: cognitive relations which “may or may not be.” *E. g.* in perception, now this and now that presents itself; this is associated now with that and now with the other; there is no limit to the changeable relations of circumstance and fact in the environment of a given subject — that is, relations which are originated in the Syllogism of Being, and which themselves originate corresponding relations in apprehensive and comprehensive intelligence as the Syllogism of Knowledge. This adaptation or conformity of the *understanding* to the single and several relations immanent in the *object understood* is the element of experience, the element of empirical contingency and particularity in cognition, and in it lies the possibility of scientific induction and classification under the law of unit-universals, that is, of grouping known specimens in known species as things of a kind. Thus the Aposteriori

of Being reappears as the minor premise in the Syllogism of Knowledge.

iii. These two elements of *Reason*, which is inseparably related to necessity and universality in Being as the One, and *Experience*, which is inseparably related to contingency and particularity in Being as the Many, are themselves related inseparably but distinguishably to each other in all Knowledge of the One in the Many and the Many in the One — in one word, *Science*. The essence of cognition as such is the relational determination of thought by existence — reproduction of the relational constitution of the object, as reality, in the relational constitution of the percept-concept, as ideality or idea. That is, the law of unit-universals is the absolute ground of all ideality because it is the absolute ground of all reality, and because all ideality, if itself real, must conform to the condition of all reality, the Apriori of Being. On the one hand, as an active capacity of knowledge or knowing-faculty, the human subject is one self-consciousness, a unit of reason-energy derived from the reason-energy of the World as a Unit; on the other hand, as an actual content of knowledge or product of the knowing-faculty, the human subject is a series of many consciousnesses, a universal of real cognitions derived from real relations in the World as a Universe; in both aspects together, the human subject is a particular Knower, a unit-universal of finite reason and finite experience derived from the unit-universal of infinite reason and infinite experience, the universe itself as the Absolute Knower. The origin of all actual relations in human knowledge, therefore, is twofold. All necessity and strict universality in Reason (relations which “cannot be otherwise”) originate in the unoriginated Apriori of Being, the unity of those absolute conditions of existence which determine the Apriori of Knowledge; all contingency and particularity in Experience (relations which “may be otherwise”) originate in the Aposteriori of Being, the totality of those innumerable forms of existence which determine the Aposteriori of

Knowledge.¹ Every real cognition as a present fact of consciousness, therefore, is the identity in difference of a universal relational necessity and a particular relational contingency, that is, the actualized identity in difference of a universal principle and a particular instance of it. How can these two ever coincide? Such a relational combination is possible only as the conclusion of a real syllogism, in which the principle is the rationally or ideally isolated major and the instance is the isolated minor, and in which the partial identity in difference of the two as one combined reality, whether as fact of consciousness or fact of the world, can be effected only by inferential energy in drawing or making the conclusion (evolution through involution in the objective inference = course of reason in course of energy = "Course of Nature" = Syllogism of Being = condition of Syllogism of Knowledge). Without energy, reason could draw no conclusion from its own premises; without reason, energy would have no premises, neither principles nor instances, and could have no conclusions to draw. In other words, every real cognition must be a syllogism of which reason (conception of principles) is the major premise, experience (perception of instances) is the minor premise, and knowledge, or the identity in difference of reason and experience, that is, of the principle and the instance, is the energized conclusion, in that Syllogism of Thought which ideally reproduces the Syllogism of Being in real science and realistic philosophy as the Syllogism of Knowledge.

§ 214. III. ETHICAL RELATIONS.

i. Invariable, conditioned, originated: determination of the Apriori of Duty (moral obligation or relational form of the Right) by the Apriori of Being as Justice: relational necessities as conditions of possibility of Real Right or

¹ "Καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἐν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα." (Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1139 a, 6.)

Objective Good as the ultimate end of ethical beings: justice or ethical reciprocity as the objective standard of human conduct (your right = my duty, your duty = my right): moral ideals which ought to be realized = moral relations which "cannot be otherwise." *E. g.* every man has a necessary natural right, unalienable by others, but forfeitable by himself, to his "life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness," and a correlative duty to respect this right in others, that is, freely to subsume all his purposes and actions under it as a law — in a word, to be just; all men are equal in this right and this duty; all men have an equal duty to obey just laws and an equal right to receive their protection: all nations have an equal right to self-sovereignty, and no nation has any right to buy, to sell, to acquire, or to hold sovereignty over any other nation except by the free consent and act of the latter. Such reciprocal relations result of necessity, in the nature of the case, from the law of unit-universals and its corollary, the moral co-equality of moral units in a moral universe; they are natural, uncreatable, and indestructible except by misconduct. Their proximate origin is knowledge of the necessary constitution of society as an organism, but their ultimate origin is this necessary constitution or nature itself. They cannot ultimately originate either in "command" or in "contract," because they exist and determine *a priori* the nature and limits of just command and valid contract; knowledge of them is the origin of their felt or subjective obligatoriness as "conscience," but the knowledge of them is itself determined by the natural obligation or *a priori* moral necessity of the co-equality which cannot but subsist between man and man as free units in one universal moral society. Neither can this necessary ethical equation of man and man, as co-members of one species and bearers of the same fundamental rights and duties, possibly originate in any individual consciousness, or be the product of its "synthesis *a priori*;" on the contrary, it is the antecedent condition, origin, and ground of all those rights and

duties. The organic constitution of mankind as one ethical society conditions that generic unity of apperception which itself conditions all personal consciousness (§ 59), and, since every organism is a living dynamical syllogism (§ 198), its syllogistic idea (§ 199) constitutes an absolutely rational element in ethics analogous to that in mathematics. Hence "the rights and duties of the parties," formulated as objective relations in scientific ethics with its two great divisions of personal ethics and political ethics, constitute an objective moral standard which is independent of all subjective and all merely abstract considerations, and furnish a scientific ground for jurisprudence and just legislation. Thus the Apriori of Being reappears in ethics as the Apriori of Duty, that is, as the Ought, Justice, Virtue, Moral Obligation, the Real Right, the Objective Good, and constitutes the major premise in the Syllogism of Duty.

ii. Variable, conditioned, originated: determination of the Aposteriori of Duty (moral action or relational form of the Deed) by the Aposteriori of Being as the Free Purpose: relational contingencies shaped as means to the end of Real Right or Objective Good: just purpose the subjective standard of human conduct of all kinds: moral ideals realized freely = moral relations which "may or may not be." *E. g.* (1) A borrows money from B — that is the form of a fact; (2) A owes the money to B — that is the form of the obligation incurred in the fact; (3) A intends to repay the money to B — that is the form of the ideal right purpose to fulfil the obligation incurred; (4) A repays the money to B — that is the form of a new fact, as the real right deed which embodies the ideal right purpose and thereby actually fulfils the obligation incurred in the antecedent fact. What is the origin of the various relations thus brought into existence? (1) The objective relations in the form of the first fact are contingent, that is, may or may not be, and originate in the contingent acts of A and B — Aposteriori of Being; (2) the objective relations in the form of the particular obligation incurred are neces-

sary, that is, cannot be otherwise, and originate in the universal Ought — Apriori of Duty; (3) the subjective relations in the form of the ideal right purpose are contingent, since A may intend either to repay or not to repay, that is, may form either a right or a wrong purpose, and they originate in A's moral freedom — Aposteriori of Duty; (4) the objective relations in the form of the real right deed are precisely the same as the subjective relations in the form of the ideal right purpose, are therefore contingent as depending on the subjectively contingent (not to consider other contingencies from outside), and originate in the form of the ideal purpose which is embodied in the real deed through the will of A — Aposteriori of Being. The elements of the case being thus the borrowing, the duty to repay, the purpose to repay, and the repaying, what determines the rightness or wrongness of the final deed? The borrowing necessarily involves the duty, the purpose is freely subsumed under the duty, the repaying merely effectuates the purpose, that is, realizes it or conforms the real to the ideal: clearly, the rightness or ethical character of the deed is determined by the free subsumption of the purpose under the duty, and the relational form of the right purpose, rightly forming or determining the wholly blind will, makes the relational form of the deed right. Purpose, then, is the subjective standard of the moral quality of every deed; as that is subjectively right or wrong, so is this also. Thus the Aposteriori of Being reappears in ethics as the Aposteriori of Duty, that is, as the particular right purpose, and constitutes the minor premise in the Syllogism of Duty.

iii. These two elements of Justice or *Real Right*, the objective standard of human conduct, and the Free Right Purpose or *Ideal Right*, its subjective standard, are distinguishably but inseparably one in the *Right Deed*, which is identity in difference of the two. That is, every entirely right deed is a moral syllogism; subsumption of ideal purpose under real duty in the good deed or act of virtue is

quite analogous to subsumption of experience under reason in the real cognition. The universal objective principle of duty as Real Right is the major; the particular subjective instance of purpose as Ideal Right is the minor; and identity in difference of the principle and the instance, — that is, the deed which is both objectively and subjectively right, — is the logical conclusion, effectuated by the blind but rightly formed energy of the will. Thus it is the purpose, as giving its whole relational form to the will, which freely mediates between two successive facts of Being (*e. g.* the borrowing, and the repaying or not repaying), and determines the relational form of the later fact as subjectively a right or a wrong deed (when action is obligatory, inaction is a bad action). Ultimate determination of the relational form of the deed, that is, the ultimate origin of the subjective moral relations embodied in it, must be traced back through the blind will to the subjective, conscious, and freely formed purpose; and my deed can be traced back no further than to me, inasmuch as my purpose cannot be formed except by myself — will not be my purpose at all unless I myself am its ultimate origin, its absolute source. Choice is the making of my purpose, the act of my reason; for the very essence of choice is to originate or create relations, to fix them as this rather than that or that rather than this, first ideally in my purpose, and then really in my deed. My will cannot go counter to my actual purpose; my surroundings may, but not my will. Hence the essential principle of moral freedom lies, not in the will as blind executive energy, but in the creativeness of the reason as “spontaneous synthesis *a priori*,” that is, as the absolute originator of those ethical relations in the purpose which, effectuated by the will, render the deed subjectively right or subjectively wrong. Kant’s supreme error was to apply this principle of freedom or “spontaneous synthesis *a priori*” to epistemology, where it has no applicability, rather than to ethics, where it is that free creativeness which is the absolute condition of all moral responsibility;

for *knowledge of the object* is absolutely determined by its immanent relational constitution (that is, the subject must either know the object as it is in itself or else not know it at all), while *action by the subject* absolutely determines itself as right or wrong according as the subject does or does not subsume its particular purpose under universal duty. My purpose is mine, and mine alone; it cannot be formed for me, or forced upon me, by any other subject human or divine; it can be my purpose solely on condition that I myself, not this or that abstracted faculty of mine, but I myself as an organic unit-universal of faculties, freely form or absolutely create it. In this principle of moral freedom, conceived as my sole personal responsibility for the formation of my own purposes, that is, for the rational creation of subjective relations which then of necessity become objective through the will in a new fact of Being as my personal deed, lies the whole possibility of ethics; and the philosophy which makes its ethics hinge on the abstracted will as will, whether as determinism, or indeterminism, is an *ignoratio elenchi*. Certainly the will as will is determined, but by nothing except the free purpose in which I determine myself. "Motives"? There are neither "motives" nor "laws of motion" in ethics—nothing but free purposes and deeds under the Apriori of Duty. In determining myself, I may either form my purpose by subsuming it rationally under duty as my major premise or universal end, which formation of it is the moral syllogism, or I may subsume it irrationally under some other and lower end, which formation of it is the moral sophism: fallacies and self-cheats are as easy in ethics as in logic. But to form my purpose both freely and syllogistically, not sophistically, is the highest law of reason, because it is the moral law itself. In every situation, however transient, my life involves some present obligation to the others among whom I live and act, and this obligation I incur not voluntarily, but necessarily, under the ever-present Apriori of Duty. If I content myself with the subsumption of my

present purpose under my present duty as each situation occurs, the successive realizations of these momentary ideals through the blind will is right living in the small empirical way. But if, looking backward over the past and interpreting the future in its light, I grasp my life as a living whole and freely subsume all my single right purposes under one universally right life-plan, as free self-identification of my entire reason-energy with the omnipresent Reason-Energy of the Universe, that is, as free self-consecration and self-surrender of my limited personal being to the All-Personal Being, that is right living in the sublime rational way. For in that universalized life-purpose the Syllogism of Duty exalts itself to the Syllogism of Religion, in which the major premise is God, the minor premise is Man, and the conclusion, alike ontological, epistemological, and ethical, is Real Religion, or living identity in difference of God and Man so far as the Finite may hold the Infinite.

§ 215. The foregoing general division of relations as necessary and contingent, whether in ontology, epistemology, or ethics, contains already the answer of critical realism to the question, "What is the origin of relation as such?" This answer is unavoidably twofold.

On the one hand, necessary relations are immanent and absolute conditions of existence; they have no origin just because they are necessary, that is, because all origin as such already involves, presupposes, and depends upon them *a priori*; they are what they are simply because they "cannot be otherwise";¹ they constitute the ground of possibility of all originated relations, but remain themselves mere blank potentialities until realized in these as conditions complied with; they are the *Apriori* of Being. Necessary in this sense are the relations of extension or extendedness to Space, — of protension, permanence, or duration to Time, — of substance or Energy to essence or

¹ "Τὸ δ' ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως εἶναι." (Arist. Anal. Post. 88b. 31.)

Reason, — and of all particularities, contingencies, or originated forms to the universality, necessity, and absolute unoriginatedness of Form itself as the Law of Unit-Universals. Such relations cannot without a fatal *petitio principii* be held to originate either in empirical consciousness or in rational self-consciousness, that is, either *a posteriori* in the individual subject or *a priori* in the universal subject. For the very existence of the subject, whether as individual or universal, phaenomenal or noumenal, finite or infinite, involves or presupposes the necessary form of that existence as an immanent relational constitution, that is, according to Kant himself, as an “organization of reason,” of which any and all production of subjective relations, however conscious and free, must still be the organic functioning. This ontological principle of the objectivity or objective apriorisms of all necessary and strictly universal relations, in opposition to that of their exclusively subjective origin in “pure synthesis *a priori*,” and therefore in opposition to the merely subjective apriorism of the Kantian *Erkenntnisstheorie*, is the only possible foundation of a scientific epistemology. In brief, all actually existent necessary relations are simply *conditions complied with*, and are rooted as such in the unoriginated Apriori of Being.

Contingent relations, on the other hand, are immanent and changeable forms of existence, and originate in the freedom, purposiveness, self-activity, spontaneity, spontaneous synthesis *a priori*, faculty of combination, or relating power of the subject, as identity in difference of energy and reason. Under the all-conditioning Apriori of Being, the contingent relations or forms of existence originate in the creativity of reason in energy as the free purpose of the Absolute Subject. But, under that all-conditioning necessity and by reason of it, all free purpose, that is, all free creation or selection of ends and means to ends, is unconditionally ethical in nature, inasmuch as both ends and means are necessarily determined, under the absolute *a priori* category of Worth, as good or bad, right or wrong.

Hence all exercise of freedom in the formation of purpose, that is, all creativity of reason in energy as giving to energy itself the relational form of ends or means, must take place or be actually subsumed under the Apriori of Being as the Apriori of Duty. This is the identity in difference of freedom and necessity in the Syllogism of Being, by which purpose is freely involved (principle of finality or involution) and form is necessarily evolved (principle of causality or evolution) in real existence as the effectuated idea or fulfilled purpose, and therefore as the ethical deed (principle of ethicality or personality). Briefly, all actually existent contingent relations are *purposed effects or effected purposes*, are rooted in the Aposteriori of Being, and originate in the ethical freedom of the subject as identity in difference of energy and reason.

Thus necessary relations, or those which "cannot be otherwise," have no origin because they are eternal conditions of all origin, and admit of no explanation because all explanation presupposes them; while contingent relations, or those which "may or may not be," cannot come into existence without being determined to be, must originate in some cause or some reason, and must be explained by the cause or the reason which determines them. Four theories may be propounded, at least nominally, to explain the origination of contingent relations.

I. Contingent relations may originate in Chance, that is, may come into existence without either cause or reason. This theory has no meaning and is a simple absurdity.

II. Contingent relations may originate in Fate or Absolute Unreason, that is, may come into existence from "objectless will," pure energy without form, pure cause without reason. But purely caused relations would be nothing but effects, and effects as such are not contingent, but necessary. By hypothesis, however, the relations in question are not necessary, but contingent. No contingent relation, therefore, can originate in Fate. This theory is a simple self-contradiction.

III. Contingent relations may originate in "pure reason *a priori*," that is, may come into existence from pure form without energy, pure reason without cause. But pure reason without cause is no cause, and can produce no effect. The origination or production of a contingent relation, however, must be not only a purpose, but also an effect, and cannot come from no cause. Hence no contingent relation can originate in "pure reason *a priori*," unless reason without cause is reason with cause. This theory, too, is a simple self-contradiction.¹

IV. Contingent relations may originate in the Real Free

¹ "I may here add a remark about Kant's view of the content of the causal relation. He has not developed this in a connected way. His view does not diverge far from Hume on the one hand, and from Leibniz on the other. Causality in the phenomenal world signifies for Kant, as for Hume, nothing but regularity in the sequence of phenomena. Real causal efficiency cannot of course occur here, for phenomena are ideational products. As such they can no more produce an effect than concepts can. But, as concepts logically determine one another, phenomena likewise can mutually determine their place in space and time. Or, more precisely, the place of each one is determined with relation to that of all the others. On the other side, Kant conceives of the intelligible causality of things-in-themselves, which indeed can produce a real effect, after the pattern of the Leibnizian pre-established harmony. The *noumena* stand in the divine understanding in a relation which one can designate as an *influxus idealis*. They determine one another, like the parts of a work of art, with logical and teleological necessity." (F. Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: his Life and Doctrine, tr. 1902, p. 196.) This passage well illustrates the impossibility of separating the inseparable elements, causation and ideation, energy and reason. If phenomena determine each other's place in space and time, they act causally and produce an undeniable effect; if noumena in the divine understanding determine each other's position like parts of a work of art, they do the same. In any case, the *influxus idealis* becomes an *influxus realis*, because it produces a real effect and therefore does the work of real energy. In other words, ideation without causation, "logical determination" without "real causal efficiency," is an absolute impossibility; each of the two is possible only as conditioned by the other, and the whole theory of "pure reason" and "pure thought" is *ein metaphysischer Traum*, just as much as the theory of "pure energy," or "nothing but mechanical causality," or "nothing but an infinite and eternal Energy whence all things proceed."

Subject, that is, may come into existence from the identity in difference of form and energy, reason and cause, — from the Real I as free formative activity, that is, relating and realizing power. Only through the co-operative union of these two principles, rationality as purpose and causality as will, can a real form come into existence either in Being or in Thought as a *purposed effect*, and with it all the real relations which constitute that form as the *free purpose fulfilled in the deed*. The origination of every real form is an event, and every event is a deed (1) of the Eternal Subject or Unoriginated I in the Course of Nature, or (2) of the temporal subject or Originated I in the course of human life. Even the formation of a free purpose requires will as well as reason, and so is an ideal deed before the deed. All contingent relations, therefore, are purposed effects, and originate in the Syllogism of Being as the formative activity, at once dynamical, logical, and ethical, of the Real Subject. This theory alone can stand.

§ 216. It can now easily be seen that the classification of all relations as either necessary or contingent, carried out successively in ontology, epistemology, and ethics, supplies the data for determining the relations of the three sciences of Being, Knowing, and Doing.

In ontology, the Syllogism of Being gives method and form to all reality and all ideality alike in the Course of Nature — to all motion in the mechanism, all life in the organism, all conscious action in the person. The major premise is Necessity, or the Apriori of Being; the minor premise is Freedom, or the Aposteriori of Being; and the conclusion, or real identity in difference of the two, is Actuality, or the Syllogism of Being itself, that is, the actual origination of the Many in the One as the perpetual production of new real forms through the identity in difference of substance as energy, essence as reason, process as evolution through involution, form of the process as syllogism, and ground of the form of the process as the law of unit-universals. Thus the Syllogism of Being is the

identity in difference of necessity and freedom, being and becoming, the conditioned and the unconditioned, or the eternal unity of the Many and the One in the real universe as the Absolute I.

In epistemology, the major premise is Reason, or the Apriori of Knowledge determined absolutely by the Apriori of Being; the minor premise is Experience, or the Aposteriori of Knowledge determined by the Aposteriori of Being as either true or false; and the conclusion, or real identity in difference of the two, is Science, or the Syllogism of Knowledge itself, that is, the actual origination of the Many in the One as the perpetual production of new real cognitions in the growth of science through its governing principle that *knowledge is determined by existence*. In other words, the understanding must conform its percept-concept to the real relations of the thing understood, or else the thing must be misunderstood and the understanding must be determined as sheer misunderstanding; nothing is known or can be known but the thing-in-itself, as identity in difference of noumenon and phaenomenon; if the thing-in-itself were unknowable, such a *fortiori* would be the thing-out-of-itself; "phaenomena alone" are nothing but things-out-of-themselves as mere sensations-in-the-subject, mere sensible appearances without intelligible relations or noumenal forms in themselves, and therefore cannot be known, because they cannot exist except as *ignes fatui* of a pseudo-epistemology. Hence the determination of knowledge by existence, that is, the principle of scientific objectivism, is the necessary logical condition of the possibility of epistemology itself as a science, and the Syllogism of Knowledge is the Syllogism of Thought as determined by the Syllogism of Being.

In ethics, the major premise is Justice, or the Apriori of Duty determined by the Apriori of Being; the minor premise is Free Purpose, or the Aposteriori of Duty determined by the Aposteriori of Being as either just or unjust, good or bad, right or wrong; and the conclusion, or real

identity in difference of the two, is Character, or the Syllogism of Duty itself, in its highest form the Syllogism of Religion, that is, the actual origination of the Many in the One as the perpetual production of new real deeds, right or wrong, in the growth of personal character and national civilization through their governing principle that *free action determines existence*. That is, the free I both thinks and wills, but can neither think without willing nor will without thinking; every free deed (and the free purpose itself is an ideal deed) is the real identity in difference of energy and reason, a *purposed effect of free action*, and in itself, therefore, has a nature at once ontological, logical, and ethical, as identity in difference of necessity and freedom; the free deed comes into existence both *for a purpose* (reason) and *from a cause* (energy as will), and its freedom lies in the rational creation of the relational purpose as right or wrong; the free deed is identity in difference of involution, or inflow of the purpose into the deed, and evolution, or outflow of the deed from the purpose, and takes its place thereby in the Course of Nature as a particular Syllogism of Being. Hence every free deed is a change or new determination of the relations or forms of existence which is wrought by the free action of the I as the real force in Nature. An obscure consciousness of this immanent relational constitution of the free deed betrays itself in such common expressions as "the ethics of the intellect," "the logic of events in history," and so forth. Since the course of Nature is the eternal free deed of the Absolute I, the moral law is the bed-rock of the real universe, and human understanding of that law measures the reach of human knowledge. Hence the determination of existence by free action, that is, the same principle of scientific objectivism, is the necessary logical condition of the possibility of ethics itself as a science; and the Syllogism of Duty, exalted to the Syllogism of Religion, is again the Syllogism of Thought as determined by the Syllogism of Being.

So considered, then, the three fundamental sciences of ontology, epistemology, and ethics evidently stand related to each other as a syllogism of syllogisms, in which ontology is the major premise, epistemology the minor premise, and ethics the conclusion. This is the Syllogism of Philosophy, the conditioning ground of knowledge of the Syllogisms of Thought, of Knowledge, of Duty, and of Religion; but it needs explication.

§ 217. Being is the necessary existence of the thing-in-itself as the real universe, the unit-universal as *summm genus* or *genus generum*. Knowing is thinking the thing-in-itself as the object, the unit-universal as species. Doing is making the thing-in-itself as a new action, the unit-universal as specimen. Hence Doing, in the free deed or purposed effect, is actual subsumption of the specimen under the genus through the species, that is, its actual emergence into existence in Space and Time as dynamical subsumption of a New Action under Being through Knowing; which is the identity in difference of Being and Knowing in Doing. This clearly defines the general relation of Being, Knowing, and Doing, as the Syllogism of Being; and therefore of ontology, epistemology, and ethics, as the Syllogism of Philosophy.

How vast is the scope and how profound the significance of this principle will be evident on a little reflection; for it reveals itself as the principle of *Individuation through Genesis*, that is, the law of all Becoming, the eternal Apriori of Being by which the Universe of Being exists in itself as a Universe of Doing because it is a Universe of Knowing — because Knowing is the only possible middle term which can mediate syllogistically between Being and Doing — because Intelligence is the only possible means by which the Universal can particularize itself in individuals, or the One involve and evolve itself in the Many. Hence the Syllogism of Philosophy is the demonstration of God, not as Spirit which is “separate” from Nature, not as Spirit which “alienates itself” in Nature, but as the iden-

tity in difference of Spirit and Nature — the Absolute 1 whose substance is Energy, whose essence is Reason, and whose life is that free ethical process of Evolution through Involution which eternally realizes the eternal ideal in the Syllogism of Being, or the Cosmic Process as itself Spiritual Life.

CHAPTER XVII

PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD AS DIALECTIC

§ 218. THE last chapter exhibits the transparent necessity of a thorough reform in philosophical method. So far as philosophy can be said to have a settled method (which in fact is rendered impossible by the epistemology founded on the self-contradictory principle of the absolute relativity of knowledge and the Kantian doctrine that we can know phaenomena alone), it offers nothing but various distortions of Syllogistic. Empiricism relies on pure induction, recognizes only particular and contingent relations, and thereby invalidates the major premise, which must be at least assumed as universal and necessary, or else the conclusion will not necessarily follow. Rationalism relies on pure deduction, recognizes only universal and necessary relations, and thereby invalidates the minor premise, in which perception of singulars must be at least assumed to furnish actual knowledge of the particular and contingent, or else the conclusion will have no actual content. From the absolute necessity of the case, however, no reasoned work (and all philosophical works at least profess to be reasoned) ever yet adhered rigorously and consistently either to the method of pure induction or to that of pure deduction: all such works hitherto, so far as we know them, exhibit an unavoidable yet logically ruinous inconsistency in this point of method, because neither pure induction nor pure deduction can be at all possible, so long as the syllogism itself remains the actual identity in difference of induction and deduction, contingency and necessity, experience and reason. For deduction is reading the syllogism forward from genus through species to specimen, while induction

is reading it backward from specimen through species to genus. Nothing but theoretical recognition of these truths, embodied in undeviating practical observance of them, will ever prevent the methodological confusion which has itself prevented philosophy thus far from becoming the established *scientia scientiarum*; for this methodological confusion, rooted in epistemological confusion, results from the doctrine that *no* human knowledge is absolute, but *all* human knowledge is relative — that doctrine of the *absolute relativity* of human knowledge which is, perhaps, the most astonishing contradiction in terms ever yet perpetrated ostensibly in the name of reason. If there is any logical necessity in the syllogistic conclusion, it constitutes an absolute element in human knowledge.

Beyond the vast marshland of all these modern confusions rises the white peak of Aristotle's discovery that the necessary and absolute form of all thought as thought, and therefore of all true thought as knowledge of Being, is the syllogism. Not "Retreat to Kant," but "Retreat to Aristotle," must be the watchword of methodological reform — not at all to remain with Aristotle, but to make from his immortal discovery a true advance in the light of all subsequent investigation, above all of Darwinism, with its discovery of the knowable individual difference. Aristotle failed to discover the magnitude of his own discovery; he failed to perceive that the syllogism is the necessary form, not only of all Thought, but of all Being as well; he failed to perceive that the syllogism *must be* the form of thought solely *because it is* the form of Being and *because it cannot be otherwise* (Apriori of Being). These absolute grounds of his doctrine of Syllogistic were hidden from him by his own Aristotelian Paradox: namely, that the universal inheres in the individual and the individual does not inhere at all in the universal, and that the individual difference is unknowable because all the individuals or specimens of one species, containing only one and the same immutable universal, are totally indistinguishable

(ὁμοία, ἀδιάφορα). From these premises it follows, of course, that the syllogism cannot account for the origination of the individual through sex — cannot be, therefore, the principle of Individuation through Genesis — cannot be, therefore, the Syllogism of Being as well as of Thought. The untruth of those premises, however, and the truth of the law of unit-universals as re-formation of the Aristotelian Paradox by means of the Darwinian principle of the knowable individual difference, have been clearly shown already, and need not detain us here.

§ 219. Independently of Syllogistic, no formal method of thought has been wrought out in philosophy with scientific precision other than Dialectic.¹ Sokrates and Plato at first conceived it as simply question and answer in argumentation or dialogue (διαλέγεσθαι).² Fichte's bold and original conception of it (doubtless suggested by Kant's antinomies) as the immanent, self-perpetuating process of thought itself as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, in which the synthesis itself becomes a new thesis for a new antithesis, and so on, — a method employed also by Schelling, — was still further developed by Hegel into a similar triadic movement of the self-determining *Begriff* as position, negation, and negation of negation as new position — a process of affirmation and double negation which, as the "absolute negativity" or principle of *productive con-*

¹ "Der Ruhm jedoch bleibt dem Sokratiker Aristoteles ungeschmälert, dass in dem Verlaufe der ganzen abendländischen Culturgeschichte keine Logik, ohne alle Ausnahme, sich der aristotelischen auch nur an die Seite stellen darf." (C. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, I. 27) — ("Andrerseits wird uns ein Gegenstand wahrer Bewunderung sein, mit welch grossartiger Conception Aristoteles eine Logik entfalte, welche den tiefsten Kern des allgemein-menschlichen Denkens überhaupt — nicht bloss des griechischen Denkens — richtig trifft und zugleich im unlösbarsten Zusammenhange mit der gesammten Speculation ihres Urhebers steht. . . . da in dem ganzen Verlaufe unserer abendländischen Cultur bis zum heutigen Tage die aristotelische Logik ausser der Hegel'schen die einzig philosophisch-wissenschaftliche ist." (*Ibid.* I. 87.)

² Τὸν δ' ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον ἄλλο τι σὺ καλεῖς ἢ διαλεκτικόν; (Crat. 390 C. Quoted by Prantl, I. 68, footnote.)

tradition, constitutes the essential nature and life of all thought as thought, the eternal pure self-thinking of the Idea, or νόσις νοήσεως. Instead of conceding, as is required by the Aristotelian logic, the finality of either one or the other of two contradictory judgments, one as necessarily true and the other as necessarily false, Hegel pours scorn on this "either — or" of the "reflective understanding,"¹ and in the name of the higher logic of the "speculative reason" treats them both as relatively true, but absolutely false, finding their real truth only in their combination, concretion, or "negative unity," — both of them being sub-

¹ "Es ist diess [d. h. das Dogmatische] überhaupt das strenge *Entweder-Oder* und es heisst demgemäss z. B. die Welt ist *entweder* endlich oder unendlich, aber *nur eines* von beiden. Das Wahrhafte, das Spekulative ist dagegen gerade dieses, welches keine solche einseitige Bestimmung an sich hat und dadurch nicht erschöpft wird, sondern als Totalität diejenigen Bestimmungen in sich vereinigt enthält, welche dem Dogmatismus in ihrer Trennung als ein Festes und Wahres gelten." (Encyklopädie, Logik, Werke, VI. 68.) — "In solchen Ausschlüssungen selbst giebt sich sogleich der genannte Standpunkt als ein Zurückfallen in den metaphysischen Verstand kund, in das *Entweder — Oder* desselben," u. s. w. (*Ibid.* VI. 133.) — "Es ist die Weise der Jugend sich in Abstractionen herumzuwerfen, wohingegen der lebenserfahrene Mensch sich auf das abstrakte *Entweder — Oder* nicht einlässt, sondern sich an das Konkrete hält." (*Ibid.* VI. 151.) — "Der Satz *des ausgeschlossenen Dritten* ist der Satz des bestimmten Verstandes, der den Widerspruch von sich abhalten will, und indem er es thut, denselben begeht. A soll entweder + A oder — A seyn; damit ist schon das Dritte, das A ausgesprochen, welches *weder + noch —* ist, und das *eben sowohl auch* als + A und als — A gesetzt ist." (*Ibid.* VI. 238.) Any schoolboy would know that A and + A are the same: that the + is always understood unless the — is expressed. Such argumentation is worthy only of Euthydemus or Dionysodorus, and exhibits Dialectic as pure Sophistic. — "Es giebt in der That nirgends, weder im Himmel noch auf Erden, weder in der geistigen noch in der natürlichen Welt, ein so abstraktes Entweder — Oder, wie der Verstand solches behauptet." (*Ibid.* VI. 242.) Sokrates expresses none too pungently the verdict of every reasoning mind on disregard of the law of excluded middle, when he characterizes it as "the mark of a trifler:" "Οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ποῖ. Ἄδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. Καὶ τοι τοῦτό ἐστι παλῶντος." (Plat. Apol. Soc. cap. xiv.)

lated, annulled, cancelled, reconciled, carried up, absorbed, or concreted (*aufgehoben*) in that higher "moment" or term which is to serve as at once the last of one triad and the first of the next. The very essence of reason as the Idea's self-evolution is eternal but productive self-contradiction: there is no "absolute truth" other than the dialectic process itself as Absolute Logic, Speculative Philosophy, or the whole system of self-evolving and self-dissolving views. In the sphere of Being, the game goes on as (1) Position or Immediacy, (2) Negation or Mediation, and (3) Negation of Negation, New Position, or Self-Mediation; in the sphere of Essence, as (1) Reflection in Another and (2) Reflection in Self; and, in the sphere of the Notion, as the one ceaseless self-returning movement of the Notion itself (*die absolute Negativität oder Bewegung des Begriffs*), or the self-knowledge and self-determination of the Speculative Idea as the One Totality (*das Erkennen, dass die Idee die Eine Totalität ist*). Hegel confesses that "the interest lies in the whole motion" — a sea of forms as restless, as fleeting, and as barren as the waves of Homer's ἀλὸς ἀπρηγόειο.¹

§ 220. The issue between Syllogistic and Dialectic, therefore, condenses itself into a brief question: *Does demonstration demonstrate?* That is, does the syllogistic *must* exist? Is the syllogism valid or invalid? Does the conclusion, if the premises are sound or conceded to be sound, follow with a necessity which is final, apodeictic,

¹ Encyklopädie, Logik, Werke, VI. 408–414; Philosophie des Geistes, Werke, VII, ii. 19, 20. — "Die Einsicht, dass die Natur des Denkens selbst die Dialektik ist, dass es als Verstand in das Negative seiner selbst, in den Widerspruch, gerathen muss, macht eine Hauptseite der Logik aus." (Logik, Werke, VI. 17.) — "Die Dialektik dagegen ist diess *immanente* Hinausgehen, worin die Einseitigkeit und Beschränktheit der Verstandesbestimmungen sich als das, was sie ist, nämlich als ihre Negation, darstellt. Alles Endliche ist diess, sich selbst aufzuheben. Das Dialektische macht daher die bewegende Seele des wissenschaftlichen Fortgehens aus," u. s. w. (*Ibid.* VI. 152.) — "In der That ist das Denken wesentlich die Negation eines unmittelbar Vorhandenen." (*Ibid.* VI. 19.)

absolute? In Chapter XII we saw that the absolute *must* is the essence of the syllogism, which derives its subjective necessity from objective necessity as the nature of things or the eternal conditions of existence, that is, from the Apriori of Being. But Hegel, while conceding the truth of the conclusion of the syllogism as contingent or relative, repudiates it as necessary or absolute; for both the conclusion and its contradictory are equally true or equally false, and the contradiction itself disappears and becomes relative truth itself, when the two contradictories are concreted or *aufgehoben* in their "negative unity" as a "new position."

This principle of "absolute negativity" lays the axe at the root of the syllogism as apodeictic necessity; if it is tenable, demonstration does not demonstrate. The Aristotelian logic means that contradiction is the clashing of truth and error, knowledge and ignorance, in human thought, but cannot exist in Being, — that, of two contradictory judgments one must be true and the other false in fact (laws of Contradiction, Excluded Middle, and Identity). But the Hegelian logic means that contradiction alone produces truth, — that thought is the only Being as "Substance," and that truth is nothing whatever but the agreement of thought with its own reality,¹ — that the agreement of thought with itself is nothing whatever but the absorption or concretion of two contradictories in their "negative unity," — and that this merely relative truth of the "negative unity" instantly dissolves and disappears in the new contradiction it generates. That is, the pure pro-

¹ "Das Denken, wie es die Substanz der äusserlichen Dinge ausmacht, ist auch die allgemeine Substanz des Geistigen." (Encyklopädie, Werke, VI. 46). — "Die logische Idee. . . ist die absolute Substanz des Geistes wie der Natur, das Allgemeine, Alldurchdringende." (*Ibid.* VI. 353.) — "Aus diesem Urtheil ist es, dass die Idee zunächst nur die Eine, allgemeine *Substanz* ist, aber ihre entwickelte wahrhafte Wirklichkeit ist, dass sie als *Subjekt* und so als Geist ist." (*Ibid.* VI. 385). — "Wahrheit heisst eben Uebereinstimmung des Begriffs mit seiner Wirklichkeit." (*Ibid.* VII. ii. 11.)

ductivity of contradiction means the absolute relativity of knowledge; and this principle is repudiation of the syllogism as apodeicticity or demonstration. Hegel's denial of the "either — or" as apodeictic necessity or demonstrative certainty is unequivocal and avowed denial of the law of excluded middle; and his forthputting of the "negative unity" as a concretion and real reconciliation of two contradictories is undeniable presentation of it as *a middle which is not excluded*. If Dialectic could make good this prodigious claim, it would be the total overthrow of Syllogistic in the name of "absolute negativity," that is, the absolute relativity of human knowledge. To be sure, absolute relativity is a contradiction in terms; but what would that defence avail against one to whom contradiction is the very essence of reason? Syllogistic cannot defend itself by begging the question of Excluded Middle, or stolidly reasserting the point at issue; it can only defend itself by attacking the cardinal principle of Dialectic and exposing it as in reality nothing but Sophistic.

This cardinal principle of Dialectic is the "absolute negativity" itself—the principle of the *pure productiveness of contradiction as double negation*—the principle that *double negation of a position is itself a new position*; and it is precisely this principle that Syllogistic most vigorously and emphatically denies. How it came into existence is plain enough. Hegel's fundamental position is that "every true philosophy is idealism,"¹ that is, absolute idealism; and the principle of absolute idealism is that nothing exists but ideas, as endlessly appearing and disappearing self-determinations in the motion of THE IDEA—in Hegel's wording of it: "Thought, as it constitutes the Substance of external things, is also the universal Substance of the spiritual;" "The Logical Idea is the absolute Substance of the Spirit as of Nature;" "The Idea at first is only the one universal Substance, but its true and developed reality is that it exists as Subject, and so as Spirit;" and so forth.

¹ Encyklopädie, Logik, Werke, VI. 189.

Thought, then, must be "pure," that is, pure from Experience, which is its only possible "impurity;" absolute idealism must be *reines Denken*. From this fundamental idealistic position it follows inevitably that the "reflective understanding," whose instrument is the syllogism alone, with its "either — or" and its law of excluded middle, must be subordinated to the "speculative reason," whose instrument must be something higher and purer than the syllogism. For the syllogism necessarily involves experience in the minor premise, and is unfitted thereby for being the instrument of "pure thought" or absolute idealism; the major premise, as supplying the universal, is as pure as it is possible for Thought to be, but the minor premise, as supplying the particular or the individual, is radically impure.¹ If absolute idealism is possible, therefore, its possibility depends upon its ability to dispense with the syllogism and to devise an instrument of "pure thinking" which shall absolutely exclude all "empirical impurity."

It is Hegel's supreme greatness as a thinker to have discerned this necessity and to have met it by developing Fichte's conception into the purely rational method of Dialectic as Absolute Negativity. For the dialectical triad seems to move exclusively in the rational or pure element of the major premise; pure reason posits the abstract universal, pure reason negates the same universal, and pure reason, negating its own negation, thereby creates a new position as the concrete universal, all without quitting the sphere of the universal or borrowing anything from the empirical spheres of the particular or the individual, as the syllogism must in the minor premise and the conclusion. The purity seems perfect. If this semblance is no illusion, — if the third moment of the triad,

¹ "Ein Schluss kann ohne die Beziehung des Allgemeinen auf das Besondere nicht begriffen werden." (A. Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, I. 25.) As reason deals with the universal and experience with the particular, this statement expresses the necessary constitution of the syllogism as identity in difference of reason and experience.

simply in virtue of being a "negation of negation," is *ipso facto* a new position in advance of the first, — Dialectic establishes itself impregnably as the method of the higher or speculative reason, apparently superior to Syllogistic as the method of the reflective understanding. Are these conditions fulfilled?

§ 221. Let us seek our answer to this question in Hegel's first example, and for the sake of perfect fairness state this in his own language. We refer once for all to the "Logic" of the "Encyclopædia," preserving his own italics.

"*Pure Being* makes the beginning, because it is pure Thought as well as the undetermined simple Immediate; but the first beginning can be nothing that is mediated and further determined."

"This pure Being is *pure Abstraction*, hence the *absolutely-negative*, which, likewise taken immediately, is *Nothing*."

"*Nothing*, as this self-equal Immediate, is likewise, on the other hand, the *same* that *Being* is. The truth of Being, like that of Nothing, is therefore the *unity* of the two; this unity is *Becoming*."

"Being, as one with Nothing, and Nothing, as one with Being, equally vanish in *Becoming*; through this contradiction in itself, *Becoming* eventuates as the unity in which the two elements are concreted (*aufgehoben*); its *result*, therefore, is *Existence*."

"*Existence* is Being with a *determinateness*, which, as immediate or existent determinateness, is *Quality*. Existence as reflected into itself in this its determinateness is an *Existent*, *Something*."

Here we have Hegel's account of the origination of the Many in the One, his principle of individuation as "absolute negativity," that is, the absolute creation of Something (*Etwas*) out of Nothing (*Seyn = Nichts*) through the pure productivity of Contradiction (*Widerspruch*). The principle of the ancients that "nothing becomes from nothing, something becomes only from something," Hegel lightly, if not flippantly, dismisses as "the principle of the eternity of matter, of pantheism," and substitutes for it his own principle that "Being goes over into Nothing, Nothing goes over into Being" (*dass das Seyn das Uebergehen in Nichts, und das Nichts das Uebergehen ins Seyn*

ist). To the question, "What goes over?" Hegel has no possible answer: if pure Being is absolute Nothing and absolute Nothing is pure Being, *Nothing goes over to Nothing*—that is, there is no possible *what* to go over from one to the other. If he should answer that Thought is a possible *what*, that Being and Nothing are both Pure Thoughts, and that, in the *Uebergehen*, Pure Thought goes over from itself to itself, the double retort is necessary: (1) that this answer is exactly what he himself discredits, in case of the ancients and their just quoted maxim, as "only the proposition of the abstract identity of the understanding," which "in fact abolishes Becoming, for that which becomes and that from which it becomes are one and the same;" and (2) that the concession thus made, namely, that Being and Nothing are both Pure Thoughts, destroys at once his own original position that they are empty or undetermined abstractions (*leere Abstraktionen*), for it definitely determines each of the two as *Thought* in opposition to *Experience* and to *Matter*. Such an answer, of course, would be no answer. The thesis of the pure productivity of contradiction in the creation of Something out of Nothing would not, then, be helped in the least by begging the question, and presupposing Thought, that is, a *Determined Being which is not Nothing*, as the false Nothing out of which absolute idealism creates its false Something as mere idea.

§ 222. But Syllogistic does not need to win a victory by merely turning the guns of Dialectic against itself. It fundamentally denies that double negation of any position is itself a new position; it denies the pure productivity of contradiction in any case or in any form, repudiates the principle of "absolute negativity," together with the dialectical method which is its application, and exposes Dialectic as absolute Sophistic. For, whatever may be posited as A, negation of it negates nothing but A and produces nothing but —A; similarly, negation of —A negates nothing but —A, and produces nothing but —(—A).

But $-(\neg A)$ is and can be nothing whatever but $+A$. In other words, no matter what is originally posited, the double negation of it as negation of negation simply reproduces the original position totally unchanged, and is incapable of producing anything whatever that is new or in any way different from that original position. This is the general but irrefutable refutation of the cardinal principle of Dialectic, that is, the principle of "absolute negativity," or pure productivity of contradiction as applied in the constitutive triad of the Dialectical Method. The refutation is nothing but sober and rigorous insistence on that principle of Identity which is everywhere asserted and employed by Dialectic itself: namely, " A is A ." For negation of negation of the first moment in any triad, if made in rational accordance with this principle of Identity, *reproduces* that first moment precisely as it was, before it was *aufgehoben* in the "negative unity" or concretion of the first two moments in the third, and is absolutely incapable of *producing* what is in any respect or in any degree a "new position." Whatever new position is now discovered in the third moment as an ostensible "advance" upon the first, or as a pretended "result" of the double negation, must very evidently be slipped in from some other source than the barren process of merely repeated contradiction. This other source, whether acknowledged or unacknowledged, justifiable or unjustifiable, stands outside of pure Dialectic as quite another principle: what is absolutely certain is that $-(\neg A) = +A$, and nothing else, and that contradiction twice made gets back to the old position, but makes no new one. In claiming, therefore, to be a productive method, pure Dialectic is pure Sophistic.

How is it, then, with Hegel's first and fundamental triad of Being, Nothing, Becoming? If Dialectic were Logic and not Sophistic, the triad would be a duad—a mere pendulum-swing from Being to Nothing and from Nothing to Being *in saecula saeculorum*. Becoming has no

dialectical place whatever in the triad, and must originate from the outside.

For Pure Being is first posited — how, by what, or with what warrant, we will not here pause to inquire — as Pure Abstraction (*die reine Abstraktion, das ganz Abstrakte, das absolut-negative*). The original absolute position is thus in itself the first absolute negation: Being is No-Being or Nothing. This aboriginal Being as Nothing is then negated again as No No-Being or No Nothing. But this double negation, *being thus derived*, has no possible positive content other than that of the first position from which it starts; it cannot, therefore, be an affirmation of Something, which was not contained in but explicitly excluded from that first position; it must be here only a return to the original Pure Being as Pure Abstraction, that is, to Being as No-Being or Nothing. Here there is no “advance” whatever, but only retreat to the beginning. This eternal swing from Being to Nothing and from Nothing back to Being, this duad and no triad, is the only logical result of Hegel’s premises, unless his Dialectic is prepared to deny the very principle of Identity which it so freely uses, and to repudiate the “A is A.” The third term Becoming is logically underivable from the principle of “absolute negativity,” from which reason, however pure and however keen of sight, can extract no more than the duad. This perfectly empty tautology, however, ending precisely where it began and producing *no result* which can constitute in itself a *new position* for further advance, is the only logical outcome, the whole rational content, of the process of double negation. If “A is A,” the pretence that contradiction is or can be productive, and that double negation actually produces a new position, goes to the ground. But with it goes Dialectic, as a method of pure reason which aspires to supplant the method of Syllogistic, that is, identity in difference of reason and experience.

§ 223. For, be it remembered, it is the cardinal principle of Dialectic that pure contradiction *produces* new

position, when it takes the form of double negation and becomes affirmative in a positive result which is at once, not only (1) the third moment of one triad, but also (2) the first moment of another triad, inasmuch as this result is not a simple return to the first position, but rather the evolution of a new position as a real "advance" (*Fortschritt*) upon the first. If this last claim is unwarranted, the principle of "absolute negativity" breaks down. But the disproof of it is conclusive. When two contradictories are both negated and concreted (*aufgehoben*) in a third moment as their "negative unity," this third moment necessarily reproduces the first position absolutely without change; it does not produce a new position at all, and, if it is made to appear or become one, the appearance is effected through some principle other than that of double negation. For $-(-A) = A$, in general, and $-(-\text{Being}) = \text{Being}$, in particular; $-(-A)$ is not $= B$, and $-(-\text{Being})$ is not $= \text{Becoming}$, Hegel to the contrary notwithstanding. It is precisely his uniform but nowhere justified assumption at this pivotal point which constitutes the fatal irrationality of his Dialectic Method, and acquiescence in it is the amiable credulity of his disciples.

For his "Being" = "pure abstraction," pure emptiness of all content, absence of all determinations, or 0; his "Nothing" = "pure abstraction," absence of all determinations, or 0; and the only possible unity or concretion of the two is $0 + 0$. But $0 + 0 = 0$, which is simple return to his first position, namely, *Being without determinations*, and not at all advance to Becoming, namely, *Being with determinations*. For Hegel himself explicates Becoming as full of determinations: namely, as "the first concrete thought (*Gedanke*) and thereby the first Notion" (*Begriff*); as "the first concrete and thus the first true thought-determination" (*Gedankenbestimmung*); as "a Being, but a Being with negation or determinateness" (*Bestimmtheit*); as "unrest, the absolutely restless, the abstract restlessness" (*Unruhe, das durchaus Rastlose, diese abstrakte Rastlosigkeit*).

keit); as "a something that vanishes" (*ein Verschwindendes*); as "a fire, so to speak, that extinguishes itself in consuming its material;" as motion in *Uebergehen*, as change in *Umschlagen*, etc. Now, is one to believe that all these various real determinations can be begotten by mere double negation out of empty zero? Yet this absurdity must be swallowed by any one who admits that double negation can in any rational way explain or derive Becoming, definitely determined as *Filled Being*, from Pure Being and Nothing, two elements of which each is defined as "pure abstraction" or *Absolute Emptiness*. Syllogistic writes the "negative unity" of the two as $0 + 0 = 0$, while Dialectic writes it as $0 + 0 = 1$. Which equation or conception is rational, and which sophistical or irrational?

The clear result of this investigation so far is that a bottomless chasm, not to be bridged by the dialectic process, yawns between "Pure Being," the primal position with which the first triad begins and to which double negation necessarily brings it back unaugmented by any fresh content, and "Becoming," the vastly augmented new position with which the second triad begins. The "pure reason" which despises and excludes "experience" cannot connect the two, because without experience it has no principle of linkage between two successive positions of which one is Nothing and the other Everything. The whole series of triads becomes an incoherent succession of ungrounded and unconnected positions, in every philosophical regard a mere rope of sand, when once the principle of double negation as the productivity of contradiction breaks down, turns out to be a mere grandiose assertion against reason, and is stripped of its deceptive mask of rationality. For by Hegel's own elucidations, "Pure Being" is Empty Being, and "Becoming" is Filled Being; he everywhere assumes that his "absolute negativity" or persistent contradiction *produces* the Absolute Fulness out of the Absolute Emptiness — *creates* Everything out of Nothing; and that amazing assumption is the only founda-

tion and only real content of Dialectic. More technically stated, the assumption is that the combination or concretion of two contradictories generates a new "position" which is a tenable mean between them and the "truth" of both together. This is implicit denial of the law of excluded middle, abolition of logic, quintessence of irrationality; it exhibits *reine Vernunft* as *felo de se*. All real rationality lies in the syllogistic *must*, and absolutely vanishes if the syllogism does not demonstrate; and the syllogism certainly does not demonstrate, unless its "either—or" stands as final and conclusive—that is, unless the law of excluded middle holds good. Yet this law of excluded middle is precisely what Hegel repudiates, as valid only for the "reflective understanding"—not valid or binding at all for the "speculative reason," which recognizes no logic but Dialectic.¹

Here at last we get at the real secret of "absolute idealism"—of Dialectic as superior to Syllogistic, and of the dialectical triad as its substitute for the syllogism. The Hegelian logic assumes, in tacit defiance of the Aristotelian, that self-contradiction is the very essence, or essential self-determining activity, of thought as thought (*Bewusstsein des Gegensatzes des Denkens in und gegen sich*); that the conclusion of the syllogism is no more true in itself than its absolute contradictory; that both are relatively true or relatively false; that both have their real truth only in being concreted (*aufgehoben*) in their "negative unity;" that this "negative unity," as a positive "result," now stands as a "new position," to be again negated, again concreted, and thereby advanced to yet another "new position;" that the only absolute truth at last is this absolute motion of the Idea as the One Totality, eternally contradicting itself, eternally solving its own contradictions by means of its own concretions, and eternally contradicting again its own solutions; and that, in each triad

¹ *Encyklopädie, Logik, Werke, VI.* 238-243.

of this self-mediating process, the "new position," that is, the middle term which is *not excluded* by any contradiction, but which lies already *involved* in it as its self-reconciliation, and which can nowise be inferred by the merely abstractive or reflective understanding, must be discovered, discerned, or seen by the *higher speculative reason*. In this doctrine of the speculative reason, then, we have the real "Secret of Hegel," the key to Dialectic as the peculiar and higher method of his "Speculative Philosophy;" for, while the form of procedure is the dialectical method in general and the dialectical triad in particular, the soul of the process is that which proceeds, and this is the Spirit which immediately, that is, *without mediation*, "sees" the "new positions" of the successive triads — the Spirit itself as *Einsehen*, *Einsicht*, or *Spekulation*. This must be scrutinized very closely and at length.

§ 224. There are three attitudes, according to Hegel, by which the mind may relate itself to reality, three attitudes of thought towards the objective world.

The first of these attitudes is Dogmatism, the naïve procedure which rests on the belief that truth is known through reflection and that what things really are can be presented to consciousness; it goes on the assumption that, of two contradictory contentions, one must be true and the other false, as something which is final or fixed, that is, not to be again denied.

"The old Skeptics called every philosophy dogmatic in so far as it had anything definite to teach. In this broad sense, even the speculative philosophy, from the skeptical point of view, must pass for dogmatic. In the narrower sense, the Dogmatic consists in adhering to one-sided determinations of the mere understanding to the exclusion of their contradictories. It is in general the strict '*either — or*': for instance, the world is *either* finite *or* infinite, but *only one* of the two. On the other hand, the True, the Speculative, is precisely that which has in itself no such one-sided determination and is not exhausted by it, but, as Totality, holds united in itself those determinations which to dogmatism are valid in their

separation as something fixed and true. . . . The battle of reason consists in overturning that which the understanding has fixed." ¹

In other words, by concreting (*aufheben*) two contradictions in their negative unity as a new positive result, the reason overturns the contradiction fixed as conclusive or final by the understanding — and with it overturns the law of excluded middle. . But, in defining this first attitude of thought, Hegel falls into a caricature of the understanding which is so gross as to become grotesque: "The reflective thinking of the mere understanding is limited to the form of the abstract universal, and is powerless to advance to the particularization of this universal." ² Since the characteristic act of the understanding is the syllogism, by which the genus particularizes itself in the specimen through the species, — and since, as we have shown at great length in a previous chapter, Syllogistic is thus the principle of individuation through genesis, that is, the principle of *all particularization of the universal*, whether as abstract in Thought or concrete in Being, — Hegel's misjudgment here is glaring. His criticism of the understanding as dealing only with the "abstract universal" recoils witheringly upon his own theory of the reason as active only in the *Begriff*, of which the three constitutive moments are "universality, particularity, and individuality" ³ — three abstractions, and nothing but abstractions, drawn from the *real universals, particulars, and individuals* which Dialectic, as "pure reason," excludes and ignores as given only in experience, but which Syllogistic includes and recognizes as the necessary condition and source of these very abstractions. When the speculative reason thus blames the reflective understanding for

¹ Werke, VI: 67-69: ". . . Der Kampf der Vernunft besteht darin, dasjenige, was der Verstand fixirt hat, zu überwinden."

² "Das blos verständige Denken ist auf die Form des abstrakt Allgemeinen beschränkt und vermag nicht zur Besonderung dieses Allgemeinen fortzuschreiten." (Werke, VI. 78.)

³ Werke, VI. 320.

dealing with the "abstract universal," when Dialectic deals with nothing else, it acts out the parable of the wolf and the lamb with a vengeance, and Hegel's characterization of the understanding becomes pure caricature.

§ 225. The second of Hegel's "three attitudes" is Empirism or Empiricism. This exalts the content of the single perception, feeling, or intuition, into the form of universal representations, propositions, laws, and so forth, as ultimates of thought whose interconnection in the phenomenon needs no further investigation or justification. It contains the great principle that what is true must be in reality and exist for perception.

"This principle is opposed to the Ought, with which reflection puffs itself up and in the presence of Reality scornfully busies itself with a Beyond [that is, an Ideal], which can have its seat and existence solely in the subjective understanding. Like Empiricism, philosophy, too, knows only that which *is*; it knows no such thing as that which merely *ought* to be, and which, therefore, *does not exist*.¹ On the subjective side, likewise, Empirism contains the important principle of Freedom, namely, that whatever the human being should allow as valid in his own knowledge he should *himself* see — should know *himself* as *present* in it."

Further consideration of the second attitude is unnecessary in this connection. But it should be noted in passing that the two "principles" here approved by speculative philosophy, namely, "freedom" and "opposition to the Ought," are totally incompatible: without freedom there could be no Ought, and without the Ought there could be no freedom. Both equally belong to ethics, and without ethics neither has the least significance; for the Good is the Ethically True — the True is the Rationally Good — all

¹ Compare the explicit statement elsewhere: "Die *frei* sich wissende *Substanz*, in welcher das absolute *Sollen* eben so sehr *Seyn* ist, hat als Geist eines *Volkes* Wirklichkeit." (Philosophie des Geistes, Werke, VII. ii. 391.) That is, the Ought does after all "exist" in the objective understanding as the "spirit of a people" — though Hegel does not teach that it exists also as the Divine Ideal of the Infinite Spirit.

freedom of thought is necessarily ethical, since perfect truth, which is or should be the aim of all thought, is the intellectual ideal, that is, the Ought in all intellectual activity. If speculative philosophy knows no Ought, no Ideal of Truth, no Beyond as Purpose to be realized or effected, it has no possible meaning or worth for man; and the "motion" or "free self-determination" of the Idea itself, if devoid of the Ought as its not yet realized Aim, sinks to the level of merely mechanical motion as blind, as meaningless, and as unethical as the blowing of the wind.

§ 226. The third attitude is Speculative Philosophy itself, or the Logic of Absolute Idealism — not the merely subjective, abstract, and formal logic of the Critical Philosophy, but the objective logic of which the fundamental principle is the pure productivity of contradiction as double negation, the "absolute negativity" of the Idea.

"In respect to its form, the Logical has three sides: (1) the abstract or merely intellectual; (2) the dialectical or negatively-rational; (3) the speculative or positively-rational. These three sides do not constitute three *parts* of logic, but are *moments of every Logically-Real*, that is, of every concept or every truth in general. They can be posited all together under the first moment (*das Verständige*), and thereby held in isolation from each other; but so they are not considered truly."¹

The activity of the reflective understanding consists essentially in imparting to its content the form of universality, and the universal posited by it is an abstract universal, that is, a universal abstracted from all its particulars; but by holding the universal in this manner over against its particulars the understanding converts the universal itself into a particular. Since the understanding thus relates itself to its objects as simply analytic, by the way of separation and abstraction, it is the precise opposite of immediate intuition and sensation, that is, the

¹ Werke, VI. 146, 147.

sensibility as such, which deals only with the unanalyzed whole of the sensuously-concrete. Thus the essential principle of the understanding is that of abstract identity [A is A, A is not Not-A], inasmuch as it abstracts and isolates the results of its analysis as something ultimate or final in themselves, always the same in their absolute differences. Since all progress in knowledge from one determination to another must be effected through this principle of identity, the full right and desert of the understanding must be conceded in philosophy; its abstractions are indispensable in mathematics, jurisprudence, and so forth, no less than in common life. But these abstractions of the understanding are not, as it supposes, ultimate or fixed; they strike over into their opposites, and must be handled by a higher faculty which is capable of treating them dialectically.

The dialectical movement is properly the self-cancellation (*Sich-Aufheben*) of such finite determinations, and their crossing over into their opposites. The Dialectical, taken separately for itself by the understanding and exhibited particularly in scientific conceptions, constitutes Scepticism, which retains mere negation as the final result of the Dialectical. But genuine Dialectic is the real and true nature of the understanding's abstractions, nay, of things themselves and the finite in general. Reflection is in itself an external transcendence of them in their isolated determinateness and disconnectedness, and a bringing of them into definite relations, although it still maintains their isolated validity. But Dialectic is an *immanent* transcendence by which the onesidedness and limitedness of the understanding's abstractions is exhibited as that which it really is, namely, their negation. "Everything finite is this — to abolish itself" (*Alles Endliche ist diess, sich selbst aufzuheben*). The Dialectical, therefore, constitutes the moving soul of the scientific process, and is the principle by which alone all *immanent connection and necessity* come into the content of science, in which there lies,

in general, the true and internal exaltation above the finite. It is the principle of all motion, all life, all effectuation in reality, and the soul of all truly scientific knowing. The finite is not merely limited from without, but nullifies itself from within through its own nature, and of itself goes over into its contradictory. Dialectic, moreover, is not to be confounded with Sophistic, the essence of which consists in setting up onesided and abstract determinations as valid in their isolation, according to the existing interest or situation of the individual.¹ From all such procedure Dialectic is essentially different, for it goes straight to the consideration of things in and for themselves, and thereby exposes the finiteness of the understanding's onesided abstractions. Philosophy contains the Sceptical as a moment in itself, that is, as the Dialectical; but it does not stop with the merely negative result of Dialectic, as is the case with Scepticism. Since Dialectic has for its result the negative, this negative, just by being a result, is at the same time a positive; for it contains that from which it results as absorbed in itself, and does not exist without it. But this is the fundamental characteristic of the third form of the Logical, namely, the speculative or positively-rational.

The Speculative or Positively-Rational seizes the *unity* of determinations in their opposition, that is, the Affirmation which is contained in their melting away and going over into their opposites or contradictories.² (1) Dialectic

¹ "Methinks the lady doth protest too much." In this case the protest itself is sophistical in setting up a misleading definition of Sophistic. Sophistic is the art of making the worse appear the better reason — of violating undetected the laws of Syllogistic. Any definition of Sophistic which determines its essence by referring it to any norm but Syllogistic is itself sophistical. Aristotle finds its essence in an "apparent wisdom" which aims at "apparent demonstration" — ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, χρηματιστικὴ τις ἀπὸ σοφίας φαινομένης, διὰ φαινομένης ἀποδείξεως ἐφίενται — and the norm of demonstration is the syllogism.

² "Being" is posited as "pure, abstract, or empty Being;" its logical contradictory is "No Being," while its real opposite, that is, the contrary

has a positive result because it has a determined content, or because its result is not really the empty, abstract Nothing, but the negation of *certain determinations*, which are contained in the result for the very reason that this is not an *immediate Nothing*, but a result. (2) This rational result, although it is one that is thought and even abstract, is at the same time one that is *concrete*, because it is not simple formal unity, but the *unity of different determinations*. With mere abstractions or formal thoughts philosophy has nothing to do; it deals with concrete thoughts alone. (3) The logic of the mere understanding is contained in the speculative logic, and can be directly derived from this; nothing is necessary for such derivation but to leave out the speculative elements, that is, the Dialectical and the Rational; then it becomes what the common logic is, a "history of variously compounded thought-determinations which in their finitude get credit as something infinite." The Speculative in general is nothing but the rational, indeed the positively-rational, so far as this is thought. It is not the merely subjective, but rather that which contains in itself, as *aufgehoben*, all those opposi-

which contains a real position is "empirical, concrete, or filled Being." Manifestly, the "Nothing" which stands in the triad as the "negation" of "Being" must be the logical contradictory, not the real opposite. Hence Dialectical Negation must be logical contradiction, not real opposition; Not-A must deny whatever A posits in its entirety, and not merely a part of it. Hegel himself defines the relation of "opposed determinations," not as real opposition, but as logical "contradiction," when he says (Werke, VI. 178): "Es ist überall *gar nichts*, worin nicht der Widerspruch, d. i. entgegengesetzte Bestimmungen aufgezeigt werden können und müssen." Still more distinctly: "Wollte man es für richtiger halten, dass statt des Nichts dem Seyn das *Nichtseyn* entgegengesetzt würde, so wäre in Rücksicht auf das Resultat nichts dawider zu haben, denn im *Nichtseyn* ist die Beziehung auf das *Seyn* enthalten; es ist Beides, Seyn und die Negation desselben, in *Einem* ausgesprochen, das Nichts, wie es im Werden ist." (Werke, III. 79.) The only conceivable ground of Hegel's repeated and energetic protests against the "Either — Or" is his own consciousness that his antitheses are logical contradictions, and not mere real oppositions.

tions (including that of the subjective and the objective) to which the understanding holds fast; and it thereby shows itself as concrete and as totality. Hence a speculative content cannot be expressed in a onesided proposition. If we say, for instance, that the Absolute is the unity of the subjective and the objective, this is correct, to be sure, yet onesided so far as here the unity alone is expressed and the emphasis laid on it, while in fact the subjective and the objective are not only identical, but also different. Further, the Speculative is the same as the Mystical, not in the sense of inconceivability, superstition, or illusion, but in the sense of that which is mysterious for the understanding alone; for the principle of the understanding is abstract identity, while the Mystical, as synonymous with the Speculative, is the concrete union of those determinations which for the understanding hold good only in their separation and opposition. The abstract thinking of the understanding is so little fixed or final that it shows itself rather as the constant nullification of itself and as its going over into its contradictory, whereas the rational as such consists in holding both the contradictories as ideal moments in itself. Everything rational, therefore, is to be described as at the same time mystical; which is only saying that it transcends the understanding, not at all that it is to be considered as inconceivable or inaccessible to thought.

§ 227. The transcendent importance of method in philosophy, as the source of all its results, justifies the space we are giving to Hegel's exposition of Dialectic, brought by him to its fullest and highest development as the "Speculative Method." It professes, not to invalidate Syllogistic, but to absorb and transcend it, as *aufgehoben* in itself. It professes to justify the logic of the reflective understanding as an inferior faculty, and to retain it still in the logic of the speculative reason, whence it can be again recovered unimpaired by simply dropping the speculative-rational element of "absolute negativity." But the

truth of the matter comes out in the frank declaration that "the battle of reason consists in overturning [*überwinden*] that which the understanding has fixed" [*fixirt*]. Certainly, if the understanding has fixed anything as logically immovable, it is the three fundamental laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, on which Syllogistic rests, and it is precisely the "Either — Or," the law of excluded middle, against which Dialectic wages its most relentless war. At this central strategic point the whole battle must be won or lost.

All the issues involved between Dialectic and Syllogistic are brought to a luminous focus in these words of Hegel:

"Since Dialectic has for its result the negative, this negative, just by being a result, is at the same time a positive; for it contains that from which it results as absorbed or concentered in itself, and does not exist without it. But this is the fundamental characteristic of the third form of the logical, namely, the Speculative or Positively-Rational."¹

It is a mere truism that "two negatives make an affirmative," but the affirmative thus made is always the original positive that is negated, nothing less and nothing more. This is the conclusion of Syllogistic, with its $-(\neg A) = +A$. But it clashes irreconcilably with the conclusion of Dialectic, that $-(\neg A) = B$, or, more exactly, $-(\neg A) = A + B$. For Dialectic is the principle that double negation does not simply *reproduce* the original positive, but *produces* a new positive which is an advance upon the old, containing all that this contains, but at the same time evolving out of the union of this positive and its first negative, by the pure force of the second negative and the creative negativity itself, a new content that was not in either factor alone. Hence, if A was the original positive, the "result" of the double negation is not, as Syllogistic teaches, A alone, but rather $A + B$. Hegel evidently considers it enough, in order to establish the pure produc-

¹ Encyklopädie, Logik, Werke, VI. 157.

tivity of his double negation, to maintain that "this result, just by being a result, is at the same time a positive." This does not in the least need to be proved; it is admitted by the common truism that "two negatives make an affirmative," no less than by Syllogistic. But what does need, and very badly need, to be proved, is that *the admittedly positive result is $A + B$ and not A alone*. It is the justification of that unaccountable B which is demanded, not the merely "positive" character of the "result" as such; and it is this justification of B, some rational account of its origin and its presence where it has no right to exist, for which one looks to Hegel in vain.

For instance, in his fundamental triad of Pure Being, Nothing, Becoming, the real "positive result" of double negation, according to Syllogistic, is *A alone*, that is, Pure Being once more, absolutely and totally unchanged as Empty Being; and yet what Dialectic presents as its "positive result" is Becoming, Filled Being, Pure Being *plus* innumerable determinations, that is, $A + B$. Unless that addition of B can be explained by Dialectic as Hegel has nowhere explained it, the first triad shrivels into a duad; Pure Being goes over to Nothing, and Nothing goes back to Pure Being, and the pendulum swing goes on forever, without ever arriving at Becoming at all. In short, the Dialectical Process, if true to itself as mere "absolute negativity," presents itself as the profitless agility of the squirrel in his revolving cage, whirling it in endless motion as he leaps, yet never advancing its position by so much as the breadth of a hair.

§ 228. In this total inability of Dialectic to effect a rational connection between the first position to which it inevitably returns and the second position on which all its further progress must depend,—in the consequent necessity of employing some other principle than that of "pure thought" as "absolute negativity" in order to pass from Pure Being, or Nothing, to Becoming, or Everything,—and in its silent refusal to acknowledge this necessity or

legitimize this other principle, — lies the failure of Dialectic as a philosophical method. From Being to Becoming, from Nothing to Everything, the leap is enormous, — it is indeed Schelling's *Sprung*. The enormity of it is revealed in the enormity of the claim made to hide it, namely, that double negation *as such* is productive of new position, and that such new position is an unexcluded and tenable middle term between contradictories. Of two things one is necessary: if Being and Nothing are logical contradictories, they cannot, either alone or in combination, produce Becoming as a middle term between them; but, if they are contraries or real opposites, they cannot be pure thought-abstractions, and can be known so far only as they are given in experience. These necessary alternatives, either of which is fatal to Dialectic as a method of pure thinking independent of all experience, presented themselves in clearness to Trendelenburg while Hegel's work was still recent:

“There results for the Dialectic of Pure Thought an unavoidable dilemma. The negation which mediates the advance of the second and third moments of the triad is either pure logical contradiction (A, Not-A), — in which case, however, it can neither produce anything intrinsically determinate in the second moment nor admit a unification in the third moment; or else it is real opposition, — in which case, again, it is not to be attained by means of logic, and Dialectic is no Dialectic of *Pure Thought*. Whoever, therefore, sees deeply into the so-called negative movement of Dialectic will discover something ambiguous in most cases of its application.”¹

If Being and Nothing, then, are logical contradictories, Becoming is absolutely excluded as a mean between them, unless Dialectic can effectively discredit the law of excluded middle, and prove that double negation generates *ex proprio vigore* a middle which is not excluded; but neither of these things has Dialectic done. On the other hand, if Being and Nothing are real opposites, that is, contraries which

¹ A. Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, I. 56.

contain in themselves a real position, a position which is not generated by the mere act of negation, but subsists previously and independently in and of itself, then Being and Nothing must be empirically known and Becoming must be their empirically known concretion. From this dilemma there can be no escape by any means known to the understanding. How does Hegel escape it? By seeking to discredit the understanding and its law of excluded middle. He seeks to flank the difficulty, to rise above the understanding's dilemma itself, and to accomplish this purpose by heroically postulating a new principle as "the Positively-Rational" which is identical with "the Speculative" and "the Mystical," a principle altogether superior to the syllogistic intellect, a principle which "transcends the understanding," yet is "not inconceivable or inaccessible to thought," when "the positively-rational," that is, the reason which posits as well as negates, is itself conceived or "thought" as *Spekulation*.¹ What is this?

§ 229. For Hegel, the fundamental standpoint of absolute idealism that *Thought is the only Substance*, or that nothing exists but ideas as appearing and disappearing forms of The Idea, determined everything in philosophy. Since the syllogism, (1) in Being and (2) in Thought, is the identity in difference of genus, species, and specimen, or universals, particulars, and individuals, and since this, as a method of Knowing, is the identity in difference of reason and experience, it could not possibly be the method of philosophizing as *reines Denken*, the thinking which separates reason and experience and eliminates the latter in order to make reason "pure." But it was not enough to eliminate experience in general as mere "intuition," "per-

¹ "Alles Vernünftige ist somit sogleich als mystisch zu bezeichnen, womit jedoch nur so viel gesagt ist, dass dasselbe über den Verstand hinausgeht, und keineswegs, dass dasselbe überhaupt als dem Denken unzugänglich und unbegreiflich zu betrachten sey." (Werke, VI. 160). — "Weiter ist nun das *Spekulative* überhaupt nichts Anderes als das Vernünftige (und zwar das positiv Vernünftige), insofern dasselbe *gedacht* wird." (*Ibid.* VI. 158.)

ception," or "sensibility." Since the syllogism is the characteristic act of the understanding, and since it necessarily involves experience in the minor premise and the conclusion as intuition of particulars or individuals, *reines Denken* must eliminate the syllogism itself as "impure," and eliminate the understanding, too, as fatally contaminated by this "impurity;" it must have a "pure" *method*, absolutely sufficient unto itself, and absolutely independent not only of the sensibility, but also of the understanding, on account of its *liaison* with the sensibility in the syllogism. Hence *reines Denken* must discard Syllogistic, and originate for itself an absolutely "pure" method as Dialectic: "pure" in the sense that it moves only in the purely rational or universal element of the major premise, positing nothing but the universal, negating nothing but the universal, and again negating nothing but this negation of the universal. Such a method as this will be presumptively "pure," free from the empirical "impurity" which obstinately lurks in the minor premise and the conclusion of the syllogism, and which thus totally unfits syllogistic to be the method of "pure thought." As method, therefore, the "Speculative or Positively-Rational" is and must be Pure Reason, which (1) posits, and (2) negates, but of course (3) cannot negate *before* it posits, nor yet take its positions on trust. If the actual process is to start at all, then, this initial and purely rational act of positing, this aboriginal position or first moment of Dialectic without which the consistent dialectical process could not even begin, is necessitated as itself *Spekulation* — not the intuition or *Anschauung* of the sensibility, not the reflection or *Nachdenken* of the understanding, but the pure insight or *Einsicht* of the speculative reason.

§ 230. It is precisely at this point that Dialectic, by Hegel's own showing, hopelessly breaks down. He himself explicitly admits that the "reflection" of the understanding (which means, of course, Syllogistic) is both the "principle" and the "beginning" of philosophy — in other

words, its ἀρχή in the twofold Greek sense.¹ Again, still more explicitly, he admits that philosophy has its origin and starting-point in "experience, the immediate and reasoning consciousness" — in other words, the consciousness which posits through intuition and perception and infers through reflection, not the consciousness which posits through speculation and proceeds dialectically through double negation or absolute negativity.²

These admissions are the quite unintentional confession that pure reason as such is powerless to effect a start, that philosophy is impossible as "pure thought," and that Dialectic is impossible as the non-empirical method of a "Positively-Rational," which *ex vi termini* must posit before it can negate, and must therefore begin with "pure insight" as its act of positing. For, if "pure reason" as the "Positively-Rational" cannot begin with a "pure" *first position*, but must borrow this its starting-point from "impure" *experience*, then the professed "purity" of *reines Denken*, and the professedly "pure insight" of the *spekulatives Denken*, which, although "absolute negativity," cannot possibly negate before it posits, become simply ridiculous.

Hegel's quoted admissions, therefore, are fatal to his fundamental standpoint of absolute idealism as "pure thought;" yet they are reiterated and confirmed by his actual procedure. For Being, as "pure abstraction," can be the product of nothing but the understanding, which, as Hegel has just taught us (§ 226), is the source of all

¹ "Indem das *Nachdenken* überhaupt zunächst das Princip (auch im Sinne des Anfangs) der Philosophie enthält," u. s. w. (Werke, VI. 11).

² "Die aus dem genannten Bedürfnisse hervorgehende *Entstehung* der Philosophie hat die *Erfahrung*, das unmittelbare und raisonnirende Bewusstsein, zum *Ausgangspunkte*." (Werke, VI. 18). — "Der Anfang wird im Sinne unmittelbaren Seyns aus der Anschauung und Wahrnehmung genommen, — der Anfang der *analytischen* Methode des endlichen Erkennens; im Sinn der Allgemeinheit ist er der Anfang der *synthetischen* Methode desselben." (Werke, VI. 410).

abstractions; and Nothing, as another "pure abstraction," can likewise have no origin other than the understanding. Hence, as the avowed and actual beginning of his Dialectic, the transition of Being into Nothing (*Uebergang*) and of Nothing back into Being (*Rückgang*) is simply the interplay of "abstractions" which originate in the understanding alone and have nothing to do with the speculative reason; the double negation must conform, then, to the ordinary laws of the understanding, in this case the law of excluded middle, and can produce nothing but the equation — (—Being) = Being, *not Becoming*. "Pure thought" alone, then, cannot begin: the fundamental first triad shrinks into a mere tautology, a duad which ends eternally in itself and makes no "advance."

If, however, Becoming is now assumed to be the positive first moment of a new triad, it must be solely on the warrant of the speculative reason and its positive "insight;" for, without the introduction of this positive and wholly new principle, Dialectic could never eke out its fundamental and constitutive equation that Reason as Double Negation = New Position. The assumption that Becoming, and not Pure Being, is the initial position of the second triad has self-evidently no warrant in the mere principle of "absolute negativity," which *ex vi termini* can never account for anything but negation; hence a new principle, namely, *absolute positivity*, must now be introduced in the form of "speculative reason" and its positive "insight." But this is a completely new and arbitrary assumption, a change of front in face of the enemy, a total abandonment of "absolute negativity," already laid down as the sole principle or nature of thought as thought. It now appears that the nature of thought as thought is *absolute negativity plus absolute positivity*. But this is an unsolved contradiction, and according to Dialectic, it cannot be solved except by concreting (*aufheben*) the two contradictions in some "negative unity" higher still. Where shall we look for this? Nowhere in Hegel, if not to his

"I = I," the relation of opposition in the Absolute between Universality and Individuality as "two I's" (*beide Ich*), and the "reconciling Yes" (*versöhnendes Ja*) by which they extinguish themselves in their mere "relation" (*Verhältniss*) as the Pure It. (§ 142.) There he cuts the Gordian knot in despair of untying it; but even his "reconciling Yes" would prove useless in concreting absolute negativity and absolute positivity, which even Hegel would not venture to hypostasize as *beide Ich*. In this culminating self-contradiction of Dialectic, therefore, we look in vain for any concretion or solution, any "negative unity" of absolute negativity and absolute positivity. It must remain a riddle without an answer. What is clear is, not only that the *soi-disant* philosophy of "pure thought," by its own confession, begins with impure experience in its first triad, but also that it begins with impure experience just as much in the first moment of every succeeding triad, and so never emancipates itself at all, first or last, from its dependence on experience; for in every triad its absolute negativity brings it back relentlessly to the moment with which it starts, unchanged and unchangeable, and nothing but its absolute positivity, that is, the freshly positing "insight" of its "speculative reason," enables it to begin a new triad which shall be in any sense an "advance" on its predecessor. Let us, then, look a little more closely at this salvatory "insight," in which must lurk the secret of the absolute positivity of pure reason as *Spekulation*.

§ 231. In the "intellectual intuition" which Kant denied to the human understanding, while yet conceding it to possible intelligences higher than ours, and which Fichte and Schelling, notwithstanding Kant's denial, made the foundation of their constructive idealisms, is undoubtedly to be found the germ of Hegel's "insight" as the specific act of the speculative reason. This, like "intuition" (*intueri*), is essentially conceived after the optical metaphor or analogy: it is a looking, beholding, perceiving, contemplating, intuiting, — in Hegel's own expressions,

einsehen, gleichsam zusehen, Einsicht, philosophische Ansicht, die theoretische Thätigkeit der Idee [θεωπία], *das ewige Anschauen ihrer selbst im Andern, Spekulation* [speculari], *speculatives Denken, das Auge des Geistes, etc., etc.* So conceived, the speculative reason is said (1) to transcend the understanding, to be exalted above it as a superior faculty or higher mode of knowing, inasmuch as (2) reflection or Syllogistic, the logic of the understanding, is already embraced in speculation or Dialectic, the logic of pure reason, and can be separated from this once more in all its original purity and force by simply omitting the distinctively speculative element. Are these contentions well founded?

(1) Hegel gives us a hierarchy of faculties. Both the reflective understanding and the speculative reason, as the two forms of *Denken*, transcend the sensibility, so far indeed that this, as the lower faculty of "experience," must be excluded altogether from philosophy as idealism or *reines Denken*. Further, of these two forms of *Denken*, the speculative reason transcends the reflective understanding, because the former attains to *Wissen* through its *Einsicht*, while the latter attains only to *Erkennen* through its *Nachdenken*, and because *absolutes Wissen* alone is the culmination of *reines Denken*, the Idea itself. But this hierarchy is a vulgar superstition of the schools. No actual cognition is possible into which the sensibility, the understanding, and the speculative reason do not all enter inseparably, though in varying proportions according to the degree of abstraction and the scope of universalization reached at last; for the absolute form of cognition, whether as *Erkennen* or as *Wissen*, is the syllogism, as identity in difference of reason and experience.¹ *Erkennen* is satisfied with the truth of the con-

¹ Prantl expresses this truth with admirable terseness and force: "Die Einsicht in das Was und in das Warum des Was ist das Ziel, nach welchem das menschliche Wissen strebt. Wo und wie weit es einen vermittelnden Weg vom Begriffe zur Definition gibt, ist es der Syllogismus, vermittelt

clusion, irrespective of the truth or the untruth of the premises; whence we have formal logic. But *Wissen* is satisfied only with the truth of the syllogism, including the premises as well as the conclusion; whence we have real logic, or philosophy itself as Syllogistic. Hence the only genuine "insight" is that which recognizes the equal necessity (and therefore the equal dignity) of sensibility, understanding, and reason, in every syllogism as a whole and in every element of the syllogism as a part.

But Speculative Philosophy, in its mere onesidedness as *reines Denken*, seeks a substitute for the syllogism in the dialectical triad, because this appears (a false appearance) to dispense wholly with the sensibility and the reflective understanding, and because its principle of absolute negativity appears (another false appearance) to exalt it above the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. But the triad itself, if it abides by its absolute negativity, ends, as has been proved, in absolute tautology with no advance; advance is possible only through the unrecognized, yet constantly used, principle of absolute positivity; and this very advance is irregular, arbitrary, and delusive, because mere *Einsicht*, if unmediated and unregulated by Syllogistic, sinks to mere personalism in philosophy, knows no law superior to the "freedom" of the "spirit" as individual subject, and is utterly incommunicable by one subject to another. For Syllogistic alone legislates for all subjects by laws which all subjects can understand and must obey. The hierarchy of faculties, therefore, sets up as supreme in the last resort, amenable to no law and subject to no appeal, the

dessen wir jene Einsicht erlangen. Wo kein Vermitteln mehr vorhergeht und kein Vermitteln mehr nachfolgt, hat der Syllogismus seinen Anfang und sein Ende." (Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, I. 321.) Hence the absolute first, the unoriginated, unmediated, and unsyllogized foundation of the syllogism, is the Apriori of Being, that aboriginal necessity of the law of unit-universals as genus, species, and specimen, which determines the form of the syllogism itself, but for that very reason can be no further proved or explained.

personal and incommunicable "insight" (*Auge des Geistes*) of the particular philosopher, and thereby, for all to whom logic is law, disproves itself.

Nor is this all. When Hegel thus exalts "speculative insight" above "logical reflection," he is not in truth exalting the speculative reason above the reflective understanding, but, by his own standard, degrading the former and exalting the latter. For he himself makes both of the two unquestionably superior to the sensibility, and does not see that his "speculative insight" is nothing but the sensibility itself in a higher form. The optical metaphor strikes into the very essence and spirit of his thinking, and makes the "speculative insight" an act of visualization, rational perception, rational experience, rational vision, sublimated or rationalized sensuousness, apotheosis of the sensibility as *θεωρία*; and this, by his own criterion of "purity" *from experience*, is degradation, not exaltation. It is no degradation to Syllogistic which recognizes neither high nor low among elements equally essential to cognition as such; but it is degradation, not exaltation, to Dialectic as *reines Denken*. The constant infusion of empirical elements in the dialectical process, as evolution of the categories in the *Begriff*, is no new discovery; Trendelenburg and others made it long ago.¹ But that the highest act of "pure thought," the very "insight" of the "speculative reason," is itself neither more nor less than supersensuous sensuousness, and therefore, by Hegelian rules of precedence, of lower and not higher rank or dignity than the despised "reflection" of the "understanding," has perhaps

¹ "Die Logik ist kein Erzeugniss des reinen Denkens, wie sie behauptet, sondern an vielen Stellen eine sublimirte Anschauung, eine anticipirte Abstraktion der Natur. . . . Wer diese Elemente mit ihren Folgen zusammenfasst, wird an den immanenten Fortgang und die nackte Selbstentwicklung des Begriffs nicht mehr glauben. Das Meiste ist von Erfahrung aufgenommen. Wenn die Anschauung das geliehene Gut zurückforderte, so käme das reine Denken an den Bettelstab." (A. Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, I. 78, 79.)

been imperfectly appreciated, if at all perceived. But it is a truth which must deeply affect the critical estimate, not only of Hegelianism and Neo-Hegelianism, but also of the intuitionist philosophy of New England Transcendentalism. For the perfection of syllogistic is the scientific method, which sets Dialectic wholly aside as mere Sophistic; and the scientific method is a vast advance on all intuitionism.

(2) The contention that the logic of speculative reason transcends, yet contains intact, the logic of reflective understanding, may be tested in a case of Hegel's own selection. After stating that the essence of "the dogmatic in the narrower sense" consists in the insistence of the understanding on its onesided determinations as ultimate and fixed, to the exclusion of their contradictories (*entgegengesetzte* means logical contradictories, not real opposites, as is here immediately shown), he says:—

"This means in general the strict '*Either — Or*,' and accordingly it means, for example, that the world is *either* finite (*endlich*) or not finite (*unendlich*), but *only one* of the two. . . . Idealism, however, will say: the soul is neither *only* finite nor *only* not finite, but it is essentially *as well* the one *as also* the other, and consequently *neither* the one *nor* the other — that is, such determinations are invalid in their isolation, and valid only as concentered in their negative unity (*aufgehoben*)."¹

This is saying explicitly, to all intents and purposes, that the law of excluded middle, without which the syllogism proves nothing and demonstration demonstrates nothing, is itself invalid, and that the concretion of two contradictories in their "negative unity" is a *middle term which is not excluded*. Now, if idealism says that the two propositions, "the soul is finite" and "the soul is not finite," do *not* exclude any such "negative unity" as a middle term, *provided subject and predicate mean precisely the same things in both propositions*, then idealism says

¹ Encyklopädie, Werke, VI. 68.

what is simply idiotic. If it should mean, however, that the soul is finite *in one sense*, and not finite *in another sense*, and yet omit to point out this all-important difference at the same time, then it means what is intellectually insincere.¹ To this extent Dialectic convicts itself of being either idiotic or insincere, and justifies Prantl's sarcasm when he speaks of "that colossal jugglery which lies at the bottom of the Hegelian logic as its restless elastic spring."² Hegel here proves that, instead of *absorbing and preserving* Syllogistic, as he professes to do, his Dialectic undermines and destroys it by nullifying the law of excluded middle and turning demonstration itself into a farce. If Syllogistic is valid, that law is absolutely true; if Dialectic is valid, that law is absolutely false. Between these two positions, no mediation or reconciliation is either thinkable or possible, and the contention that Dialectic "contains" Syllogistic is sophistry gone to seed.

¹ At the close of the Introduction to the *Philosophie des Geistes* (Werke, VII. ii. 34-39), Hegel devotes several pages to this subject: "The Spirit is the infinite Idea, and finitude has here the signification of the non-conformity of the Notion and of Reality, with the determination that it is an illusion within itself, — an illusion which the Spirit *in itself* posits as a limit, in order through its annulment to have and to know freedom *for itself* as *its own* essence, that is, to be absolutely *manifested*. . . . In the Spirit, therefore, the finite has only the signification of something absorbed, not that of something existent. . . . It is for this reason an empty expression if one says: 'There are finite spirits.' The Spirit as Spirit *is* not finite, it *has* finiteness in itself, but only as something to be absorbed and as absorbed. . . . The Spirit is therefore *as well* infinite *as* finite, and *neither* only the one *nor* only the other," etc. All that concerns us here is to note that Hegel in no wise escapes or weakens the law of excluded middle. He affirms that "the Spirit" *is* infinite; he discovers no mode of showing that "the Spirit" both *is* and *is not* finite. He merely shows that "the Spirit" *is not finite* in one sense of the word, but *has finiteness in itself* in a wholly different sense of it. The same is just as true of Space, which *is* infinite, and infinite only, yet *has* finite bodies in itself. His rejection of the "Either — Or," and his attempt to discover a tenable middle term between *is* and *is not*, are complete failures, and Dialectic exhibits itself again as nothing but Sophistic.

² C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, I. 153.

§ 232. The true "insight," therefore, which Syllogistic is the last to deny — namely, that which, in the already quoted words of Prantl, as "insight into the *what* and the *why* of the *what*, is the aim which human knowledge strives to win" — must be won by "the mediating way from the concept to the definition," and this mediating way is "the syllogism" itself. But Hegel chafes under the rigor of the syllogism; he would fain dispense with it and substitute in its stead the dialectical triad, relying on pure contradiction or "absolute negativity" as the only motion of the *Begriff*." So irresistible, however, is the power of truth, that, in order to attain his "speculative insight," we find him driven to assume in his *Begriff*, not only the motion of absolute negativity, but also another motion which contradicts it, namely, that of absolute positivity. In his first and fundamental triad, he starts with Being as the Undetermined — a pure abstraction of the reflective understanding; he arrives at Becoming as the Determined — a pure "insight" of the "speculative or positively-rational," that is, of the speculative reason. How does he get there? The advance is from indetermination to determination: what posits the determinations? Not double negation or absolute negativity, for this, as we have seen, leads him straight back to — (— Being) = Being, that is, to the Undetermined with which he started: nothing can lead him forward to Becoming, or the Determined, as a new position in advance of the first, except *Einsicht* or *Spekulation* as absolute positivity. This absolute positivity, then, not at all absolute negativity or pure contradiction, ought to have been proclaimed from the beginning as the real essence of Thought, as it is of Being. But this absolute positivity, this *Einsicht* or *Spekulation*, is nothing in the world but Experience, intuition, the supersensuous sensuousness which exposes the utter hollowness of the pretensions of "pure thought;" and these hollow pretensions of being pure from all experience, when experience itself is the essential characteristic of the highest dialectic.

tical act as "speculative insight," exhibit Dialectic in its true light as nothing but Sophistic. For its essential principle, the pure productiveness of contradiction as double negation or absolute negativity, proves to be productive of nothing; it simply reproduces the absolute indetermination of Pure Being; and the fresh position made in Becoming, as definite determination, is effected solely by the unacknowledged principle of absolute positivity, or experience in its sublimated form of "speculative insight" or rational intuition (*Anschauen*). Positive intuition, then, not absolute negativity, is the only real link of connection in the dialectical chain; it alone connects triad with triad; it alone is the positing principle, the absolute positivity without which the absolute negativity is as sterile as the meaningless, purposeless, resultless undulations of the sea, and without which the "new position," attributed misleadingly to "double negation," could never be made. The act of concretion by which two contradictories are *aufgehoben* in their negative unity as a new position, and in which lies the magical spell of the whole evolution of the categories, consists in the intuitive "insight" of the speculative reason, the empirical sensuousness common alike to the eye of the body and the eye of the spirit (*das Auge des Geistes*). And thus the "experience" from which *reines Denken* aspires and pretends to be absolutely free turns out to be the very highest act of *Vernunft* or *Denken* itself, as immediate or unmediated *Einsicht* or *Spekulation*.

§ 233. In the light of the foregoing criticisms, then, the dialectical process as illustrated in Hegel's first triad (and no less in the triads that follow) really resolves itself, not into three, but into four constitutive moments.

(1) The reflective understanding posits or presents Being as pure immediacy, simple unity of the abstract universal, absolute abstraction from all experience. The content is pure indetermination, or 0.

(2) Pure reason as the "negatively-rational" negates Being by identifying it with its contradictory No-Being or

pure Nothing, and forthwith repeats this act of negation by negating its result. But the second negation as No No-Being or No Nothing merely brings thought back once more to simple immediate Being, the original position without advance. The content is again pure indetermination, or 0.

(3) Pure reason as the "positively rational" now immediately, that is, without mediation, "sees" (*einsieht*) that Being and Nothing, after all, are only onesided elements of the truth (*Einseitigkeiten*). But it can "see" this higher real truth only by actually "positing" it, that is, only by annulling the independent separateness of Being and Nothing as abstract universals and combining or concreting them in their negative unity (*Sich-Aufheben*). But the "negative unity" so formed contains no more in fact than the original "simple unity;" it adds nothing to the latter but a pure act of the positing reason (*Bewegung des Begriffs*), which posits no determination save its own self-determination (*Selbstbestimmen*). This self-determination of reason is so far the only "new position." It is the pure form of the triad, and neither adds nor can add to its content. It is the speculative act of "insight" as the act of "concretion" (*Einsicht* as *Aufheben*), which is essentially identical with Kant's "combination" (*Verbindung, conjunctio, synthesis a priori*); and its only actual product or "concrete result" (*das Resultat, das Konkrete*) is the self-determination produced, that is, itself as the mere form of the triad. The "concrete result" is certainly not Becoming, as something really determinate and different from either Being or Nothing. For no "concrete result" can possibly contain more than what the concreted elements themselves contain, and Being + Nothing, by Hegel's own showing are simply $0 + 0$. But $0 + 0 = 0$; indetermination + indetermination do not = determination, and Being + Nothing do not = Becoming. Hence the professedly "positive" content of the third moment is again indetermination, or 0; and again no advance is made.

(4) Consequently, in order to arrive at Becoming at all, a fourth moment is indispensable. The world of Being is pure abstraction or indetermination; the world of Nothing, again, is pure abstraction or indetermination; and no "insight," be it finite or infinite, can "see" in them what does not exist in them — determination. Even if speculative reason ("insight" with nothing to "see") can proceed to determine itself, and then "see" its own self-determination (pure form of the triad with absolutely no content), it still remains infinitely distant from Becoming as the world of Existence or Determined Being. To arrive at this, therefore, recourse must be had either to *discovery* of real determinations, which is experience, or else to *production* of real determinations, which is creation out of nothing (Fichte's *absolutes Selbsterzeugen aus Nichts*). Hence the "insight" which is to arrive at Becoming by the act of *aufheben* must include, not merely absolute negativity, which produces nothing, and self-determination, which produces nothing but itself, but also absolute positivity, which alone can produce real determination. Without this latter element, no "insight" can possibly reach Becoming as explained by Hegel himself (§ 223). Since however, "insight" claims to reach Becoming in the third moment of the triad, it must include absolute positivity, as either experience or creation out of nothing; and this must be a fourth moment over and above "position," "negation," and "negation of negation" — a fourth moment which is unconfessed, yet without which no new position can possibly be reached. But "insight" claims to be pure thought; it cannot, then, include experience, but must include the only alternative, creation out of nothing; and the nature of pure thought, or "motion of the *Begriff*," cannot be, as Hegel explains it, absolute negativity alone, but just as much absolute positivity, or absolute creation out of nothing. This consequence, however, is the *reductio ad absurdum* of "pure thought;" for, if anything is absurd, creation of something out of nothing is absurd. The

ancient maxim, *De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti*, was right, and Hegel's dismissal of it without discussion as the formula of "pantheism" or "eternity of matter" was mere flippancy. In truth, his unacknowledged fourth moment is not creation at all, but experience; his arrival at Becoming as a new position is possible only as an unmediated empirical result, immediate perception of real determinations, introduction of supersensuous sensuousness in the form of *intellectuelle Anschauung, Einsicht, Spekulation*; and his Dialectic, dependent as it is on this fourth moment as the only escape from endless oscillation between 0 and 0, is capable of no advance without the aid of experience. A chasm yawns between "negation of negation," as the end of one triad, and "new position," as the beginning of another; the claim that "negation of negation" is itself "new position" and that "absolute negativity" is itself "infinite affirmation," that is, the claim that pure contradiction is itself pure production or creation out of nothing, constructs no bridge across the chasm, but is simply the wish for the deed;¹ and the only possibility of a real "advance" from triad to triad in the dialectical process lies in the surreptitious introduction of professedly excluded experience as *Einsicht* itself, an empirical fourth moment which is complete self-destruction of Dialectic as a triadic philosophical method of "pure thought."

§ 234. Thought the sole substance, — absolute negativity, or motion of thought as incessant self-contradiction, the sole essence, — Dialectic, or thought's *Aufheben* of

¹ "Schon im endlichen Geiste hat die Idealität den Sinn einer in ihren Anfang zurückkehrenden Bewegung, durch welche der Geist aus seiner Ununterschiedenheit, — als der ersten Position — zu einem Anderen, — zur Negation jener Position — fortschreitend, und vermittelt der Negation jener Negation zu sich selber zurückkommend, sich als absolute Negativität, als die unendliche Affirmation seiner selbst erweist." (Philosophie des Geistes, Werke, VII. ii. 20.) Here the whole essence of Dialectic concentrates itself in the enormous assumption of the equation, "absolute Negativität = unendliche Affirmation;" and this equation is now proved to be untrue.

contradictories, the sole process,—and *das Konkrete*, their negative unity, the sole product: these are the great determinative outlines of “absolute idealism.” In the two elements of (1) *Aufheben*, as the act by which concretion is substituted for inference, speculation for reflection, and the triad for the syllogism,—and (2) *das Konkrete*, as product of the act, triadic substitute for the syllogistic conclusion, and only real, yet instantly evanescent content of cognition (*Wissen*),—in these two elements is concentrated the whole of Dialectic, as the real principle of the immanent productiveness of contradiction. For thought as thought, the absolute negativity which is itself absolute positivity, is *Selbstbestimmen*; and *Selbstbestimmen*, the self-determination or self-activity of the Absolute Universal, particularizes itself in *Aufheben* as its normal act, and individualizes itself in *das Konkrete* as its normal product or result—being itself *das schlechthin Konkrete* as the *Begriff des Begriffs* or *absolute Idee* (νόησις νοήσεως).¹ Says Hegel: “I give the name of Dialectic to the moving principle of the *Begriff*, as not only dissolving, but also producing, the particularizations of the universal.” Thus the dialectic of the *Begriff* consists in its spontaneously and *negatively* determining itself as its own contradictory, limit, and opposite, and then educing from the contradiction a *positive* content and result, as that which alone raises its self-determination to the plane of evolution and immanent progress. This *Aufheben* or amalgamation of two contradictories into a single positive result is the act

¹ “Das bewegende Princip des Begriffs, als die Besonderungen des Allgemeinen nicht nur auflösend, sondern auch hervorbringend, heisse ich *Dialektik*. . . . Dieser Entwicklung der Idee als eigener Thätigkeit ihrer Vernunft sieht das Denken als subjectives, ohne seiner Seits eine Zuthat hinzu zu fügen, nur zu. . . . Der Gegenstand ist für sich selbst vernünftig; hier ist es der Geist in seiner Freiheit, die höchste Spitze der selbstbewussten Vernunft, die sich Wirklichkeit giebt und als existirende Welt erzeugt; die Wissenschaft hat nur das Geschäft, diese eigene Arbeit der Vernunft der Sache zum Bewusstseyn zu bringen.” (Philosophie des Rechts, Werke, VIII. 65, 66.)

of concretion, and the result itself is the concrete as such. "Dialectic is no *external* activity of a subjective thinking, but properly the *soul* of the content itself, which puts forth its twigs and fruits like an organism. Subjective thinking, without adding anything on its own part, passively contemplates (*sieht nur zu*) this development of the Idea as the proper activity of reason in the object itself." "The object is rational for itself; here it is the Spirit in its freedom, the highest pinnacle of self-conscious reason, which gives itself reality and produces itself as the existing world. Science has no other business than to bring to consciousness this immanent labor of the reason of the thing at hand (*Sache*)."

The criticism now made goes to the very heart of all this. Being and Nothing, as pure abstractions, are absolutely empty of all determinations; they contain neither "motion" nor "rest," neither "understanding" nor "reason," neither "reflection" nor "speculation," neither "development" nor "progress;" and what is not in them cannot be drawn out of them. There is, then, no "immanent labor of reason" at all in this *Sache*. Whatever motion there is in the case must be in the "subjective thinking" which "contemplates" it. Being does not of itself go over (*Uebergehen*) to Nothing. Nothing does not of itself go back to Being (*Rückgehen*); Being and Nothing do not of themselves go forward (*Fortgehen, Fortschreiten*), either singly or together, into any negative unity. They, as abstractions, cannot "go" at all, whether "over" or "back" or "forward." If anything goes at all, it is the contemplative thinking of some subject that goes, the "speculative insight" of some subject that shifts its gaze from one to the other. Being and Nothing, defined as absolute emptiness, are not endowed with the agility so deceptively attributed to them, and contain no possibility of a determinate content, much less of a "soul of the content which puts forth its twigs and fruits like an organism."

But, even granting that these contentless abstractions could move in some sort in virtue of being contradictories, the motion of contradiction must be *between* them as contradictories alone—it could not be *from* them to any definite point in “advance” of them. Here lies the fatal fallacy of the triad *per se*, the falsity of its essential principle of *Aufheben*: *the negation of negation is not in itself a new position*. If the negation of Being is *Uebergang* to Nothing, it follows that the negation of Nothing must be *Rückgang* to Being; it cannot possibly be *Fortgang* to Becoming. For Becoming is the wholly new position of Determination: no game of battledore and shuttlecock between Being and Nothing, each of which is pure and absolute Indetermination, can possibly “produce” that new position. The genuine “negative unity” of *Uebergehen* and *Rückgehen* is, not *Werden*, but simply *Gehen*—neutralization or annulment of the *Ueber-* and the *Rück-* and preservation of the absolutely indeterminate *Gehen* alone. To advance from *Gehen* to *Werden*, and thus set up Becoming as the negative unity of Being and Nothing, can be rationally justified, not at all by the principle of productive contradiction, but only by an essentially positive principle as either Experience or Creation, to one or the other of which all really new position must be referred. Absolute negativity ends with mere *Gehen*; absolute positivity begins with *Werden*; and solely by use of both these two principles can Dialectic effect the enormous advance from indeterminate Being to determinate Becoming. Thus the ostensibly single moment of *Aufheben*, as the pure productiveness of contradiction by which double negation is identified with new position, is in fact two moments which differ by the whole diameter of existence; and their fusion in *Aufheben* is the sleight of hand by which the prestidigitator pulls out of his professedly empty mouth an interminable dialectical ribbon.¹

¹ “Das *Aufheben* stellt seine wahrhafte gedoppelte Bedeutung dar, welche wir an dem Negativen gesehen haben; es ist ein *Negiren* und

§ 235. In *Aufheben* and in *das Konkrete* lies the greatest difficulty of understanding Hegel. Not until it is perceived that the third moment of the triad is in reality two moments, — that absolute negativity is exhausted in the “going over” and the “going back,” produces no genuine negative unity of the two except their neutralization as mere abstract “going,” and is powerless to effect any real advance as “going forward,” — that absolute positivity is the radically new and independent moment of “speculative insight” (a mere change of phrase for the already familiar “intellectual intuition”), which is supersensuous sensuousness, and, as such, effects the real advance to a “new position” solely in virtue of being experience in disguise, — not until these things are understood does the real nature of each “new position” as a “concrete result” become intelligible. Being, the first given position of “Immediacy” with which the dialectical evolution begins, is confessedly a “pure abstraction” of the “reflective understanding” from data of the “sensibility,” that, is from *experience*. As absolute negativity, the *Begriff* “goes over” to Nothing and “goes back” to Being, and produces no negative unity of the two beyond its own self-determining “motion” as bare “going;” as absolute positivity or “speculative insight,” a new moment wholly independent of the absolute negativity, the *Begriff* “goes forward” to a new position as Becoming, and thereby posits real determination in

ein *Aufbewahren* zugleich.” (Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke, II. 86). — “Ihre That ist die abstrakte Negation, nicht die Negation des Bewusstseyns, welches so *aufhebt*, dass es das Aufgehobene *aufbewahrt* und *erhält*, und hiermit sein Aufgehobenwerden überlebt.” (*Ibid.* II. 144.) In fact, all the chief meanings of *aufheben* enter into Hegel’s dialectical use of it in the triad: to *raise* the two contradictories from antagonism to reconciliation, to *remove* them from independent separateness to interdependent union, to *cancel* or *annul* them as isolated abstractions, to *neutralize* them as opposites, to *keep*, *preserve*, or *absorb* them as co-factors or co-efficients of the “concrete result.” So understood, it would be convenient to translate *aufheben* by the rather awkward verb “to concrete,” *i. e.* to *make grow together*. All other prestidigitation pales before this.

place of absolute indetermination, not at all as a result of the antecedent double negation, but as a result of its own positive "insight" or supersensuous *experience*. Thus the first triad of "pure thought," thought professedly pure from all experience, begins and ends in experience alone; and the whole series of triads, really uninfluenced by the "going over" and the "going back" which is the futile and superfluous (because self-neutralizing) epiphaenomenon of absolute negativity, is a really unmediated succession of "concrete results" of which each is the product of nothing but experience — not, of course, in the form of "sensation," but in the higher form of the absolute positivity as "insight." For experience, as the *Einsicht* of the *Auge des Geistes*, that is, as supersensuous sensuousness, is precisely that unaccountable B which, as we saw in § 227, Dialectic arbitrarily adds to the result of double negation, changing the true equation of Syllogistic, $-(-A) = A$, into its own untrue equation, $-(-A) = A + B$. This $A + B$, in which A is the whole legitimate result of double negation and B is the added and arbitrary result of "speculative insight," is a general formula for the negative unity or "concrete result" which is at once the third moment of one triad and the first moment or new position of its successor — the general formula for Hegel's *das Konkrete*, the complete result of *Aufheben*.

That this addition of B to A, by which in each triad Hegel effects an advance from the barren result of double negation (A alone) to the concrete result as $A + B$, is arbitrary, because unaccounted for by *Aufheben* as a single and merely negative moment, may be very clearly seen. His argument already quoted (§ 227) is that the negative result of his Dialectic, just because it is a result, is *ipso facto* a positive result at the same time; whence he imagines he proves that his whole *das Konkrete* is a positive product of his mere double negation. This would be true enough, if his *das Konkrete* were A alone; for when was it not known that "two negatives make an affirmative"?

But A alone is the pure, simple, immediate, indeterminate Being with which he started, and to which alone his double negation brings him back. Pure Being, however, as A alone, will not serve his purpose as a result, for it is mere reproduction of his first position and not production of a new one. So to A alone he adds a mysterious B, and in $A + B$ gets a new position in advance of the old, which, however, he still represents as a mere product of his double negation. That is, to Undetermined Being he adds Determination, which he never got from his double negation *at all*, and now represents Becoming, *das Konkrete, der erste konkrete Gedanke und damit der erste Begriff, die erste wahrhafte Gedankenbestimmung*, as the pure product of the double negation *alone!* But Syllogistic dissolves the spell of the wizard Dialectic by pointing out that, while, in all Becoming, real determinations do indeed come into Being and go back to Nothing, every *single* determination must be known by *Experience*, or else remain unknown; that double negation gives nothing but A, that experience gives B, and that it takes double negation + experience to give $A + B$ as *das Konkrete*; and that Hegel's *Aufheben*, instead of being a single moment by which double negation *produces* new position, is the confusion of two moments,—of which one, as absolute negativity, uselessly undoes the first given position in order forthwith to undo its own undoing, and thus *reproduce* the same position unchanged,—and of which the other, as absolute positivity, speculative insight, or experience in disguise, first apprehends single real determinations, and then (with the indispensable but unacknowledged aid of Syllogistic) universalizes these as Becoming, thus effecting by itself alone whatever real advance is made in the first triad, and arriving by itself alone at *das Konkrete* as a new position. This is the collapse of Dialectic as “absolute negativity or motion of the *Begriff*,” which is no sooner understood than, crumbling by its own inherent weakness into a dust-heap, it falls as fell the Campanile at Venice.

§ 236. But this is not all. In this analysis of *Aufheben* as the central futility of Dialectic, it appears very clearly that Dialectic itself, as an attempt to exclude experience from philosophy and make pure reason or *reines Denken* do all the work of philosophical construction, is a mere "onesidedness" (*Einseitigkeit*), and most of all needs to be *aufgehoben* in the interest of good thinking. Over against the great outlines of absolute Idealism as Dialectic — namely, Thought the sole Substance, Self-Contradiction of Thought the sole Essence, Concretion of Thought the sole Process, and the Concrete of Thought the sole Product — are the great outlines of critical and constructive Realism as Syllogistic: Energy (at once physical and psychical) the sole Substance, Reason (intelligence) the sole Essence, Involution (teleology) in Evolution (causality) the sole Process, and the Real All the sole Product. Rationalism and empiricism, idealism and materialism, "pure thought" and "pure experience," are nothing but rival "onesidednesses," and by Hegel's own principles should be *aufgehoben* in a higher truth that shall negate, yet hold and preserve them both. But, while Dialectic is unable to combine them except in a concretion of contradictories which destroy each other, and, instead of seeking to combine them, insists on "pure thought" alone in its abstract isolation, Syllogistic combines them in a union of complementaries which reciprocally condition and realize each other: namely, identity in difference of Reason and Energy in Real Being, and identity in difference of Reason and Experience in all Real Cognition of Real Being. In all that concerns the interrelation of fundamentals, whether in existence or in knowledge, the determining principle of Dialectic is contradiction (subjectivity of relations), while that of Syllogistic is reciprocity and interdependence (objectivity of relations). Hence the opposing methods — triad *versus* syllogism, concretion *versus* inference, speculation *versus* reflection, reason pure from all experience *versus* identity in difference of experience and reason; and

hence, too, the opposing results — a “kingdom of shadows” or world of abstract thought-determinations (*Schattenreich*) versus a living world of intelligible realities, the perfectly abstract *das schlechthin Konkrete* of thought alone as pure Idea versus the concrete universe of reason in energy as the Absolute I.

The issue which Dialectic thus raises with Syllogistic by repudiating the law of excluded middle and its “Either — Or” springs from no superiority of insight, no greater profundity of intelligence, no broader comprehensiveness of reason, no finer delicacy of spirit. Quite the reverse of this is the truth. The jealous exclusion of experience from speculative philosophy, and the ambition to work out a system and method of “pure thought” which shall be independent of it, not only defeat themselves, inasmuch as *Spekulation* itself, as we have seen, is nothing at last but supersensuous *Erfahrung*, but also betray their origin in the spirit of monachism, asceticism, scholasticism — the ingrained vulgarity of contempt for the wonderful and beautiful world of “matter.” Understood in their true relation as inseparable elements of all real knowledge, experience is the knowledge of units and reason the knowledge of universals, and both elements are realized necessarily in the syllogism, which is knowledge itself. If *reines Denken* had its will and could succeed in excluding all experience, that is, all knowledge of real units, from the *absolutes Wissen* at which it aims, the irony of its own success would be the attainment of *absolutes Unwissen*; for without experience the dialectical triad itself has proved under examination to be impossible, and thus the exclusion of experience becomes *ipso facto* the exclusion of knowledge. But science refuses to sanction this petty jealousy of experience. Identity in difference of the unit and its universal in Being is the *real what* of the thing in itself; identity in difference of experience and reason in Thought is its *conceptual what as real cognition*; and the necessary form of every real cognition is thus conceptual

subsumption of experience under reason in a percept-concept, that is, a syllogism. There is no other form of real knowledge. Hence the annihilation of Dialectic as pure knowledge (*reines Wissen*) is its own pretension and effort to be the impossible, namely, pure thought (*reines Denken*).

§ 237. In a profound discussion of "The Ultimate Difference of Systems," of which Erdmann remarks that it "found a very wide circle of readers,"¹ Trendelenburg reduced all the other differences among philosophical systems to that which subsists in their respective attitudes towards Energy and Reason, Force and Thought.² This is indeed the ultimate metaphysical difference between Dialectic and Syllogistic, as the methods respectively of absolute idealism and scientific realism. Dialectic aspires to create a really concrete world out of nothing but thought as sole substance, and self-contradiction as its sole essence; but, even with the unrecognized aid of experience in the form of "speculative insight," the result it claims to arrive at remains still a mere "concrete of pure thought," inasmuch as "the absolutely concrete" itself remains nothing but the *reiner Begriff*. This is not "the sensuous concrete

¹ J. E. Erdmann, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, II. 818.

² "Wenn wir nun in dem bezeichneten Sinne Kraft und Gedanken (also blinde Kraft und bewussten Gedanken) einander gegenüber stellen und die Richtung auf die Einheit voraussetzen: so ergibt sich eine dreifache Möglichkeit ihres gegenseitigen Verhältnisses. *Entweder* steht die Kraft vor dem Gedanken, so dass der Gedanke nicht das Ursprüngliche ist, sondern Ergebniss, Product und Accidenz der blinden Kräfte;— *oder* der Gedanke steht vor der Kraft, so dass die blinde Kraft für sich nicht das Ursprüngliche ist, sondern der Ausfluss des Gedankens;— *oder* endlich Gedanke und Kraft sind im Grunde dieselben und unterscheiden sich nur in unserer Ansicht." (A. Trendelenburg, *Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie*, II. 10). No conception is here suggested of a fourth possibility: that naked Force and pure Thought are equally unthinkable because impossible—that Energy is the substance and Reason the essence of the universe, and that the only possible relation of the two elements is identity in difference. This is the metaphysical ground-principle of objective logic as Syllogistic, and lies involved in that of the objectivity of relations.

of intuition," but "the concrete of reason and the Idea," the "subject as such," the "spirit;" and the *Begriff*, even when it "exists" as "subject" or "spirit," is itself "always abstract" in the sense of excluding whatever is "immediately perceptible."¹ For whatever is empirical must be absolutely excluded from Hegel's "concrete of reason" — all sensations, all sense-intuitions, all sense-perceptions, all images, all responses to *unitary stimuli* of whatever nature in the world of Energy. In Hegel's "concrete of pure thought" there is no place whatever for units of physical energy — no place for units of psychical energy, except in the generalized and abstract form of pure self-activity or self-determination as "absolute negativity or motion of the *Begriff*" — no place for things, or persons, or anything but *actus purus*. With *reines Denken* for sole substance, *Negativität* for sole essence, *Aufheben* for sole process, and *das Konkrete* for sole product, Dialectic has no real world but Reason without Energy, and no real

¹ "Eben so wenig ist das Sinnlich-Concrete der Anschauung ein Concretes der Vernunft und der Idee." (Logik, Werke, VI. 404.) — "In der That . . . ist der Begriff vielmehr das Princip alles Lebens und damit zugleich das schlechthin Konkrete." (*Ibid.* VI. 315.) — "Eben so mag dann auch der Begriff immerhin abstrakt genannt werden, wenn man unter dem Konkreten nur das sinnlich Konkrete, überhaupt das unmittelbar Wahrnehmbare versteht." (*Ibid.* VI. 316.) — "Man hört nichts gewöhnlicher sagen, als dass der Begriff etwas *Abstraktes* ist. Diess ist theils insofern richtig, als das Denken überhaupt und nicht das empirisch konkrete Sinnliche sein Element, theils als er noch nicht die *Idee* ist. . . . Ob er also gleich abstrakt ist, so ist er das Konkrete, und zwar das schlechthin Konkrete, das Subjekt als solches. Das Absolut-Konkrete ist der Geist, — der Begriff, insofern er als Begriff, sich unterscheidend von seiner Objektivität, die aber des Unterscheidens unerachtet die *seinige* bleibt, *existirt*. Alles andere Konkrete, so reich es sey, ist nicht so innig identisch mit sich und darum an ihm selbst nicht so konkret, am wenigsten das was man gemeinhin unter Konkretem versteht, eine äusserlich zusammengehaltene Mannigfaltigkeit." (*Ibid.* VI. 324.) — "Weil ihre [d. h. der Logik] Gegenstände die einfachen, von aller sinnlichen Concretion befreiten Wesenheiten sind, darum nennt Hegel ihr System 'das Reich der Schatten.'" (Kuno Fischer, Hegels Leben, Werke und Lehre, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, VII. i. 444.)

science but Reason without Experience of Energy. And the one is no more reality than the other is science, which is Syllogistic itself, as Knowledge of the world's Reason-Energy through human Reason and Experience in one.

§ 238. A still deeper defect from the logical point of view lies in Hegel's *das Konkrete*. There is no necessity in it, all its pretension to the contrary notwithstanding.¹ There is no absolute *must* in Dialectic, as there is in Syllogistic. The initial act of "speculative insight" in Hegel's process at once shows this defect: "The truth of Being, as well as that of Nothing, is the unity of the two; this unity is Becoming." Why Becoming? Why not Rest? Why not Motion? Why not Change? Why not a dozen other things? In each of these, "insight" can discern the two elements of Being and Non-Being or Nothing; mere Rest or Motion or Change is just as much their unity as Becoming. Hegel gives no reason for his free, optional, capricious, arbitrary choice of the latter in preference to the former. But it is easy to divine one. In Becoming, but not in mere Rest or Motion or Change, lies the teleological implication of Evolution, the implication of a *terminus a quo* as germ and a *terminus ad quem* as matured form; and this is quite convenient for the doctrine of a dialectical evolution of the categories. There is, nevertheless, absolutely no necessity in his choice, no compelling reason for it; indeed, "insight" admits of no compelling reason, for, if such exists, "insight" instantly ceases to be mere "insight," and becomes an inference of the "reflective understanding" — which would be the end of *Vernunft* as *Spekulation*. Hence Hegel's choice is purely arbitrary, not in the least necessary; his "spirit" is pure "freedom" without necessity; and the consequence is that the whole dialectical chain of triads, instead of being a logical necessity, is merely an artistic device, a teleological means to a freely chosen end, a logical rope of sand. A further con-

¹ ". . . wohingegen, wie vöher bemerkt wurde, das wahre Denken ein Denken der Nothwendigkeit ist." (Logik, Werke, I. 241.)

sequence is that in each triad the "concrete result" is a mechanical or (at the most) a chemical composition, like that of oxygen and hydrogen in the water-molecule H_2O ; for the elements of the third moment were actually separated in the first and second moments, and become united only by this optional mixture, fusion, or composition, in the third.

As a union of elements previously separated in thought and admitting of combination in more than one conceptual form (*e. g.* Rest or Motion or Change as well as Becoming), Hegel's *das Konkrete* is thus a product of pure "freedom" and contains no logical necessity. Indeed, his whole Dialectic is rebellion against the tyranny of the "Either — Or," the laws of contradiction and excluded middle in which all logical necessity centres, as an Other which threatens the substantial and essential "freedom" of the "spirit" and must be subdued by it; and it carries its rebellion into an open declaration of war against the Aristotelian or "common logic" by proclaiming the "spirit" to be superior to the law of contradiction itself.¹ There is no necessity even in contradiction: the "spirit" makes it, the "spirit" can unmake it. What is this but a delirium of intellectual lawlessness, the love of "freedom" run into Corybantic frenzy? The only freedom to be desired or respected in philosophy is freedom under law, freedom to

¹ "Das Wesen des Geistes ist deswegen formell die *Freiheit*, die absolute Negativität des Begriffes als Identität mit sich. . . . Die Substanz des Geistes ist die Freiheit, d. h. das Nichtabhängigseyn von einem Anderen, das Sichaufsichselbstbeziehen. . . . Die Freiheit des Geistes ist aber nicht bloss eine ausserhalb des Anderen, sondern eine im Anderen errungene Unabhängigkeit vom Anderen, — kommt nicht durch die Flucht vor dem Anderen, sondern durch dessen Ueberwinden zur Wirklichkeit. . . . Die gewöhnliche Logik irrt daher, indem sie meint, der Geist sey ein den Widerspruch gänzlich von sich Ausschliessendes. . . . Der Widerspruch wird aber vom Geiste ertragen, weil dieser keine Bestimmung in sich hat, die er nicht als eine von ihm gesetzte und folglich als eine solche wüsste, die er auch wieder aufheben kann." (Philosophie des Geistes Werke, VII. ii. 24–26.)

think in accordance with logical necessities. But the "concrete result" of the Hegelian triad contains no logical necessity, and regards none. It is a pure product of the "freedom" of the "spirit," which posits, negates, and concretes (*aufhebt*) in absolute irresponsibility, with no aim but just to realize its own "freedom" as "the highest pinnacle of self-conscious reason," and assert its own superiority to every law that would determine its "freedom," excepting only the law of its own essence as "absolute negativity." For this reason the "concrete of pure thought" has no necessity, no fixity, no permanence, no abiding truth, and therefore no scientific value.

But the fixed, permanent, and scientifically valuable concepts of Syllogistic are quite otherwise constituted. Syllogistic repudiates the superficial concept of "concretion," whether as act (*Aufheben*) or as product of the act (*das Konkrete*), not as altogether untrue or always worthless, but as crude and uncertain because altogether wilful and lawless. Instead of this, it forms and uses the fundamental and far deeper concept of *necessary identity in difference*—inseparable unity of distinguishable elements which cannot even exist in isolation and cannot be conceived apart from each other, yet can and must be conceived in and through each other—reciprocity so profound that each element conditions every other element and is conditioned by it. Such is the relation of the sides and the angles in every triangle. Not contradiction, but reciprocity,—not concretion, but completion,—not a union of contradictories that devour each other in a "concrete result" which itself is straightway devoured in a new contradiction, but a union of complementaries that condition, realize, support, and perpetuate each other in abiding organic unity: that is the living and lasting product of the syllogism, as contrasted with the ephemeral and mocking product of the triad. For the syllogistic conclusion is identity in difference of its own premises as the universal and the unit,—self-mediating and self-

perpetuating identity in difference of genus, species, and specimen, — in the UNIT-UNIVERSAL: (1) as the necessary and permanent form of the thing-in-itself or *Object of Knowledge*, and (2) as the no less necessary and permanent form of the percept-concept or *Knowledge of the Object*.

This fundamental principle of syllogistic as the law of unit-universals, therefore, is itself the identity in difference of Ontology and Epistemology, and develops still further the profound conception of its great founder, so long obscured by the fog of nominalism, conceptualism, phaenomenism, idealism, and modern subjectivism in general: "There is a science which considers Universal Being and the Units which belong to it in itself — τὸ ὄν ἢ ὅν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὐτό." For combination of the Aristotelian principle that the *real universal* is knowable rationally as genus and species through the real common essence, and the (implicit) Darwinian principle that the *real unit* is knowable empirically as specimen through the real individual difference (especially that of sex), grounds the theory of Syllogistic in Being, and completes it as the law of *unit-universals*, or necessary identity in difference of genus, species, and specimen, (1) in Being and (2) in Thought. Such combination for the first time makes it possible to show that the rational-empirical syllogism is the one vital principle of ontology, epistemology, and ethics — the law of evolution through involution at once in Being, in Knowledge, and in Life. And the *a priori* condition of the syllogism, as the movement of all reason, human or divine, is the three necessary laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle — necessary by the Apriori of Being that conditions and determines the Apriori of Thought.

§ 239. In fine, apart from the pure logical formalism of Kant, Syllogistic and Dialectic are the two great forms of Logic which still contend for mastery of the modern mind, the one as the scientific method by which all that is known of Reason-Energy as a real universe of real law has been

learned, and the other as the speculative method by which the Reason of the universe, illusively isolated from its Energy, and vainly set up as its only "truth" in the form of "pure thought" or "absolute idealism," has been dreamed.

The essence of Dialectic is its principle of Concretion (*Aufgehobenwerden*)—the principle that absolute negation as concretion of contradictories is itself absolute position as the absolutely concrete (the *Begriff* as *das schlechthin Konkrete*, the *Idee* as *die Eine Totalität*). This is the central principle of the Hegelian logic as the positive productiveness of contradiction, and it is a pure sophism. Contradiction as such produces and can produce nothing. The whole plausibility of the speculative method, by which double negation as *Aufheben* falsely appears to produce a new position as *das Konkrete*, lies altogether in the adroitness with which two independent and incongruous moments are sophistically confused as one moment in *Aufheben* itself: absolute negativity as *Widerspruch* and absolute positivity as *Einsicht* or *Spekulation*. This sophistical confusion once detected in the essential constitution of the triad as such, the whole dialectical chain of triads instantly falls asunder into a row of logically disconnected links, a rope of sand; for the first moment of each triad is posited, not in the least as a "result" of double negation in the preceding triad, but as an act of new, original, immediate or unmediated, and strictly intuitive "insight," that is, supersensuous sensuousness as direct vision of the *Auge des Geistes*. This, however, is nothing but "experience," "perception," "intuition," relapse to pure "immediacy;" it is not "self-mediation" or "pure thought" at all; and by Hegel's own standard of dignity it puts "speculative reason" below, and not above, "reflective understanding." Thus by three absolute sophistries, (1) by abstracting Reason from Energy in the distinguishable but inseparable Reason-Energy of the World, and then misrepresenting this absolute abstraction of "pure thought" as "the abso-

lutely concrete,"—(2) by confounding negativity and positivity as production of new position through mere concretion of contradictories, and then misrepresenting this false result of double negation as logical linkage of triad with triad, — and (3) by elevating the speculative method above the scientific method, and misrepresenting the mere unverified "insight" of reason alone as superior to verification of reason by universal experience in the quest for truth, — Dialectic convicts itself of being at bottom pure Sophistic.¹

Syllogistic is in reality what Dialectic only professes to be — Objective Logic. Its foundation is, not the nugatory principle of "pure thought," which, professing to be "the

¹ "Das durchgängige Thema der hegelschen Philosophie ist die *vernunftgemässe Entwicklung der Welt*. Inhalt und Form dieses Systems sind identisch. *Was* sich entwickelt, ist das Vernunftbewusstsein, der Geist, die Selbsterkenntniss der Menschheit. *Wie* oder in welcher Form diese Erkenntniss stattfindet und fortschreitet, ist die Form der begrifflichen oder vernunftgemässen Entwicklung. Diese ist durchgängig logisch, es wird nicht von Ding zu Ding, sondern von Begriff zu Begriff fortgeschritten: von dem entwickelten Begriff der Vernunft, d. h. von der Logik zur Naturphilosophie, von dieser zur Philosophie des subjectiven, des objectiven Geistes, der Weltgeschichte, des absoluten Geistes in Kunst, Religion und Philosophie, d. h. zur Philosophie der Kunst, der Religion, der Philosophie, welche letztere die Geschichte der Philosophie ist. Dabei herrscht die Gewissheit, dass die Begriffe nicht bloss dem Wesen der Dinge entsprechen, wie das Abbild dem Urbild, sondern dass sie das Wesen der Dinge selbst ausmachen, dass sie das Wesen der Dinge sind. Diese Einheit heisst die *Identität von Denken und Sein*." (Kuno Fischer, Hegels Leben, Werke und Lehre, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, VII. ii. 1174.) That is, Thought or Reason is the sole "substance" and the sole "essence," both "content" and "form," of the universe in its total reality. In this exposition Fischer is perfectly faithful to Hegel. The Form, or Logical Idea, is itself the whole Content, or Nature: Thought as Thought is itself Being as Being — it has no "other" which is not itself. This panlogism is the absolute suppression of Energy as an element of Being which is fundamentally "other" than pure Reason — fundamentally inseparable, but none the less fundamentally distinguishable, from "the element of pure thought." And this suppression of Energy is the incurable vice of "absolute idealism," the absolute sophism of Dialectic as objective logic.

absolutely concrete," turns out to be the absolutely abstract, but rather the principle of the objectivity of relations as necessary and real identity in difference of correlated Energy and Reason, Energy as the substance or "matter" and Reason as the essence or "form" of this universe of law; for law itself is the demonstration of reason, and changeless law the demonstration of perfect reason. Unfailing energy is the universal law of cause and effect; unfailing reason is the universal law of end and means; and identity in difference of unfailing energy and unfailing reason is the cosmic process itself, as identity in difference of evolution and involution, that is, necessary real identity in difference of causality and teleology, as alike the way of the world and the way of the mind in the Absolute I. This one and only way of Being, Knowing, and Doing, of ontology, epistemology, and ethics, is Syllogistic, not merely as formal logic, but also as real logic—formal logic because, and only because, real logic (1) as Syllogism of Being, (2) as Syllogism of Knowledge, and (3) as Syllogism of Duty. The syllogism of Being is subsumption of Energy under Reason in the real Event; the syllogism of Knowledge is subsumption of Experience under Reason in the real Cognition; and the syllogism of Duty is subsumption of Free Purpose under Right Reason in the real Deed. These three constitute the Syllogism of Syllogisms as Realism or Scientific Philosophy, which is subsumption of Epistemology under Ontology in Ethics, and therefore the intellectual groundwork of all real Religion. The scientific method itself as the perfection of Syllogistic is subsumption of Observation of Experience under Hypothesis or Reason in the Verified Result, which is reduction of Theory to Fact in the real and known Law of Nature—in other words, substitution of universal verification for mere personal "insight" through Consensus of the Competent, which is and must be for man the supreme Criterion of Truth. The essence of Syllogistic is its principle, not

of sophistical concretion of contradictories, but of necessary real and ideal reciprocity of complementaries—the principle of Organic Reciprocity as the Apriori of Being or absolute law of unit-universals, that is, the reciprocal intermediation of genus, species, and specimen, in the very form and nature of the syllogism as such.

So compared, the ultimate logical difference between Dialectic and Syllogistic is simply that between Sophistic and Heuristic; and so we leave it here.

CHAPTER XVIII

PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD AND SYSTEM AS SYLLOGISTIC

§ 240. ABSOLUTE Logic is absolute Syllogistic, and its essence is the fundamental or constitutive principle of the syllogism as such: namely, *Whatever is evolved as consequent must be involved as antecedent.*

This logical axiom is simply expression of the absolute necessity of a relation which "cannot be otherwise;" its warrant is the nature of things, the conditions of existence, the Apriori of Being. It is only a more technical rendering of Persius's *gigni de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti*, or Beneke's *das Product kann nicht mehr enthalten, als was die Factoren hineingeben*, or Emerson's "what comes out, that was put in." The traditional *dictum de omni et nullo* (that is, whatever can be affirmed or denied of a class can be affirmed or denied of every member of that class), although often treated as the ultimate ground of the syllogism, is no principle at all, but merely a derivative practical maxim or immediate corollary of the principle above stated; for the *dictum* itself would not hold, unless every member of the given class were involved in it, and the involution or non-involution of a given member in the given class is the only logical ground of the affirmation or denial. So, too, Kant's alleged "principle on which rest the possibility and validity of all categorical syllogisms," namely, "what belongs to the mark of a thing belongs likewise to the thing itself, and what contradicts the mark of a thing contradicts likewise the thing itself,—*nota notæ est nota rei ipsius, repugnans notæ repugnat rei ipsi*,"¹ is no principle, but only a formal maxim derived from the real principle stated

¹ Logik, ed. Jäsche, Werke, VIII. 119.

above; for it would not hold good, if the thing did not involve all its marks in its essence or *Ansich*, and if every mark did not involve all its own marks in its own *Ansich*, and if, furthermore, the thing did not evolve out of its *Ansich* first the mark, and then the mark of the mark, as still "belonging to itself." If Kant had traced back his own "principle of all categorical syllogisms" to its logical condition in the deeper and wider principle of evolution through involution, it would have led him perforce to absolute syllogistic as already stated.

The essence of absolute logic, therefore, is its *method* of evolution through prior involution, and its jurisdiction must extend wherever that method obtains. For this reason the sphere of absolute logic is that of all reality and all ideality—the concentric and coinciding spheres of Being, Knowing, and Doing, each of which includes both the others in the one absolute sphere of the Absolute I. So conceived, Being is not, as Hegel holds, merely the most abstract concept or category of the reflective understanding, and so the poorest and emptiest of all idealities; on the contrary, since Being includes all Knowing and all Doing and is itself included by them, it is the fullest and richest and most real of all realities, namely, the real universe itself. In other words, Absolute Logic, not as Dialectic, but as Syllogistic, is the immanent principle or law of the cosmical process as such, the one and only method of universal and eternal evolution through universal and eternal involution, the self-revealing and intrinsically intelligible Real Life of the Absolute I.

Referred, therefore, to the I as Absolute Subject, that is, as the only possible and consequently only conceivable real unity of the real universe, the intrinsically "Unknowable" is not only non-existent, but also nonsensical, in fact impossible. Everything which becomes is and must be logically constituted, by the Apriori of Being. Nothing is or can be unknowable in itself or because of itself. Whatever exists must be a product of the cosmical Reason-

Energy, working by the method of absolute syllogistic ; in order to exist, then, it must at once *be* and *be known* and *be done* — that is, done into being through knowing, or, in one word, *evolved*, as “something ;” and even the cosmical Reason-Energy itself, the eternal self-activity of evolution through involution as the syllogistic process of Reason as essence in Energy as substance, is certainly “something” to itself, in the self-consciousness of the Absolute Subject-Object.

Referred to the I as human subject, however, the distinction between the known and the unknown is vitally important in absolute logic. Everything within the reach of our knowing-faculty may fall within the compass of the humanly known, while everything beyond its reach must remain within that of the humanly unknown, and so be “unknowable” in the only sense that has a meaning ; as, / for instance, the science of selenography extends to the whole side of the moon which is turned toward us, but cannot extend to that which is turned away from us. There is no other “limit of human knowledge” than this, and it is a shifting one, constantly receding as human knowledge grows by natural increase or the invention of new artificial aids. All learning or discovery is conversion of the unknown into the known, and its boundless possibility implies the impossibility of the intrinsically unknowable. The doctrine of modern subjectivism that we know things phaenomenally, or as they appear, but not noumenally, or as they are in themselves, limits knowledge only by extinguishing it altogether ; for to know things as they are not is not to know them at all. That such a theory of necessary and universal ignorance should have passed so long for a “theory of knowledge” will be a marvel to succeeding ages.

§ 241. Because identity of working method is the universal solvent of all differences of worked material, and because absolute syllogistic thus holds in solution, as it were, all the infinitely various elements of Being, Knowing, and Doing, absolute logic is the identity in difference of

ontology, epistemology, and ethics, — in other words, the necessary and universal unity of philosophy as such. The unity of absolute logic itself is its principle of the necessary continuity of Being — its principle that whatever is evolved as consequent must be involved as antecedent.

§ 242. The fundamental truth of Ontology is that all forms of real existence, by the Apriori of Being, are necessarily and logically constituted as unit-universals, or specimens, species, and genera, — specimens as things in themselves, species and genera as kinds in themselves, and things in kinds as the only possible object of knowledge. "States of consciousness," if they were the "only realities," are yet real only as things and kinds in themselves, and subject as such to the laws of absolute logic; whatever necessity "for us" lies in the Apriori of Thought is derived from the deeper-lying and all-including absolute necessity of the Apriori of Being, without which thought itself could not be. Absolute syllogistic might be defined as the necessary and universal interrelatedness of genera, species, and specimens *per se*, whether in Being or in Thought or in Act, not in the least as mere formal classification or abstract categories or barren rules, but rather as that living cosmical process of evolution through involution by which Being eternally produces, sustains, and changes all its forms. From the Darwinian standpoint of the mutability of species, Nägeli said as early as 1865: —

"The centre of gravity in natural history lies no longer in species, but in the fact that *every* systematic category is conceived as a natural unity, which exhibits the transition-point of a great evolutionary movement. Like species, genus and the higher notions are no abstractions, but concrete things, complexes of allied forms which have a common origin."¹

The objective reality of genera, species, and specimens, and of the relations inseparable from them, and of the con-

¹ Quoted in Ueberweg's "System der Logik," edited by J. B. Meyer, with additions in 1882, p. 164. Nägeli's words are almost the philosophization of Darwinism.

ditions without which they could not be, constitutes a Trichotomy of Being, as Things, Relations, and Conditions, which is the foundation of scientific ontology. The very subjectivism which affects to question the reality of an external world, and altogether denies the possibility of a scientific ontology, borrows from the latter, nevertheless, the distinction of genus and species (specimen it does not understand), as the foundation of its formal logic; for without that distinction no doctrine of the concept, the judgment, or the syllogism is possible, while with it no denial of ontology is possible without self-contradiction, since the distinction itself is ineradicably ontological. It avails nothing to plead that in formal logic genus and species are pure abstractions, for every abstraction depends on that from which it is abstracted as its necessary logical presupposition; hence the abstract relations of genus and species which are formulated in the definitions and rules of formal logic are absolutely invalid, even as canons of formal truth, unless their subjective necessity and universality are grounded in the objectively real relations of genera, species, and specimens, as that which "cannot be otherwise" — that is, unless their necessity and universality in Thought as Thought are grounded in their necessity and universality in Being as Being. In other words, formal logic has no validity whatever which is not derived from absolute logic.

§ 243. The fundamental laws of Ontology, or absolute syllogistic as operative in both Objective and Subjective Being, are these: —

I. Genera evolve species, and species evolve specimens; therefore, genera evolve specimens. That is, genera evolve specimens through species, because species, as real middle terms, are the real efficient causes of their specimens (*τὸ αἴτιον τὸ μέσον*). This is the law of Substance as Energy, the law of causality, the law of the world as mechanism, the evolutionary Course of Nature: *nothing happens without an efficient cause.*

II. Genera involve species, and species involve specimens; therefore, genera involve specimens. That is, genera involve specimens through species, because species, as real middle terms, are the final causes or real ends of their specimens. This is the law of Essence as Reason, the law of teleology, the law of the world as organism, the involutational Course of Mind: *nothing happens without a sufficient reason.*

III. Genera involve and evolve specimens through species in one inseparable logical and ontological process as the Syllogism of Being. The only efficient cause is that which *effects*, or realizes the End; the only sufficient reason as End is that which *suffices*, or satisfies the Good; the only perfect ideal is that which *perfects*, or ordains the Best. Hence the Syllogism of Being subsumes the causal through the teleological under the ethical, that is, the mechanical through the organic under the personal. It is the law of Reason in Energy as Right, the law of ethicality or character, the law of the world as person, the Process of Essence in Substance, the Course of Spirit: *nothing happens without the Good as efficient cause, sufficient reason, and perfect ideal.*

IV. Specimens, at once things in themselves and things in kinds, are perpetually evolved out of species and genera because they are perpetually involved in them and cannot exist out of them; each new specimen inherits its specific form (heredity) and acquires its individual difference (adaptation) in its own species alone — otherwise a new generation would not perpetuate its species. For this reason every specimen as such necessarily unites in itself generic essence, specific essence, and reific essence or individual difference. In these three elements, so united or combined, consists the immanent relational constitution of the “thing in itself” (*Ding an sich*) as only one specimen of only one species of only one genus, — consequently, as a concrete syllogism in itself, and for that very reason a necessarily intelligible “object of knowledge.” Moreover,

every species is a single specimen to its own genus: in which light its generic essence becomes now its specific essence, and its specific difference now its individual difference or reific essence. Similarly, every genus is a single specimen to its own higher genus. Hence every "thing" and every "kind" is of necessity a unit-universal, both one in many and many in one, by the Apriori of Being. This is the law of unit-universals as the law of individuation — law of the reality of units of energy in universal energy, or substances in substance, as monad, particle, corpuscle, molecule, atom, ion, electron, mechanism, organism, person, subject, object, subject-object, or whatever other "something:" to wit, *nothing exists except as a specimen, a universal in itself and a unit in its kind*. This is the absolute unity of the universe, one in many and many in one as the Absolute Unit-Universal, the *summum genus* or *genus generum* as the Absolute I or *summum individuum*.

V. The necessary and constitutive relations of generic, specific, and reific essence in the specimen, or "thing in itself," are demonstration of the OBJECTIVITY OF RELATIONS, as involved in the Apriori of Being. That is, things and kinds, units and universals, terms and their relations, cannot exist separately; no units of energy, as substance, are possible without relations or universals of reason, as essence. But such constitutive relations as these cannot be the work of any *a priori* synthetic intellect which is logically prior to them; for every such intellect is itself the function or faculty of a unit-universal of energy, an I which, even as one pure subject with various faculties of thought, feeling, and will, absolutely presupposes these very relations. They are the necessary *Ansich* of whatever is real; they are logically prior alike to Energy and to Reason; they simply "cannot be otherwise" (Aristotle's τὸ δ' ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως εἶναι).¹ They belong

¹ Cf. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Einleitung, Werke, III. 34: "Erfahrung lehrt uns zwar, dass etwas so oder so beschaffen sei, aber nicht, dass es nicht anders sein könne." Spencer's notion that simple

to the absolutely objective yet *a priori* necessity which conditions the very possibility of existence in any real form, just as the necessary contraposition of greatest side and greatest angle is an absolute *condicio sine qua non* of every plane triangle, whether in sensuous experience, in sensuous imagination, or in Kant's illusory "pure intuition *a priori*" and free mathematical "construction," — there *may or may not* be triangles, but, if a triangle *is*, it *must* be built on that plan. They are the Apriori of Being as Being, and sole possible explanation of the Apriori of Thought. Other relations, however, which "can be otherwise" (Aristotle's ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως εἶναι), constitute the Aposteriori of Being, the field of contingency and change, the sphere of freedom; and all such relations must originate in plastic or form-giving reason itself, as free in Nature as in Man. Absolute Fate and Absolute Chance are equally unthinkable because equally impossible. Thus necessity and freedom are the warp and woof of the world, which would be impossible if either element were wanting: *nothing happens except as a*

accumulation of experiences through a long series of generations will at last constitute an absolute necessity of reason rests on inability to grasp this distinction, which Kant adopts from Aristotle, yet without knowing how to use it. For he leaves the constitution of "pure reason *a priori*," the organic unity of "consciousness in general," as a mere empirical datum at last, a mere given fact of existence. From this no true Apriori of Thought, no real necessity at all, can be deduced. Yet Kant seeks to deduce all necessity in thinking from pure "spontaneity" in the subject as "synthesis *a priori*:" " . . . indem wir die Analysis nur so weit treiben dürfen, als sie unentbehrlich nothwendig ist, um die Principien der Synthesis *a priori*, als worum es uns nur zu thun ist, in ihrem ganzen Umfange einzusehen." (Kr. d. r. Vern. Einleit. Werke, III. 49.) Such deduction is no deduction. Necessity cannot be deduced from or found in the subject as pure "spontaneity" or "self-activity" in "synthesis *a priori*," *i. e.* in the subject as sole and absolute originator of all relations or "combinations" (*Ibid.* Werke, III. 114, 115): yet this pure spontaneity or absolute non-necessity is the only source of the "necessity and universality" which Kant makes the marks of all "pure knowledge *a priori*" and identifies with all "objective validity." The logic is vain enough which deduces necessity from non-necessity.

free act within necessary laws. This principle, so far as it goes, is the identity in difference of science and philosophy: science as special sciences sees necessity, but science as philosophy sees necessity and freedom, too.

VI. The objectivity or equal reality of Things and Relations is self-evidently involved in a world of things which are necessarily related in and among themselves as genera, species, and specimens. This objectivity of relations is the real ground of all real Form, the immanent Law of Reality, the Apriori of Being in its narrower significance. But, since no form can be real which is not in itself possible, the OBJECTIVITY OF CONDITIONS is the real ground of the possibility of all real form, the immanent Law of Potentiality, the Apriori of Being in its absolute significance. For the real is the evolved potential, while the potential is the involved real, and nothing can be evolved which is not first involved. Hence the potential conditions the real, and involution conditions evolution, as logical *prius* in the absolute Aristotelian sense (*πρότερον τῇ φύσει*). This is in other words the constitutive principle of absolute logic — whatever is evolved as consequent must be involved as antecedent. In its full meaning, therefore, the Apriori of Being is the totality of the objective Conditions which constitute the Immanent Necessity of Being itself — the ground of its reality as the process of eternally self-realizing potentiality. These conditions of Being are: (1) Space and Time, since to be “spaceless and timeless,” that is, to be nowhere and never, is simply not to be; (2) Substance as Energy, since to be is to act, and not to act is not to be; (3) Essence as Reason, since to think is to relate, to be is to be related, and to be out of relation is to be out of being and not to be; (4) Process of Essence in Substance or of Reason in Energy as Syllogistic, that is, evolution through involution, motion from the potential to the real and from the involved to the evolved, or production of immanent relational constitution as real form, since no other process than the Syllogism of Being could possibly evolve

new specimens out of pre-existing specimens, species, and genera, while ceasing to do this is to die or not to be; and (5) Being itself as Reality, or identity in difference of substance and essence and process in space and time, since reality could never be unless reality had always been ("naught from naught comes and naught to naught returns" — the Absolute I as Necessary Being). Consequently, the objectivity of conditions is the principle of the identity in difference of reality and potentiality in the syllogism, the law of the self-dependent continuity of Being as Acting and Relating: *nothing happens except as the evolved consequent of an involved antecedent — as at once the effect of an involved cause, the fulfilment of an involved end, and the realization of an involved ideal*. This interprets and further develops the principle at the close of the preceding paragraph.

VII. Genus, species, and specimen are the major, middle, and minor terms in the Syllogism of Being. Nature's premises are the perpetual and universal presence of these three elements, and her conclusion or objective inference is the endless production of new specimens; each of which, being in itself a concrete syllogism in the development of its own immanent relational constitution as generic, specific, and reific essence, repeats the same logical and ontological ratiocination. This fundamental syllogistic movement, determined to be such by the Apriori of Being, necessarily moulds all kinds and all things, clearly in the organic world, less clearly but no less certainly in the so-called but mis-called inorganic world; even moderate acuteness can easily identify the process everywhere. The universe persists solely through endless syllogizing, or endless subsumption of particulars under universals in new units, and all methodology, whether of Being, of Knowing, or of Doing, ultimates in the syllogism as the one necessary and universal method of methods — course of Nature, course of Mind, course of Spirit. For the essence of the syllogism is EQUATION of the implicit or potential relations involved in the antecedent with the explicit or real rela-

tions evolved in the consequent; and this metamorphosis of potentiality into reality, of thought into fact, of the form that may be into the form that is, of the reason that relates into the energy that makes, is not only the secret of the syllogism, but the mystery of life.¹ Here we touch bottom in our deep-sea soundings; we cannot get below that Apriori of Being which determines the syllogism to be the necessary form of the life-process itself, and which determines the essence of the syllogism to be *necessary relational equation* of the antecedent as Thought with the consequent as Existence (ἐν τοῦτοις ἡ ἰσότης ἐνότης). On no other terms can both the quantity of energy and the continuity of reason remain constants in the cosmical process. Evolution *without* involution (and such is Spencer's "Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed" — Energy without Reason) strikes over into the ostensibly rejected process of "creation of something out of nothing;" for it is a blindly mechanical process of production stretched out in time into an infinite series of infinitesimal increments of Being, each of which constitutes an

¹ To Schleiermacher, who had objected to the syllogism that the conclusion gives no "progress in thought," no "new cognition," no "new insight," and that the premises merely show how we arrive at it by mediation, Ueberweg excellently replied (*System der Logik*, ed. 1882, p. 322): "But there certainly lies a new insight in the fusion into one judgment of two concepts which were previously thought in two different judgments, separated from each other and connected with a third." More than this, however, needs to be said. The "new insight" is already implied, involved, or potential in the premises, through the objectively necessary relation which unites all the particulars in their universal; but it becomes expressed, evolved, realized, asserted, or judged, in the conclusion alone. In this transition from the potential to the real, from the involved to the evolved, lies the "newness" of the "insight," the march of thought, the logical necessity of the syllogism as resting at bottom on the *relational identity*, yet *real difference*, of the antecedent and the consequent. Whoever clearly gets the full meaning of this will see as far as may be seen into that movement from ideality to reality which is not only the secret of the syllogism and the mystery of life, but also the history of Nature, the truth of Spirit, and the inexhaustible creativeness of Being as Being.

increase of Being as a whole — an increase of relations evolved uncompensated by relations involved, and therefore a “creation” of real living forms. But evolution *through* involution maintains the living equality of Potentiality and Reality, Thought and Existence, Reason and Energy, in a Being which is incapable alike of increase and of decrease. When the cosmical process is conceived as Syllogistic, the eternal equality of antecedent and consequent in the syllogism becomes the eternal equality of reason and energy in the Absolute I; the syllogistic cosmical process becomes the demonstration that the universe is alive; and the living universe itself becomes the demonstration of God, when Being reveals itself as Knowing and Doing, too.

§ 244. The fundamental truth of Epistemology lies in the principle of the strictly logical Idealization of the Real. This is the principle that the object determines the subject in Knowing, — that the forms of knowledge are of necessity determined by the forms of existence, — that all forms of thought not so determined are forms of creative fancy, poetic art, free imagination, insane hallucination, or sheer illusion, — that “things in themselves,” that is, things in their internal and external relations, so far from being “unknowable,” are the only possible objects of knowledge, — that Kant’s “mere phaenomena,” or things out of themselves, are pure figments or objects of ignorance, — and that Hegel’s “phaenomena in themselves” are nothing but “things in themselves” under another name and fall at once under the laws of absolute logic. The grand desideratum of philosophy at the dawn of the twentieth century is an epistemology which shall recognize natural science as real knowledge of real existence, and confirm the scientific method as that necessary identity in difference of experience and reason which grounds the Syllogism of Knowing in the Syllogism of Being. With nothing better than the brilliant, elaborate, yet intellectually futile *Erkenntniss-theorie* to rely upon, philosophical subjectivism must perish

of its own effeminacy and degeneracy, and leave nothing but a thoroughly onesided physicism to inherit the earth. For the Kantian epistemology is simply the nominalistic conceptualism of the middle ages ripened and gone to seed, and nothing short of Syllogistic will avail to develop the rude vigor of modern physicism into the trained and disciplined strength of scientific realism, — that is, a *πρώτη φιλοσοφία* at once acute, comprehensive, and profound, thoroughly modernized by Darwinian reform of the Aristotelian Paradox (as explained in Chapters VI and VII), and brought to complete internal harmony by the principles of absolute logic. In Greek realism, not in Anglican or German idealism, lies the germ of a truly modern philosophy.

The peculiar specimens, species, and genera with which epistemology deals, the things in kinds which constitute the ultimate elements of intelligence as conscious subsumption of particulars under universals in new units, are percepts, concepts, and ideas: percepts of specimens, concepts of species, ideas of genera.¹ All particular sciences (including psychology) rest upon and branch out of epistemology as the universal science of Knowing, the *ἐπιστήμη* which is determined by *τὸ ὄν ᾗ ὄν*; that is, Knowing is ultimately grounded in Being, and epistemology in ontology, and formal logic itself in absolute logic as Syllogistic. Hence the elements of intelligence are *ex vi termini* true percepts,

¹ Being precisely defined by its object, this use of the word idea to denote the subjective correlate of the objective genus, or the thought which thinks the genus as the major term in the Syllogism of Being and therefore stands itself as the major term of the Syllogism of Knowing, need cause no confusion whatever, though it is a special application of a term with myriad meanings. It only requires to be mentioned that, just as every unit-universal of Being is at once a universal to its own units and a unit to its own higher universal, so every unit-universal of Knowing is at once an idea to its own included percept-concepts and a percept-concept to its own higher idea. In every syllogism of knowing, the idea is the major, the concept is the middle, and the percept is the minor term; and in a series or sorites of dependent syllogisms the conclusion of one becomes the major premise of the next.

true concepts, and true ideas; if these are not true, they are elements of error or mistake — not of intelligence at all, but of the want of it. This unconditional necessity of agreement, not in sensuous content, but in relational constitution, between specimens, species, and genera in Being, on the one hand, and percepts, concepts, and ideas of them in Knowing, on the other hand, is the Apriori of Truth, which is the Apriori of Being in its epistemological application.

But percepts, concepts, and ideas possess a double character in themselves. As existing realities in the subject, they are themselves unit-universals of Being, or original specimens, species, and genera of Being as Thinking; but, as simple idealities or cognitions of their objects, they are the primary unit-universals of Knowing as Knowing. Further, just as every real specimen or unit of existence is a concreted syllogism as identity in difference of generic, specific, and reific essence, so every specimen of knowledge or real cognition is a concreted syllogism as identity in difference of perceptual, conceptual, and ideal essence. For percepts, concepts, and ideas are the minor, middle, and major terms in every Syllogism of Knowing; their necessary interrelatedness or unitary relational constitution is involved or potential in the premises, but evolved or real in the conclusion; and every logical conclusion from true premises, that is, every concreted syllogism of knowledge, every true judgment or real cognition, is one of the ultimate cells which Syllogistic, as the cell-theory of the organism of universal human knowledge, recognizes as the indivisible living components of all science and all philosophy.

The object, we repeat, determines the subject in Knowing. That is, what the object is in itself, even on the idealist's assumption that the subject has created it, must determine all possible knowledge of it; the relations immanent in it must determine all relations immanent in the cognition of it, since any variation in these at once vitiates the cognition

so far. This simply "cannot be otherwise;" and, when idealism makes the knowing process itself create the "mere phaenomenon," that is, condition and determine the object known, it puts the cart before the horse and falls into hopeless self-confusion. In other words, Being necessarily determines Knowledge. Hence the Trichotomy of Being as Things, Relations, and Conditions determines the Trichotomy of Perception, as distinguishably but inseparably (1) *sensuous*, or apprehensive of things through the senses; (2) *intellectual*, or apprehensive of relations through the understanding; and (3) *rational*, or apprehensive of conditions through the reason. All perception, intuition, immediacy, simple apprehension, or immediate experience of whatever name, is essentially determined and characterized by the character of its object as a specimen or *unit*, —unitary thing as an object of immediate sense-perception, unitary relation as an object of immediate understanding, or unitary condition as an object of immediate reason. But all comprehension is essentially determined and characterized by the character of its object as a species, genus, or *universal of units*, whether these are things, relations, or conditions. Moreover, because every possible object of knowledge is a unit-universal of reific, specific, and generic essence, every real cognition of a real object must be determined by the object itself to be a unit-universal of perceptual, conceptual, and ideal essence. Apprehension and comprehension, that is, experience and reason, reciprocally condition each other in every real cognition, and may be distinguished, but not separated, in each of the elements of a concrete syllogism of Knowing, because unity and universality may be distinguished, but not separated, in each element of the real object as a concrete syllogism of Being.

It will not fail to be observed that, in this Trichotomy of Perception as sensuous, intellectual, and rational, and in the determination of it by the Trichotomy of Being as things, relations, and conditions, *immediate experience as*

such becomes simple apprehension of units as units, whether single things or single relations or single conditions. This is a great expansion of the notion of experience. The usual and time-honored view is that experience includes only sense-perceptions; it measures everything by the mere functions of the subject, refers experience to the senses alone, does not even inquire as to the nature of the object, and doubts, if it does not deny, that there is any object at all other than the phaenomenal product of the subject itself. On the one hand there have been denials, and on the other hand abuses, of intellectual perception, intellectual intuition, perceptive understanding, and so forth, in the subjectivist school; but no subjectivist seeks in the nature of the object for the ground of primary distinctions in the knowledge-faculty. The objectivist, however, will seek for it nowhere else, and he will find it in the *Apriori* of Being, by which nothing exists or can exist save as a unit-universal, a unit in its kind and a universal in itself. This ontological difference of unit and universal grounds the epistemological difference between experience, or simple apprehension of units, and reason, or comprehension of universals; it is Kant's "unknown root" of the ultimate unity of the understanding and the sensibility, which to subjectivism must always remain unknown, but to objectivism is self-evident. From the standpoint of absolute logic, then, experience is simple, immediate, or unmediated *perception of the unit as unit*, whether this unit be an objective thing, an objective relation, an objective condition, or any *single* subjective fact of consciousness whatsoever.

But experience is sensation as well as perception — it is the identity in difference of both. Sensation is the purely subjective side of experience, and perception is its purely objective side; but neither side can actually exist in perfect purity, that is, without the other. These two elements of experience, however, are found in it in unequal proportions, and Sir William Hamilton's law is doubtless correct, that sensation and perception are in the inverse ratio — the

more sensation, the less perception, and the more perception, the less sensation; yet there is no sensation unless it is perceived and no perception unless it is felt. Both elements are equally primal; neither of them is a product or derivative of the other. Sensation both begins and ends in the subject; but perception, while it ends in the subject, begins in the object — that is, begins in the object's determinative influence over the form or relational content of empirical cognition. On no other terms than these is objective knowledge possible, whether as knowledge by a subject of an object other than itself (the It or Not-I) or knowledge by one subject of another subject as its own object (the Other-I). If these terms are denied, absolute solipsism is the only logical alternative — the Not-I, the Other-I, and the I itself as One of the We, become alike logically impossible. Hence even self-consciousness of the I as One of the We, without which the I necessarily lapses into Kant's "unknown x ," presupposes perception as originating in the relationally determinative influence of the object perceived on the perceiving subject. Aristotle holds no other opinion of perception or αἴσθησις.¹

We conclude, therefore, that immediate experience on its subjective side is identity in difference of sensation and perception, but on its objective side perception of units as units, that is, sensuous perception of single things, intellectual perception of single relations, and rational perception of single conditions. Because the object necessarily determines the subject in all knowing, the Trichotomy of Being necessarily determines the Trichotomy of Perception.

¹ οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος. ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χεὶρ ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὀργανὸν ἐστὶν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν. (Aristotle, Psychology, Book III. Chapter 8, § 2.) — αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἢ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου. ταῦτα δ' ἐν αὐτῇ πῶς ἐστὶ τῇ ψυχῇ . . . τὰ αἰσθητὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐξωθεν. (*Ibid.* II. Chap. 5, § 6.) What Aristotle does not clearly perceive is the necessary objectivity of relations. These are "somehow in the soul," yet also "somehow out of the soul," and their agreement is truth.

§ 245. The fundamental laws of epistemology, or absolute syllogistic as operative in Knowing, may be expressed somewhat as follows: —

I. Ideas evolve concepts, and concepts evolve percepts; therefore, ideas evolve percepts. This does not mean that ideas evolve sensations; for, as just explained, sensation and perception are equally primal elements in immediate experience. But it means that every new cognition, as conclusion in a new syllogism of knowing, and therefore as identity in difference of logically prior premises, derives its cognitive form from the subject and its intelligible content or relational constitution from the object — that is, inherits its ideal and conceptual essence from already gained concepts and ideas, but acquires its perceptual essence, its individual difference as *this particular perception*, through adaptation to the determining environment as *this particular object perceived*. For instance, I have a sudden visual sensation as I look out of my window, and gradually but rapidly perceive in the distance (1) a something, (2) a moving something, (3) a moving quadruped, (4) a running dog. My mere sensation tells me nothing beyond myself, but my immediate experience contains also a threefold perception of something related to something else in space and time, in this case perception of a dog moving in the landscape, just as soon as my previously formed concepts enable me to discover or determine in my own consciousness the real “what” of the object. Until that is determined, I have not perceived the dog. For I perceive an object so far only as I can perceive and think its “what,” and “what I see” must always depend upon “what I know” — a rule which explains why a botanist and a poet never see precisely the same flower. In other words, ideas evolve the *form* of new percepts as percept-concepts, concrete syllogisms, or cognitions, while the co-operant outer world evolves their *content* by determining their relational constitution in agreement with that of outer objects, so far as this is perceived: the *What in Being*, or immanent rela-

tional constitution of the object, must be itself the *What in Knowing*, or immanent relational constitution of the cognition of the object (*ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἰσότης ἐνότης*). This is the evolution of real cognition as identity in difference of heredity and adaptation, — that is, the “origin of knowledge” as determination of Knowing by Being in Learning.

II. Ideas involve concepts, and concepts involve percepts; therefore, ideas involve percepts. The only adequate concept would be cognition of the species in and with all its specimens, including and not excluding all their individual differences or peculiarities; that alone is the real species in Being, and that alone would be real cognition of it in adequate Knowing. But the quantity of perceptive and conceptive energy *in us* is insufficient to form an adequate concept of any species; every human concept must be concrete as identity in difference of experience and reason, but also imperfect or abstract as failing in adequacy to its object as real species (see § 65). Hence we are obliged to employ so-called “abstractions,” that is, imperfect concrete concepts, in all our thinking. But abstraction is always incomplete, and no abstraction can be independent of that from which it is abstracted; absolute abstraction of species from specimens or of concepts from percepts would reduce them to “pure universals” or “blank forms” or absolute zero, since units and universals condition each the possibility of the other. It is never possible to abstract the real common essence of any species so completely in a concept of it as wholly to exclude all the real individual differences of all its specimens, and this impossibility lies at the bottom of the old difficulty of “general terms,” as pressed so vigorously by Berkeley and the other conceptualists. Image and notion condition each other in thought as rigorously as sides and angles in a triangle. Hence every concept necessarily involves percepts, and every idea necessarily involves concepts: both concepts and ideas, in whatever degree of abstraction from immediate experience, rest ultimately on percepts, and

vanish into sheer nothingness when their involved percepts are absolutely suppressed. Herein lies the unreality of "pure thought," "pure reason," "pure knowledge *a priori*," and so forth, in every attempt to establish which the least analytic skill detects the elements drawn from the ostensibly excluded "experience." This necessary involution of percepts in all ideas is the impossibility of the separation of experience and reason — impossibility, therefore, of the Kantian epistemology and the Hegelian panlogism as *reines Denken*.

III. Ideas involve and evolve concepts, and concepts involve and evolve percepts; therefore, ideas involve and evolve percepts. This, stated in the most general terms, is the manner in which knowledge is acquired, the identity in difference of evolution and involution as knowing, the productive continuity of the intellectual life, the organic use of mind, the learning process, the scientific method. There is a complete and entire analogy between the growth of a living specimen or species in nature and the growth of human knowledge as a whole, whether in the individual mind or in the race as such. The scientific method, begun in common experience, developed in science, and perfected in philosophy, involves the immanent relational constitution of universal human knowledge as a self-developing system or real organism, whose germ is the realized identity in difference of experience and reason in the concrete syllogism, real cognition, or particular percept-concept of the particular unit-universal, — whose matter is the innumerable percept-concepts thence resulting, — whose life is the universal syllogistic process or scientific method itself, — whose form is the system of organic philosophy, — whose immanent end is the perfection of human knowledge, and whose exient end is the perfection of human life. Nothing but this conception of the organic development of our knowledge as the living process of a living form can explain the frequent simultaneity of discoveries of the same thing by diverse discoverers, in satisfaction of the organ-

ism's needs at a given period: they come because they were involved already in past discoveries as potential percepts in realized ideas, and now are evolved syllogistically as new realized percepts. For the scientific method of observation, hypothesis, and verification is itself an inductive syllogism. Observation is accurate determination in the observer's mind of the particular relations of facts as they exist in themselves (minor premise); hypothesis is his surmise of their universal relations, not as yet observed, but, as he reasons, logically implied or potential in the given facts (major premise); and verification is confirmation of this surmise of new universals through experiments so devised as to realize this logical potentiality in new facts newly observed (conclusion). This is induction, or verification of an uncertain major premise as the *probable condition* of a certain minor premise and a certain conclusion; and the possibility of induction as a valid process proves that the Syllogism of Knowing is grounded in the Syllogism of Being. For the principle of both induction and deduction is the same, that is, whatever is evolved as consequent must be involved as antecedent: deduction infers a necessary conclusion from given premises, while induction infers a probable major premise from a given minor premise and a given conclusion. The latter is verification — that is, satisfactory proof of the hypothesis, surmised beforehand by the scientific reason and imagination to be involved in the facts observed, and found afterwards by the "appeal to Nature" to be evolved in the new facts as determined by experiment. The scientific method is a working union of deduction and induction, and both of these are syllogisms of differing form and value — evolutions of percepts out of ideas and involutions of percepts in ideas. Science itself is syllogistic equation of immanent relational constitutions involved and understood in the unit-universals of existence, as antecedent, with that which is evolved and inferred in the percept-concepts of human intelligence, as consequent: reason thinks these constitu-

tions in the premises, and energy makes them in the conclusions. So comprehended, it is frivolous to consider the syllogism a mere *petitio principii*, for syllogizing is that change of potentiality (*δυνάμει*) into reality (*ἐνεργεία*) which is the life of the world as endless subsumption of units under universals in new units.

IV. Every real cognition must be identity in difference of percept, concept, and idea; it is related in itself as specimen, species, and genus, that is, as a concrete syllogism. Analysis of intelligence as the cognitive faculty in general (*Erkenntnisvermögen*) justifies distinction of it into three elementary but inseparable functions as perceptivity, understanding, and reason. We say perceptivity rather than sensibility, because immediate experience, as has been already shown, contains both sensation and perception as its ultimate factors, the former on its subjective or sensitive side and the latter on its objective or cognitive side, and because epistemology deals directly with the latter alone—the former belonging to psychology as one of the many sciences included under epistemology. The great fundamental principle of the necessary objectivity of relations, which distinguishes the objectivism of science from the subjectivism of the philosophy prevalent since Descartes, involves a vast enlargement of the notion of experience. Relations must cease to be regarded as exclusively the work of “pure synthesis *a priori*” or product of the pure “consciousness in general,” and take their proper place as the intelligible *Ansich*, the immanent necessity, unity, and universality of the “thing in itself” or only possible object of knowledge. Hence the perceptivity or cognitive principle of immediate experience must be correlated with this *Ansich* of the object in general, namely, the identity in difference of things, relations, and conditions (Trichotomy of Being), and be itself understood as the identity in difference of sensuous, intellectual, and rational intuition (Trichotomy of Perception). From this it follows that the notion of experience on its perceptive side must be expanded by

recognition of three mutually irreducible orders of real percepts: sensuous percepts of single things or related terms, intellectual percepts of single relations of single things, and rational percepts of single conditions of all related things. For no unit can be known as a unit unless it is perceived, and no unit-universal of existence, whether as genus, species, or specimen, can be known as such, unless it is known in its unity as well as in its universality — that is, unless it is apprehended sensuously, intellectually, and rationally in one indivisible percept, as well as comprehended rationally in one indivisible concept and one indivisible idea. Consequently, the syllogistic functional constitution of intelligence itself as perceptivity, conceptivity (or understanding), and ideality (or reason), necessitates the syllogistic constitution of every product of intelligence as identity in difference of percept, concept, and idea, that is, as a concrete syllogism of knowing, a real cognition.

V. The perceptivity is identity in difference of sensuous, intellectual, and rational intuition, that is, immediate apprehension of units of whatever kind as “somethings;” the understanding is identity in difference of perceptive, conceptive, and abstractive intellection of “relations;” the reason is identity in difference of perceptive, logical, and ethical comprehension of “conditions” and the unconditioned. These distinctions inevitably overlap to some extent; the intellectual perceptivity is identical with the perceptive understanding, and the rational perceptivity with the perceptive reason. But they are, nevertheless, indispensable, because they are grounded in those ontological differences which determine all valid epistemological distinctions. Just as absolute necessity, or the Apriori of Being, underlies logical necessity, or the Apriori of Thought, in the “must” or “cannot *be* otherwise” of the relation of equation between antecedent and consequent in every valid syllogism, and thereby stands as the last appeal of *Reason*: just so change of objective relations, or the Aposteriori of Being, underlies change of subjective

relations, or the Aposteriori of Thought, in the "may be otherwise" of the objective relations perceived, and thereby renders immediate perception itself, as sole reflector of changing facts, the last appeal of *Experience*. For instance, reason decides from what we have learned of the solar system that the sun must rise and set every day; but whether it is rising or setting now, on this particular day, can be decided by perception alone. But, just as things without relations, and relations without things, and either things or relations without conditions, are alike impossible in Being, so for that very reason are apprehension of things, intellection of relations, and comprehension of conditions, impossible in Knowing except as combined indissolubly in one realized cognition. For to apprehend "*a* thing," or to understand "*a* relation," or to comprehend "*a* condition," necessarily involves and connotes the universals in which these are units. Since the knowledge of relatives is only one knowledge, it follows that specimen and species on the one hand, and percept of the specimen and concept of the species, on the other hand, being related necessarily by the Apriori of Being, are for that reason related necessarily by the Apriori of Thought, and knowable only with and through each other.

It is this ultimate necessity which determines the function of the understanding to be at once perceptive of single or unitary relations and conceptive of specific and generic, that is, of universal relations, — cognitive at once of the "this" and the "what" in "this somewhat" (*τὸδε τι, hoc aliquid unum numero*), and therefore productive at once of individualization and of generalization in every real cognition of it. But, while every concept and every idea of the human intelligence must thus include both empirical and rational elements (*reines Denken* would be *kein Denken*), no such concept or idea can ever be adequate to its real object, which can be adequately known by the Absolute I alone (§ 65). Hence all our cognitions are necessarily abstractions, partly by reason of this necessary inadequacy and

partly by reason of the voluntary concentration of our attention on the likenesses of things in our inability to grasp all their differences; although in another sense they are necessarily concretions, since, as just remarked, every real cognition must contain both empirical and rational elements, and therefore be concrete as union of experience and reason. This necessarily abstract and imperfect nature of all our cognitions defeats the overweening claim of philosophy to be *absolute Wissen*; yet without the abstractive function of our understanding no human knowledge at all would be possible. Notwithstanding our unavoidable derivation of merely abstract, partial, and artificial universals from the real universals of existence, they are true as far as they go: demonstration remains demonstration, and verification remains verification, and "knowledge grows from more to more." We know because we generalize and abstract, but for the same reason we know only in part, and our knowledge itself, as identity in difference of experience and reason, must take the form of the concrete syllogism because this is the form of the total object known: namely, the world-process in the world-history as evolution through involution, self-evolution of Nature in Spirit as the Many in the One and self-involution of Spirit in Nature as the One in the Many, the eternal Syllogism of Being.

VI. Sense-perception and the perceptive understanding, dealing inseparably with the actual unit-universals of existence as the *Aposteriori* of Being, reproduce in human consciousness *that which is* as *that which is known*; but the perceptive reason, dealing with the absolute conditions of all unit-universals as the *Apriori* of Being, reproduces in us *that which cannot be otherwise* as *that which cannot be known otherwise*—whereby the *Apriori* of Being becomes itself known as determining the *Apriori* of Thought. That is, the first two functions of the perceptivity bring to pass cognition of the simply real, while the third brings to pass cognition of the necessary, the unconditioned, the condi-

tions of the real which themselves have no condition. These conditions, already named as Space, Time, Substance, Essence, Process, are neither things nor relations of things, and therefore objects neither of the sensuous nor of the intellectual perceptivity. Yet, since nothing can be known which is unperceived, they must be perceived immediately by the reason in a perceptive capacity which is adapted to the object itself, and as different from perception of things and perception of relations as things and relations are themselves different from their own *a priori* conditions. To go further into this recondite inquiry, profoundly important as it is, would be out of place in this connection; it must suffice to state the conclusion that the universal and absolute conditions of existence must be perceived by reason immediately, or else they cannot be known at all, since any attempt to prove them presupposes the syllogism, which itself presupposes these very conditions. Reason must directly perceive the necessary to be necessary, that is, perceive the "cannot be otherwise" without syllogistic proof, or else necessity and strict universality have no standing in human knowledge. But this is absurd.

VII. In its logical function, therefore, reason is immediate perception of the syllogistic *must* — immediate perception that whatever is evolved as consequent must be involved as antecedent, and that this "cannot be otherwise." This rational perception conditions all inference in the syllogism, and in itself constitutes the whole "force of demonstration" — to confound which with "compulsion," "coercion," "coerciveness," or any other use of the will as such, would betray a natural inaptitude for philosophy. That the bisectors of the three angles of any plane triangle must all intersect at one point is necessary, and seen to be necessary just as soon as the demonstration is comprehended; and this relational necessity, determined by the *Apriori* of Being, cannot be either created or destroyed, or altered, or weakened in any degree by any will, whether finite or infinite. "To feel the force of demonstration" is

only a bad description of the fact that the reasoning subject immediately *perceives and feels*, that is, *experiences*, the absolute necessity of it, coupled with the other fact that reason itself is a very feeble faculty in most human minds. The absolute necessity itself is a fact in Being, and inheres as the "cannot be otherwise" in the relation of every condition to its conditioned, whatever these may be: this relation itself is objectively real, product of no subject's "spontaneity," absolute, unconditioned, and it is the essential mark of the reason, or "faculty of the unconditioned," to experience it as a fact, not mediately by inference, but immediately by intuition. If the reason as such did not immediately perceive that the antecedent and consequent of every syllogism stand in this objectively real and absolutely necessary relation of condition and conditioned, reasoning itself would be impossible; there would be no linkage or coherence in the elements of the syllogism; nothing could ever be inferred. Further, the mark of a rational truth in distinction from an empirical truth, even in the common understanding of the distinction, is the necessity and strict universality of the relation which is the content of that truth. But the necessity of a relation cannot be itself a relation; it can only be the intrinsic quality of a relation which "cannot be otherwise," just as variableness is the mark or intrinsic quality of a relation which "may be otherwise." Now this necessity or non-necessity of a relation as such can be discerned neither by sense-perception nor by the merely perceptive understanding: the former perceives terms or units, and the latter perceives the relations of these terms as they are, but neither of the two perceives that these relations *can* or *cannot* be otherwise than they are. Hence the intelligence which perceives this must be a mode of perception different from either of the two functions noted: it must be rational perception. That is, the logical reason which perceives necessity in the syllogism is both apprehension and comprehension of the Apriori of Being, without which there

could be neither apprehension nor comprehension of the Apriori of Thought.

VIII. In its ethical or teleological function, reason still remains the "faculty of the unconditioned" — the faculty which not only perceives logical necessity as the syllogistic *must*, but also perceives ethical necessity as the syllogistic *ought*. For every duty or moral obligation is the syllogistically necessary subsumption of a particular act under a universal law, which derives its authority, not from the fiat of a sovereign will, not from the "categorical imperative" of a self-determining subject, whether individual or collective, and whether finite or infinite, but solely from the Apriori of Moral Being, that is, from the Apriori of Right, the "cannot be otherwise" of the Good. The ethical reason is immediate perception of the syllogistic *ought*, as the intrinsic necessity or essential quality of the relation which exists between the ideal and the deed, the ethical condition and the ethical conditioned, in every good action as such. The "good will" cannot evolve its own goodness solely out of itself; its goodness essentially consists in freely subsuming its own subjective activity, in general and in particular, under an objective moral law which it did not enact and can never repeal, and which, therefore, derives its obligatoriness or binding authority over the will solely from the immutable conditions of moral existence as such, that is, from the Apriori of Right. The "good will" is indeed "autonomous," but its autonomy is limited to free choice between the Good and the Bad, that is, the Not-Good, and does not extend so far as to eradicate or to weaken the eternal difference between them. Hence it is the function of reason in its capacity of ethical intuition, not to create, or to originate out of itself alone, or to legislate on its own authority alone, but to perceive immediately the ethical necessity of the Good as the supreme End of Being — that is, as identity in difference of Truth, Beauty, and Right. For Truth is the supreme rational good, Beauty the supreme aesthetic good, and Right the

supreme active good; and these are the triple end of Being as the Absolutely Good I, determined as such not by a mere act of will, but by the necessary nature of Being itself, as relational equation of potentiality and actuality, or ideality and reality, in the Syllogism of Being. For this is simply the indestructibility or necessary continuity of Being as Being, the eternity of the All as the All-Person or Absolutely Good I.

IX. But the ethical function of reason does not culminate with the immediate perception of necessity as the syllogistic *ought*, that is, of the Good as the End of Being or major premise in the Syllogism of Doing. Reason is not only perceptive of the ultimate unconditioned end of the I as the Good, but also creative of conditioned and subordinate ends as Means to the Good, that is, of *purposes* as middle terms or final causes in the Syllogism of Doing. In other words, reason is not only the perceptive "faculty of the unconditioned," but also the teleological faculty of moral freedom. The "freedom of the will," if by that phrase is understood indeterminism of the will, is a false issue in ethics; for will as will is an alogical or blindly executive energy which is impotent to determine itself, and derives its whole direction and form from the purposes with which creative reason informs it. Notwithstanding Schopenhauer, an alogical will can tend of itself alone in *no direction*. Not freedom of the will, but freedom of the I, is what ethics demands as the condition of moral action; and the freedom of the I lies in the creative, teleological, or ethical reason which informs the will, and which, as free purpose, mediates between the ideal and the deed. Every decision or choice of the I is a concrete syllogism of Doing, and its freedom lies in the ethical reason which (1) sets up an ideal or end, necessarily either in concord or in discord with the Good; (2) constructs or invents a free purpose as means to that end; and (3) realizes that end through that means in a new deed. This is the ethical syllogism, into each term of which both reason and will enter, the former

as determining, the latter as determined; it is the self-determination of the I as a free moral being, and it is the work of the ethical reason. In this fact lies the truth of the old definition, "Man is a rational animal." Feeling is indispensable to moral action, which without it would lapse into inaction; but wrong action at once emerges, when feeling refuses to subordinate itself to ethical reason and seizes the reins. In the present state of mankind, in the existing feebleness of reason as compared with feeling in the average man, the ethical syllogism too often becomes the ethical fallacy, that is, the wrong deed; but the progress of man as a "rational animal" consists in a slow but constant approximation towards the practical sovereignty of ethical reason over both feeling and will. The worst evils of the world result from error, or logical fallacy, and wrong, or logico-ethical fallacy, through distortion of reason by feeling as selfishness.¹

§ 246. The fundamental truth of Ethics lies in the principle of the strictly logical Realization of the Ideal. This is the principle that, while the object determines the subject in Knowing (Idealization of the Real), the subject determines the object in Doing, that is, alters its form or changes its relations, in order to realize in it some purpose and ideal of its own, or to make it a means to some remoter end. The subject and the environment (including all other subjects) stand in the relation of action and reaction under the universal laws of energy. The action of the environment on the subject in Knowing is necessary, since the object (if known at all, and just so far as it is known) must be known as it is in itself and cannot be known as it is not in itself: the relations immanent in the environment as object must *impress* the perceptivity of the subject, or else all knowledge of the environment (including all other sub-

¹ "Der Entstehungsgrund alles Irrthums wird daher einzig und allein in dem *unvermerkten Einflusse der Sinnlichkeit auf den Verstand*, oder genauer zu reden, auf das *Urtheil*, gesucht werden müssen." (Kant, Logik, Werke, VIII. 54.)

jects) is a metaphysical and logical impossibility. The reaction of the subject on the environment in Doing, however, just so far as it is conscious (all Doing as such must be understood as conscious action or praxis in the ethical sense), is free: the relations immanent in the deed, which makes some change in the environment as object and enters into it thenceforward as a causal part of it, must *express* the creative, teleological, or ethical reason of the subject, because they must vary according to the limitless variety of the purposes which the reason freely creates and which the will blindly executes.

As epistemology is thus the science of *necessary impression* of the subject by the object in all Knowing, so ethics is the science of *free expression* of the subject in the object in all Doing: there is no freedom in Knowing as Knowing, and there is nothing but freedom in Doing as Doing. Hence there are neither "motives" nor "motion" in moral action — no causes but final causes. I am the absolute and ultimate originator of my own purposes; if any other power in the universe could make them for me, they would simply not be mine; either I create them freely and absolutely for myself, or else I have none at all. Freedom is the absolute condition of ethics, and I know it, not because I am immediately and personally conscious of it (which might conceivably be an illusion), but because without it there could be neither right nor wrong; which would be the *reductio ad absurdum* of all human consciousness and human history and human life. Freedom lies in the making of the purpose which mediates between the ideal and the deed, for it is the free purpose, that is, *the free subject purposing*, which chooses the ideal and determines the deed, as good or bad on their subjective side; while necessity lies in the working of the deed as a cause in the environment and its effect on human society, as good or bad on its objective side. Hence a given action is subjectively right or wrong according to the purpose or intention of the actor, but objectively right or wrong according to the effect it works as a cause

on the welfare of others. The importance of recognizing this double standard of ethical judgment is apparent: the actor is right if his purpose is right according to his knowledge, but his action is wrong if it militates in fact against the rights of others, as in the case of Torquemada and the Spanish Inquisition. For the principle of freedom in all moral action logically involves the equality of all moral actors with respect to freedom, that is, the equality of all men in their fundamental rights and duties. The supreme precept of ethical wisdom, therefore, addressed equally to nations and to men, will be substantially as follows: "*Be just!* Maintain your own freedom without encroaching on the equal freedom of any other, and devote it to promoting justice as the moral equilibrium of the world." For universal observance of justice is the condition of the world's maximum welfare: it is at once the law of self-preservation, non-aggression, and service, — egoism and altruism in one; and universal observance of it would be universal happiness as the result, so far as this depends on human action. No truer word was ever said than that of Ralph Waldo Emerson: "justice satisfies everybody, and justice alone."

Mere happiness as such, whether as "my own happiness," "the happiness of the greatest number," or the "maximum happiness of all," though it is undoubtedly an object of legitimate and universal desire, is not and cannot be an ethical end in itself. For every end as such is *something to be done* — certain freely preconceived relations to be made real in a deed which as yet are only potential in a purpose; and every ethical end is something to be done which shall realize right relations in a right deed. But happiness is simply a state of feeling, not a mode of action; it is largely independent alike of the reason and of the will; it is neither a necessary consequence nor an invariable accompaniment nor an inseparable element of Right Doing, and for that reason cannot be considered as an ethical end in itself without complete subversion of ethics as a science. Herein lies the failure of eudaemonism, hedonism, and utili-

tarianism in all their forms, as ethical theories which find the supreme good in happiness and the criterion of good in conduciveness to happiness; for they omit all recognition of *Right*, or the objective moral law of *Doing as Duty*. But, in accordance with the double standard of ethical judgment just mentioned, the supreme good is identity in difference of subjective right and objective right as Right Doing: that is, (1) as right ideal or principle of universal justice, necessarily determined by the Apriori of Right, but intuited and freely posited by the ethical reason in the objective major premise; (2) as right purpose, or free formation by the ethical reason of particular means to this universal end in the subjective minor premise; and (3) as right deed, or identity in difference of universal end and particular means wrought by the merely executive will in the subjective-objective conclusion. This is the ethical syllogism, the identity in difference of absolute necessity and moral freedom in the ethical process; and its product is Honor as Character, that is, the fixation of necessary principles as the ground of conduct and the resultant habitude of free acts as voluntary but instantaneous obedience to principle. Nothing short of this syllogistic conception of ethical process will suffice to give an adequate foundation to ethics as the science of character and conduct (*ἡθικα, mores*).

On quite another side lies the failure of transcendentalism, sentimentalism, emotionalism, intuitionism, or intuitive morals in general. These all correctly affirm the necessary or absolute nature of Right; they correctly affirm the perceptive or intuitive function of reason in the comprehension of it; but they erroneously deny the necessity of the logical reason as complementary to the ethical reason in that comprehension as final action. Fear or jealousy or contempt of logic as the "reflective understanding" is the hall-mark of what commonly passes as ethical idealism, but what ought rather to be characterized as ignominious defeat of the intellect in ethics. There is

but one process in Being, Knowing, and Doing, and that process is Syllogistic. Virtue is the ethical syllogism, and sin is the ethical fallacy: the deed which is both subjectively and objectively right is everywhere and always the rigorously logical inference from a right ideal through a right purpose. The "prudence" or "practical wisdom" or "statesmanship" which seeks a short cut to happiness or a royal road to virtue through compromise with wrong is beyond the pale of ethics; and the intuition of *Right* in the major premise, if not followed by the uncompromising and effective purpose in the minor premise *to Do that Right*, ends as a miserable *non sequitur* in the conclusion — ends as the *Right Undone*. This Syllogism of Right Doing as the very soul of ethics is just what eudaemonism and utilitarianism, on the one hand, and transcendentalism, intuitionism, and ethical idealism, on the other hand, always have failed to understand; and the failure is fatal to ethics, whether as the science or as the art of spiritual life. There will be no scientific ethics until it is grounded in Ethical Syllogistic, and then these tedious disputes between utilitarianism and intuitionism, each as false as the other, will be hushed. Certainly no other principle will justify to the scientific understanding a Delphic oracle of Emerson which is as scientifically true as it is ethically sublime: "The moral law lies at the centre of Nature, and radiates to the circumference."

Ethical systems hitherto have all been forms of ethical individualism. They have culminated in the ideal of the ethical individual, as the "superior man" of Confucianism, the "enlightened man" of Buddhism, the "sage" of Stoicism, the "saint" of Christianity, the "good will" of Kant, and so forth, or else in the ideal of the "universal individual" according to the Hegelian Paradox that "*Ich, das Wir, und Wir das Ich ist*" (see Chapter XI). This latter tenet renders Hegel's own distinction between *Moralität*, or ethicality of the I, and *Sittlichkeit*, or ethicality of the We, a misleading subtilty, a distinction without a dif-

ference. Hegel's We is not a universal at all, except in the sense of Aristotle's τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν; it denotes no real plurality of Many I's in One We, except in the sense of Aristotle's ὁμοία καὶ ἀδιάφορα, with an empty numerical difference in each as a pure unit, τὸ ἀριθμῶν ἓν, but with no individual or personal difference, no *character*. Such a universal as this recognizes, indeed, the real common or specific essence of all men, which is the true ground of their fundamental equality in respect to universal human rights and duties; but it totally suppresses all their real reific essence as specimens, that is, all those personal differences of constitution, character, and circumstance on which all particular rights and duties in the varying ethical situations of human life depend. The consequence is to wipe out all ground of valid distinction between *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit*, and to reduce the "universal individual" to a fleshless skeleton, an unreality, a mere abstraction, — in fact, to abolish real ethics as the law of real life.

But syllogistic ethics, grounded as it is in the law of unit-universals, requires recognition of the profound difference between the I, or *real person*, and the We, not as the abstract "universal individual," but as the *real organism of real persons*, in the various forms of the family, the corporation ("artificial person" or *corpus incorporatum* of the common law), the church, the state, the nation, or society in general. Ethics deals with realities, not abstractions, and all ethical relations are social relations, even to the extent of duplicating self as at once culprit and judge in the court of conscience — "*I judge myself*."

Without the generic unity of apperception (§ 59), justice could not be known; for justice is equity, and equity is equality, and equality is the ethical equation of the I and the Other-I, the We and the Other-We, and no less the I and the We themselves when these meet in reciprocal activity, for instance, as citizen and community, in the sphere of Doing. For each member in the ethical equation owes justice to the other member, and justice is the identity in

difference of egoism and altruism, or self-preservation, non-aggression, and service, in the specific equilibrium of fundamental human rights and duties. In other words, all the infinitely complicated relations of men to men as individuals, of men to nations and nations to men, or of nations to nations, ought, by the Apriori of Right as the necessary condition of civilization and all true progress in civilization, to be adjusted in free conformity to the ethical equation of justice. That is, morality as universal justice in all personal and social Doing is the absolute condition and sole ultimate test of civilization: all things else, all triumphs of industry, trade, commerce, machinery, politics, diplomacy, arts useful and arts ornamental, elegant letters, learning, science, philosophy, religion itself, — all these go for nothing if this condition fails. Peoples may perish through the injustice of other peoples, but they must perish through their own: moralization is the health and corruption is the suicide of civilization. There is but one law of life for man, whether as a person or as a people, and that is the law of equal freedom devoted to equal justice. For justice covers all that is due, all duty, and the only measure of this is equality and reciprocity. Hence ethics divides itself into two great branches, the personal ethics of the I, and the social ethics of the We, although neither can be treated without the other; for the I is the person and the We is the organism of persons, and Doing, under the one law of Right as Justice, must necessarily be more or less affected by the great difference between individual and collective action. This difference cannot be unfolded here. Nevertheless, it remains true that all Doing, whether individual or collective, must still be subsumption of purposes under ideals in deeds, and thus exhibit everywhere and always the necessary constitution of the syllogism; and that the science of politics, as the Doing of Peoples, is not co-ordinate with, but strictly subordinate to and included by, the science of ethics as the Doing of Persons. Only when philosophy subsumes the Course of Mind under the

Course of Spirit in the Course of Nature, as the Syllogism of Doing in the Absolute I, will the ground of that other deep truth of Emerson, saying more perhaps than he consciously meant, be laid bare in all its profundity: "Men reason badly, but Nature and Destiny are logical."

§ 247. The fundamental laws of ethics, or absolute syllogistic as operative in Doing, may be summed up somewhat as follows:—

I. Ideals evolve purposes, and purposes evolve deeds; therefore, ideals evolve deeds. This by no means signifies or implies that every ideal is good. It signifies, however, that the subjective goodness or badness of a purpose is necessarily determined by the objective goodness or badness of the ideal to which the purpose itself is freely conformed, and that the subjective goodness or badness of the deed is necessarily determined by that of the purpose of which it is the execution. This is the element of necessity in moral action. In the sphere of Being as Being, the relations of one and many, unit and universal, identity and difference, likeness and unlikeness, and so forth, are necessary and ultimate; they belong to the "cannot be otherwise" of the syllogism as real form; they constitute unconditioned conditions of existence, the Apriori of Being as Being. In the sphere of Being as Knowing, the equally necessary relation of true and untrue, or false, that is, of agreement or non-agreement between the immanent syllogistic constitutions of the real unit-universal and the percept-concept of it, is the unconditioned condition of knowledge or ignorance; it belongs to the "cannot be otherwise" of the syllogism as logical form; it constitutes the Apriori of Being as the Apriori of Truth. So, in the sphere of Being as Doing, the equally necessary relation of good and not-good, or bad, that is, of agreement or non-agreement between the deed and the objectively right ideal, is the unconditioned condition of righteousness or unrighteousness; it belongs to the "cannot be otherwise" of the syllogism as ethical form; it constitutes the Apriori

of Being as the *Apriori* of Right. Determination of every ideal as objectively good or not-good by the *Apriori* of Right — the determination of every deed as subjectively good or not-good by the purpose which it executes: these determinations, wholly independent of the freedom of the subject, are elements of necessity in every moral act, and characterize it in its evolutionary aspect.

II. Ideals involve purposes, and purposes involve deeds; therefore, ideals involve deeds. Into every element of the ethical syllogism, the will, as determined or formed energy, and the ethical reason, as informer or immanent determining former of it, enter indissolubly. It is the I as this inseparable reason-energy which chooses the ideal as its own end, constructs the purpose as its own subordinate end or means, and executes both ends in its own deed. In the pure ethical syllogism, the ground of choice of the ideal is simply the rational perception of the ethical necessity of Right as Justice or the Ought, that is, the rational perception of Objective Moral Obligation, the Objective Moral Law of Equal Freedom as the absolute condition or *Apriori* of Moral Being in the We.

In the ethical fallacy or wrong act, the ground of choice of the ideal is some form of feeling instead of a pure perception of objective ethical necessity by the reason, some selfish desire which finds its end in the pleasant, or the profitable, or the advantageous, or the popular, some lust of lawless power or wealth or station, or something other than the Right as the sole legitimate and ultimate end of Doing; and this falsification of the ideal as major premise of the ethical syllogism falsifies the deed as its conclusion. Or, if the ideal remains (apparently) unfalsified, the purpose may be falsified as a wrong means to a right end ("the end justifies the means,") and this is a falsification of the minor premise; in which case the deed, as ostensibly realization of the right major end but actually of the wrong minor end, becomes a self-contradiction as hypocrisy, a bewilderment to the simple and a scandal to the wise, as

pretence of a major premise which is abandoned in the conclusion, an unscrupulous doing of real evil that pretended good may come.¹ The world is full of such deeds as these, true inferences from false principles or false inferences from

¹ An opportune illustration of this fallacy occurs in a daily journal with reference to a prominent English statesman, reporting his position without the least perception of its logical and ethical self-contradiction: "He declares himself a free trader in principle, but he approves of a departure from the free-trade policy of the empire as a measure of self-protection imposed by the circumstances in which Great Britain is at the present time placed." This is the logic of the highwayman, who approves of the sacredness of human life in principle, but shoots this particular traveller, as a measure of self-protection against his own impecunious circumstances by appropriating the traveller's purse. It was the logic of a late President of the United States, who conceded that "forcible annexation" is "criminal aggression" in principle, but forcibly annexed the Philippine Islands as a measure of "benevolent assimilation," imposed upon the United States by a benevolent regard for its own interests and a benevolent disregard of the rights of the Filipino people. This, however, is the logic of ethical barbarism, which will pass for "statesmanship" until the world is civilised by Ethical Syllogistic. It is succinctly formulated in the words of Medea — *video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*. But it is put to shame in David Atwood Wasson's "Ideals":—

Angels of Growth, of old in that surprise

Of your first vision, wild and sweet,

I poured in passionate sighs

My wish unwise

That ye descend my heart to meet, —

My heart so slow to rise !

Now thus I pray : Angelic be to hold

In heaven your shining poise afar,

And to my wishes bold

Reply with cold

Sweet invitation, like a star

Fixed in the heavens old.

Did ye descend, what were ye more than I ?

Is't not by this ye are divine,

That, native to the sky,

Ye cannot hie

Downward, and give low hearts the wine

That should reward the high ?

true principles, works of the trimmer, the compromiser, the timeserver, the usurper of what belongs to others. "Men reason badly, but Nature and Destiny are logical." But there are better reasoners among men than the trimmers, and the best of all reasoners is the man who involves in his own deeds the unerring logic of Nature and of Destiny — the man who at all costs freely involves the Right in every ideal, every purpose, every deed of his own. For these free self-determinations, independent of all the necessities of Being, are the elements of freedom in every moral act, whether as right or wrong, and characterize it in its involutory aspect.

III. Ideals involve and evolve purposes, and purposes involve and evolve deeds; therefore, ideals involve and evolve deeds. That is, whatever is evolved as consequent must be involved as antecedent. This principle of absolute logic determines the cosmical process or course of nature as the Syllogism of Being, the cognitive process or course of mind as the Syllogism of Knowing, and the ethical process or course of spirit as the Syllogism of Doing; and, though the first of these three is the "earlier for us," or *πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς*, the last of the three is the "earlier in itself," or *πρότερον τῇ φύσει*. Logically considered, the theory of evolution without involution by pure causal necessity, as a slow instead of a quick creation of relational constitutions or real living forms in space and time *out of no prior forms at all*, is the logically self-annihilating theory of a consequent which has no antecedent. But evolution through involution is the very essence of logic itself in the necessary constitution of the syllogism, as the passage from potential form in the antecedent to real form in the consequent through the identity in difference of necessity and freedom — necessity as causal energy or will, and freedom as teleological reason or thought. Only the combination of causality and teleology in the syllogistic ethical process can possibly explain either the life of Man or the life of Nature, and he risks little who

predicts that the fashionable mechanical evolutionism of Spencer and Haeckel will be speedily outgrown. It is the I alone that involves, and it is the I alone that evolves: cosmical process, cognitive process, ethical process, each a form of Syllogistic or Absolute Logic, are all one and the same in the Absolute I. For the ethical process unites in itself both necessity and freedom, and is identity in difference of evolution and involution as Being through Knowing in Right Doing.

IV. *Knowing is necessary idealization of the real, and Doing is free realization of the ideal.* Identity in difference of these two as the ethical syllogism is the self-perpetuating process of the ethical life, the continuity of Being as the ethical or good I. In other words, the ethical I (1) necessarily idealizes its own present reality by simply perceiving it at once as it *is* and as it *ought to be*, both as facts of the present, and thereby knows itself to be a moral being under moral law; (2) subsumes this *is* under this *ought to be* by freely forming some good purpose to evolve the ideal, change the reality, and realize this *ought to be* in a new *is*; and (3) effectuates this purpose in a good action as the new *is* or new reality of the ethical I itself. But duty never ends; the right is always to be done; the *ought to be* is inexhaustible; the perfect ideal is unattainable; in short, the ethical necessity of idealizing the new reality which is the conclusion of every ethical syllogism remains as absolute as before. Hence the ethical syllogism instantly repeats itself in another, and this in another still, and so on with no limit; the ethical syllogism necessarily develops itself into the ethical sorites. The syllogistic ethical process in the I, therefore, shows itself to be interminable from within, and terminable, if terminable at all, only from without. It is the Course of Spirit, the law and the fact of all spiritual life as the Syllogism of Doing.

V. The syllogistic ethical process, being thus self-perpetuating or interminable from within the I, and terminable,

if terminable at all, only from without the I, that is, only from the environment or Not-I (including all Other-I's, finite or infinite), whenever this process once begins in space and time, constitutes the moral consciousness, the conscious self-affirmation of spirit as spirit, the essential humanity of man, both as the I and as the We. Not until the vague stirrings of self-consciousness in the nascent being take the definite form of the ethical syllogism, — not until the dim distinction of the I and the Other-I (see Chapters IV and V) deepens into the perception of the necessity of the ethical equation between them as reciprocity of rights and duties in the We, — that is, not until the ever-present difference in the I itself between the *is* and the *ought to be* is perceived by the ethical reason as necessary moral obligation to bring the former into conformity with the latter, can the young I become conscious of itself as a moral being under moral law. The beginning of that consciousness is the birth of the human spirit in space and time, through the development of the generic unity of apperception into the ethical unity of apperception in the ethical reason. For the birth of reason, at once perceptive, logical, and ethical, is itself the birth of the spiritual consciousness in the ethical syllogism: (1) perception of the objective necessity of the Good as the Obligatory Better which is the immanent, involved, and ever-growing ideal in the present reality of the I, or self-consciousness as a moral being under moral law; (2) response to the perceived present obligation as free formation of the purpose as a means to evolve this Better out of the present reality — formation of a good purpose being the subjective Good and malformation or non-formation of it the subjective Bad; and (3) realization of the ideal or *ought to be* in the deed or new *is* as necessary execution of the free purpose — every failure of a purpose being always either a free change of it from within or an unfree frustration of it from without. This is the essential form of the reason-energy of the I as the syllogistic spiritual consciousness, and the

birth of the individual spirit in space and time is formation, however rudimentary, of its first ethical syllogism. But, although neither memory nor observation can detect the precise moment of its birth, the actual beginning of the ethical process in the I, as the syllogistic subsumption of free purpose under necessary ethical law in the ethical deed, is the I's quickening or coming to self-consciousness as a real person, and reveals to the I itself for the first time, though not the logical character, yet the vital form and method of its own real personality as a spiritual I in a spiritual We. Discovery of the logical character of that form and method belongs later to philosophy alone.

VI. Just as the origin of the ethical I or normally real person can be found only in the syllogistic ethical process, so the only rational anticipation of its destiny must be drawn from the same source. It is absolutely right for the physicist, the chemist, the anatomist, the physiologist, the biologist, the psychologist as such, to exclude the inquiry into the permanence of personality after death from the circle of their proper problems, and to resent it as an irrelevancy; their sciences furnish no premises from which conclusions on that subject, whether affirmative or negative, can be drawn. The question belongs logically to ethics alone. It is a question solely of the *continuance or non-continuance* of the syllogistic ethical process as the law of spiritual life, the essence of real personality; and this is an ethical question, admitting only of an ethical answer. That is, the question of fact, "*Does* the I as real ethical person survive the event of death as still real ethical person?" could only be answered by experience of that fact, and experience of it, notwithstanding many confident claims, seems to be totally lacking. Knowledge is the identity in difference of experience and reason, and, however absolute may be the reasons for affirming the fact in question, we cannot know it until we have experienced it, either in others or in ourselves. But the case is different with the ethical question, "*Ought* the I as real ethical

person to survive the event of death as still real ethical person?" If we understand our own inner life, we know that, so long as we are sane and awake, we can neither act, speak, nor think without a purpose as means to some end — that purpose-making and purpose-executing is the whole of our conscious activity — that even the changing of a purpose is itself an act as the making of a different purpose — and that every act is of necessity the realizing of some end through some purpose as minor end or means. But all this swift and constantly varying purposive activity, however complicated or disguised, goes on according to the unvarying law of the syllogistic ethical process, that is, the self-perpetuation of real ethical personality. If all our purposes were absolutely good, we ourselves should be absolutely good; if they were all absolutely bad, we ourselves should be absolutely bad — that is, we should absolutely cease to be ethical persons, and annihilate ourselves as such through fatal abuse of our own freedom and total defeat of the conditions of our own existence. As matter of fact, we are neither one nor the other, neither absolutely good nor absolutely bad; the best of us is not perfect, and the worst of us is not all evil; nay, the worst of us makes vastly more good than bad purposes, and the belief in "honor among thieves" is no superstition. Hence the free self-perpetuation of our ethical personality means the perpetuation of more good than evil; and even on this view of the case the ethical question, "*Ought* the I to survive death as real ethical person?" must be affirmatively answered on ethical grounds. But the case is stronger than that. If all human beings as ethical persons cease to exist as such at death, and if the whole human race itself perishes totally in the final exhaustion or destruction of the globe as its habitat, then all the ethical good achieved in the rise of civilization and the moral education of mankind will perish with them, and "leave not a wrack behind." So understood, the ethical question whether the good I and the good We ought to survive the event of death becomes the broader question

whether the Good itself ought to be perpetual. To this ethical question what is the ethical answer?

VII. Ought the Good as Good to be perpetual? And how can it be perpetual?

The real and unreal, or existence and non-existence, in Being — the true and not-true or false, in Knowing — the right and not-right or wrong, the good and not-good or bad, in Doing: these are absolute categories and primordial distinctions in the nature of things, and cannot be explained by other categories or distinctions because they are necessarily presupposed by all these others. In Doing, the right as the just is the only ethical good, because it is the necessary and only end of ethical action. Happiness and love are goods of feeling, but not ethical goods, because they cannot be made the ends of direct action, and because they result from conditions which are mostly independent of direct action — can be reached only indirectly by actions which must themselves be judged ethically as right or wrong, just or unjust; whence it follows that happiness and love, if results of wrong action (as they too often are), become themselves wrong by reflection of that wrong. It is folly to suppose the good must needs be happy or the wicked unhappy: it is not so. We cannot even say that the good ought to be happy, for the ought is fulfilled in being good, be the consequence what it may. The only ethical good is the Right as Justice. On its subjective side, justice is the *Self-Sovereignty of the I as I and of the We as We* — that is, self-preservation of our own being and self-respect through self-defence of our freedom against all aggression, self-restraint or non-aggression on the equal freedom of all others, and self-devotion or due yet free service of all others as equal brothers in the great human family. On its objective side, justice is the state of recognized and actualized equality of all I's in the We as free moral beings under the Apriori of Right as objective moral law — the moral equilibrium of the universe. The Good as Good, therefore, is (1) the moral law or the

Apriori of Right, which is real only as moral obligation or the unconditioned condition of either Right or Wrong Doing, and (2) Right Doing itself, which is real only as it is realized in the right doings of the ethical I in the We. In the first aspect, the Good is necessarily perpetual as the Apriori of Right, but it would be unreal in itself alone, as the blank condition which can be filled or realized only by the conditioned. In the second aspect, the Good can be perpetuated as Right Doing only in the perpetuity of the right-doer, that is, the ethical I in the We. The Good as Good ought to be both real and perpetual because it is itself the Ought; but it cannot be real at all except as Right Doing, and it cannot be perpetual as Right Doing unless the right-doer is perpetual. It follows that the ethical I, which is the only possible right-doer, *ought* to be perpetual in a continuous life to which death, so called, is a mere incident or momentary phase. In other words, the syllogistic ethical process, which is Right Doing, and which is self-perpetuating or interminable from within the ethical I as right-doer, *ought not* to be terminated from without the right-doer by the environment.

But this raises a new and still deeper question. By what right is an ethical relation of *ought* or *ought not* to be affirmed between the ethical I, as human person subject to death, and the cosmical environment? By what right can the universe be held *to owe* to any of its own products the continuance of its life beyond the grave in any form? What is the ethical ground of this seemingly presumptuous "*ought not*"?

VIII. If there is any truth in this Syllogistic Philosophy, it has been proved that Reality, or Being as the One in Existence as the Many, is the identity in difference of substance, essence, and process; that substance is Energy or the world-will as universal causality, essence is Reason or the world-intellect as universal teleology, and process is Syllogistic or identity in difference of Energy and Reason as evolution through involution; that the immanent re-

lational constitution of such a world is that of free self-determination under the necessary Apriori of Being, as identity in difference of the conditioned and the unconditioned; and that a world so constituted must be a world of Being through Knowing in Doing — in other words, Absolute I or Ethical All-Person. This, then, is the "environment" of the human I as ethical person; and the relation between the two must be that of ethical person to Ethical All-Person. It is of necessity the absolute relation of Right — of Justice — of Honor — of the *ought* and the *ought not*.

For the history of the universe is the dimly yet certainly discerned syllogistic ethical process — evolution of the spiritual out of the natural through prior involution of the spiritual into the natural — Being through Knowing in Doing — course of Spirit through course of Mind in course of Nature. Just as soon as the finite ethical person (it matters not when nor where nor how) begins to exist as a conscious unit of subjective freedom under the objective necessity of moral obligation, then begins the self-perpetuating ethical process which cannot be stopped from within and ought not to be stopped from without. If it be argued that no self-perpetuating process can possibly begin, because "to begin implies to end," the reply comes at once that division of 1 by 3, as a mathematical process, begins and yet perpetuates itself in the circulating decimal $0.33333 + ad\ infinitum$; for the mind can find no possible end of the process except by ceasing to pursue it and leaving it unfinished, that is, by recognizing its necessary and eternal self-perpetuation. However halting, wayward, and zigzag may be the course of its development in us, the never-ceasing purposive activity of the I is instantly subsumed under the never-changing moral law as the right deed or the wrong deed, and instantly judged on its subjective side by the doer himself in the court of conscience; and, even in bad cases, the net outcome of it on its objective side is usually more of good than of bad. The very essence of

the ethical process, whether in the finite or in the infinite, is to realize and perpetuate the Good; and whatever does that *deserves* to be itself perpetuated — in other words, *ought* by the Apriori of Right to be perpetual. From these considerations it plainly follows that the “environment” of the human ethical person, being itself the Ethical All-Person, *ought not* to stop the human ethical process which, even on an infinitesimal scale, is doing its own infinite work of realizing and perpetuating the Good.

IX. The answer which ethics gives to the question of immortality, therefore, is that the permanence of the personal I after death cannot be known empirically until it is actually experienced, but that it is already known rationally as an ethical and so far a logical necessity. From the ground-principles of absolute logic and the Syllogistic Philosophy it is a necessary inference that the syllogistic ethical process in the I as such (realization of the ideal through the purpose in the deed) is itself the principle of eternal life, and establishes between the human I and the Absolute I a moral relation of identity in difference so profound, a community of moral nature so absolute and so real, that reason cannot deny the moral relationship without denying its own fundamental law of the syllogism itself. The Apriori of Right, which is the element of necessity in the syllogistic ethical process, can be realized only in the Righteous I, that is, the I which freely subsumes under it all its own purposive activity in its own righteous acts; and this holds good of every I, human or absolute. In other words, the ethical relation between the human I and the Absolute I must be determined by the same law of Right, or Justice, or Honor, which determines the ethical relation of I to I in the human world. As we have seen, the ethical process in the I is self-perpetuating or interminable from within, and can be terminated only from without. If one human I takes merely the physical life of another human I without just reason, we call it murder, although the deed cannot reach the self-perpetuating process which perpetuates

the Good. If, however, the Absolute I should take without just reason both the physical and the spiritual life of a righteous human I, and thereby stop the self-perpetuating process which, however imperfectly, was yet perpetuating the Good, could we characterize the deed by any name less stern? Why do we shrink from the bare suggestion, if not because we know that the Absolute I must be the Absolutely Righteous I? We need the courage of logic, if we would judge righteous or reasonable judgment in ethics. We need to know that the relation of every I to every other I, even though it be that of creature and Creator, must be determined by the absolute and changeless law of justice and honor, and that it would be injustice, dishonor, outrage, to stop in any I the ethical process which was perpetuating the Good. Such a process *ought* to be perpetuated, and *ought not* to be terminated. In other words, the ethical necessity of the continuation of it beyond what we call death is so clear, and so overwhelming on rigorously rational grounds, that, if ethical necessity be a good ground of belief in the absence of all experience of the fact, no belief is better grounded in reason alone than the belief in personal immortality. For myself, I believe in it because the Absolute I is necessarily the absolute realization of righteousness, justice, and honor, — incapable, therefore, of the unethical act of defeating the Good by failing to perpetuate the ethical I that is freely perpetuating that Good, or by disregarding the right of the least of its servants to persevere in a faithful service of it. I believe in it because the "Oversoul" is the only absolute realization of the Apriori of Right in the Absolute Right-Doer, and therefore incapable of dishonor or meanness towards the finite yet faithful right-doers, imperfect as they are, whose life-principle, like his own, is free service of the necessary Right. Tersely put, I believe in personal immortality because (I say it with all reverence) I believe that God is the only perfect gentleman.

X. It remains to show briefly here how the principles of

the syllogistic ethics bear on the problem of evil. It has been shown that happiness and love, supremely desirable as they are for their own sake, are goods of feeling, but are not and cannot be ethical ends because they cannot be directly effected by Doing. They cannot be made to order. If, as is too commonly the case, they are put in the place of ultimate ends of action, they are not thereby made ethical ends, but often defeat the one ethical end of the Good as Right or Justice, and often effect the Bad as Wrong or Injustice. The maximum of happiness and love that is possible for man, whether as the I or as the We, depends on justice as their condition; they spring up like the grass in its sunshine, and wilt in its absence; they are poisonous weeds without it. In spite of inevitable natural calamities, such as sickness or the death of friends, universal and perfect justice would make a comparative heaven of this world, while nothing but misery comes in the end from injustice. On the other hand, unhappiness and hate, abhorrent as they are in themselves, are evils of feeling, but not even negative ethical ends, because they cannot be directly removed by Doing. No effort can directly produce happiness or love, and no effort can directly banish unhappiness or hate; but the world of direct effort is the world of ethics. Hence the only ethical good is Right Doing, the only ethical evil is Wrong Doing; and freedom, or the free self-determination of the I to either alternative, lies in the reason, which, while perceiving the ethical necessity of the Right as the Just, frames the just or the unjust purpose that determines the blindly executive will in the just or unjust deed, and which thus takes the form of the ethical syllogism or the ethical fallacy. That is, moral freedom lies in the framing of the purpose, as either in concord with the perceived necessity of the Just or in concord with some other end selfishly substituted for it; and moral evil lies in this selfish substitution, which is negation of the perceived necessity of the Just and is realized in the framing of the unjust purpose and its execution in the unjust deed. In

this free negation or rejection of the Right as realized in the unjust purpose and deed consists the essence of subjective moral evil as the Not-Right or Wrong; while objective moral evil as injury to others enters into the causal series of the world as a part of it. Human injustice and injury, as moral evil, are the cause of nine-tenths of human suffering.

But there is another tenth, the so-called natural or physical evils of death, disease, pain, famine, pestilence, earthquakes, and so forth. Are these, with all the suffering entailed by them on the animal as well as the human world, to be referred to the Absolute I as its own moral evil, originating as injustice and injury in the Divine Purpose? Such a notion is irrational. Moral evils are wrongs, because they are purposed, not necessary, acts of freedom; natural evils are not wrongs, because they are not purposed acts of freedom, but necessities by the Apriori of Being, unavoidable results of the conditions of Existence, inseparable accompaniments or consequences of the limitation which is the absolute condition of all finite being as such. The real universe or absolute unit-universal is identity in difference of Being as One and Existents as Many. In the nature of things, *Being as One must be infinite*, that is, not limited, because there can "be" nothing else to limit it; but *Existents as Many must be finite*, that is, must be constituted as many units whose co-existence or co-inherence in the universal One Being is necessary limitation of each by the others. Not even Omnipotence as absolutely free and absolutely unopposed Will could cancel this necessity or prevent its consequences, for it is the Apriori of Being itself. It is this necessary finitude of the finite which constitutes the essence and reality of natural evil, and evil must be real in all possible worlds so long as Being remains the One in the Many. But it is the essence of Good to overcome Evil, to subdue it to its own uses through the free ethical reason — "from seeming evil still educing good;" and its necessary method is the syllogistic ethical process

of evolution through involution, identical in every I as I, whether finite or infinite. In truth, the Absolute I could have no end to achieve, no ideal to realize, no ground whatever for its eternal purposive activity, in itself as the One Being alone; it can have an end, an ideal, a ground of purpose, only in itself as the One Being in Many Existents. Hence the necessary finitude of the finite, that is, the necessity of natural evil, becomes the condition of the reality of Good itself as the Infinite Life, the eternally continuous but eternally victorious march of the Divine Purpose to the realization of its own Divine Ideal, the eternal self-devotion of the Absolute I to the spiritual education and higher possible beatification of its own Finite I's. Avoidable evil as Wrong Doing is the only evil which ought not to be and need not be; it should be fought at all costs to the bitter end. But unavoidable evil, such as pain, sorrow, death, is the fate of the finite over and above all Providence, yet through that very fact becomes the absolute condition of all goodness human or divine. So much here for the problem of evil from the standpoint of the syllogistic ethics.

§ 248. From this survey, however brief and inadequate, of the three spheres of ontology, epistemology, and ethics, or of Being, Knowing, and Doing, it becomes very clear that one and the same method obtains in each, the method of absolute syllogistic. Genera, species, and specimens are the only realities in Being; genera are realized only in the whole of their species, and species only in the whole of their specimens; the relation of genus, species, and specimen is necessarily that of the three terms in the syllogism; the production of a new specimen is necessarily the process of evolution through involution, as inheritance of generic and specific characters in its involved common essence and adaptation of these to the environment in its evolved individual difference; and this is manifestly a process of objective inference, being a syllogistic evolution in the consequent, or new specimen, of what was already involved in

the antecedent, or pre-existent genus and species. Similarly, ideas, concepts, and percepts are the only realities in Knowing; ideas are realized only in concepts, and concepts only in percepts; the relation of idea, concept, and percept is that of the three terms of the syllogism; the acquisition of a new percept is the involution of already acquired concepts and ideas in the new experience, or inheritance of its common essence, and evolution of its individual difference through adaptation of these inherited forms to the object newly perceived in the environment; and this is a process of subjective inference, a logical formation of the new percept as percept-concept or concrete syllogism—the syllogistic identity in difference of experience and reason in a new cognition. Lastly, ideals, purposes, and deeds are the only realities in Doing; ideals are realized only in purposes, and purposes only in deeds; the relation of ideal, purpose, and deed is that of the three terms of the syllogism; the performance of a new deed is the involution of some freely chosen ideal and freely formed purpose in a new volition, or inheritance of the common essence of the volition as subjectively right or wrong, and evolution of this subjective antecedent in its objective consequent through the blind energy of the will, as formation of a change in the environment through purposed adaptation to it, or realization of the individual difference of the deed as objectively right or wrong; and this is a process of subjective-objective inference, an objective modification of the environment as self-expression of the subject in it, a syllogistic self-realization of the I as identity in difference of experience, reason, and will in a new subjective-objective deed.

In this all-penetrative and all-determinative unity of the syllogistic process as the method of all Nature, all Mind, and all Spirit, Being realizes itself through Knowing in Doing: that is, Doing is the conclusion of the Syllogism of Being, the identity in difference of necessity and freedom, and therefore the identity in difference of Nature, Mind,

and Spirit in the Absolute I as the Ethical All-Person. Through this principle of absolute syllogistic as the law of unit-universals, or Apriori of Being, or necessary identity of method in the spheres of reality and ideality alike, philosophy attains its end in Syllogistic as the principle of absolute methodology, and in Personality as the topmost reach of its application in human knowledge. Not personality in the raw and gross form of the vulgar anthropomorphism, of course, but *personality as identity in difference of causality, finality, and ethicality in the I as such* — in the I as human and in the I as Divine, since personality so comprehended is raised above all possible differences of degree or scope as finite and infinite. The Syllogism of Being, the Syllogism of Knowing, the Syllogism of Doing : these are the major, middle, and minor terms of philosophy itself as the Syllogism of Syllogisms, read extensively in the order named and intensively in this order reversed. In other words, philosophy is the identity in difference of ontology, epistemology, and ethics, under which fundamental sciences all others are to be classed as branches, subdivisions, or applications ; and universal human knowledge with all its particularities and all its universalities, that is, science in its widest significance, is itself philosophy as a concrete syllogism in the Syllogism of Syllogisms. This in its simplest form is as follows :

- i. Knowing is Being : that is, true judgments are real specimens.
- ii. Doing is Knowing : that is, ethical deeds are true judgments.
- iii. Therefore, Doing is Being : that is, ethical deeds are real specimens.

In other words, the Syllogism of Being through the Syllogism of Knowing is the Syllogism of Doing ; whence it follows that the three fundamental sciences must be similarly related, — that ontology through epistemology is ethics, and that philosophy, as identity in difference of the three, is the Syllogism of Syllogisms.

Absolute logic as Syllogistic is the principle of the ne-

cessity and universality of evolution through involution — the principle that whatever is evolved as consequent must be involved as antecedent. This is the actual method of all existence, all knowledge or true thought, and all virtue or good conduct — the method alike of Nature, of Mind, and of Spirit — the method of these three in one in the I as such, whether finite or infinite, human person or Divine All-Person. Hence absolute syllogistic is the constitutive principle of PERSONALITY, as both the source and outcome of all that is; and philosophy, necessarily determined as to method and form by the method and form of that which it philosophizes, can be no other than what Aristotle found it to be, that is, theology — not theology as he conceived it, but theology modernized as scientific realism and scientific theism. The method of philosophy, therefore, is Syllogistic, or the principle of Personality in the I as I; and its system is the Syllogism of Syllogisms, or the form of LIFE in the I as identity in difference of Being, Knowing, and Doing.

§ 249. From method as Syllogistic to system as Syllogism of Syllogisms, that is, from the principle of Personality to the form of Life: in this transition lies the transition from philosophy as Ideality to religion as Reality, that is, from the Syllogism of Syllogisms to the Absolute Syllogism, as identity in difference of Ideality and Reality in the “Living God,” the Absolute Unit-Universal which is at once *summum genus* and *summum individuum*, the I of I’s or Person of Persons “in whom we live and move and have our being.” Expressed in terms of human thinking, the Absolute Syllogism of the World as the Living God may be thus set down: —

- i. WE ARE in I AM.
- ii. I AM in WE ARE.
- iii. Therefore, I AM in I AM.

This is the “Absolute Idea,” not at all, as Hegel expounds it, as the dialectical ultimatum of *reines Denken* or Reason without Experience, but rather as the syllogistic Absolute

Reality or identity in difference of Reason and Experience, the Absolute Reason in the Absolute Fact, the interpenetration of Nature, Mind, and Spirit, or Being, Knowing, and Doing, in the Real Universe as science knows it, or will know it when it finds the supreme generalization in Syllogistic as the law of unit-universals or the Apriori of Being. The Absolute Syllogism is at once the Absolute Idea and the Absolute Reality as the ground of Absolute Religion, and its transcendent importance demands an attempt to interpret some of its meanings more fully.

I. The Absolute Syllogism means that the human I derives its being from the We, and that the We derives its being from the Absolute I; that the We, as species, necessarily mediates between the Absolute I, as *summum genus*, and the finite I, as specimen or *infimum individuum*, not only in existence, but also in the knowledge of that existence; that the finite I cannot know the Absolute I except through the We, because the Absolute I evolves the finite I through the We alone, and because knowledge of the species must mediate between that of the specimen and that of the genus.

II. It means that the Absolute I itself, no less than the finite I, is conditioned by the We, just as the parent is conditioned by the child no less than the child by the parent; that the One must evolve the Many in order to be the One, and that the Many must involve the One in order to be the Many; that the Absolute I and the finite I must have a common generic and specific essence no less than each must have its unique reific essence; that this common essence is the necessary identity in difference of Being, Knowing, and Doing, and that the reific essence or individual difference is the free, unique, and self-born individual Character; that God needs us just as much as we need him; that (understanding by Man all spiritual beings) our human religion is self-devotion to God in Man, and that the Divine Religion is self-devotion to Man in God; and that the perfection of this reciprocal self-devotion is the perfect Love.

III. It means that the human-divine ideal of the Universe is the Home, to be gradually wrought out and established by the educated freedom of all its inmates, here and hereafter, through universal service of the Good as Truth, Justice, and Love; and that the ideal of the Home, as it may be and sometimes is realized on this earth is the natural type and prophecy of the Heaven which we rationally believe ought to be awaiting us in the unrevealed future.

IV. It means that the principle of the generic unity of apperception, as conditioning, supplementing, and realizing the "synthetical unity of apperception" and as explained in Chapters III, IV, and V, is the principle of self-consciousness, race-consciousness, and God-consciousness in the personal consciousness of *the I in the We in the Absolute I*; that the relation of these three elements of personal consciousness may be imperfectly symbolized by three concentric circles of differing radius, the smallest as the I, the larger as the We, and the largest as the Absolute I, the circle "whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere;" that the area of the smallest is part of the areas of the other two, and is so far the realized identity in difference of all three; and that this syllogistic God-consciousness is the actual truth underlying the mystical "intuition of God" as taught by New England Transcendentalism.

V. It means that, if the ethical freedom of the I be a fact (and without it ethics is no fact), the question how the Absolute Will can emancipate the human will from itself ceases to be unanswerable; that the finite I is evolved from the Absolute I solely through the mediating We; that the transmission of freedom from the Absolute I to the We is the same fact as is its transmission from the We to the finite I; that this is simply the transmission of freedom as part of the generic and specific essence of every I to each I as a new specimen; that this transmission of freedom is simply part of the larger fact of heredity; and that the mystery of transmissible freedom is neither more nor less

than the mystery of heredity itself. It follows either that heredity itself is unreal because it is mysterious, or else that freedom is real because heredity is real. But evolution consists in the double fact of heredity and adaptation, and it is too late in the day to question the reality of either.

§ 250. In bringing to a close this too condensed exposition of the Syllogistic Philosophy (the fundamental conception of which as Objectivism, somewhat vaguely formed in 1859, lay in the principle of the objectivity of relations and its immediate consequences, namely, the trichotomy of existence as things, relations, and conditions, and the derivative trichotomy of perception as sensuous, intellectual, and rational, and was already reduced to writing in 1864 as the germ of a definitely projected system which should emancipate philosophy from the bondage of unscientific Subjectivism), it remains to develop the Absolute Syllogism as the solution of two philosophical problems of the gravest importance — how to effect a rational transition from the I to the We, and how to effect a rational transition from the internal world to the external world. Neither of these problems, which belong peculiarly (if not exclusively) to modern philosophy as subjectivism, has ever received a logically sound or satisfactory solution from the subjectivist position.

The failure to solve the former of the two problems resulted inevitably from the lack of a scientific theory of universals and the still prevalent influence of the Aristotelian Paradox, which have been sufficiently dwelt upon in our early chapters. Its necessary consequence, however, was the failure to form any clear concept of the I in the We, and the inevitable result of this was to seek the origin of self-consciousness in the antithesis of I and Not-I, instead of the antithesis of I and Other-I as the We. Now the Not-I remains an absolute zero to thought, when it derives no thinkable content from the I it negates. So long, therefore, as the I could not be thought except as an

"unknown x " or an Impersonal It, the attempt to derive the origin of self-consciousness from the antithesis of I and Not-I was foredoomed to defeat; the concept of the I being itself a nullity, it was manifestly impossible to effect a rational transition in philosophy from the I to the We.

The second of the two problems necessarily failed to be solved, when the first proved insoluble. If there is no intelligible I, there can be no intelligible "internal world," and *a fortiori* no intelligible "external world." A confused and chaotic mass of "states of consciousness," without intelligible unity or intelligible organization as a unit-universal, yields no solid pier for a bridge to a still more chaotic mass of "mere phaenomena." One might as well seek to build a bridge from one cloud to another.

"Since the acceptance of the Cartesian *cogito* as the starting-point of philosophy," remarks Prof. Noiré with admirable candor and pith, "the chief pre-occupation both of its author and all his successors has been to discover some explanation or excuse for the assumption of a real external world, when everything is only thought, ideal, a mode or modes of consciousness."¹

Excuses, assumptions, postulates, naïveté, common sense, inferences that do not infer—that is all that modern philosophy as subjectivism offers to modern science as a foundation on which to build real knowledge of a real world. What wonder if scientific men sneer at "meta-physicians"? It lies on the surface of things that subjectivism fails demonstrably in the effort to effect a rational transition from a real internal world to a real external world.

What better has the Syllogistic Philosophy as objectivism to offer? Logical necessity in the Absolute Syllogism. For the rational transition from the I to the We is itself the rational transition from the internal world to the external world. Both transitions are made at once in the

¹ Sketch of the Development of Occidental Philosophy, prefixed to Professor F. Max Müller's Centenary Edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, I. 355.

very first instant of personal consciousness, as self-consciousness through race-consciousness and race-consciousness through self-consciousness — that is, as identity in difference of the “synthetical unity of apperception” and the *generic unity of apperception*. Neither of these is possible without the other, as Kant unconsciously proved when, endeavoring to conceive the Pure I as nothing but the “synthetical unity of apperception,” or “pure spontaneity” as “pure synthesis *a priori*,” he at once lost the Pure I itself in the “unknown *x*.” *The I cannot be thought without the We, nor the We without the external world.* For the We is (1) real unity of the I and the Other-I’s, and for that very reason (2) real unity of the I and the Not-I; hence the We itself is necessarily (3) the real identity in difference of the I and the Not-I as the internal and the external worlds, that is, as one real world which to every I is partly internal and partly external (*cf.* §§ 62–72). This logical necessity of the Other-I as middle term between the I and the Not-I in the origin of personal consciousness may be made still clearer by an expansion of the Absolute Syllogism in a changed form as follows: —

I. KNOWN INTERNAL WORLD.

- i. My present conscious state, as a Real Unit, is evolved from the whole series of my conscious and subconscious states, as its Real Universal: *Evolution of the Specimen from its Species.*
- ii. The whole series of my conscious and subconscious states, as a Real Universal, is evolved from my I, as its Real Unity: *Involvement of the Species in All its Specimens.*

II. KNOWN EXTERNAL WORLD.

- iii. My I, as a Real Unit, is evolved from the We, as its Real Universal: *Evolution of the Species from its Genus.*
- iv. The We, as a Real Universal, is evolved from the Absolute I, as its Real Unity: *Involvement of the Genus in All its Species.*

In this exposition or explication of the Absolute Syllogism, the method and system of cosmical Being, that is, Reality as World-Process or Nature as the Life of the ethi-

cal All-Person, is the determining ground of the method and system of human Thought, that is, Ideality as Reason-Process or Spirit as the Life of the ethical human Person. This is philosophy as objectivism.

A few of the innumerable meanings easily developed with great clearness in this expanded form of the Absolute Syllogism require to be specially noted before we leave it.

I. The semblance of two independent worlds, one internal and the other external, although it has played a great part in the history of philosophy as the dualism of mind and matter or body and soul, is now seen to be illusory. There is but one world, self-dependent as identity in difference of Nature and Spirit in itself as a whole and in each and every part of that whole. There are as many "internal worlds" as there are single I's, but there is no one internal world common to all of them: to each I, its own internal world is unique and incommunicable, just because it is an experience of which only an infinitesimal portion can be shared with another, a personal difference which excludes and is excluded by every other. This lies in the necessary nature of personality as individuality. Nevertheless, all these countless internal worlds are as subtly and inseparably connected in the one real world as the countless leaves are connected in the one tree, or the one tree in the species to which it belongs. The individuality of the person is as real and necessary as that of the leaf, yet the universality of the World as All-Person is as real and necessary as that of the tree. At either pole of Being as the Infinite and the Finite is personality, and this is the one absolute category which includes all others known to us; whatever unsuspected reaches of Being may lie beyond our knowledge, every higher includes, not excludes, every lower, and the Absolute I, whatever else it may be besides, must remain what we know it is, the Ethical All-Person. Syllogistic Philosophy is indeed pantheism, but, with personality as the supreme reality at either extreme, it cannot be confounded with what commonly passes by that name.

II. The law of unit-universals is exemplified in this table with the utmost clearness. The I, as the principle and the fact of personal identity, appears in it as a unit-universal, a species or universal in all its specimens or units. But the unit as such inheres in the universal as such, and not *vice versa* as the Aristotelian Paradox requires (*cf.* Chapter VI): the unit inheres in its universal, but the universal inheres in all its units together, not wholly in any one of them alone. In the first half of the table, the finite I stands as the real universal of all its conscious states, but in the second half it stands as the real unit in the We, as its higher universal; and in both halves together it stands as a real unit-universal in a higher unit-universal, that is, as a specimen in its species. It is precisely in this relation that the logical necessity of the two transitions consists — a necessity as absolute as that of the *Apriori* of Being which determines it.

III. The method of absolute syllogistic as evolution through involution is no less clearly exemplified in this table. Every specimen is evolved from its own species; every species is involved in all its own specimens as a whole, and in each of them as a part. The same relation holds when the species becomes a specimen to its own genus, and the genus a higher species to all its own species as its own specimens. As Nägeli saw in 1865 (see § 242), this reformation of the Aristotelian Paradox lay implicit in the Darwinian revolution. The logical necessity of the first half of the table, as relation of specimen and species, is identical with that of the second, as relation of species and genus: the two together constitute the syllogistic relation of specimen, species, and genus, as more directly shown in the Absolute Syllogism (*cf.* § 249) and in the constitutive principle of absolute logic itself (*cf.* § 240). In this logical linkage of the two halves of the present table lies the logical necessity of the solution which objectivism effects, but which subjectivism has certainly never yet effected, with regard to the two problems already

mentioned. The rationality of the transitions from the I to the We and from the internal world to the external world cannot be successfully impugned without overthrowing the ground-principle of absolute logic, that whatever is evolved as consequent must be involved as antecedent. With this conviction, I now leave the Syllogistic Philosophy to stand by its own merits or fall by its own demerits, wishing it no more success than it deserves to win by its intrinsic truth, but hoping that my fellow-men will value at its true worth what truth soever it may contain. My work of forty-four years is done, and I commit its destinies to the Master of Life, whom I have resolutely but reverently sought to know by using the free reason which is his supreme gift to man.

NONQUITT, MASS., Sept. 29, 1903.

TABLE VI

Synopsis of Syllogistic Philosophy.**I. ONTOLOGY: THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING.**

TRICHOTOMY OF EXISTENCE: SPECIMENS, SPECIES, GENERA.

*Things in Kinds: Generic, Specific, and Reific Essence in Substance: Immanent Relational Constitution.**Evolution through Involution as Cosmical Process: Absolute Logic as Apriori of Being.*

- i. Species, or Kinds in Themselves, are evolved from Genera, or Higher Kinds in Themselves.
- ii. Specimens, or Things in Themselves, are evolved from Species, or Kinds in Themselves. Therefore —
- iii. Specimens are evolved from Genera, as New Individual Things in Universal Kinds.

II. EPISTEMOLOGY: THE SYLLOGISM OF KNOWING.

TRICHOTOMY OF KNOWLEDGE: PERCEPTS, CONCEPTS, IDEAS.

*Knowledge of Things in Kinds: Generic, Specific, and Reific Essence in Cognition: Immanent Relational Constitution.**Evolution through Involution as Cognitive Process: Absolute Logic as Apriori of Truth.*

- i. Concepts, or Comprehensions of Species, are evolved from Ideas, or Comprehensions of Genera.
- ii. Percepts, or Apprehensions of Specimens, are evolved from Concepts, or Comprehensions of Species. Therefore —
- iii. Percepts are evolved from Ideas, as Percept-Concepts or New Cognitions of Things and Kinds in Themselves.

III. ETHICS: THE SYLLOGISM OF DOING.

TRICHOTOMY OF PRAXIS: DEEDS, PURPOSES, IDEALS.

Good Actions as Things in Kinds: Generic, Specific, and Reific Essence in Conduct: Immanent Relational Constitution.

Evolution through Involution as Ethical Process: Absolute Logic as Apriori of Right.

- i. Good Purposes, or Free Formation of Right Means, are evolved from Good Ideals, or Cognitions of Right Ends.
- ii. Good Deeds, or Realized Right Ends, are evolved from Good Purposes, or Free Formations of Right Means. Therefore—
- iii. Good Deeds are evolved from Good Ideals, as New Individual Things in Universal Kinds.

IV. PHILOSOPHY: THE SYLLOGISM OF SYLLOGISMS.

SYNTHETIC UNITY OF APPERCEPTION: I AM THROUGH MY KNOWING IN MY DOING: I AM MY CHARACTER.

- I. *Absolute Principle of Logic: Whatever is Evolved as Consequent must be Involved as Antecedent.*
 - i. *Major:* the Syllogism of Being, as Realized Principle, Ground, and Norm of Absolute Logic.
 - ii. *Minor:*

{	the Syllogism of Knowing is evolved from the Syllogism of Being.
{	the Syllogism of Doing is evolved from the Syllogism of Knowing.
{	therefore, the Syllogism of Doing is evolved from the Syllogism of Being.
 - iii. *Conclusion:*

{	the Syllogism of Knowing is involved in the Syllogism of Being.
{	the Syllogism of Doing is involved in the Syllogism of Knowing.
{	therefore, the Syllogism of Doing is involved in the Syllogism of Being.
- II. *That is: Philosophy is Scientific Realism, or Identity in Difference of Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics.*
 - i. Whatever is evolved as Consequent must be involved as Antecedent.
 - ii. The Syllogism of Doing is evolved as Consequent from the Syllogism of Being.
 - iii. Therefore, the Syllogism of Doing is involved in the Syllogism of Being as Antecedent.
- III. *That is: Philosophy is Scientific Theism, or Identity in Difference of Reality and Ideality.*

Being, Knowing, and Doing are Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, or Wholeness and Holiness as Character of the Absolute I.

V. RELIGION: THE ABSOLUTE SYLLOGISM.

GENERIC UNITY OF APPERCEPTION: I AM THROUGH MAN IN GOD: LOVE
TO GOD IN MAN IS MY END.

- i. WE ARE in I AM.
- ii. I AM in WE ARE.
- iii. Therefore, I AM in I AM.

TABLE VII

Ontology as Ground of Epistemology.

INSEPARABLE OBJECTIVE REALITY OF THINGS, RELATIONS,
CONDITIONS.OBJECTIVE INFERENCE AS THE COURSE OF NATURE: LOGICAL DETER-
MINATION OF THE REAL IN ITSELF.

- I. *Things in Kinds: Law of Unit-Universals: Syllogistic Genesis of Objects of Knowledge: Apriori of Being.*
- i. Genera: Major Term in the Syllogism of Being: Law of Generification.
 - ii. Species: Middle Term in the Syllogism of Being: Law of Specification.
 - iii. Specimens: Minor Term in the Syllogism of Being: Law of Individuation.
- II. *Relations of Things in Kinds: Necessary Objectivity of Relations.*
- i. Contingent Relations: Aposteriori of Being (*ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως εἶχειν*).
 - ii. Necessary Relations: Apriori of Being (*οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως εἶχειν*).
 - iii. Real Relations: Being as One in Many (*τὸ ὅν ἢ ὂν καὶ τὰ τοῦτω ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὐτό*).
- | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|
| <p>(a) Cause and Effect: Energy as Mechanical Causality</p> <p>(b) End and Means: Reason as Organic Finality</p> <p>(c) Ideal and Deed: Character as Personal Ethicality</p> | } | = | <p>Real Principles of the Ultimate Real Forms of Being as Known — One in Many as Mechanism of Mechanisms, Organism of Organisms, Person of Persons, in the All-Person — Identity in Difference of all Specimens, Species, Genera, in the <i>Genus Gen-erum</i> or Absolute I.</p> |
|--|---|---|---|
- III. *Unconditioned Conditions of Related Things: Necessary Objectivity of Conditions.*
- i. Space and Time: Possibility of Extension, Protension, — Continuity, Discontinuity, — Permanence, Change.

- ii. Substance : Being as Acting, Causal Energy, Will as Self-Particularization : Evolution.
- iii. Essence : Being as Relating, Formative Reason, Thought as Self-Universalization : Involution.
- iv. Process : Being as Acting and Relating, Reason-Energy as Motion, Evolution through Involution : Method of Nature.
- v. Reality : Identity in Difference of Substance and Essence and Process in Space and Time : God.

TABLE VIII

Epistemology as Grounded in Ontology.

DETERMINATION OF COGNITIVE RELATIONS BY ONTOLOGICAL RELATIONS.

SUBJECTIVE INFERENCE AS THE COURSE OF MIND: LOGICAL IDEALIZATION OF THE REAL.

I. *Elements of Intelligence: True Percepts, True Concepts, True Ideas: Apriori of Truth.*

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|--|
| i. <i>Perceptivity as</i> | { | Sensuous: Apprehensions of Real Specimens as Single Things. |
| | | Intellectual: Apprehensions of Real Specimens as Single Relations. |
| | | Rational: Apprehensions of Real Specimens as Single Conditions. |
| ii. <i>Understanding as</i> | { | Perceptive: Intellections of Single Relations as Specimens or Real Units. |
| | | Conceptive: Intellections of Kinds of Relations as Species or Real Universals. |
| | | Abstractive: Intellections of Relational Species as Artificial or Abstract Universals. |
| iii. <i>Reason as</i> | { | Perceptive: Comprehensions of Single Conditions of Specimens, Species, Genera: Apriori of Being. |
| | | Logical: Comprehensions as Inferences of Conclusions from Premises: Evolution of New Cognitions. |
| | | Ethical: Comprehensions as Inventions of Means to Ends: Involution of New Purposes. |

II. *Cognitive Process determined by Cosmical Process: Evolution through Involution as Intelligence: Scientific Method.*

- i. Rational Comprehension of Universals as Principles or Laws.
- ii. Empirical Apprehension of Units as Instances, Events, or Facts.
- iii. Subsumption through Mediation: Deduction through Induction: Hypothesis as Tentative Conclusion: Verification of Reason by Experience as Cognition.

- III. *Cognitive Product: Self-Involving and Self-Evolving Knowledge of the Cosmos by Man: Science.*
- i. Individual Discovery of Cosmical Truth by the Competent Investigator.
 - ii. Universal Verification of Individual Discovery by the Consensus of the Competent.
 - iii. Logical Development of the Organism of Universal Science into Syllogistic Philosophy.

TABLE IX

Ethics as Grounded in Epistemology.**DETERMINATION OF ONTOLOGICAL RELATIONS BY COGNITIVE RELATIONS.****SUBJECTIVE-OBJECTIVE INFERENCE AS THE COURSE OF SPIRIT: LOGICAL REALIZATION OF THE IDEAL.**

- I. *Elements of Morality: Right Ideals, Right Purposes, Right Deeds: Apriori of Right.*
 - i. Moral Obligation: Rational Comprehension of the Good as Cosmical Moral Law, End, and Order.
 - ii. Moral Freedom: Rational Formation of Purposes in Free Conformity to Moral Law as the Ought.
 - iii. Moral Action: Volitional Fulfilment of Free Purposes in Deeds as New Realizations of the Good.
- II. *Ethical Process determined by Cognitive Process: Evolution through Involution as Virtue: Spiritual Method.*
 - i. Cosmical Determination of the Good as Necessary Ideal, End, or Genus: Objective Major Premise.
 - ii. Personal Determination of the Good as Free Purpose, Means, or Species: Subjective Minor Premise.
 - iii. Cosmical-Personal Determination of the Good as Deed, Realized End, or New Specimen: Objective-Subjective Conclusion.
- III. *Ethical Judgment: Double Standard of Worth or the Ethical Evaluation of Conduct: Objective and Subjective Right.*
 - i. Absolute Standard: Agreement of Deed with Cosmical Moral Order: Objective Right in the Result.
 - ii. Relative Standard: Agreement of Deed with Personal Ideal of the Doer: Subjective Right in the Purpose.
- IV. *Ethical Product: Personality as Purpose-Involving and Deed-Evolving Good Character: Freedom in Necessity.*
 - i. Necessary Idealization of the Real in Knowing.
 - ii. Free Realization of the Ideal in Doing.
 - iii. Growth of the Good Character in Being, as Alternating Process or Self-Perpetuating Ethical Life.
- V. *Ethical Destiny: Desert of Immortality by the Good Character.*
 - i. In a Good Universe, whatever freely perpetuates the Good deserves to be itself perpetual.

- ii. The Good Character freely perpetuates the Good.
 - iii. Therefore, in a Good Universe, the Good Character deserves to be itself perpetual.
- VI. *Ethical Necessity as Rational Ground of the Expectation of Immortality.*
- i. In a Good Universe, whatever ought to be will be.
 - ii. The Good Character ought to be immortal.
 - iii. Therefore, in a Good Universe, the Good Character will be immortal.

TABLE X

Philosophy as Grounded in Absolute Syllogistic.

EVOLUTION THROUGH INVOLUTION: COURSE OF NATURE
THROUGH COURSE OF MIND AS COURSE OF SPIRIT.

SYLLOGISM OF BEING AS THE BECOMING OF GOOD: BEING AND BECOM-
ING OF GOOD AS THE ABSOLUTE I.

IDENTITY IN DIFFERENCE OF NATURE AND SPIRIT: REAL GOOD AS
REAL GOD.

- I. *Cosmical Process as Ethical Process: Evolving Syllogism of Being as Involved Syllogism of Doing.*
 - i. Syllogistic as the Method of Mind is involved in the Method of Nature.
 - ii. Syllogistic as the Method of Spirit is involved in the Method of Mind.
 - iii. Therefore, Syllogistic as the Method of Spirit is involved in the Method of Nature.
- II. *Cosmical End as Self-Involving Ethical End: Good as the Divine Ideal.*
 - i. Truth, or the End of Knowing, is involved in the End of Being.
 - ii. Good, or the End of Doing, is involved in Truth, or the End of Knowing.
 - iii. Therefore, Good, or the End of Doing, is involved in the End of Being.
- III. *Cosmical End as Self-Evolving Ethical End: Good as the Divine Character and Deed.*
 - i. Absolute Syllogistic, or Evolution through Involution as Ethical Process, is the Life of the Cosmos.
 - ii. The Life of the Good I is Evolution through Involution as Ethical Process.
 - iii. Therefore, the Life of the Good I is the Life of the Cosmos.

IV. *Macrocosm and Microcosm: Man the Measure of the Universe:
Personality the Acme of Known Being.*

- i. Evolution through Involution as Ethical Process is Person as such.
- ii. Man in the Cosmos is Imperfect Ethical Process in Perfect All-Ethical Process.
- iii. Therefore, Man in the Cosmos is Imperfect Person in Perfect All-Person.

TABLE XI

Philosophy as Ground of Absolute Religion.

IDENTITY IN DIFFERENCE OF THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
WORLDS.

THE I IN THE WE IN THE ABSOLUTE I: I AM BECAUSE WE ARE, AND
WE ARE BECAUSE I AM.

I. *Known Internal World.*

- i. My present conscious state, as a Real Unit, is evolved from the whole series of my conscious and subconscious states, as its Real Universal. (Empirical particularity of my personal consciousness in succession of single perceptions: "I Know that I Know This Here and Now.")
- ii. The whole series of my conscious and subconscious states, as a Real Universal, is evolved from my I, as its Real Unity. (Rational Universality of my personal consciousness in synthetic unity of apperception: "I Know that I Am.")

II. *Known External World.*

- iii. My I, as a Real Unit, is evolved from the We, as its Real Universal. (Empirical particularity of my personal consciousness in my race-consciousness, or specific unity of apperception: "I Know that We Are.")
- iv. The We, as a Real Universal, is evolved from the Absolute I, as its Real Unity. (Rational universality of my personal consciousness through my race-consciousness in my God-consciousness, or generic unity of apperception: "I Know that I AM.")

APPENDIX



FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHEMES OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD

BOOK I

SCIENTIFIC REALISM. REALITY OF THE UNIVERSAL AS GENUS, CONCEPT, AND WORD: ORGANIC THEORY OF UNIVERSALS.

Definition. Philosophy is World-Science, or the Self-Comprehension of Universal Human Reason in Universal Divine Reason.

Philos. I. The Beginning-point or Given Fact of Philosophy is the Reality or Real Existence of Human Knowledge, as an Unorganized Manifold; and its Goal or Rational End is the Comprehension of Human Knowledge as an Organized Unity.

Philos. II. The Reality of Human Knowledge involves the Threefold Reality of Universals, as its Constituent Molecules: (1) Objective Reality in the Real Genus, or Universal of the First Power; (2) Subjective Reality in the Ideal Concept, or Universal of the Second Power; and (3) Objective-Subjective Reality in the Real-Ideal Word, or Universal of the Third Power.

Philos. III. The Threefold Reality of Universals involves the Threefold Universality of Human Knowledge: (1) Objective Universality in the Genus; (2) Subjective Universality in the Concept; and (3) Objective-Subjective Universality in the Word.

Philos. IV. The Threefold Universality of Human Knowledge involves its Relativity, or the necessary, yet partial, Essential Identity of Immanent Relational Constitution in the Genus, the Concept, and the Word.

Philos. V. The Relativity of Human Knowledge involves the Objectivity of Relations, or the Reality of Immanent Relational Constitution as the Intelligible Essence of the Real Genus in Itself, and therefore as the Real Object of Human Knowledge.

Philos. VI. The Objectivity of Relations involves the Validity of the Scientific Method, as the only possible Learning-Process by which Knowledge of the Real Genus can be Acquired.

Philos. VII. The Scientific Method involves three Essential Moments:—

- i. Observation: Discovery of Real Genera in Real Things.
- ii. Hypothesis: Creation of Ideal Generalizations in Anticipation of Real Genera.
- iii. Experimental Verification: Discovery of Identity in Immanent Relational Constitution between Real Genera and Ideal Generalizations.

Philos. VIII. The Organic Theory of Unit-Universals, or Immanent Law of the Scientific Method, is the Atomic Theory of Philosophy, and predetermines its Divisions. The principle of the Genus as the Universal of Existence involves Constructive Realism, or the Theory of Being; the principle of the Concept as the Universal of Thought involves Critical Realism, or the Theory of Knowing; and the principle of the Word as the Universal of Speech involves Ethical Realism, or the Theory of Doing. The organic union of these three theories in Free Religion is Religious Realism, or the Theory of Living.

BOOK II

CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM. NOUMENAL REALITY OF THE GENUS IN ITSELF: ORGANIC THEORY OF BEING.

Philos. IX. The Genus as Class involves the Genus as Whole; the Genus as Whole involves the Genus as Kind; and the Genus as Kind involves the Genus as Organism.

- i. The Genus is at once that Real Similarity in Many Members which constitutes them One Class, and that Real Dissimilarity in One Class which constitutes it Many Members.
- ii. The Genus is at once that Real Totality in Many Parts which constitutes them One Whole, and that Real Division in One Whole which constitutes it Many Parts.
- iii. The Genus is at once that Real Identity in Many Things which constitutes them One Kind, and that Real Difference in One Kind which constitutes it Many Things.
- iv. The Genus is at once that Real Unity in Many Organs which constitutes them One Organism, and that Real Plurality in One Organism which constitutes it Many Organs.
- v. Every Genus originates through the Double Process of Individuation, or the Evolution of Many Units as each the Intensive

Organization of Many Universals, and Generification, or the Involution of One Universal as the Extensive Organization of Many Units; and this Double Process involves the Double Principle of the Interpenetration and the Combination of Universals.

vi. Every Genus is at once an Organ to a superior Organism, and an Organism to inferior Organs.

vii. The *Summum Genus*, or Universe of Being, is identical with the *Infima Species*, or All Units of Being. That is, the One and the Many are identical as Unity, Plurality, and Totality in the Immanent Relational Constitution of Infinite Being as One Absolute Organism — the *Genus Generum* as *Summum Individuum*.

viii. In every Genus, the Reality of the Thing is the Real Union in Substance of One Class Essence with One Individual Difference, and the Reality of the Kind is the Real Union in Substance of One Class Essence with Many Individual Differences and One Generic Difference. Hence, of necessity, the Thing involves, explains, and reveals the Kind, and the Kind involves, explains, and reveals the Thing, through the Class Essence which is common to Both. This is the Syllogism of Being, mediating the Genus and the Specimen by the Species.

ix. In the *Summum Genus*, or Infinite Being, the Unit reveals the Universe, and the Universe reveals the Unit, through the Essential Nature which is common to Both.

x. The Organic Constitution of the Genus, as a Noumenon or Intelligible Real Essence, is at once the absolute Ground of a Real World-Order and the absolute Condition of a Possible World-Science. As Ground of a Real World-Order, it is the Law of Unit-Universals as the Law of the Necessary Unity of the Universe; as Condition of a Possible World-Science, it is the Law of the Necessary Intelligibility of the Universe — the Law of the Necessary Self-Revelation of Being to Thought in Nature. That is, the Reality of a World-Order constitutes in itself the Possibility of a World-Science.

Philos. X. The Genus as Organism involves the Universality of the Organic Constitution as the Noumenal Form of all Real Existence.

Philos. XI. The Universality of the Organic Constitution as the Noumenal Form of all Real Existence involves the Universality of the Organic Idea as the Noumenal Form of all Real Knowledge.

Philos. XII. The Universality of the Organic Constitution and the Universality of the Organic Idea involve the Essential Iden-

tity in Difference of the Form of Existence and the Form of Knowledge.

Philos. XIII. The Essential Identity in Difference of the Form of Existence and the Form of Knowledge involves the still deeper Identity in Difference of Being and Thought in the Infinite Organism which, as Word, is Nature, and, as Genus or Meaning, is Spirit.

Philos. XIV. The Identity in Difference of Being and Thought in the Infinite Organism involves the Identity in Difference of the Method of Being and the Method of Thought, as One Organic or Syllogistic Life-Process by which One Self-Thinking Energy eternally organizes itself throughout One Space and One Time as One Substance and One Essence in One Universe, that is, as One Spirit.

Philos. XV. The Identity in Difference of the Method of Being and the Method of Thought involves: (1) the Spirituality of Substance, or the principle that All Being is Thought; (2) the Substantiality of Spirit, or the principle that All Thought is Being; and (3) the Identity in Difference of Spirituality and Substantiality in Personality, or the principle that All Being and All Thought can be one only in One Infinite Person.

Philos. XVI. The Identity in Difference of All Being and All Thought in One Infinite Person involves: (1) the Universality of the Personal Constitution as the Noumenal Ground-Form of All Being; and (2) the Universality of the Personal Idea as the Noumenal Ground-Form of All Thought.

Philos. XVII. The Universality of the Personal Constitution and Personal Idea as the Noumenal Ground-Forms of All Being and All Thought involves the Universality of the Self-Creative Process, as the Divine Personal Life of the Universe: (1) as Eternal Evolution of Nature in Spirit, or of the Many in the One; and (2) as Eternal Involution of Spirit in Nature, or of the One in the Many.

Philos. XVIII. The Eternal Evolution of Nature in Spirit involves the Created Multiplicity of the Universe, as three great Genera, Categories, or Categorical Types of Real Being: (1) the Machine, of which the distinctive real principle is Mechanical Causality (*nexus effectivus*); (2) the Organism, of which the distinctive real principle is Organic Finality (*nexus finalis*); and (3) the Person, of which the distinctive real principle is Active Self-Consciousness as Personal Ethicality (*nexus ethicus*).

Philos. XIX. The Machine involves the Organism, and the Organism involves the Person.

i. The Machine is an Artificial Organ of the Natural Organism; and the Organism is a Self-Making and Self-Working Natural Machine.

ii. The Machine and the Organism are both Systems of Ends and Means; and the Person is the Sole Creator of Ends and Means, artificially in the Machine and naturally in the Organism.

iii. All Real Types are One in the Person. This is the Law of the Correlation of Real Types.

Philos. XX. The Eternal Involution of Spirit in Nature involves the Uncreated Unity of the Universe as Real *Summum Genus*: (1) as Infinite Machine, or Universal Cause and Effect in Motion; (2) as Infinite Organism, or Universal End and Means in Life; and (3) as Infinite Person, or Universal Real and Ideal in Action.

Philos. XXI. Mechanical Causality involves Organic Finality, and Organic Finality involves Personal Ethicality.

i. The Efficient or "Out-Making" Cause contains within itself the Preconceived End; the Effect or "Out-Made" Result contains within itself the Realized End; and the Causal Nexus is itself the Energetic Realizing End, or Real Union of End and Energy in Effort. Therefore, the Principle of Efficient or Mechanical Causality contains within itself the Principle of Organic Finality.

ii. The Immanent Organic End is Self-Evolution or Ethical Egoism; the Exient Organic End is Self-Devotion or Ethical Altruism; and the Total Organic End is Identity in Difference of Ethical Egoism and Ethical Altruism as Character. The lower Finite Organism realizes its Character, of which Nature is conscious, in Ethical Unconsciousness; the higher Finite Organism realizes its Character in Ethical Consciousness of Limited Freedom; the Infinite Organism of Nature realizes its Character in Ethical Consciousness of Illimitable Freedom. Therefore, the principle of Organic Finality contains within itself the principle of Freedom, Self-Determination, or Personal Ethicality.

iii. All Real Principles are One in Personality. This is the Law of the Correlation of Real Principles.

Philos. XXII. The three Categorical Types of all known Finite Being are related to Infinite Being as Microcosm to Macrocosm or Ectype to Archetype.

Philos. XXIII. In the Order of the External Self-Creative Process, Nature successively evolves (1) Finite Machines, (2) Finite Organisms, and (3) Finite Persons, and Spirit eternally involves (1) Infinite Person, (2) Infinite Organism, and (3) Infinite Machine; and the Order of Involution in Spirit is converse, complement, and explanation to the Order of Evolution in Nature.

Philos. XXIV. Constructive Realism culminates in the Syllogism of Knowledge, Scientific World-Concept, or Philosophic Idea of God, as follows:—

Mechanical Causality, or the Law of Motion, Organic Finality, or the Law of Life, and Personal Ethicality, or the Law of Spirit,—the three eternal and all-pervasive Real Principles by which the whole known World exists,—are at bottom One in the Real Principle of Omnipresent Self-Conscious Reason-Energy or Absolute Personality, and constitute the Unity of the Universe in the Essential Being and Life of God, as at once Infinite Machine, Infinite Organism, and Infinite Person, the All as Absolute I.

BOOK III

CRITICAL REALISM. DERIVATION OF THE CONCEPT FROM THE GENUS. ORGANIC THEORY OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

Philos. XXV. The Genus, or Real Universal of Being, and the Concept, or Real Universal of Thought, together involve the Equal Reality and Universality of Subject and Object, of which Human Knowledge in general is the Real and Universal Relation.

Philos. XXVI. The cognitive relation of the Universal Real Subject and the Universal Real Object involves: (1) that of the Individual Subject to the Individual Object, or of the Person to the Thing; (2) that of the Individual Subject to the Universal Object, or of the Person to the Cosmos; and (3) that of the Universal Subject to the Universal Object, or of the Race to the Cosmos.

Philos. XXVII. The cognitive relation of the Person to the Thing involves: (1) the Intelligibility of the Object, or the Immanent Relational Constitution of the Thing; (2) the Intelligence of the Subject, or the Immanent Relational Constitution of the

Person; and (3) the Cognitive Determination of the Person by the Thing in Intellectual Perception and Conception.

Philos. XXVIII. The cognitive relation of the Person to the Cosmos involves: (1) the Trichotomy of Existence as Things, Relations, and Conditions; (2) the Trichotomy of Perception as Sensuous, Intellectual, and Rational; and (3) the Determination of the Trichotomy of Perception by the Trichotomy of Existence, or the Dependence of Epistemology upon Ontology.

Philos. XXIX. The cognitive relation of the Race to the Cosmos involves: (1) the Experiential Origin of all Human Knowledge; (2) the Dynamical Nature of all Human Knowledge; and (3) the Scientific Method of all Human Knowledge.

Philos. XXX. The Experiential Origin of all Human Knowledge involves: (1) the Necessity of Intellectual Perception *a posteriori*; (2) the Impossibility of Pure Thought and Pure Knowledge *a priori*; and (3) the Derivation of all Forms of Human Thought from Forms of Being.

Philos. XXXI. The Dynamical Nature of all Human Knowledge involves either (1) Critical Idealism, the Principle of the Generation of the Universal Object by the Universal Subject (*Apriorismus*), or (2) Critical Realism, the Principle of the Generation of the Universal Subject by the Universal Object (*Aposteriorismus*.) Logically, no third Principle is possible. Further, the Principle of Critical Idealism involves the System of Constructive Idealism, Idealistic Evolution, or Solipsism; and the Principle of Critical Realism involves the System of Constructive Realism, Realistic Evolution, or Cosmism. Logically, no third System is possible. Man is either the Producer or the Product of the Cosmos.

Philos. XXXII. The Scientific Method of all Human Knowledge involves the universal and necessary Derivation of the Concept from the Genus, or the Unity, Continuity, and Essential Identity of the Learning-Process throughout the three stages of Experience, Science, and Philosophy, in nine consecutive and constitutive movements:—

A. FORMATION OF PERSONAL CONCEPTS IN EXPERIENCE.

i. Individual Observation of Real Genera by means of the Perceptive Understanding; or Formation of Personal Percepts.

ii. Individual Generalization of Personal Percepts by means

of the Conceptive Understanding; or the Formation of Personal Working Hypotheses.

iii. Individual Experimental Verification of Personal Hypotheses by means of the Perceptive and Conceptive Understanding; or Formation of Personal Concepts in Experience (Percept-Concepts of Unit-Universals).

B. FORMATION OF RACE CONCEPTS IN SCIENCE.

iv. Universal Observation of Personal Concepts through Communication by Words in Language and Literature; or Formation of Race Percepts.

v. Universal Generalization of Race Percepts through Criticism, Combination, or Conflict of Opinions; or Formation of Race Working Hypotheses.

vi. Universal Experimental Verification of Race Hypotheses, and Establishment of Scientific Formulas of Truth through the Consensus of the Competent; or Formation of Race Concepts in the Sciences.

C. FORMATION OF RACE CONCEPTS IN PHILOSOPHY.

vii. Universal Self-Reflective Observation of Race Concepts, and Self-Recognition of Science as One Organic Joint-Product of One Organic World-Order and One Organic Human Reason or Birth of World-Science in the Philosophic Percept of the Organic Constitution of Human Knowledge.

viii. Universal Self-Reflective Generalization of the Organic Constitution as the Form of All Reality; or Growth of World-Science in the Philosophic Hypothesis of the Organic Inherence of Universal Finite Being in Universal Infinite Person.

ix. Universal Self-Reflective Experimental Verification of the Philosophic Hypothesis as the Philosophic World-Truth, and Establishment of the Absolute Personality of the All as the Supreme Formula of Truth, through its Sole Adequacy to explain either Finite or Infinite Being; or the Maturity of World-Science in the Scientific World-Concept as the Philosophic Idea of God.

Philos. XXXIII. Critical Realism culminates in the Philosophic Idea of the Scientific Method as the Life-Process of Universal Human Knowledge, as follows:—

The Scientific Method, begun in Experience, developed in

Science, and perfected in Philosophy, and constituting, therefore, the regulative principle in all Acquisition of Experience and Organization of Reason, involves the immanent relational constitution of Universal Human Knowledge as a self-developing system or Real Organism, whose Germ is the realized Identity in Difference of Experience and Reason in the Syllogism, as Percept-Concept of the Unit-Universal, — whose Matter is the innumerable Percept-Concepts of Unit-Universals thence resulting, — whose Life is the Universal Syllogistic Process or Scientific Method itself, — whose Form is the System of Organic Philosophy, — whose Immanent End is the Perfection of Human Knowledge, and whose Exient End is the Perfection of Human Life.

BOOK IV

ETHICAL REALISM. DERIVATION OF THE WORD FROM THE CONCEPT. ORGANIC THEORY OF HUMAN CONDUCT.

Definition. Ethics is the science of Conduct as Free Self-Government, that is, as Realization of the Concept in the Word, the Purpose in the Deed, or the Ideal in the Real.

Definition. Personal Ethicality is the Law of the Utterance or Realization of Personal Concepts in Personal Words, and Social Ethicality is the Law of the Utterance or Realization of Race-Concepts in Race-Words.

PART I. — PERSONAL ETHICALITY. IDEAL OF THE SELF-GOVERNING PERSON.

Philos. XXXIV. The Word, as Utterance of the Personal Concept, involves the Real Principle of Freedom, Self-Determination, or Personal Ethicality, in the Conscious Purpose and Effort of the Self-Governing Person to Know, to Do, or to Be: (1) Intellectual Freedom in the Creation of Concepts in general, or Reproduction of the Real in the Ideal; and (2) Moral Freedom in the Creation of Words in general, or Reproduction of the Ideal in the Real.

Philos. XXXV. Intellectual Freedom involves Reproduction of the Real in the Ideal as the Concept in general: (1) Idealization of the Genus as the Concept in general, in order to Know; (2) Idealization of the Machine as the Concept of the Causal

Means in general, in order to Do; (3) Idealization of the Organism as the Concept of the Self-Working System in general, in order to Do; and (4) Idealization of the Person as the Concept of the Moral Ideal in general, in order to Be. Hence Truth to Reality is the Absolute Ethical Law of the Intellect.

Philos. XXXVI. Moral Freedom involves Reproduction of the Ideal in the Real as the Word in general: (1) Realization of the Concept in general as the Word Proper in Language and Literature; (2) Realization of the Concept of the Machine as the Utilitarian Word in Industry and the Æsthetic Word in Art; (3) Realization of the Concept of the Organism as the Co-operative Word in Association; and (4) Realization of the Concept of the Person, or the Moral Ideal, as the Ethical Word in Life and Character. Hence Self-Realization, Self-Utterance in Reality, or Truth to the Moral Ideal, is the Absolute Ethical Law of the Person.

Philos. XXXVII. The Word in general involves: (1) Race-Consciousness, or the Pluralism of Self and Other Selves in the sphere of Man; (2) Self-Consciousness, or the Dualism of Self and Not-Self in the sphere of Nature; and (3) God-Consciousness, or the Monism of Self and All-Self in the sphere of Spirit.

Philos. XXXVIII. The Word Proper involves Consciousness of Creative Power in the sphere of the Intellect or Understanding (*λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *λόγος προφορικός*).

Philos. XXXIX. The Utilitarian and the Æsthetic Words involve Consciousness of Creative Power in the sphere of Nature, and the Co-operative Word involves Consciousness of Creative Power in the sphere of Man.

Philos. XL. The Ethical Word involves Consciousness of Self-Creative Power in the sphere of Spirit.

Philos. XLI. Race-Consciousness involves: (1) Consciousness of the Organic Union of the Personal Self with Other Selves in Society; (2) Consciousness, through Pleasure and Sympathy, of the Absolute Must, or Absolute Organic Necessity, in the Organic Idea as the Ideal of Reciprocity, or Absolute End of the Organic Constitution; and (3) Consciousness through Pain and Antipathy, that Failure to Realize the Organic Idea is not only Organic Disease or Death of the Organism, but also Violation of the Ideal of Reciprocity.

Philos. XLII. Self-Consciousness involves: (1) Consciousness of

the Reality, Unity, and Identity of the Personal Self; (2) Consciousness, through Happiness, of the Absolute Ought, or Absolute Personal Obligation, in the Moral Ideal, or Absolute End of the Personal Constitution; and (3) Consciousness, through Unhappiness, that Failure to Realize the Moral Ideal is Moral Disease or Death of the Person.

Philos. XLIII. God-Consciousness involves: (1) Consciousness of the Personal Union of the Finite Self with the Infinite All-Self; (2) Consciousness, through Self-Approval, of the Essential Identity of the Finite Ideal with the Infinite Ideal; and (3) Consciousness, through Self-Condensation, of the Absolute Authority and Inviolable Sanctity of the Moral Ideal, as the Absolute Self-Legislator and Self-Executing End of the Universe. That is, Consciousness of Necessary Self-Judgment by the Personal Conscience is Consciousness of Necessary Judgment by the All-Personal Conscience.

Philos. XLIV. Race-Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and God-Consciousness reciprocally involve each other.

Philos. XLV. The Absolute Must in the Organic Idea and the Absolute Ought in the Personal Ideal reciprocally involve each other. That is, in the Evolution of Nature, Absolute Moral Obligation in Consciousness is grounded in, and derived from, Absolute Organic Necessity in Constitution; while, in the Involution of Spirit, Absolute Organic Necessity in Constitution is grounded in, and derived from, Absolute Moral Obligation in Consciousness.

Philos. XLVI. The Organic Idea, or Concept of the Absolute End of the Organism, written in the Organic Constitution as the Divine Law of its Being, involves: (1) the Immanent End as Self-Evolution; (2) the Exient End as Self-Devotion; and (3) Harmony of Self-Evolution and Self-Devotion in Unconscious Character. Therefore, The Organic Constitution is the Utterance or Actual Realization of the Organic Idea as the Legislative Word of God in Nature.

Philos. XLVII. The Moral Ideal, or Concept of the Absolute End of the Person, written in the Personal Constitution as the Divine Law of its Being, involves: (1) the Immanent End as Egoism, or Personal Self-Culture in Wholeness and Holiness; (2) the Exient End as Altruism, or Social Usefulness in Service, Justice, and Love; and (3) Harmony of Egoism and Altruism in Conscious Character. Therefore, the Personal Con-

stitution is the Utterance or Possible Realization of the Moral Ideal as the Legislative Word of God to Man.

Philos. XLVIII. Egoism, or Personal Self-Culture, involves: (1) Pursuit of Knowledge, or Loyalty to Truth; (2) Pursuit of Virtue, or Loyalty to Goodness; (3) Pursuit of Loveliness, or Loyalty to Beauty; (4) Pursuit of Health; and (5) Pursuit of Happiness.

Philos. XLIX. Altruism, or Social Usefulness, involves: (1) Service of the Home; (2) Service of Friends; (3) Service of Country; (4) Service of Mankind; and (5) Service of God.

Philos. L. Realized Harmony of Egoism and Altruism in Conscious Character involves Free Self-Utterance of the Concept of the Absolute Personal End, Realization of the Moral Ideal in Personal Life, or the Supreme Word of Man to God in Religion.

PART II. — CORPORATE OR SOCIAL ETHICALITY. IDEAL OF THE SELF-GOVERNING PEOPLE.

Philos. LI. The Word, as Utterance of the Race-Concept, involves the Real Principle of Freedom, Self-Determination, or Social Ethicality, in the Corporate Purpose and Effort of the Self-Governing People or State: (1) Social Freedom in the Formation of Race-Concepts in general, or the Idealization of the Real; and (2) Political Freedom in the Formation of Race-Words in general, or the Realization of the Ideal.

Philos. LII. The Corporate Self-Governing State involves (1) Social Constitution in a Community of Persons organized as a Family of Families on the Basis of Race; (2) Political Constitution in a Community of Persons organized as a Commonwealth of Citizens on the Basis of Law; and (3) Ethical Constitution in a Community of Persons organized as a Brotherhood of Men on the Basis of Religion. Therefore, the State is an Organism of Persons, and to that extent involves the Ethical Principle of Freedom.

Philos. LIII. The Corporate Purpose of the Self-Governing State involves Social Freedom in Intellectual Co-operation, or Freedom of Public Speech and of the Public Press: (1) Co-operative Formation of Race-Percepts and Race-Concepts in general; (2) Co-operative Formation of Race-Concepts of Machinery, as the Causal Means in general; (3) Co-operative Formation of Race-Concepts of Organization, as the Self-Working System in

general; and (4) Co-operative Formation of Race-Concepts of Civilization, or Civilized Society, as the Ethico-Social Ideal in general.

Philos. LIV. The Corporate Effort of the Self-Governing State involves Political Freedom in Civic Co-operation, or Freedom of Public Action and of the Public Meeting: (1) Co-operative Formation of Public Judgment and Will in Law, Language, and Literature; (2) Co-operative Formation of Public Machinery in Industry and Art; (3) Co-operative Formation of Public Organization in Institutions; and (4) Co-operative Formation of Civilized Society, or Realization of the Ethico-Political Ideal in Political Character and Life.

Philos. LV. The Social Constitution of the Self-Governing State, as a Family of Families on the Basis of Race, involves Corporate Race-Consciousness of a Common Origin, a Common Nature, a Common Interest, a Common Sympathy, and a Common Destiny in Weal or Woe, as the Ground of a Corporate Purpose and Effort. This is the Principle of Socialism: Each for All — Society is the End of the Individual.

Philos. LVI. The Political Constitution of the Self-Governing State, as a Commonwealth of Citizens on the Basis of Law, involves Corporate Self-Consciousness of Universal Personal Rights and Duties in the People as Individuals, and of the Universal Need of Government for the Establishment of these Rights and Duties, as the Condition of a Corporate Purpose and Effort. This is the Principle of Individualism: All for Each — the Individual is the End of Society.

Philos. LVII. The Ethical Constitution of the Self-Governing State, as a Brotherhood of Men on the Basis of Religion, involves Corporate God-Consciousness of the Infinite, Absolute, or Divine Moral Ideal as the Higher Law of the State itself, of the Organic Union of All Persons with the All-Person as Father, and of the Organic Union of All Persons with Each Other as Brothers, as the End of a Corporate Purpose and Effort. This is the Principle of Universalism: Each for All, All for Each, and Both for God — God is the End of Society and of the Individual. That is, the State is also the True Family and the True Church.

Philos. LVIII. The Principle of Socialism involves Organic Self-Evolution and Self-Devotion in Man as the Family.

Philos. LIX. The Principle of Individualism involves Corporate Egoism and Altruism in Man as the State.

Philos. LX. The Principle of Universalism involves Personal Egoism and Altruism in Man as the Church.

Philos. LXI. The Principles of Socialism, Individualism, and Universalism reciprocally involve each other, and are One in Universalism.

Philos. LXII. The Family, or Natural Union of Individuals on the Basis of Sex, involves: (1) Monogamy, or the Marriage of One Husband and One Wife; (2) Mutual Love, Mutual Fidelity, and Personal Equality between Husband and Wife; and (3) Mutual Love, Devotion, and Service between Parents and Children. That is, Man, Woman, and Child are the Family Triple-Unit, and the Family is the Social Unit.

Philos. LXIII. The State, or Natural Union of Individuals on the Basis of Civil Law, involves: (1) Equality of Natural Rights and Duties in the People as Individuals; (2) Origin of Law and Government in the Common Act of the People as individuals; (3) End of Law and Government in the Common Service of the People as Individuals; and (4) Limit of Law and Government in the Natural Rights and Duties of the People as Individuals. That is, Government of the People by the People for the People is the Political Universal as Democracy, and the Individual is the Political Unit as Freeman.

Philos. LXIV. The Church, or Natural Union of Individuals on the Basis of Moral Law, involves: (1) Intellectual and Moral Freedom of the Individual as the Condition of Religious Fellowship; (2) Free Self-Consecration of the Individual to the Divine Ideal, as the Ground of Religious Fellowship; and (3) Free Self-Consecration of Society to the Universal Realization of the Divine Ideal, as the End of Religious Fellowship. That is, the Service of Man is the Service of God: God is the Religious Unit.

Philos. LXV. The Family, the State, and the Church, as three great Natural Institutions or Race-Words, involve respectively the Domestic Ideal, the Democratic Ideal, and the Religious Ideal.

Philos. LXVI. The Domestic Ideal, the Democratic Ideal, and the Religious Ideal reciprocally involve each other, and can be fully realized in the Ethical Constitution alone.

Philos. LXVII. Real Harmony of the Domestic, Democratic, and Religious Ideals in the Self-Governing State involves Self-Utterance of the Race-Concept of Humanity, Realization of the Ethical Ideal in National Life, or the Supreme Word of Mankind to God in Religion.

BOOK V

RELIGIOUS REALISM. SELF-REALIZATION OF MAN IN
GOD. ORGANIC THEORY OF HUMAN LIFE.

Definition. Religion is the Effort of Man to Perfect Himself in All his Relations, and thereby to Fulfil the Absolute End of his Being in God.

Philos. LXVIII. God as the One, or Religious Unit, involves : (1) One Absolute Substance, or Eternal and Omnipresent Energy ; (2) One Absolute Essence, or Eternal and Omnipresent Personality ; and (3) One Absolute Life-Process in Personality, or Self-Involution of Spirit in Nature and Self-Evolution of Nature in Spirit throughout Space and Time. This is Absolute Monism, the Real Ground of all Religion.

Philos. LXIX. God as the All, or Religious Universal, involves : (1) Spirit in Nature, or Person, as the Divine Genus ; (2) the Absolute Ideal as the Divine Concept ; and (3) Nature in Spirit as the Divine Word.

Philos. LXX. Spirit in Nature as the Divine Genus involves God in Man as the Human Spirit.

Philos. LXXI. The Absolute Ideal as the Divine Concept involves God in Man as the Human Ideal.

Philos. LXXII. Nature in Spirit as the Divine Word involves God in Man as Human Nature and Human Life.

Philos. LXXIII. God in Man as the Human Spirit involves Human Aspiration to the Divine Spirit. This is the Ground of Worship.

Philos. LXXIV. God in Man as the Human Ideal involves Human Recognition of the Divine Ideal. This is the Ground of Responsibility.

Philos. LXXV. God in Man as Human Nature and Human Life involves Human Participation in the Divine Nature and the Divine Life. This is the Ground of Effort and Work.

Philos. LXXVI. Human Aspiration to the Divine Spirit involves Divine Revelation of the Universal Law of Love.

Philos. LXXVII. Human Recognition of the Divine Ideal involves Divine Revelation of the Universal Law of Duty.

Philos. LXXVIII. Human Participation in the Divine Nature and Divine Life involves Divine Revelation of the Universal Law of Freedom.

Philos. LXXIX. The Universal Law of Love involves the Fatherhood of God and the Sonship and Brotherhood of Man, as the Ethical Constitution of Universal Spiritual Society, that is, of the Universe as Home.

Philos. LXXX. The Universal Law of Duty involves the Absolute Authority of the Divine Ideal in Human Life, as the Absolute Ideal of Mankind in its complex constitution as the Person, the Family, the State, and the Church.

Philos. LXXXI. The Universal Law of Freedom involves the Equal Possibility, in every Human Life, of Loyalty and Disloyalty to the Divine Ideal.

Philos. LXXXII. The Fatherhood of God and the Sonship of Man involve the Determination of Human Destiny by Divine Wisdom, Justice, and Love.

Philos. LXXXIII. The Absolute Authority of the Divine Ideal in Human Life involves the Unattainability of the Absolute Ideal of Humanity, but the Attainability of Loyalty in the Endless Pursuit of the Unattainable Ideal.

Philos. LXXXIV. The Equal Possibility, in every Human Life, of Loyalty and Disloyalty to the Divine Ideal involves : (1) the Reality of Holiness in the Loyal Life ; (2) the Reality of Sin in the Disloyal Life ; and (3) the Self-Vindication of the Divine Ideal in the Natural Consequences of Loyalty and Disloyalty.

Philos. LXXXV. The Reality of Holiness in the Loyal Life involves, as Natural Consequence, Happiness, Self-Peace, and Joy in Conscious Spiritual Union with God.

Philos. LXXXVI. The Reality of Sin in the Disloyal Life involves, as Natural Consequence, Unhappiness, Self-War, and Self-Abhorrence in Conscious Spiritual Alienation from God.

Philos. LXXXVII. The Self-Vindication of the Divine Ideal in the Natural Consequences of Loyalty and Disloyalty involves, in the Spiritual Organism, whether Personal or Social, either Health, Evolution, and Desert of Eternal Life, or Disease, Disolution, and Desert of Eternal Death.

Philos. LXXXVIII. The Reality of Holiness and of Sin in every Human Life involves Inspiration or Corruption in Social Life : in things spiritual Health is as catching as Disease — Holiness and Sin are equally contagious. This is the Law of Influence or Example.

Philos. LXXXIX. The Determination of Human Destiny by Divine Wisdom, Justice, and Love, the Unattainability of the

Absolute Ideal of the Human Person, and the Desert of Eternal Life by the Loyal Person, together involve the Hope and Ethical Necessity of Personal Immortality, as Eternal Pursuit of the Absolute Divine Ideal by the Loyal Human Spirit.

Philos. XC. The Determination of Human Destiny by Divine Wisdom, Justice, and Love, the Unattainability of the Absolute Ideal of Human Society, and the Desert of Eternal Life by the Loyal Society, together involve the Hope and Ethical Necessity of Social Immortality, as Eternal Pursuit of the Absolute Divine Ideal by the Re-united Society of Loyal Human Spirits.

THE CATEGORIES OF ORGANIC PHILOSOPHY

- I. CATEGORIES OF BEING
- II. CATEGORIES OF MIND
- III. CATEGORIES OF EVOLUTION
- IV. CATEGORIES OF CONSTITUTION

Definitions.

- 1. SUBSTANCE = Energy.
 - 2. ESSENCE = Immanent Relational Constitution.
 - 3. PROCESS = Involution and Evolution of Essence in Substance.
 - 4. REALITY = Identity in Difference of Substance, Essence, and Process.
-

CATEGORIES OF BEING

I. IMMANENT UNCONDITIONED CONDITIONS OF BEING, OR APRIORI OF ESSENCE IN SUBSTANCE.

- i. **Space**, or Condition of Extensive Continuity in Essence.
- ii. **Time**, or Condition of Protensive Continuity in Essence.
- iii. **Energy**, or Condition of State and Change in Essence.
- iv. **Law of Unit-Universals, Apriori of Being**, or Condition of Relation in Essence :
 - 1. Law of *Necessity* in Essential Relations.
 - 2. Law of *Contingency* in Non-essential Relations.
 - 3. Law of *Freedom* in Ethical Relations.

II. CONDITIONED BEING, OR APOSTERIORI OF ESSENCE IN SUBSTANCE.

i. Real Things.

- 1. *Machines* as Causal Energy in Motion.
- 2. *Organisms* as Causal-Teleological Energy in Life.
- 3. *Persons* as Causal-Teleological-Ethical Energy in Conduct.

ii. Real Relations.

1. *Necessity in Essence*: e. g.

- a. *Metaphysical* in Correlation of Conditioned and Unconditioned, and of Substance, Essence, and Process in the Real.
- b. *Mathematical* in Correlations of Number in Quantity and Form.
- c. *Physical* in Correlations of Degree in Quality, Motion, and Action.
- d. *Dynamical* in Correlation of Cause and Effect in the Event.
- e. *Psychical* in Correlation of Knower and Known in the Cognition.
- f. *Logical* in Correlation of Premise and Conclusion in the Syllogism.
- g. *Teleological* in Correlation of End and Means in the Effort.
- h. *Ethical* in Correlation of Ideal and Real in the Deed.
- i. *Spiritual* in Correlation of Deed and Consequence in the Character.

2. *Contingency in Non-essential Relations*: e. g.

- a. *Spatial*: Position, Distance, Direction.
- b. *Temporal*: Simultaneity, Priority, Posteriority.
- c. *Quantitative*: Magnitude, Multitude, Increase, Decrease.
- d. *Qualitative*: Degree, Equality, Superiority, Inferiority.
- e. *Dynamical*: Action, Inaction, Reaction.
- f. *Statical*: Identity, Similarity, Dissimilarity.

3. *Freedom in Essence*.

Ethical in Correlation of Ideal and Real in Purpose and Effort.

TRICHOTOMY OF EXISTENCE = THINGS, RELATIONS,
CONDITIONS.

CATEGORIES OF MIND

I. UNITY OF CONSTITUTION,
Conduct, and Character, in Identity of
Personality.

II. DIVERSITY OF FUNCTION.

i. Receptivity or Original Experience.

1. *Sensitive*:
 - a. *Sensation* (Bodily Feeling).
 - b. *Emotion* (Immanent Mental Feeling).
 - c. *Affection* (Exient Mental Feeling).
2. *Cognitive (Perceptive Understanding)*:
 - a. *Sensuous Perception* (Perception of Feeling, and Apperception of Self in Feeling: "I know that I feel" and "I know that I feel").
 - b. *Intellectual Perception* (Perception of Real Relations of Things).
 - c. *Rational Perception* (Perception of Real Conditions of Things).

ii. Retentivity or Conservation of Experience.

1. *Organic*:
 - a. *Memory and Recollection* (Organic Permanence of Experiences).
 - b. *Association and Habit* (Personal Organization of Experiences).
 - c. *Instinct and Faculty* (Hereditary Organization of Experiences).
2. *Cognitive (Conceptive Understanding)*:
 - a. *Imagination* (Concepts of Things).
 - b. *Intellect* (Concepts of Relations).
 - c. *Reason* (Concepts of Conditions).

iii. Spontaneity or Reaction to Experience.

1. *Volitive*:
 - a. *Concentration, or Will in Thinking* (Purpose, Attention, Deliberation, Recollection, etc.).

- b. Appetency, or Will in Feeling* (Desire, Appetite, Passion, etc.).
 - c. Active Energy, or Will Proper* (Purpose, Volition, Action, Effort, etc.).
2. *Cognitive:*
- a. Analytical or Perceptive Understanding* (Comparison, Discrimination, Abstraction, etc.).
 - b. Synthetical or Conceptive Understanding* (Predication, Reasoning, Generalization, etc.).
 - c. Teleological or Creative Understanding* (Formation of Purpose to Know, to Do, or to Be — Free Creation of Immanent Relational Constitutions in Concepts of Ends and Means — Free Creation of Life-Purpose as the Personal Ideal).
 - d. Judicial or Ethical Understanding* (Necessary Subsumption of Deed, Word, and Thought under Absolute Moral Law — Necessary Judgment and Self-Judgment in the Court of Conscience).
 - e. Religious or Spiritual Understanding* (Necessary Subsumption of Absolute Moral Law in Man under Absolute Moral Law in Nature, of the Finite Ethical Ideal under the Infinite Ethical Ideal, and of the Finite Personal Self under the Infinite Personal Self).

TRICHOTOMY OF PERCEPTION = SENSUOUS, INTELLECTUAL,
RATIONAL.

CATEGORIES OF EVOLUTION

THE FIVE CAUSES OF GENESIS.

I. GERM.

Efficient Cause = Ideal Essence of the Thing, as Preconceived End in Energy of Creative Mind.

II. MATTER.

Material Cause = Substance or Energy.

III. METHOD.

Modal Cause = Evolution through Involution or Gradual Realizing Process.

IV. FORM.

Formal Cause = Realized Essence of the Thing as an End in Itself.

V. END.

Final Cause = Realized Essence of the Thing as a Means to an End out of Itself.

CATEGORIES OF CONSTITUTION

I. METHOD OF BECOMING.

Genesis = Evolution of Essence in Substance or of Form in Matter = Process of Formation as Sequence in Time.

II. MODE OF BEING.

System = Unity of Substance and Essence or of Form and Matter = Result of Formation as Co-existence in Space.

III. BEING IN AND THROUGH BECOMING.

Constitution = Unity of Genesis and System, or of Substance, Process, and Essence, as Total Reality of the Thing in Itself in Space and Time.

IV. CONSTITUTION OF INFINITE BEING.

1. *Infinite Substance* = Universal Energy or Self-Activity.
2. *Infinite Process* = Eternal Self-Creation of Essence in Substance, or Self-Involution of Spirit in Nature as the One in the Many, and Self-Evolution of Nature in Spirit as the Many in the One, throughout Space and Time.
3. *Infinite Essence* = Immanent Relational Constitution of Universal Energy as Infinite Personality, One in Many as Self-Involving Spirit and Many in One as

Self-Evolving Nature, or Cosmical Constitution of the Absolute All-Thing in Itself as at once Infinite Machine, Infinite Organism, and Infinite Person.

V. CONSTITUTION OF FINITE BEING.

1. *Finite Substance* = Unit of Energy individualized out of, but within, Universal Energy, as One of the Many.
2. *Finite Process* = Creation of Essence in Substance, or Evolution in Space and Time.
3. *Finite Essence* = Immanent Relational Constitution of Unit of Energy as One of the Many, or Real Nature of the Thing in Itself as Finite Machine, Finite Organism, or Finite Person.

FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSES

UNIVERSAL ELEMENTS OF THE MACHINE, ORGANISM, AND PERSON, AS THE ONLY KNOWN TYPES OF THINGS IN THEMSELVES, AND OF THE COSMOS, AS THE ABSOLUTE ALL-THING IN ITSELF OR UNIVERSAL NATURE

THE MECHANICAL CONSTITUTION

Analysis of the Machine as known in Experience.

I. MECHANICAL GENESIS: FORM DERIVING.

1. *Germ* = Mechanical Idea in External Maker (Ideal Essence).
2. *Matter* = Appropriated External Energy of Nature.
3. *Method* = Artificial Process of Construction and Use.
4. *Form* = Causal Means between External Maker and External Effect.
5. *End* = Real Essence of the Machine:
 - a. Immanent End = Machine as End in Itself.
 - b. Exient End = Machine as Means to External Effect.

II. MECHANICAL SYSTEM: FORM DERIVED.

1. *Inherence*: Collocation of Parts in Whole, and of Whole in Self-Extended Organism.
2. *Causality*: Parts = Minor Machines in Whole Machine = Internal Co-effects of External Cause and Internal Causes of Internal Effects: Whole = Total Effect of External Cause and Total Cause of External Effect.
3. *Finality*: Parts = Means to Whole as End: Whole = Means to External Effect as End.

III. MECHANICAL CONSTITUTION: DERIVATIVE FORM.

Causal Energy Individualized and Utilized by the Organism as an *Artificial, Separable, and Temporary Organ for its own Self-Extension*.

THE ORGANIC CONSTITUTION

Analysis of the Organism as known in Experience.

I. ORGANIC GENESIS: FORM INVOLVED AND EVOLVING.

1. *Germ* = Immanent Inherited Organic Idea (Ideal Essence).
2. *Matter* = Self-Appropriated External Energy of Nature.
3. *Method* = Natural Process of Self-Evolution with Modification by Environment.
4. *Form* = Causal Means between the Organism and its own End.
5. *End* = Real Essence of the Organism:
 - a. Immanent End = Organism as End and Means to Itself.
 - b. Exient End = Organism as End and Means to its own Species.

II. ORGANIC SYSTEM: FORM EVOLVED AS INVOLVED.

1. *Reciprocal Inherence* of Organism and Organs (Continens Sui).
2. *Reciprocal Causality* of Organism and Organs (Causa Sui).

3. *Reciprocal Finality* of Organism and Organs (*Finis Sui*) and of Organisms and Species (*Finis Alterius*).

III. ORGANIC CONSTITUTION: INVOLVED AND SELF-EVOLVING FORM.

Individualized Teleological Energy as *Self-Making and Self-Working Machine* or *Self-Embodying Life*.

THE PERSONAL CONSTITUTION

Analysis of the Person as known in Experience.

I. PERSONAL GENESIS: FORM DETERMINING.

1. *Germ* = Immanent Inherited Personal Idea (Ideal Essence).
2. *Matter* = Self-Appropriated External Energy of Nature.
3. *Method* = Ethical Process of Self-Realization in Limited Freedom.
4. *Form* = Causal Means between the Finite Person and its own Ideal.
5. *End* = Real Essence of the Finite Person as its own Realized Ideal:
 - a. Immanent End = Real Person as End and Means to its own Finite Ideal.
 - b. Exient End = Real Person as End and Means to the Infinite Ideal.

II. PERSONAL SYSTEM: FORM DETERMINED.

1. *Finite Self-Inherence*: Identity of Subject and Object (*Conscientia Sui*).
2. *Finite Self-Causality*: Identity of Cause and Effect (*Causa Sui*).
3. *Finite Self-Finality*: Identity of End and Means (*Finis Sui*).
4. *Finite Self-Morality*: Identity of Real and Ideal (*Lex Sui*).

III. PERSONAL CONSTITUTION: SELF-DETERMINING FORM.
 Individualized Self-Conscious Energy as *Self-Realizing*
Ideal or Self-Creating Character.

THE COSMICAL CONSTITUTION

As Infinite Machine, Organism, and Person.

I. COSMICAL GENESIS: ETERNAL BECOMING.

1. *Germ* = Immanent Infinite Ideal (Natura Naturans).
2. *Matter* = Infinite Self-Existent Energy of Nature.
3. *Method* = Ethical Process of Self-Realization in Illimitable Freedom.
4. *Form* = Causal Means between Infinite Person and Infinite Ideal (Natura Naturata).
5. *End* = Real Essence of the Infinite Person as its own Realized Ideal:
 - a. Immanent End = Person self-realized as the One in the Many (Spirit).
 - b. Exient End = Person self-realized as the Many in the One (Nature).

II. COSMICAL SYSTEM: INFINITE BEING.

1. *Infinite Self-Inherence*: Identity of Subject and Object (Conscientia Sui).
2. *Infinite Self-Causality*: Identity of Cause and Effect (Causa Sui).
3. *Infinite Self-Finality*: Identity of End and Means (Finis Sui).
4. *Infinite Self-Morality*: Identity of Real and Ideal (Lex Sui).

III. COSMICAL CONSTITUTION: INFINITE BEING IN ETERNAL BECOMING.

Universal Self-Conscious Energy as *Infinite Self-Realizing*
Ideal, or Self-Creating Character of the Infinite Divine
Person as Absolute Wisdom, Goodness, and Power.

UNIVERSAL SCHEMA OF ORGANIC PHILOSOPHY

SCHEMA I

ORGANISM OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

SCHEMA II

ORGANISM OF HUMAN LIFE.

SCHEMA III

ORGANISM OF DIVINE LIFE.

UNIVERSAL SCHEMA

SCHEMA I.—ORGANIC IDEA OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

I. ORGANISM OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

1. *Germ* = Original Experience, both Sensitive and Cognitive, in Observation of Nature (Divine Education of Human Personality).
2. *Matter* = Personal Percepts of Things and Kinds in Nature (Objective Universality).
3. *Method* = Syllogistic Process (Necessary Formation of Personal Concepts as Subjective Universals in Thought).
4. *Form* = Personal Concepts of Things and Kinds in Nature (Subjective Universality).
5. *End* = Perfection of Personal Concepts as Means to Knowledge (Intellectual Ideal as Endless Approximation to Truth):
 - a. Immanent End = To perfect Individual Human Knowledge.
 - b. Exient End = To help perfect Universal Human Knowledge.

II. ORGANISM OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

1. *Germ* = Universal Observation of Personal Concepts in Literature (Perpetual Self-Education of Society through Speech).
2. *Matter* = Personal Concepts of Things and Kinds in Nature Communicated through Literature (Subjective Universality).
3. *Method* = Syllogistic Process (Co-operative Formation of Race Concepts as Subjective-Objective Universals in Speech).
4. *Form* = Race Concepts of Things and Kinds in Nature Established as World-Science in Literature through Consensus of the Competent.
5. *End* = Perfection of Race Concepts as Means to Life (Moral Ideal as Endless Approximation to Goodness):
 - a. Immanent End = To perfect Universal Human Knowledge.
 - b. Exient End = To help perfect Universal Human Life.

III. TOTAL ORGANIC END OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

- a. *Immanent End* = Pursuit of Truth for its own Sake = Intellectual Perfection of Human Life = World-Science.
- b. *Exient End* = Pursuit of Truth for the Sake of its Uses = Moral Perfection of Human Life = World-Goodness.

SCHEMA II.—ORGANIC IDEA OF HUMAN LIFE.

I. ORGANISM OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN LIFE.

1. *Germ* = Immanent Inherited Personal Idea (Determination of Personality by Heredity).
2. *Matter* = Energy Determined as Personal Self-Consciousness in Thought, Feeling, and Action.
3. *Method* = Syllogistic Process (Free Formation of Personal Ideals as Subjective Codes of Action in Personal Life).

4. *Form* = Person as Self-Determined Life in Conduct and Character (Self-Determination of Personality in Limited Freedom).
5. *End* = Perfection of Person as Means to Human Society (Social Ideal as Endless Approximation to World-Brotherhood):
 - a. Immanent End = To perfect Individual Human Life.
 - b. Exient End = To help perfect Universal Human Life.

II. ORGANISM OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN LIFE.

1. *Germ* = Immanent Inherited Social Idea (Determination of Society by Tradition and Historic Heredity).
2. *Matter* = Persons as Self-Determined Lives Acting and Reacting on Each Other in Society.
3. *Method* = Syllogistic Process (Co-operative Formation of Social Ideals as Objective Codes of Action in Social Life).
4. *Form* = Society as Self-Determined Life in Race Consciousness, Conduct, and Character (Co-operative Determination of Society in Limited Freedom).
5. *End* = Perfection of Human Society as Means to Divine Society (Religious Ideal as Endless Approximation to World-Religion):
 - a. Immanent End = To perfect Universal Human Life.
 - b. Exient End = To help perfect Universal Divine Life.

III. TOTAL ORGANIC END OF HUMAN LIFE.

- a. *Immanent End* = Application of Truth to Service of Man = Spiritual Self-Evolution of Human Life in Human Society = World-Brotherhood.
- b. *Exient End* = Application of Truth to Service of God = Spiritual Self-Devotion of Human Life to Divine Life = World-Religion.

SCHEMA III. — ORGANIC IDEA OF DIVINE LIFE.

I. ORGANISM OF NATURE AS INDIVIDUAL FINITE LIFE.

1. *Germ* = Eternal Self-Activity of Infinite Reason (Natura Naturans).
2. *Matter* = Determinate Finite Units of Energy Individualized out of, but within, Universal Energy.
3. *Method* = Syllogistic Process (Eternal Evolution of the Many in the One as Finite Units and Finite Universals in the Infinite Universal Unit).
4. *Form* = Machines, Organisms, and Persons, as Individual Things and Universal Kinds in Themselves (Natura Naturata).
5. *End* = Self-Realization of Divine Ideal as Finite Life in the Many:
 - a. Immanent End = To realize Individual Finite Life in the Many as Nature's End in Itself (Self-Evolution).
 - b. Exient End = To help realize Universal Infinite Life in the One as Nature's End above itself (Self-Devotion).

II. ORGANISM OF SPIRIT AS UNIVERSAL INFINITE LIFE.

1. *Germ* = Eternal Necessity of Self-Existent Being (Impossibility of Absolute Non-Being).
2. *Matter* = Infinite Substance in Infinite Essence, or Universal Energy of Self-Existent Being.
3. *Method* = Syllogistic Process (Eternal Self-Involution of the One in the Many as Infinite Unit and Infinite Universal, and Eternal Self-Evolution of the Many in the One as Finite Units and Finite Universals).
4. *Form* = Infinite Essence in Infinite Substance, or Universal and Eternal Self-Consciousness of Self-Existent Being as Infinite Machine, Infinite Organism, and Infinite Person.
5. *End* = Self-Realization of the Divine Ideal as Infinite Life in the One and Finite Life in the Many:
 - a. Immanent End = To realize Universal Infinite

Life as Eternal Self-Involution of the One in the Many (Egoism).

- b. Exient End = To help realize Individual Finite Life as Eternal Self-Evolution of the Many in the One (Altruism).

III. TOTAL ORGANIC END OF DIVINE LIFE.

- a. *Immanent End* = Eternal Self-Realization of the Infinite Ideal = Infinite Holiness.
- b. *Exient End* = Eternal Self-Devotion to the Finite Real = Infinite Love.

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